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This thesis explores how changes in health service delivery are conceived of and pursued by 
different stakeholders. The thesis focuses on the importance of evidence to inform change. 
The London stroke service reconfiguration (2008-2011) is used as a case study to explore the 
interplay between evidence and the management of large-scale strategic change in health 
care. 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders involved in the 
reconfiguration at both macro- and micro-levels through a pan-London case study with an 
embedded study at one London hospital affected by the reconfiguration. Observations of 
clinical meetings and analysis of official documentation was also performed. The study uses 
an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean, 2010) approach which is derived from Foucault’s (2007) 
work on ‘governmentality’ to interpretively explore the role of evidence in the 
reconfiguration process. This approach highlights the specific ways in which London’s stroke 
services were ‘problematised’ and explores the application of knowledge and techniques of 
power to address these issues. The discourse of evidence based health care is shown to be 
important in depoliticising potentially controversial strategic decisions. The advantages of 
conceptualising health service reconfigurations in ‘biopolitical’ terms are discussed. The 
impacts the reconfiguration had upon the relations between managers and professionals are 
analysed alongside a discussion around the interplay of disciplinary power and 
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1.1 Introduction; health care, evidence and politics 
 
This thesis explores how changes in health service delivery are conceived of and pursued by 
different stakeholders. The thesis focuses on the importance of evidence to inform change. It 
is cognizant of the political nature of change in the NHS and the dynamic relationship 
between the forces of professionalism and managerialism in contemporary debates around 
how best to design and deliver twenty-first century health care.  Health services face 
continual calls to change reflecting alterations in wider social, political and economic affairs. 
Much of this is led by demographic changes; as the make-up of societies evolve – for 
example due to aging or urbanisation, the heath care structures designed to meet the needs 
and desires of one generation may come to be seen to fail to meet more contemporary needs. 
For example, the new District General Hospitals of the 1960s designed to solve the problems 
of the early post-war years have come to be seen as a barrier to the optimal health care 
delivery today (Ham, 2009). These developments are also linked to technological changes 
and modifications in how diseases are perceived and treated over time as understanding and 
evidence evolves and is challenged. Alongside changing demography and advancing 
technology sit policy developments and management reform instigated by different 




Decisions about whether, when and how to change health services are political – at both the 
macro-policy or national level and also lower local or regional levels where local interest 
groups consisting of patients, professionals and politicians frequently join forces to fight 
changes to established services (Spurgeon et al, 2010). The conflicting goals of different 
stakeholders and the non-conclusive nature of much clinical evidence frequently stymie 
efforts at reform leading to controversy, delays, stasis and underwhelming results (Oborn, 
2010; Fulop et al, 2012). Attempts to de-politicise these decisions by citing scientific studies 
alongside mortality data and models showing economic benefits and travel time impact 
analyses frequently fail to mobilise sufficient public, professional or political support. For 
example, attempts at reconfiguring paediatric cardiac services have been consistently 
contested and challenged in the 13 years since the Kennedy Review of the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary deaths (Vize, 2013). Likewise, attempts to impose change from the centre as shown 
by the recent Lewisham case (Cooper, 2013) may fall foul of well organised opposition 
groups willing to challenge change through the courts. 
 
Nevertheless, attempts at organisational change and service reconfiguration of and within the 
NHS persist. Whilst these changes may be more troublesome and delayed than many 
proponents might have hoped at the broad macro-level, the reality is that substantive change 
across NHS organisations does occur and permeates down into individual institutions, board 
rooms, wards and clinics. Since the Griffiths Report (1983) there has been a consistent 
governmental drive in England to increase professional accountability and the remit of 
management in the NHS (Hood, 1995; Ferlie et al, 1996; Newman, 2001). As managers’ 
roles have increased in importance, and techniques of accountability, measurement and 
transparency (Power, 1999) have been emphasised progressively more within the public 
sector this has affected professionals’ work and identities (Newman, 2001; Numerato et al, 
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2011). A key development has been the evolution of ‘hybrid’ professional-managers (Ferlie 
et al, 1996; McGivern, 2006) drawn from medical, nursing and AHP communities. A further 
structural concern has been the development of commissioning as a significant part of the 
health care establishment since the 1990s and the fluctuations between centralised networked 
strategic health care planning and more marketised, competitive models based on diversity of 
goals and providers (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). 
 
These political and organisational changes coincided with the rise of the evidence based 
medicine (EBM) movement since the mid-1990s (Timmermans and Berg, 2003) and 
evidence based practice and policy more broadly (Davies and Nutley, 2000) particularly 
through the New Labour era (1997-2010). EBM has impacted significantly upon health 
policy design and delivery, and how the discourse of how the need for change is framed – 
and by whom. For example, on the eve of the UK General Election in 2010, a group of 
fourteen medical leaders led by Neil Douglas, chair of the UK Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges and Faculties wrote a letter to The Guardian stating that: 
 
‘If the NHS is to cope with the financial pressures it is going to face under any 
government without resorting to indiscriminate and damaging service and staffing 
cuts, large-scale planned service redesign and reconfiguration based on clinical 





This open letter to the next government displays a political agenda that seeks to influence the 
policy decisions of whichever party or parties would come to wield power over the English 
NHS after the 6th of May 2010. Simultaneously however, these senior clinicians use language 
that aims to pitch beyond traditional Left/Right political Discourse - the (financial) problem 
is clear, so too the dangers (indiscriminate and damaging service and staffing cuts) and the 
solution (large-scale planned service redesign and reconfiguration based on clinical 
evidence). The status quo of inaction is not an option, and potential public opposition must be 
challenged – however, these leading professionals are insistent that appropriate service 
reconfiguration must be driven by clinical evidence rather than the necessity of financial 
savings. The central message of the letter is that through the mobilisation of clinical evidence, 
the traditional political pitfalls of health service change may be avoided. 
 
An interest in these broad policy and management issues led to the development of a specific 
research question focused on the interplay between evidence and the management of large-
scale strategic change in health care. In contrast to the paediatric cardiology reconfiguration 
attempts (Vize, 2013); Kidderminster (Brown, 2003); Leicester (Parkinson, 2003); St 
Bartholomew’s Hospital (Jones, 1993); Lewisham (Cooper, 2013); and indeed most other 
health care mergers and system redesigns (Spurgeon et al, 2010), the London stroke 
reconfiguration (2008-2011) has been welcomed as successful in both economic and clinical 
terms (Boseley, 2014). It has been well supported by political, managerial, professional and 
public or interest group stakeholders and is held up as a high profile, positive example of 
‘how to do a reconfiguration well’ by not only those who led the changes (NHS London, 





It was not necessarily clear when I chose to study the London stroke reconfiguration in 
September 2009 that it would be so warmly received as I sit writing here in 2014. Back then, 
the reconfiguration of stroke services across the capital faced significant challenges as it 
moved from a rather fractious phase in which different providers had bid against each other 
to be accredited to provide the new stroke services. However, as the study developed over 
time from 2009, it became apparent that as a case study of large scale service change, the 
London stroke reconfiguration may be considered a ‘positive outlier’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This 
makes this particular reconfiguration worthy of study with respect to both public policy and 
management fields – so, in practical terms, this thesis considers what lessons might be learnt 
(Rose, 1993) from this case study that may be useful for influencing policy and interpreting 
reconfigurations in the future. 
 
Beyond this however, the present thesis seeks to develop theoretical knowledge as well as 
empirical understanding for four main reasons; firstly, listing reasons for ‘success’ (whilst not 
in itself a bad thing) is not particularly additive in theoretical terms – and indeed as will be 
discussed in chapter II section 5, a significant weakness of much of the literature produced 
that covers health care mergers and reconfigurations is that it tends to be theoretically weak 
(Fulop et al, 2012). Secondly, even given the ‘successful’ nature of these particular reforms, 
there were significant controversies and weaknesses which ought to be aired if the 
reconfiguration is to be more fully understood. This is particularly important given recent 
calls to ‘roll out’ the London model across other regions of the English NHS (Barnes, 2014, 
Boseley, 2014). Thirdly, a ‘critical’ approach to health care reform allows for an 
understanding that ‘successful’ policy solutions and management changes may have coercive, 
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or dangerous elements – rather than merely ask was it successful, and if so, why was it 
successful, this thesis also seeks to explore, how it was successful, for whom and also if any 
individuals or groups were harmed by it. Finally, conducting a case study of such a high 
profile and large scale reform programme with a particular focus on the role played by 
evidence and how it impacts upon key stakeholders offers a unique insight into important 
assumptions about the development of contemporary relationships between managers and 
professionals (Numerato et al, 2011) as health services undergo reforms.  
 
For these reasons, a theoretical approach based on Foucault’s work on ‘Governmentality’ 
(Foucault, 2007) was followed. This approach is fully discussed in chapter III. The approach 
is based around analysis of when, why and how policy makers ‘problematise’ particular 
issues in particular locations. For this thesis, the problem is stroke care in London circa 2007. 
The approach encourages the analyst to critically engage with the chosen topic and to 
challenge the ‘taken for granted’ nature of political change (Dean, 2010). Whilst the study is 
grounded in  public policy, organisational studies and medical sociology literatures, it aims to 
build on recent applications of Foucauldian analyses to health care over the past decade or so 
(Doolin, 2004; Flynn, 2004; Sheaff et al, 2004; Waring, 2007; Ferlie et al, 2011; Martin et al, 
2013). It is argued that the work of these scholars and their engagement with Foucauldian 
thought is particularly useful in explaining more about indirect control and the influence of 
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and increasingly Evidence Based Health Care (EBHC). 
Building on this literature, this thesis seeks to develop a theoretically additive understanding 
of how (clinical) evidence is deployed and interpreted by senior professional and managerial 
figures and how this may be seen to impact upon different professional jurisdictions (Abbott, 




Reflecting this theoretical stand point, the thesis is not primarily focused on an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the reforms, or a judgement of the superiority or otherwise of the 
evidence behind them. Rather the thesis represents an interpretive exploration of what 
evidence means (and does) to different stakeholders at different times and how it is mobilised 
to achieve or negate aims which may be compatible or contradictory. This thesis is concerned 
with an interpretation of the ‘discourse’ of evidence based health care (and specifically 
evidence based stroke care) and how this is both influenced by stakeholders – for example 
through local level discursive practice; and also influencing of stakeholders’ actions as part of 
a broader ‘grand discourse.’ Alvesson and Karreman (2000) note a tension between these 
analytic levels, and difficulty accounting for both within the same study – though counsel that 
this should not dissuade analysts from attempting to do so. They suggest that ambiguity 
around the term ‘discourse’ means that it often ‘comes close to standing for everything, and 
thus nothing’ (p.1128).  For clarity, this thesis refers to ‘discourse’; firstly as the discursive 
practice of local actors in influencing contexts (Grint, 2005) to instantiate policy mandates for 
evidence based stroke care –termed little ‘d’ discourse (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). 
Secondly, big ‘D’ Discourse (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000) refers to wider macro-level 
policy developments of evidence based stroke care – exemplified in national and regional 
policy documentation such as the National Stroke Strategy (DH, 2007) and the London 
Stroke Strategy (NHS London, 2008b). It is important to consider both forms of ‘discourse’ 
and how they inform practice. 
 
The research question this thesis seeks to answer is: 
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What was the role played by evidence in the reconfiguration of stroke services in 
London? 
 
A brief discussion of the international development of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and 
the domestic New Labour ‘evidence based policy’ context in which it developed in this 
country is needed to contextualise this research question. EBM emerged just over two 
decades ago as a comprehensively described entity (Guyatt et al, 2004). It was primarily a 
clinically and professionally led movement with origins in the UK and North America: 
 
‘In essence, evidence based medicine is rooted in five linked ideas: firstly, clinical 
decisions should be based on the best available scientific evidence; secondly, the 
clinical problem—rather than habits or protocols--should determine the type of 
evidence to be sought; thirdly, identifying the best evidence means using 
epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking; fourthly, conclusions derived 
from identifying and critically appraising evidence are useful only if put into action in 
managing patients or making health care decisions; and, finally, performance should 
be constantly evaluated.’(Davidoff et al, 1995) 
 
Professional self-surveillance, and an emphasis on scientific approaches to evaluating data sit 
at the heart of this approach – an extension of professionalism is inherent in this push to 
restructure knowledge sharing and maintain the autonomous position of the medical 
profession. Underlying this drive to EBM is a committed belief that traditional variations in 




‘Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice 
of evidence based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the 
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research.’ (Sackett et al, 
1996) 
 
A central concern of EBM, as highlighted by these two quotes is standardisation – the 
attempt to ensure that all medical professionals adhere to validated common principles and 
knowledge bases when treating patients – such a concern has political implications both 
within and beyond the profession (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Timmermans and Berg 
(2003) place the EBM movement within the context of a wider historical push to increase 
uniformity and utilise standardised quality markers and processes which are streamlined with 
roots in the enlightenment belief in progress, rationality and organisational control linked 
with Weberian concepts of bureaucratic efficiency. This is linked to increasing medical 
complexity and specialist knowledge(s) and a fear that if the profession did not establish 
efficiency standards for themselves, then public officials might do it for them (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). Whilst this was a twentieth century phenomenon, it was only in the final 
years of the century that it became politically noticeable and potentially important. These 
years coincided with the rise of New Labour in the UK and the subordination of ideological 




Nevertheless New Labour increased NHS spending after 1999. Overall, real expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 5.3% in 1997 to 8.4% in 2010 - in money terms public 
expenditure on health rose from £58.7 billion to £117.2 billion (Vizard and Obolenskaya, 
2013). Alongside this, patient satisfaction in the service rose; there were significant advances 
in public health – notably the smoking ban, reductions in circulatory mortality, cancer 
mortality and a reduction in the infant mortality gap by social class (Vizard and Obolenskaya, 
2013). However, significant variations in outcomes persisted across the service and there 
were serious failures of governance painfully highlighted by the scandal at the mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust (Vizard and Obolenskaya, 2013). 
 
The New Labour governments also explicitly put measurement and evidence at the heart of 
their health policy; measurement most obviously in the form of targets and evidence most 
obviously with the establishment of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE). NICE opened up decision making to public scrutiny and emphasised the utility and 
superiority of evidence as a tool to legitimise politically painful decisions. Together with the 
support of the Royal Colleges, the proliferation of guidelines along evidence informed best 
practice changed the delivery of health care through the New Labour years.  New Labour 
took a strongly interventionist path with relation to attempting to improve health care 
outcomes in the UK – bench-marking itself against the best of the EU and North American 
competition with the goal tackling the areas where the UK has historically struggled – namely 
cancer and circulatory diseases. With the NHS Plan (DH 2000) the first two New Labour 
governments (1997-2001; 2001-2005) made heart disease reduction a priority along with 
cancer. The third New Labour government (2005-2010) included an increased interest in 
stroke care reform (Vizard and Obolenskaya, 2013). The following section introduces 
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important background information around what a stroke is, and how stroke care has 




A stroke is an attack upon the brain which occurs when the blood supply to brain tissue is 
disrupted potentially causing infarction (which is tissue death due to a lack of oxygen). There 
are two distinct types of stroke; ischaemic (80% of cases), in which a blood clot causes a 
blockage in the supply of blood to the brain – potential causes are a cerebral thrombosis in 
which a blood clot forms in a major artery to the brain, alternatively a cerebral embolism in 
which a blood clot formed elsewhere in the body is transported to the brain, or finally, a 
lacuna stroke which is a blockage which forms within the tiny blood vessels inside the brain. 
The second type of stroke: haemorrhagic (20% of cases) are caused by bleeding on the brain 
following a burst blood vessel. There are two types of causality for this kind of stroke, either 
an intracerebral haemorrhage – in which a blood vessel within the brain bursts, or a 
subarachnoid haemorrhage – in which a blood vessel on the surface of the brain bleeds in to 
the area between the brain and the skull (Stroke Association, 2014). 
 
Also of significance is Transient Ischaemic Attack (TIA). This is also known as a mini stroke 
and is less debilitating than a full blown stroke. Effectively, an area of the brain is starved of 
oxygen for a limited amount of time. There is evidence that TIA sufferers are at a higher risk 
of going on to develop further strokes in the future (Stroke Association, 2014). The risk 
factors for stroke increase with age. There is also evidence that black and Asian communities 
have higher incidences than white communities (Maheswaran, 1997). Finally, lifestyle factors 
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such as; smoking, inactivity, increased alcohol and salt intake, high cholesterol and obesity 
are all noted as increasing an individual’s likelihood of suffering from a stroke (Stroke 
Association, 2014). 
 
There are approximately 152,000 strokes in the UK each year. In 2010 stroke caused almost 
50,000 deaths, making it the fourth largest cause of death (after cancer, heart disease and 
respiratory disease) and is attributable for 7% of male and 10% of female deaths respectively. 
There are over 1.1 million stroke survivors in the UK – more than half of whom are 
dependent upon others for everyday activities, making stroke the largest cause of disability in 
the country. More positively, the incidence of stroke is decreasing (Stroke Association, 
2013).   The economic costs however are considerable – estimated between £3.7 billion and 
£8 billion in 2010 (NAO, 2010; Stroke Association, 2014).  
 
Whilst globally, stroke is and has been a significant cause of death and disability (Claiborne 
Johnston et al, 2009), until recently there was little public awareness of stroke, and few 
treatment options. Stroke was treated conservatively reflecting a perception of stroke as a 
natural phenomenon of ageing (Jordanova, 1995). Indeed the etymology of the term ‘stroke’ 
– which is traced back to the 1590s and ‘the stroke of God’s hande’ captures both the 
seemingly random nature of the event and the forceful blow which it imparts on those who 
suffer it (Pound et al, 1997). Parallel to this, the cause of stroke did not benefit from the 
support of a powerful group from within the medical profession –traditionally falling between 
care of the elderly physicians and neurologists neither of whom could offer much by the way 
of treatment until very recently – making stroke care somewhat of a Cinderella service. 
Furthermore, the outlook amongst those who suffered and recovered from stroke tended to be 
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of acceptance and stoicism despite the debilitating nature of an attack (Pound et al, 1998). 
These elements of both fatalism and inevitability in the attitudes amongst stroke victims may 
have hindered any attempts to organise pressure on the authorities to improve the provision of 
stroke care. These factors may have historically kept stroke as an issue at a low level in terms 
of the health care agenda. However, this traditional picture has been challenged over recent 
years so that the medical view today is that stroke is both ‘a preventable and treatable 
disease’ (RCP, 2008). The 2008 collaborative guideline document produced by the Royal 
College of Physicians (RCP) and NICE states: 
 
‘Over the last two decades, a growing body of evidence has overturned the traditional 
perception that stroke is simply a consequence of aging which inevitably results in 
death or severe disability. Evidence is accumulating for more effective primary and 
secondary prevention strategies, better recognition of people at highest risk and thus 
most in need of active intervention, interventions that are effective soon after the onset 
of symptoms, and an understanding of the processes of care that contribute to a better 
outcome. In addition, there is now good evidence to support interventions and care 
processes in stroke rehabilitation [emphasis added].’ (NICE, 2008) 
 
It is worth noting the centrality of the word – evidence in the short extract above in the 
Discourse around transforming clinical perceptions relating to stroke. It is clear that both 
professionals and policy makers were very keen to present ‘evidence’ as being at the heart of 
this transformation in stroke care. We now have more evidence about what can cause stroke, 
what may prevent it, and the interventions which can reduce the impacts of both of these. As 
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life expectancy increases due to advances elsewhere in the health system, it makes more 
economic sense to limit the effects of stroke as much as possible (NAO, 2005). 
 
The RCP has produced a bi-annual National Sentinel Audit of Stroke for England Wales and 
Northern Ireland since 1998. This includes data from all hospitals in the 3 nations which 
admit and treat stroke patients giving a comprehensive picture of the state of stroke care in 
the UK (excluding Scotland). The RCP also published National Clinical Guidelines for 
Stroke (2004), as well as the joint guidelines published with NICE in 2008. In addition, the 
Department of Health published a National Service Framework for Older People (2001) 
which promised improved access to better integrated stroke care, as well as a National Stroke 
Strategy (2007). The National Audit Office (NAO) has also produced two major documents 
focussing on quality and cost-effectiveness; Reducing Brain Damage: faster access to better 
stroke care (2005) and Joining Forces to Deliver Improved Stroke Care (2007). It is quite 
clear then, that in England; stroke has risen up the political, economic and clinical agendas 
over the last decade. Below is the key action plan taken from the 2007 Department of Health 





National Stroke Strategy: Ten-point plan for action 
(DH, 2007) 
1. Awareness: improve public and professional awareness of stroke symptoms. 
2. Preventing stroke: support healthier lifestyles and take action to tackle vascular risk, for example 
hypertension, atrial fibrillation and high cholesterol. 
3. Involvement: involve people with stroke in their care planning. Involve those who have had a stroke 
in planning and evaluating local services. 
4. Acting on the warnings: TIAs are a clear warning sign that a further stroke may occur and the time 
window for action is very short – in about half of cases, a matter of days. Put in place a system that 
responds quickly (within 24 hours) to people who have had a TIA. 
5. Stroke as a medical emergency: get people quickly to the right hospital where there are specialists 
who can deliver acute treatments including thrombolysis. Ensure that everyone who could benefit 
from urgent care is transferred to an acute stroke centre that provides 24-hour access to scans and 
specialist stroke care. 
6. Stroke unit quality: stroke unit care is the single biggest factor that can improve a person’s 
outcomes following a stroke. Successful stroke units are built around a stroke-skilled 
multidisciplinary team that is able to meet the needs of the individuals. 
 
7. Rehabilitation and community support: intensive rehabilitation immediately after stroke, operating 
across the seven-day week, can limit disability and improve recovery. Specialised rehabilitation 
needs to continue across the transition to home or a care home, ensuring that health, social care 
and voluntary services together provide the long-term support people need as well as access to 
advocacy, care navigation, practical and peer support. 
 
8. Participation: assistance to overcome physical, communication and psychological barriers to 
engage and participate in community activities helps people to lead more autonomous lives and 
move on after stroke. This will be across the range of community services – housing, education, 
leisure, transport, employment – that can help people to participate in community life again. 
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9. Workforce: people with stroke need to be treated by a skilled and competent workforce. Resources 
to assist services in planning their workforce requirements are signposted in this strategy. 
10. Service improvement: this new vision for stroke care demands services working together in 
networks, looking across all aspects of the care pathway. Regular local and national audit and 
increased participation in clinical trials will also drive improvements in stroke care. 
 
Awareness and prevention are significant. This makes sense, as historically, those who 
suffered a stroke and (perhaps as importantly) their friends or relatives present at the time 
were unaware that their symptoms suggested stroke. A MORI poll commissioned by the 
Stroke Association suggested that 50% of the public were unaware of the symptoms of stroke 
and that less than 60% of GPs would immediately refer a suspected stroke victim to hospital 
(Leatherman et al, 2008). Hence the profusion of guidelines and policy documents for the 
clinical community and the ‘FAST’ public health advertising and warnings around salt 
intake, smoking, alcohol consumption and obesity in general. 
 
Items 4-6 on the list deal with acute care responses. Essentially, health care providers have to 
be more aware of the clinical urgency of stroke and how services and practices can be 
changed to reflect this. Key here is treating TIAs seriously. Next, stroke patients must be 
recognised and prioritised in emergency care settings – radiological diagnostics need to be 
offered rapidly and clot busting drugs administered where appropriate (Wardlaw et al, 2005) 
in conjunction with timely admission to a dedicated stroke unit. Once admitted, the evidence 
shows that outcomes are improved when patients are treated on a stroke unit (SUTC, 2007.) 
It is worth detailing what we may understand by the term stroke unit. The Stroke Unit 




‘Organised inpatient (stroke unit) care can be considered as a complex organisational 
intervention comprising multidisciplinary staffing providing a complex package of 
care to stroke patients in hospital.’(SUTC, 2007) 
 
This is distinct from the traditional general medical ward treatment which may be viewed 
less positively in terms of effectiveness in relation to patient outcomes. Items 7-8 (taken 
from the National Stroke Strategy document) deal with short and long term rehabilitation 
factors. The final factors relate to staffing levels and the kind of changes in organisational 
management which the Darzi report of 2007, A Framework for Action (2007) outlines – 
specifically with reference to London. So the extent to which care is organised specifically 
for stroke patients differs across place and time.  
 
These domestic political and clinical aspirations chime with European and global stroke care 
goals enunciated by the European Stroke Initiative (EUSI, 2000) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Helsingborg Declaration of 2006 (Norrving, 2007). There is an 
international professional consensus as reported in these documents and papers around the 
key priorities to tackle stoke as a disease. Essentially these are;  public awareness campaigns, 
increased medical acceptance of stroke as a treatable acute disease, access to high-tech 
scanning techniques as a priority allied to an awareness of the value of clot busting drugs and 
specialist ‘hyper-acute stroke unit’ care with dedicated multi-disciplinary teams and 
organised rehabilitation. Having touched upon the political role of evidence and the 
contemporary clinical consensus around stroke care and hinted at how epistemic communities 
may work with receptive governments to highlight areas which they desire to have an 







Health care reform in London has been characterised as ‘conflict without change’ (Smith, 
1981). Introducing change to health care systems in any locality is frequently unpopular and 
contentious, as what change often equates to is closure (Spurgeon et al, 2010). Closing 
hospitals or rationalising services consistently runs in to opposition, however there are a 
number of contextual factors which exacerbate the situation in London even further, and a 
number of historical factors which have made reform in London even more pressing. These 
include the historical power of the most famous and prestigious London hospitals and the 
political power of their most senior consultants, the role of the media and the well-established 
local political groupings resistant to change. Key also has historically been the lack of a 
powerful central strategic force to forge consensus amongst competing parties (Pettigrew et 
al, 1992). 
 
London has suffered from a number of deep seated problems which have led to numerous 
efforts to reconfigure the capital’s health care system (Appleby et al, 2011). Historically, 
these have included; too many acute beds, low standards of primary care, patchy specialist 
provision, a lack of funding for long term elderly care and poor coordination across the 
capital for London’s medical students (Appleby et al, 2011). The Tomlinson Report of 1992 
highlighted the need for improved primary care and pointed to the high number of acute beds, 
recommending that numerous hospital sites be closed and Trusts be merged in order to fund 




These recommendations faced a great deal of opprobrium typified by the Save St Barts 
hospital campaign (Jones, 1993). In 1997 Frank Dobson, Labour’s first Health Secretary for 
close to two decades commissioned his own review of London’s NHS and Medical Schools 
on gaining office – the Turnberg Report. Turnberg found that over 9,000 beds had been lost 
in London hospitals since 1990, and that further rationalisation was unjustified (Turnberg, 
1997). A key recommendation from this report was that the health authorities (soon to 
become Strategic Health Authorities or SHAs) be divided in to five sectors as he called for 
greater strategic coherence in London health care planning (Rivett, 2013). In the years after 
1999, NHS spending increased, but London’s historic problems of poor strategic coordination 
and inadequate primary care remained. 
 
 In 2004 the decision was taken by the government to amalgamate the 5 London SHAs in to 
one strategic body representing the 31 London PCTs. In July 2006, NHS London came in to 
existence and Ara Darzi was asked to prepare a strategic report on London’s health care 
future. Darzi’s report was published a year later (NHS London, 2007). The remit of the 
review was to examine the contemporary problems of the NHS in London and set out a 
number of guiding principles to rectify these over the next five to ten years. The eight key 
drivers for change identified by Darzi are listed in Table 2, and the five principles which 





A Framework for Action (NHS London, 2007) 
1. The need to improve Londoners’ health 
2. The NHS is not meeting Londoners’ expectations 
3. One city, but big inequalities in health care 
4. The hospital is not always the answer 
5. The need for more specialised care 
6. London should be at the cutting edge of medicine 
7. Not using our workforce and buildings effectively 











With his London review, Darzi was attempting to tackle the historical problems London had 
faced. The review contained a commitment to reducing health inequalities and promoting 
disease prevention. The rhetoric of choice was maintained, whilst an implicit assumption 
made relating to the fact that people should be prepared to travel further for superior care for 
certain serious conditions, such as stroke (NHS London, 2007). Health care for London was 
an agency charged with leading strategic change across the capital under the rubric of NHS 
London. It was set up in 2007 and was funded by the 31 London PCTs and was closely linked 
with the SHA. Health care for London published its Stroke Strategy for London in November 
2008 (NHS London, 2008b). This document explained that the approach is based on the 
Framework for Action findings combined with the 2007 National Stroke Strategy. The key 
conclusions of the document were that firstly, the quality of London’s stroke care has 
improved at a slower rate than elsewhere in England and that this needs to be addressed. 
A Framework for Action (NHS London, 2007) 
1. Services should be focused on individual needs and choices 
2. Services should be localised where possible and regionalised where that improves the quality of 
care 
3. There should be joined up care and partnership working, maximising the contribution of the entire 
workforce 
4. Prevention is better than cure 




Secondly, prevention needed to be taken more seriously and that problems such as high blood 
pressure must be tackled more effectively. Thirdly, clinical approaches to acute stroke care 
management need to be rethought: 
 
‘Londoners should be no more than 30 minutes travel from a [Hyper Acute Stroke 
Unit] HASU. On arrival a stroke patient should be assessed by a specialist, and have a 
CT scan and thrombolytic drugs (if appropriate), all within 30 minutes... once 
stabilised, patients should be moved from a HASU to a [Stroke Unit] SU to receive 
high quality stroke rehabilitation care.’ (NHS London, 2008b) 
 
The document further discussed issues related to strategic management, including extending 
the role of clinical stroke networks to coordinate and regulate the continuing improvement of 
stroke care performance. The networks would be responsible for liaising with PCT 
commissioners, service providers and users and provide clinical leadership to encompass 
responsibility for innovation, audit, education and training and quality (NHS London, 2008b, 
p44).The remaining key conclusions from the report were that an additional £23m per annum 
was needed from London’s PCTs to fund the proposed improvements in acute care. 
Workforce numbers would have to increase and In-patient and community rehabilitation 
would also need to be improved (NHS London, 2008b). 
 
These changes were not to take place within a vacuum. Health care for London called for 
stroke care reform alongside that of Major Trauma Centre reconfiguration. From January to 
May 2009, Health care for London conducted a public consultation exercise suggesting that 
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London ought to have 3 or 4 major Trauma units and 8 HASUs (NHS London, 2008c). The 
changes would mean that the London Ambulance Service (LAS) would have to improve its 
performance with respect to the identification and diagnosis of stroke and take patients to the 
Emergency Department of a hospital with an HASU, even if this was further away than a 
more local hospital without an HASU. This reflected work previously done in relation to 
cardiac care by the LAS. In theory, anyone suffering a stroke must be within 30 minutes of an 
HASU by ambulance – this had implications for the locations of HASUs especially given that 
the majority of stroke patients tend to be elderly and also tend to live on the outskirts of town 
(NHS London, 2008b). The consultation document suggested that 130 HASU beds would be 
required in London (in 8 HASUs) and 550 SU beds are needed (in 24 SUs).  The new 
services would require an additional 570 whole time equivalent (WTE) nurses, 200 WTE 
AHPs and 16 WTE consultants and junior doctors (NHS London, 2008c). The consultation 
process generated just under 11,000 responses (NHS London, 2011a). The JCPCT met in July 
2009 and agreed to recommendations made by NHS London for both the Trauma and Stroke 
centre reconfigurations with respect to both models and selected sites (NHS London, 












Figure 1: Reconfiguration Process (NHS London, 2008b) 
 
This thesis concerns itself with the role of evidence across the whole reconfiguration and 
subsequent implementation process.  
 
1.4 Reflection and motivation 
 
It is important that research is conducted in a reflexive and critical way (Steier 1991; 
Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Bowling, 2009) which is open about and accounts for the 
background, interests and motivations of the researcher. This is done briefly, below.  
 
I commenced this part-time PhD study in September 2009 at the same time as I started in the 
Management Department at King’s College London as a full-time Research Associate in 
Social Science working on a European Union (EU) FP7 funded research project aimed at 
measuring how evidence based stroke care was implemented into practice in different 
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European countries. The project was entitled the European Implementation Score (EIS) 
project and I worked on the project for four years – until September 2013. It was a 
collaborative project involving nine distinct work package teams composed of stroke 
clinicians, epidemiologists, health economists and qualitative social scientists from across 
numerous universities, governmental bodies and research institutes across the EU. I worked 
as a Research Associate in Social Science on Work Package 3 of the project under the 
supervision of both my PhD supervisors. Work on the project involved extensive literature 
reviewing and personally conducting over 130 qualitative interviews as part of a series of five 
case studies with stroke care professionals, managers and policy makers across three different 
EU countries as the lead researcher in the field.  These qualitative interviews focused on the 
experiences of informants in accessing, interpreting and implementing evidence based stroke 
care at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels and included community, hospital and specialist 
care settings. The project yielded a number of publications by our specific work package 
focused on the implementation of evidence based health care in general (Boaz et al, 2011) 
and evidence based stroke care in particular (Baeza et al, 2012a; 2012b). 
 
The EIS project with its stroke care focus led me to become immersed in a world of stroke 
research over these years. It also meant that I established professional relationships with 
many national and international stroke care practitioners and researchers. Many of the 
London based individuals involved in the EIS project were also involved in the London 
stroke services reconfiguration, leading to many informal discussions and also formal 
interviews as part of the data collection for this thesis. My links with these individuals were 
advantageous in securing interviews with both them and getting contacts for to interview 
other informants. However where my connections with these individuals may have been 
known by other observation subjects and informants, this may have influenced the ways in 
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they perceived me and hence impacted upon their words (in interviews) and actions (in 
observations). This is something I have reflected on whilst introducing myself before 
interviews and observations, and when analysing data. 
 
The EIS Research Associate role kindled an interest in stroke care for me. Alongside this I 
have a long standing interest in evidence based policy and practice – specifically related to 
health policy which I had developed as a part-time MA Public Policy student at King’s 
College London (2006-08). This is aligned with my professional background as a full-time 
administrator and manager in the NHS (2002-09). This professional and academic experience 
sheds some light on my initial interest in the research question. I was always conscious of the 
need to keep the PhD and EIS work separate (and have been helped in this regard by my 
supervisors), nevertheless, there were points at which the two projects have functioned in 
complimentary ways – for example thanks to the shared focus on stroke care and access to 
the micro-level London case study site which is used for data collection for the present thesis 
– whilst at others they conflicted – for example when EIS data collection necessitated 
extensive work abroad or when project specific timelines on occasion hampered my PhD 
focus. Whilst the analysis of data from the EIS case studies was collaboratively performed 
with other team members, data collected and used for this thesis was analysed individually by 
me – reflecting the distinct foci of the two projects. Appendix E includes a timeline 










This chapter has introduced the main research question which the thesis will explore. It has 
justified the need for the research and placed it within the context of other related work whilst 
detailing the background and outline of the stroke care reforms in London.  The following 
chapter (II) will review a number of relevant streams of literature detailing the strengths and 
weaknesses of these and where this present study may extend empirical and theoretical 
knowledge. Chapter III will then focus in greater depth upon the theoretical approach that the 
research will follow, discussing the concept of governmentality (Foucault, 2007), an analytics 
of government (Dean, 2010) and a review of contemporary health care management studies 
drawing on governmentality approaches. Chapter IV will present and justify the selected 
methodology behind the research with reference to the philosophical underpinnings, research 
design and research strategy and data analysis of the data extracted from case study 
interviews, documentary analysis and non-participant observations. 
 
The empirical findings are presented in chapters V, VI and VII structured around the initial 
‘problematisation’ of stroke care in London, then the design of the ‘solution’ to this, and 
finally the implementation of the ‘London model’ of stroke care delivery. Chapter VIII, the 
discussion chapter reflects on the findings and their theoretical significance for management 














This chapter seeks to critically review the ways in which evidence based health care (EBHC) 
has been characterised and interpreted across a set of key academic literatures. The chapter 
explores how clinical knowledge is constructed, legitimated and mobilised to influence health 
care policy making and management and how different professional, managerial and political 
stakeholders interact in reforming health care delivery. The rationale behind the literature 
reviewed in this chapter reflects an interest in how both macro-level Discourse and micro-
level discourse (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000) develop and impact upon stakeholders 
involved in shaping specific health services.  
 
The chapter therefore begins with a discussion of the macro-level context of health policy 
making in England since the 1980s and how the concept of EBHC sits within the New Public 
Management (NPM) and post-NPM paradigms. This literature is important in contextualising 
the links between public policy and public management and how this has developed over the 
past thirty years. Following this, there is a focus on the impacts that ‘standardisation’ – which 
it is argued is central to the EBHC movement - has had upon the medical and allied 
professions, in both epistemic and management terms.  This literature is important in 
demonstrating how social scientists have interpreted the sociological and management 
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impacts of attempts to reframe medical care delivery since the mid-1990s. Next the chapter 
considers how policy makers and social scientists have increasingly interpreted EBHC as a 
problem of ‘implementation’. This focuses analysis at the micro-level and explores the 
competing powers of ‘standardisation’ and ‘enactment’ of EBHC for health care 
professionals and managers. The penultimate section discusses the literature dedicated to 
health care merger and reconfiguration studies and how EBHC has been interpreted within 
these. The chapter then concludes by reflecting upon the theoretical and empirical state of 
these various literature streams and lays the foundations for the theoretical framework chapter 
which follows.  
 
Before commencing the literature review, there follows a brief discussion of the methods 
used to locate the literature cited below. The first point to stress is the iterative and long term 
nature of how the literature review was conducted. This reflects the interpretive nature of 
inquiry at the heart of this work. As the research design and subsequent data analysis 
developed, an interest in Public Policy and Management literatures as well as Organisational 
Studies and Medical Sociology, and Sociology of the Professions and 
Implementation/Knowledge Transfer literatures emerged as significant. An interest in 
Foucauldian analysis of EBHC developed towards the end of the first year of this PhD study 
influenced by authors drawing Foucault’s ideas to explore changing regimes of governance in 
policy terms (Power, 1999; Newman, 2001) and in health care specifically (Waring, 2007; 
Pickard, 2010; Ferlie et al, 2011). These authors were identified mainly through 
‘snowballing’ (Greenhalgh et al, 2008) and hand searches following references from 
significant papers and recommendations from colleagues. In addition, there were more formal 
searching strategies employed – for example via ASSIA and Social Science Abstracts – 
focused on ensuring that the health care merger literature for example was adequately 
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accounted for – likewise, in the following chapter, a formal search for health care 
management papers which employ a governmentality framework was performed. Finally, 
where appropriate comprehensive reviews were drawn upon – for example, the Spurgeon 
(2010) SDO report into reconfigurations, and the Greenhalgh et al (2004) Diffusion of 
Innovations work were both relevant to the present thesis.  
 
 
2.2 The context of health policy making in the UK: New Public Management, 
Post-New Public Management and the rise of EBHC 
 
A concern for the wider political and policy context which mandates and legitimates 
structural authority within the Public Sector and the NHS in particular is an integral element 
for deeper analysis of the importance of EBHC to health care policy making in recent years. 
Two important theories of Public Management emerging alongside the rise of EBHC are the 
New Public Management (NPM); and post-NPM theories of Network Governance (Ferlie and 
McGivern, 2014). The contribution of NPM and post-NPM theories will be critically 
discussed with a focus on the tension between demonstrable, population health care 
improvements based on standardised processes (Timmermans and Berg, 2003) and measured 
outcomes on the one hand, and the creation of ‘space’ for these to be negotiated locally 
drawing on the agency of professionals on the other (Davies and Nutley, 2000). It is 
suggested that this tension highlights the paradoxical political demands of conflicting 
timeframes and policy mandates within NHS management and policy making. In this context 
the epistemic and technical impacts of delivering EBHC have been of central importance 




Hood (1991) links the rise of NPM with four administrative ‘megatrends’ which see a shift 
from traditional bureaucratic public administration delivery: (1) attempts to reduce the 
growth of government spending and staffing levels (2) moves towards ‘privatisation’ of state 
assets and roles (3) the development of ‘automaton’ linked to IT advances and (4) an 
internationalised management agenda. These trends were identified in a key US text by 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) who stress the importance of government – but call for a new 
form of government, that should be more effective and less bureaucratic – they seek to 
replace bureaucracy with ‘entrepreneurial government’ which builds on consumer choice and 
reflects the ‘knowledge-based economy’ of an ‘information society.’ Government, they 
suggest, should ‘steer, rather than row’ and they call for ‘less government and more 
governance’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; p34).  A concern for governing as ‘governance’ 
reflects the understanding that in modern liberal societies, concepts of knowledge, power and 
agency are complex, and dispersed rather than concentrated upon a single dominant (state or 
bureaucratic) actor (Fazekas, 2011). Whilst there are defenders of bureaucracy to be found in 
the Organisational Studies and Public Policy literatures – notably Du Gay (2005) and Self 
and Peacock (1993); economic critiques of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1987) 
have been increasingly influential from the 1970s onwards in setting a political context which 
is hostile to the allegedly self-interested behaviour of public officials and belief in the 
inevitability of government failure exploited by the Reagan administration in the US and 
Thatcher governments in the UK through the 1980s. 
 
Hood (1995) outlines 7 key themes of the NPM: (1) moves towards greater ‘disaggregation’ 
of public sector organisations with separate budgets and identities (2) instilling more 
competition within the public sector and outwards towards private sector organisations (3) the 
importation of private sector management techniques to the public sector (4) cost cutting 
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initiatives and budget restraint within the public sector (5) more visible, active and ‘hands on’ 
hierarchical management within the public sector (6) more emphasis on explicit performance 
measurement against standards both ‘vertically’ and ‘laterally’ (7) increased control through 
output measures – such as payment linked to agreed performance metrics. Different countries 
implemented various elements of these themes to contrasting extents due to a multiplicity of 
factors; however, the UK is recognised as an early and extensive adopter (Pollitt and 
Bouckeart, 2004). Furthermore within the UK, it has been claimed that the NHS was 
particularly heavily influenced by the NPM following the Griffiths Reforms and the 
introduction of General Management to the NHS in the 1980s (Ferlie et al, 1996; Ferlie and 
McGivern, 2014). 
 
Ferlie et al (1996),drawing on empirical work focused on the UK health sector, state that the 
aims of NPM are contested, but themes of financial efficiency and a belief in the values of the 
market, increased managerial presence, and rhetorical commitments to decentralization and 
the primacy of the patient may be discerned. They argue that increased competition and 
management encroachment challenged medical professional dominance and historical forms 
of co-ordination. Rather than viewing this in simple terms of a loss of clinical autonomy 
throughout the profession, the authors suggest the picture was more complex – with ‘some 
winners, some losers’ and that a hybrid clinical managerial class emerged (medical directors, 
clinical directors). These individuals were well placed to manage clinical colleagues because 
the hybrid managers possess the technical knowledge to judge the competence of their peers 
(c.f. Mintzberg, 1983). Overall, this is a story of’ adaptation’ according to their analysis. 
Professional powers have extended in some ways; clinical directorates and hybrid managers 
being examples of this. They have reduced in other ways; standardisation and systemisation 
of health care and published patient rights, an increase in audit and clinical governance. 
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However, crucially, clinicians have kept control of this aspect of regulation (Broom et al, 
2009). 
 
Noordegraaf and Abma (2003) emphasise how the New Public Management accentuates the 
practice of measurement and attempts to reduce ambiguity and complexity in policy making 
and delivery. They term this’ management by measurement’ (MBM). The use of rational 
staged measurement cycles by practitioners theoretically aims to add to the transparency and 
effectiveness of administrative systems. Measured performance is compared with intended 
performance (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003; p858). However, the authors suggest that this 
cycle rests on often untenable assumptions, and link this to ambiguity: ‘when issues are 
ambiguous, interpretive spaces exist; when interpretive spaces exist, strict measurement 
cycles do not work because required conditions and assumptions cannot be met.’ They 
suggest action occurs within ‘interpretive spaces’ so that management comes to be concerned 
with simplifying complexity (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003; p861). Nevertheless reality is 
more complex and messy than such measurement systems can account for (March and Olsen, 
1989; Weick, 1995) – resulting in organisational ambiguity (Parsons, 2002). They draw on 
the work of Brown and Duguid (1991) highlighting that measurement cycles linked to 
rationalist concepts of ‘knowability’, ‘identifiability’ and ‘comparability’ struggle for 
coherence in the face of organisational complexity and epistemic contestability (Noordegraaf 
and Abma, 2003; p869). 
 
The centrality of measurement and audit to late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
policy makers is a key concern for Power (1999) who makes a number of important 
conceptual points in relation to the interplay between governance, management and auditing 
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principles and the ways these increasingly impact upon our understanding of collective and 
individual identities within organisational life (p42). Drawing upon neo-Foucauldian thought 
he links the growth of value for money (VFM) auditing techniques being applied to the 
public sector with NPM and the neoliberal agenda of indirect control and surveillance of 
subjects and organisations (p43) built on a false assumption about the ‘neutrality’ and 
effectiveness of auditable performance measures. This impacts upon intra-organisational 
control (Power, 1999; p52). He makes an important distinction related to how audit may be 
interpreted by practitioners as either ‘decoupled’ from, or ‘colonizing’ of performance and 
suggests this is a key area of interest in relation to clinical and medical audit – with 
implications for how we analyse the monitoring regimes introduced as part of EBHC. This 
has parallels with Berwick’s (1998) important distinction between ‘measurement for 
judgement’ in health care which focuses on guiding patients and commissioners with respect 
to clinicians’ and providers’ competences and ‘measurement for improvement’ which focuses 
on health care professionals themselves measuring and learning from and about their own 
practice (Timmermans and Berg, 2003; p206). 
 
Dunleavy et al (2006) proclaim the NPM to be dead, and argue that numerous (but not all) 
aspects of the three key components of NPM (in ‘leading edge’ countries); ‘disaggregation’, 
‘competition’ and ‘incentivisation’ have increasingly been whole or partly reversed or stalled 
in recent years – often due to symbolic alignment with policy mistakes or disasters (Dunleavy 
et al, 2006; p471) linked to the ways in which NPM policies increased institutional and policy 
complexity for policy makers and managers. They suggest there is a shift towards ‘Digital 
Era Governance’ (DEG) partly as an attempt to correct the anomalies of NPM policies and 
also in response to wide ranging and game changing advances in IT which impact upon 
government, public service delivery and citizens. In contrast to the three key components of 
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NPM, they offer three major components of DEG; reintegration, needs-based holism, and 
digitization processes. They cite for example, Blair’s calls for ‘joined up government’ as an 
example of the reintegration component.  
 
Dent (2005) likewise questions if policy making has entered a Post-NPM epoch. He 
compares the influence of NPM in the UK, Germany and Italy, suggesting that the move to 
post-NPM marks a shift from a managerial to a governance Discourse (neither precluding 
elements of marketization). Dent claims that New Labour moved the NPM agenda on from 
markets to increased oversight and regulation – setting good performers free, for example via 
the granting of Foundation Trust status. This is ‘governance rather than government’. Dent 
cites Hood in calling this ‘enforced self-regulation’ and compares it to Courpasson’s (2000) 
theory of ‘soft bureaucracy.’ Exworthy et al (1999) caution against the idea that NHS 
management styles may be viewed as linear shifts – from bureaucracy (1948-1979) to 
markets (1979-1997) to networks (from 1997). Rather, the three organisational methods have 
often coexisted, in different places and times. This is a logical approach – the stages model 
fails to ‘recognise the political and organisational complexities of the NHS’ and that 
‘multiple organisational forms’ exist concurrently, spatially and temporally.  For example, 
professionalised networks may be said to have been influential during the bureaucratic phase 
(as evidenced by Alford’s (albeit New York) study of 1975). A useful suggestion offered by 
Exworthy is that networks may be more advanced for certain services. This seems a 
potentially fruitful way in which to picture the role of networks, as we might see from cancer, 
cardiac and now stroke services – they may be employed to improve outcomes in specific 
disease areas. They may be favoured because traditional, hierarchical localised methods at 
improvement have failed, markets are inadequate, and the specialised knowledge held by 
clinicians is seen as key to improvement. Networks offer a good way to incentivise clinical 
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leaders to reorganise and implement improved pathways and practices (Exworthy et al, 
1999). 
 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) caution that: ‘crude periodization of modes of governance can 
also carry with it the myth of progress – bureaucracy as all bad, markets as a necessary evil, 
and networks as the “new Jerusalem”’ (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; p331). They suggest 
such a narrative implies the reluctance of Public Sector managers to work to marketised 
ideals, thus preferring the collective ideals of the network model. They argue that such an 
approach fails to critically explore how power relations are affected in the new context of 
networks and ‘partnership’ work. They suggest critical analysis requires analysts to 
distinguish between organisational structure and modes of governance. ‘Partnership’ as an 
organisational structure is, in this critique, distinct from ‘network’ as a mode of governance – 
furthermore, ‘partnerships’ are associated with a multitude of forms of social co-ordination: 
which may include network, hierarchy and market. (p314). Different modes of governance 
are needed to tackle complex, ‘wicked’ or ‘messy’ policy problems in the disaggregated 
world of purchasers, providers following the NPM reforms of the 1980s and 1990s leading to 
distributed agency and fragmented communities of practice (p315). The authors insightfully 
argue that different modes of governance are apparent at different stages of policy making 
and delivery – thus we need a more nuanced understanding of how power and interaction 
fluctuates in networks and partnerships – sometimes competition will be key to interaction 
whilst at other points collaboration will be the central organising mode.  
 
Rhodes (1997; 2007) has written extensively on the influence of policy networks in UK 
policy making following the effects of the NPM reforms of the Conservative administrations 
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of the 1980s and 1990s. The term ‘policy network’ refers to ‘sets of formal and informal 
institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared 
interests in public policy making and implementation’ (p1244). Multiple organisations here 
are interdependent upon each other to achieve policy goals. They have existed in UK policy 
making for a very long time – but he argues that the Thatcherite reforms of the 1980s led to a 
bureaucratic fragmentation which required increased network working paradoxically, whilst 
‘governance refers to governing with and through networks’ (p1246) reflecting the weakened 
positive role of the state in the light of bureaucratic reform. Osborne (2006) has described 
New Public Governance (NPG) drawing on the power of networks and an increased ethos of 
trust to coordinate public management delivery – highlighting a more reflexive policy making 
process. It is in this period that the National Institute of Health Research and NICE emerge as 
significant players in the new establishment of more distributed loci of decision making and 
power. This highlights that evidence may become more important for policy making in an era 
where ideology is less so. 
 
Pollitt (2013) applies a narrative analytic approach to review a key Public Service Reform 
White Paper of the early Blair government: ‘Modernizing Government’ (1997). In contrast to 
the rhetoric often displayed by previous Thatcher and Major Administrations, ‘Modernizing 
Government’ contains a commitment to ‘value’ rather than ‘denigrate’ public service and 
servants. Although the White Paper asserts that the ‘old’ arguments over more or less 
government were over (Pollitt, 2013; p910) – and therefore issues of Public Administration 
now are not political, but managerial, he suggests this is simplistic – in reality, different 
stakeholders involved in New Labour policy delivery frequently had different, conflicting 
aims and, over the course of the New Labour years: ‘modern performance measurement 
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systems would turn into a vast, highly centralized and deeply intrusive industry run from 
No.10 Downing Street and the Treasury’ (Pollitt, 2013; p911).  
 
The governance arrangements of the New Labour years are complex and contradictory. Other 
scholars have focused on the interaction between the language, policy goals, governing styles 
and theoretical approach of the Blair governments to governance. For example Newman 
(2001) uses discourse analysis to critique the approach of the early years of the New Labour 
government with respect to governance. She places the New Labour reforms in the context of 
the Thatcherite NPM movement and endeavours to extend understanding of how government 
policy at a macro-level can be dovetailed with micro-level trends for managers and 
professionals. Whilst the model of network governance would suggest that increasingly 
decentralised, networked organisational forms came to dominate policy – Newman posits that 
‘command and control’ was simultaneously an important factor in New Labour governing – 
most strongly felt in the tightening of control over ‘recalcitrant’ professionals in health, 
education and social services amongst others and a ‘partial softening of market imperatives’ 
(Newman, 2001, p165) 
 
She argues that New Labour continued the NPM trend of devolving power to public sector 
organisations and their managers – sometimes with coercive means of regulating activity: for 
example by overtaking ‘failing’ institutions. Other approaches however, allowed New Labour 
to ‘govern at a distance’ (Dean, 2010): through an expansion of audit and inspection, an 
increase of standards, protocols and quality measures, and incentive based funding regimes 
(Newman, 2001; p168).  Newman questions whether these changes represent state power 
being withdrawn or extended. Increased partnerships and public involvement in decision 
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making could be seen to shift towards co or self-governance– this might be seen as 
‘empowerment of individuals, communities and organisations’. Alternatively; ‘Post-
structuralist theory however, would view [these ‘partnerships’] not in terms of empowerment, 
but as an enlargement of the range and penetration of state power.’ So although ‘direct’ state 
control may have been reduced – the state could be seen to have extended its reach so that 
arguably control might have been increased (Newman, 2001; p169) 
 
Newman extends this analysis of disaggregated policy making in liberal society and its 
effects upon institutions and public sector workers across networks with an application of 
Foucauldian and ‘governmentality’ influenced thought drawing on the work of Rose (1996). 
The following chapter (III) offers a full explanation of the key aspects Foucault’s 
governmentality work and the technical implications of specific terms and how language is 
utilised to express particular ideas. It is necessary here however to indicate that 
governmentality as a concept is concerned with the ‘art of government’ and  how in liberal 
societies, specific ‘practices’, or ‘tactics’ of government seek to govern individuals’ actions 
through harnessing their freedom and influencing ‘mentalities’ of rule (Dean, 2010). As will 
be explained in the next chapter, this leads the analyst to become increasingly concerned with 
concepts such as freedom, agency, language, subjectivity and control. Newman explores 
these concepts within the ‘discursive practices of “modernizing” governments’ (Newman, 
2005; p718). It is through this that meanings are generated via ‘small, everyday acts.’ She 
suggests that within the ‘micro-politics of state modernisation’ transgression is limited as a 
subject position (Newman, 2005; p730). Newman highlights the ways in which micro-level 
interactions are central to the enactment of macro-level policy goals – this is the key locus for 
research into implementation and standardisation, however concepts of leadership, agency 
and freedom become increasingly contested  (O’Reilly and Reed, 2010; Martin and 
51 
 
Learmonth, 2012) leading to Critical, Postmodernist and Foucauldian approaches to analysis 
to provide enriched understandings of the shift ‘to indirect governance’ (Ferlie and 
McGivern, 2014). 
 
In further work, co-authored with Clarke (Newman and Clarke, 2009) Newman once more 
draws on Foucauldian theory to explore conceptions of publics, politics and power with an 
interest in paradox, ‘visibilities’ and ‘assemblages’ which point to a concern for epistemic 
and technical aspects of policy making and a concern for the ways these are shaped by and 
come to shape the identities of those working in and/or touched by new conceptions of 
‘publicness’ (Newman and Clarke, 2009; p15) 
 
NPM supposedly shifts public sector organisations ‘down grid and down group’ by making 
them more like private sector organisations in their working practice and freer in designing 
and implementing local policy solutions in contrast to traditional public administration 
models (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; p9). However, during the New Labour years the extent to 
which competition drove health policy is questionable (Mays and Dixon, 2011), and 
nationally standardised clinical targets became more high profile and culturally significant 
than ever. This illuminates some contradictory elements of NPM as an organising form. It has 
proven itself to be adaptable to various political agendas and types of critiques (Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994), simultaneously and somewhat paradoxically however NPM reforms often 
adopted ‘one size fits all’ elements leading to aspects of ‘monoculture’ and ‘mimetic 




Perhaps due to the politically high profile nature of NHS policy making (and the centrality of 
the NHS to the identity of both ‘old’ and New Labour), state based funding, and resolute 
power bases of professional groups essential to effective delivery, the competitive diversity at 
the heart of the entrepreneurial state model cited by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) struggled to 
impose itself fully in the NHS context. Further factors include the ways in which clinical staff 
adapted to take on management roles – for example as clinical directors (Fitzgerald and 
Ferlie, 2000); and also the maintained control of clinical audit systems by the medical 
profession  (Herk et al, 2001). There are a number of problems with the wider NPM literature 
as represented by authors such as Hood, Pollitt and Dunleavy when applied to empirical 
projects within a specific sector such as health. Firstly, these authors operate at an abstract 
level, developing ideal typologies to account for generalised change across disparate sectors 
and an eye to international comparisons. This fails to account for sectoral and national issues 
linked to long term political trends within administrative systems, and also fails to explicate 
the gap between political reality and rhetoric. For example, New Labour claimed to be 
committed to ‘devolving power’ and making government more responsive, collective and 
open (Pollitt, 2013):  
 
‘However, this does not mean that the centre has given up control – it is dispersal, but 
not a fragmentation. In so far as “partnership” becomes a reality rather than just a 
rhetoric, it entails a new form of control that crucially involves language – shaping the 
culture, discourse and language of the dispersed agents of government rather than 




The conceptual fusion of government with ‘rational thought’ (Foucault, 2007; Dean, 2010) is 
analytically useful in the study of the application of EBHC values to English health policy 
making. On one hand there is an appeal to (macro-level) Discourse to ‘change cultures’ but 
on the other hand this is acknowledged as being centrally related to  change that has been 
internalised through local (micro-level) culture in which the discourse is constitutive of the 
values of EBHC (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). The governmental role is to encourage 
certain preferred conduct(s) to become ‘instinctive’ (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005):  
 
‘EBHC is not, however, simply about getting specific pieces of research evidence into 
practice. It is about creating a culture where practitioners automatically think in an 
‘evidence’-based way every time they see a new case, where it becomes instinctive to 
seek out research evidence and base treatment decisions on that evidence’ (Dopson 
and Fitzgerald, 2005; p37) 
 
A key idea here is that’ techniques of control work best when they make individuals “want” 
what the system needs in order to perform’ (Thornborrow and Brown, 2009; p370).Co-option 
of clinical leaders into senior policy making positions enhances the epistemological 
legitimacy of ‘evidence based’ health policy making (Armstrong, 2002); but crucially, the 
agency of professional staff must be harnessed to implement the new government policies in 
health care. Post-NPM theories such as those advanced by Newman (2001; 2005), Newman 
and Clarke (2009) and Ferlie and McGivern (2014) are theoretically useful. These authors 
draw on illuminating concepts around the dispersal of power and agency in contemporary 
society. Along with Power (1999) these authors highlight the utility of taking a detailed 
interest in the work of Foucault and in particular ideas which emerge from his writings on 
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Governmentality (Foucault, 2007, Dean, 2010) when thinking about how modern liberal 
government functions for scholars of public sector management. 
 
Having focused on the macro-level policy context and pointed towards potentially 
illuminative critiques which may extend theoretical understanding of the impact of  EBHC on 
modern health care, the next section defines the key elements of EBHC with reference to how 
these impact upon professional knowledge and workforce relations. 
 
2.3 The impacts of standardisation on medical professionals 
 
A central concern of EBHC is standardisation – the attempt to ensure that all medical 
professionals adhere to validated common principles and knowledge bases when treating 
patients – such a concern has political implications both within and beyond the profession 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Following this assertion there are two key corollaries. Firstly, 
EBHC poses epistemological challenges to the traditional modes of medical decision making 
(Carr-Hill, 1995; Sehon and Stanley, 2003) , and secondly, this in turn impacts upon the 
power structures and systems of control within the medical profession and how it interacts 
with governmental, lay, academic and commercial stakeholders ( Armstrong, 2002; Lambert, 
2006). Recent years have seen a proliferation of institutions and agencies both clinical (such 
as the Royal Colleges in the UK) and governmental (such as NICE in the UK and AHRQ in 
the USA) and new international academic journals committed to the promotion of evidence 
based practice and systems of thought which emphasise the conscious efforts to frame EBM 
as a social movement aimed at increasing the scientific basis of clinical decision making 
within medicine and beyond  – to nursing and AHP groups (Berkwits, 1998; Timmermans 




Early proponents of EBM suggested it would represent a ‘paradigm shift’ in health care 
conceptualisation and organising (Guyatt, 1991) in its early years and whilst fellow 
originators of the concept of EBM have subsequently come to question the ‘paradigm shift’  
terminology (Haynes, 2002) and other critics reject the premise that it represents a 
revolutionary discontinuity with what went before (Sehon and Stanley, 2003), the subject has 
generated significant debate both within the medical profession and amongst medical 
sociologists. Carr-Hill (1995) argues that the efforts at ‘universalising’ knowledge production 
and interpretation - central to EBM ignores the complexity central to the evaluation of 
evidence type, implementation and disparate views over the correct role for judgement in 
decision making (Greenhalgh and Wieringa, 2011). Goldenberg (2006) goes further and 
suggests there is an intellectually coercive element to EBM which affects both practitioners 
and the public. She challenges the apparent unproblematic nature of evidence underpinning 
EBM and argues that ‘the appeal to the authority of evidence that characterises evidence 
based practice does not increase objectivity but rather obscures the subjective elements that 
inescapably enter all forms of human enquiry’ (Goldenberg, 2006; p2621). Therefore we 
ought to be sceptical of claims which portray EBM as ‘politically disinterested or merely 
scientific’.  Attempts to standardise medical knowledge - in terms of understanding what a 
disease or treatment is or are, and the protocols needed to construct a valid knowledge base to 
treat patients and measure the effectiveness of the interventions may fruitfully be seen as a 
political process. Much of the time - especially with relation to strategic level change - the 
evidence may be partial, contested and rely upon ‘expert consensus’ (Klein, 2000; Nutley and 
Davies, 2000). Such evidence is necessarily subjective. Guideline development which takes 
place amongst experts seeking common consensus is not necessary conducted in transparent 
fora, but rather represents a political process reflecting the balance of the views of expert 
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contributors; “the fact that a group of individuals think that a practice is beneficial does not 
ensure that it actually is” (Woolf et al, 1996, p947; Timmermans and Berg, 2003 p4). 
 
Lambert et al (2006) suggest that ‘EBM constitutes a profound challenge to the ways in 
which established health care professions, such as biomedicine impart knowledge to new 
members and maintain professional autonomy’ (p2614). Central to this is the ability of the 
profession to respond to increased pressure to provide standardised care which is linked to 
policy concerns around rationalisation and regulation:’ Critics and supporters agree that 
standards emerge out of political concerns and can be used to implement or thwart regulation. 
But they disagree on the need for such regulation and the usefulness of standards as policy 
tools’ (Timmermans and Berg, 2003; p20). This leads to a discussion around the second key 
concern of this section – how EBM has impacted upon the power dynamics and issues of 
control of the medical and allied professions.  
 
Issues of power, control and the autonomy of the medical profession need to be seen in their 
historical context. Freidson’s (1970) original model of Professional Dominance became 
highly influential in the conceptualisation of organisational and political relations in health 
care (Abbott, 1988; Wolinsky, 1988; Light, 1991). This medical dominance necessitated 
administrative and managerial reforms to introduce a more balanced relationship between the 
medical profession on the one hand and patients, other AHPs and management on the other 
(Freidson, 1970, p176). Light (1991) characterises this tussle in terms of ‘countervailing 
powers’. Transparency of medical processes and standardisation were part of this process 
which changed the dynamic nature of state-professional relations (Freidson, 1988). Abbott 
(1988) argues that ‘the development of the formal attributes of a profession is bound up with 
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the pursuit of jurisdictions and the besting of rival professions’ (p30). This is a useful 
perspective as it opens up the possibility of studying both dominant and subordinate 
professional groupings and how they interact in a more sophisticated way than traditional 
professional dominance models. Since the early 1970s, Professional Dominance – as a classic 
sociological paradigm for characterising medicine’s relations with capital and the state - came 
under increasing strain (Haug, 1973; Wolinsky; 1988; Harrison and Ahmad, 2000; Salter, 
2002).  
 
Freidson’s later work laments these changes which have assaulted the ‘credibility of the 
professional ideology’ (2001, p197). He links the proliferation of standards and protocols 
with broader economic and political trends which lead to a re-stratification of the medical 
profession. This, he posits may empower non-professional general managers to control the 
work of professionals in new ways. Armstrong (2002) follows Freidson in suggesting that a 
clinical administrative elite ‘often grouped around the academy and professional colleges’ 
increasingly comes to control the work of individual practitioners through protocols and 
guidelines. This leads to a paradoxical situation where ‘freedom’ for the profession as a 
whole from non-professional governmental intrusion is secured by increased ‘control’ of 
individual practice from the professional centre (Armstrong, 2002, p1772). Others have noted 
how EBM ‘solidifies hierarchical relationships’ between consultants and juniors 
(Timmermans and Angell, 2001; Broom et al, 2009). EBHC therefore may be seen to impact 
upon the traditional autonomy enjoyed by professional groups. A very useful distinction here 
can be made between firstly; Professional autonomy: ‘the regulation of the profession as a 
whole by controlling entrance to the field, self-monitoring, developing a body of specialized 
knowledge and running professional organizations’ and secondly; Clinical autonomy: ‘the 
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control the individual practitioner has over routine work activities and decisions, the freedom 
to be innovative in the work process’ (Timmermans and Berg, 2003; p84). 
 
Moreover, these subtly distinct types of autonomy may fluctuate dynamically and be 
influenced by jurisdictional battles (Abbott, 1988) between established professions which 
create clinical practice guidelines in order to reduce clinical uncertainty in worlds awash with 
masses of information emphasising in turn the ‘deductive’ quality of clinical autonomy rather 
than its traditional ‘inductive’ nature. In contrast, emerging professions more often use 
clinical practice guidelines ‘to claim a special status and to solicit jurisdiction over a technical 
domain’ and make visible that which was previously unappreciated or hidden (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003; p90).   
 
The Professions literature does contain a North American bias and draws upon ideal type, 
macro-level generalisations in a number of instances which do not hold in countries like 
England with fully tax funded health services. However, it is an important literature stream 
for scholars of health care policy and management as it does highlight that professionals are 
different in how they organise themselves (and compete with others) from non-professionals. 
Having introduced a number of key concepts focused on how the medical sociology and 
sociology of the professions academic literatures have problematised the fluctuating nature of 
professional power and how it may have been influenced by first the EBM and more latterly 
the EBHC movements, the following section will focus on how policy makers, managers, 




2.4 Evidence based health care as a problem of implementation 
 
It is suggested in this section that EBHC has been framed by public policy makers, managers, 
clinical leaders and policy analysts as a problem of implementation. This is significant, as it 
demonstrates that EBHC is clearly deeply embedded in to clinical, policy and management 
communities – the question has become not whether to implement evidence based regimes of 
practice, but rather how. Dopson and Fitzgerald and colleagues (2005) produced an important 
text in which they focus on the ‘implementation gap’ which an interest in the EBM 
movement has elucidated for social science researchers. Their focus is less on standardization 
– i.e. the processes by which clinical practice is debated and changed, and more on how those 
new standards are translated into practice, or knowledge is ‘enacted’. This frames the 
problem in public policy and managerial terms. They are also keen to focus on the  multi-
professional dimension of EBHC rather than just EBM and the messiness of competing 
‘jurisdictions’ (Abbott, 1988) of heterogeneous health care organisations. The authors locate 
their study in the New Labour period here as they point towards the linkages between EBHC 
and evidence based policy. This is important as many critiques of EBHC fail to make this 
conceptual indication. They link the evidence based policy movement politically to the 
‘“modernizing” government agenda’ that ‘have confirmed the central role that evidence is 
expected to play in policy making for the twenty-first century.’ (p28). This link is central to 
understanding the macro-level, or outer context which shapes how EBHC is conceptualised 
and interpreted during the New Labour period and the role of evidence in the reconfiguration 
of stroke services in London from 2007. The modernization agenda is a central concern of 
authors such as Power (1999), Fairclough, (2000), Newman (2001; 2005), Newman and 




In the English context, NPM principles and techniques of increased (quasi)markets, 
management and measurement were closely aligned with the values of the New Right 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Hence the election of the New Labour government in 1997 and 
Frank Dobson as its first Health Secretary in a generation with a pledge to save the NHS from 
Conservative party cuts and threatened privatisation appeared to herald a new, more 
consensual, less combative era. Blair’s third way was self-consciously post-ideological and 
(it was claimed it would be) based on evidence based policy making. Stoker (1999) for 
example has argued that evidence has increasingly been employed as an antidote to fill the 
vacuum left by the decline of traditional left-right ideology and politics of conviction. 
Evidence based policy making sits uneasily with NPM (Hood and Peters, 2004), but clearly 
has parallels with EBM and EBHC.  
 
In health care as Davies, Nutley and Smith (2000) suggest, at a micro-level (i.e. bedside) 
EBM has proven more successful than at meso- (i.e. strategic planning) or macro-levels (i.e. 
national policy making). There are practical as well as theoretical and ideological reasons for 
this. Firstly, the collation and subsequent dominance of RCT data, in which trials can be 
performed in the biomedical arena and applied at the bedside, cannot be replicated with 
regard to meso-, or macro-level structural reforms. This would be impractical and inhibited 
by cost. Large scale policy change and service reconfiguration is problematic to trial. Klein 
(2000) suggests that the two main reasons for the difficulty in moving from EBM to evidence 
based policy making are firstly; the concept of evidence itself is problematic – just as the 
dominance of the hierarchical model of evidence is open to question in EBM, so too, how 
evidence is ranked in evidence based policy making is no simple matter. Secondly, Klein 
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suggests that a simple corollary between EBM and evidence based policy making fails to 
appreciate fully the complexities of the policy process. 
 
In this new political context, EBHC empowers and legitimates managers and policy makers 
to take a greater interest in how to change professional practice in the NHS because 
knowledge and decision making is increasing codified and open to the scrutiny of managers 
and policy makers in pushing an ‘improvement agenda’. A key technical aspect relates to the 
powerful new Information Technology advances from the 1980s and the ‘informating 
organization’ (Zuboff, 1988).  Halladay and Bero (2000) suggest three different factors which 
impede attempts at bringing about wide ranging change in the NHS – these are cultural, 
logistical and contextual. They argue that culturally, NHS professionals traditionally 
displayed suspicion towards commercial Quality Improvement methods – this is linked to 
dislike of the internal market reforms of the Conservative administration of the 1990s, they 
also point to professional boundaries which inhibit knowledge sharing and professional-
managerial clashes over jurisdiction. Logistical challenges include poor information systems, 
sharing and skills and a lack of time to dedicate to systems change. Contextual factors include 
the role of social networks, different learning styles across and within different institutions 
and the role of patients in the uptake of research. Nutley and Davies (2000) emphasise the 
‘different worlds’ inhabited by policy makers and practitioners and the problems of 
communication between these ‘different worlds’. Drawing on Rogers’ diffusion of innovation 
model (1995), they point to the distinction between centralised and decentralised diffusion 
systems. The advantages of the former include central quality control over the policies and 
innovations to be diffused, but a centralised approach may encounter resistance from 
practitioners. The advantages of the latter are that practitioners tend to prefer having the 
ability to shape their own practices which in turn promotes a ‘closer fit’ between innovation 
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local context and actual problems; whilst the disadvantages include lack of central oversight 
and also the potential for ineffective innovations to be diffused. This tension between 
centralised and decentralised modes of implementation and how these interplay with efforts 
at standardisation is a key factor in the literature. They also point to the ontological 
challenges of evidence based practice and the disagreements between those approaching the 
issues from post-modernist and positivist positions.  
 
It was argued earlier in this thesis that EBM fostered a ‘movement’ of adherents and 
collected critics within the medical profession. Likewise, the new disciplines of 
‘implementation studies’ and ‘knowledge translation’ emerged from the mid-1990s in 
academic circles with scholars from diverse social science, management, clinical and 
epidemiological traditions bringing conflicting views, theories and ontological assumptions 
as funding for research around implementation increased via government agencies keen to 
learn about ‘what works’ and learn how to secure health services which are both efficient and 
effective.  
 
Early proponents of EBM are criticised for possessing simplistic and positivistic assumptions 
leading to passive strategies to get research into practice (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005). 
Competing researchers with an interest in the implementation of EBHC draw on different and 
contradictory theories about organisational change. The debate over the role of theory 
becomes central to the epistemological positioning of implementation and knowledge transfer 
studies. Graham et al (2006) lament the confusion around the competing concepts of 
‘knowledge translation’, ‘transfer’ and ‘exchange’, as well as ‘research utilization’, 
‘implementation’, ‘diffusion’ and ‘dissemination’. They emphasise the social nature of 
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knowledge translation and the dynamic and complex interaction processes between the 
various stages and present a cyclical model for implementation. They stress the importance of 
a shared understanding around the language used to express the distinct stages of the process 
they identify. Ward et al (2009) performed a narrative review of the knowledge transfer 
literature and identified 28 different ‘implementation’ models – the vast majority of which 
had been produced since the mid-late 1990s. They noted that most of these models remained 
untested empirically, so it is difficult to evaluate their respective utility. They did however 
identify five common components of the knowledge transfer process: (1) Problem 
identification and communication; (2) Knowledge/research development and selection; (3) 
Analysis of context; (4) Knowledge transfer activities or interventions; (5) 
Knowledge/research utilization. In addition, thematic analysis suggested the components 
might be arranged into one of three separate knowledge transfer processes; linear, cyclical 
and dynamic/multidirectional. Cyclical models were found to be most frequent (p162).  
 
Eccles et al (2005; p111) highlight the debate between and amongst the community of Health 
Service Researchers and clinical epidemiologists around the recognition of the failure of 
‘implementation’ research as an a-contextual, non-theoretical disciplinary concern. Their 
primary contention is that implementation is first and foremost a ‘science’, and that theory 
should be employed systematically to in time ‘raise’ implementation research to the level of 
‘other clinical sciences.’ This suggests certain types of ‘scientific’ theories may be more 
attractive to these authors that other more ‘interpretive based’ theoretical formulations. 
Interestingly, much qualitative health care management research (including implementation 
studies), at least in British Management Study circles has rejected this positivistic step and 
has increasingly moved in a  ‘symbolic interpretive’ direction (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005). 
However, much of the funding for Health Service Research comes from government funding 
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bodies which tends to reflect a more positivistic ethos. As funding for health policy research 
becomes closely linked with normative implementation studies – it influences the acceptable 
approaches which researchers may take to evaluation. This is an important aspect of the 
rhetorical power of the evidence based movement overall – it is very difficult for researchers 
to be critical of it whilst remaining credible – it is of course hard to challenge its inherent 
virtue.  Learmonth (2003) employs a Critical Management Studies (CMS) framework to 
suggest that the majority of qualitative studies focused on NHS management fail to critically 
examine the underlying managerial assumptions – there is a clear danger that implementation 
studies all too often fall into this trap also.  
 
In an important paper Greenhalgh and Wieringa (2011), following Learmonth (2003) and 
Crilly et al (2010), suggest that CMS approaches might be useful to unpick the complexities 
of knowledge/power relationships in health care decision making – how does ‘best evidence’ 
become so? And what are the roles played by ‘hierarchies of evidence’ in shaping 
understanding around what clinicians ought to do? They suggest researchers critically study 
the influence of ‘ the pharmaceutical industry, medical device manufacturers, commercial 
software companies, management consultants, research leaders and political and third sector 
lobbyists in defining what counts as research knowledge and mobilising resources to generate 
and distribute it’ (Greenhalgh and Wieringa, 2011; p508).   Moreover, they call for more 
research on the development of guidelines at the strategic level and also ‘knowledge 
interaction’ – focused on how different types of knowledge come together and influence 
policy making and macro-level decision making. The role of EBHC regimes of knowledge at 
the strategic level of decision making in health care management and policy focused on the 
construction of guidelines and practice protocols to be implemented (not to mention the 
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active roles of ‘research leaders’) are under-researched topics to which this thesis aims to 
contribute.  
 
Having critically noted the normative elements of some ‘implementation’ research, it is worth 
now highlighting that much useful work has been produced in recent years with an emphasis 
on the contextual factors at the heart of implementation issues. This is important as it 
highlights the importance of micro-level discursive and relational practice (Weick, 1995; 
Brown and Duguid, 1991; Fairhurst, 2008; Pye, 2005) and the role of professional agency 
(Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005; Currie et al, 2010; Lockett et al, 2012) in changing practice. 
Greenhalgh et al (2004) produced a review of the literature which asks how innovations in 
health service delivery and organisation might be firstly spread, and secondly, sustained. 
They distinguish between diffusion – passive spread of ideas; dissemination – targeted and 
planned action aimed at significant stakeholders to encourage uptake of an innovation; 
implementation – the active attempt to embed an innovation within an organisation; and 
finally sustainability – the ‘routinization’ of an innovation (Greenhalgh et al, 2004, p582).   
 
The comprehensiveness of the study is clearly very useful; however, a criticism might be that 
there is little discussion of broader public policy concerns and the influence of macro-level 
policy contexts in impacting upon diffusion of innovations in general terms. A further 
criticism, as noted elsewhere by Boaz et al (2011) is that there can sometimes be a lack of 
criticality in questioning the validity of evidence behind various innovations – the focus tends 
to be the success of the implementation abstracted from wider impacts of change mechanisms 
(these concerns are however recognised and discussed by Greenhalgh and Wieringa in the 
2011 paper discussed above). Nevertheless a great strength of the Greenhalgh et al (2004) 
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study lies in the recognition of the importance of context in dissemination and hence the 
problems associated with universalistic models of translation (Greenhalgh et al, 2004, p615).  
This clearly however presents a problem for studies aimed at achieving external validity and 
‘objective’ comparison of studies (Pawson et al, 2005). The authors emphasise (amongst 
other recommendations) that further research should be theory driven and focused on process 
of change rather than ‘package’ orientated. The centrality of context as a concern of 
implementation and knowledge exchange processes is also emphasised by Contandriopoulos 
et al (2010) who suggest that in implementation studies, or knowledge exchange processes 
for both organisations and policy, the starting point should be an analysis of the context 
which will in turn influence the choice of policy implementation tools rather than the other 
way round. Three important dimensions of context are identified – the first is political and 
questions the polarising effects of the proposed policy; the second is economic – and 
questions how the costs of the proposed policy will be shared amongst stakeholders; the third 
is social and relates to the institutional structures and methods of communication. This is of 
high relevance to studies of reconfiguration with their strong political and economic 
implications for policy.  
 
A further central concern of the implementation literature linked to the importance of 
context is that practitioners need space in which to develop their own locally specific 
models of delivery if they are likely to be successful – but this finding may then clash 
with (national/regional) attempts at practice standardisation. Ferlie and Dopson (2005) 
highlight that rather than focus on knowledge itself, we should look at the communities of 
practice and the different agendas which different (health care professional) groups pursue 
and be cognizant of the ‘jurisdictions’ they endeavour to protect as they ‘enact’ evidence 
in particular work settings (Ferlie and Dopson, 2005). These processes are clearly likely 
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to be messy and complicated and distinctive in ways not accounted for by classic rational 
models (Van de Ven, 1992; Ferlie and Dopson, 2005). Brown and Duguid (1991) draw on 
an empirical ethnographic (non-health care based) study to demonstrate the disjunction 
between the ways in which employees actually perform their work tasks and the ways in 
which such work is described by workplace manuals, guides and job descriptions. They 
suggest that innovation and organisational learning occurs within informal and often 
unregulated ‘communities of practice’ separate from the official picture of organisational 
life derived from institutional documentation. They make a very useful distinction 
between canonical and non-canonical practice within organisations. They suggest that in 
an effort to simplify and codify work practices, management frequently come to expect 
workers to perform tasks based on an idealised set of criteria which may not bear much 
resemblance to the reality of the performance of tasks which require tacit knowledge and 
skills not accounted for in organisational level directives. This is canonical practice. In 
practice, workers learn how to perform their tasks through doing their everyday work, and 
they come to understand the unstated complexities of their tasks in this way. In doing so 
workers diverge from canonical practice and engage in non-canonical practice; they 
learn informally from other (more experienced) colleagues and come to practice in ways 
which work, but which often bear little resemblance to the official protocols drawn up to 
guide their work.  
 
There are three key elements which are central to these processes: narration, collaboration 
and social construction (Brown and Duguid, 1991). Problems are conceptualised and tackled 
through discursive practice and knowledge is located within these discussions amongst staff. 
The shared nature of these narratives highlights the collaborative nature of these processes – 
leading workers to socially construct views of their work and the nature of the problems they 
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face in doing that work. This in turn may influence their ‘identity work’ which takes place in 
both the performance of work practices and the story telling which accompanies it. Learning 
takes place by way of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) ‘learners 
are acquiring not explicit, formal “expert knowledge”, but the embodied ability to behave as 
community members’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991; p48). They conclude: ‘to understand the 
way information is constructed and travels within an organisation, it is first necessary to 
understand the different communities that are formed within it and the distribution of power 
within them.’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991; p55)  
 
Likewise Gkeredakis et al (2011) combine theoretical and empirical insight to locate 
evidence in practice if knowledge translation is to be successful. The authors argue that the 
competing perspectives on the knowledge-practice gap (evidence based management and co-
production perspectives) both place too much emphasis on knowledge itself, rather than how 
it is used in practice. They suggest that management practice is socially complex and that 
evidence and knowledge must be instrumentalised (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001) and to be 
used as a tool. They emphasise policy implementation should be seen as an iterative process 
with multiple ‘feedback loops’ and suggest also that well-crafted narratives are important in  
making the case for implementation and rendering the complexities of implementation more 
understandable. Davies and Nutley (2000) draw on the work of Argyris and Schon (1978; 
1996), and Senge (1994) and place the need for organisational learning within the politicised 
context of long term NHS reforms. They suggest the New Labour Quality Improvement 
agenda necessitates improved organisational learning capabilities but are also cognizant of 
the difficulties inherent in achieving such a goal.  They distinguish between single loop 
learning (detection and correction of error) and double loop learning (radical, locally led 
innovations and service redesign) and lament that the latter is difficult to establish whilst the 
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competing organisational pressures of NHS delivery take precedence – unless prompted by 
some kind of ‘crisis’(Davies and Nutley, 2000; p999). They point to the impact of ‘problem 
based’ learning in medical schools and EBM which equip practitioners with ‘skills rather 
than a reservoir of facts’ (Sackett et al, 1996; 1997). The authors suggest that the pressures of 
National Service Frameworks and the audit regimes they sit within may prompt single loop 
learning but inhibit double loop learning (in contrast, other New Labour policy documents 
with a longer-term focus such as ‘A first class service’ (1998) may offer more hope of the 
double loop learning systems needed to embed cultural change which will last) (Davies and 
Nutley, 2000; p1000).  
 
This insight is instructive. The kind of ‘learning systems’ and reflective practice needed to 
embed long term cultural change based on evidence based principles which enable 
‘unlearning’ of poor practice requires long term, localised, collective approaches to 
organisational change managed upwards, whilst concurrently cognizant of local contextual 
conditions (Davies and Nutley, 2000). Because the implementation of EBHC change is 
contextually dependent, as suggested by these authors, then policy needs to leave space for 
contextually accommodating factors to interplay with broader policy mandates. 
Standardisation is a double edged sword – there is an existential tension between the centre 
and the periphery. Greenhalgh et al (2009)  follow Berg’s (2001) assertion that the question 
of success in implementation is ‘socially negotiated’: ‘if a team sets out to achieve X but 
along the way learns things or encounters challenges that convince it that Y is a more 
appropriate (or practicable) goal, then it will have “succeeded” if it achieves something 
approaching Y’ (p410). This challenges positivistic modes of evaluation of implementation 
processes and emphasises a constructivist understanding of localised learning – policy 
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makers and strategic management must leave ‘space’ for local negotiating of meaning within 
local contexts – this may however have negative impacts upon drives for ‘standardisation’.  
 
This chapter has so far highlighted the theoretically rich public policy, management, OS and 
medical sociology literatures which scholars have drawn upon to analyse the impact of 
EBHC. This thesis explores the role of assumptions over clinical evidence and how this may 
frame strategic-level reconfiguration of an urban stroke service. Therefore it is necessary to 
review the literature focused reconfiguration and mergers in health care. It is noted below that 
this literature stream tends to be less rich in theoretical terms than some of the broader 
literatures discussed thus far. Potential reasons for this are discussed below.  
 
2.5 The ‘politics’ of reconfiguration and mergers in health care 
 
There are few studies which explore health care reconfigurations empirically in the acute 
sector (Fulop et al, 2012). In addition to this, definitional issues and differentiated analytic 
approaches that hamper comparisons across the studies which do exist. There are also two 
key conceptual issues which hinder the health care reconfiguration and merger literature. 
Firstly, many studies take a highly normative approach which questions whether 
organisational change is ‘successful’ or not, this in turn means that many of these studies are 
insufficiently critical in theoretical terms. Secondly, many studies fail to question the nature 
of evidence and knowledge behind reconfigurations and the power coalitions which construct 
these knowledge bases. Nonetheless a number of important empirical findings can be drawn 




Spurgeon et al (2010) produced a systematic review of the international literature relating to 
strategic health service delivery change and highlight the pluralist nature of the conflicting 
‘political’ standpoints of clinicians, managers and members of the public (Spurgeon et al, 
2010; p15). They conclude that it is useful to view reconfiguration as a process which takes 
time rather than as a singular event, and also that ‘politics’, conflict and the often 
irreconcilable goals of key players make satisfactory outcomes for all highly unlikely. 
Furthermore, they are sceptical about the role played by public consultation in health 
configuration (Spurgeon et al; p18). 
 
The authors draw on the arguments of McKee and Healy (2002) to highlight how costs and a 
desire to control them have traditionally been seen as drivers towards service 
reconfigurations. Parallel to this the work of Ferguson et al (1997) is presented. This 
highlights the argument frequently emanating from the medical lobby that larger is better. 
The authors argue that a major rationale behind recent reconfigurations has been that 
outcomes in specialised units where more patients are treated by more highly specialised staff 
are superior to outcomes achieved in traditionally delivered less specialised units – as 
suggested by Farrington-Douglas and Brookes (2007). The evidence that bigger, specialised 
centres are better has a very high degree of contestability –a number of studies exist which 
show that high volume centres may have worse outcomes than ‘those with some slack’ 
(Spurgeon et al, 2010; p56).Local factors may be more important than the generalised 
concept that bigger, and more specialised units are universally, inherently superior vis a vis 
patient outcomes. Furthermore, the evidence is incomplete when guiding thresholds at which 
efficiency is achieved, and there is a danger in extrapolating findings from one clinical area 
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as being indicative of proposed performance in other areas. Likewise claims related to the 
changes in access and times taken in travel to care are disputed. The subject of the clinical 
labour market and its regulation forms another strand of ‘supply side’ arguments for 
reconfiguration (Spurgeon et al, 2010). 
 
Central themes identified in this comprehensive review are (1) the plurality of conflicting 
view-points amongst the actors concerned – many committed to the status quo, others 
committed to change; (2) the role of perceived economic rationalisation – this is attractive to 
commissioners of services and resisted by practitioners and patient groups; (3) key arguments 
over the links between specialisation (e.g. larger is better), travel times, and labour market 
implications all draw upon highly contestable evidence. It is therefore a combination of local 
plurality of views drawing on non-definitive evidence amongst a context of economic 
suspicion which politicises reconfigurations so starkly. However, a criticism might be that is 
little attempt made to go further and unpack why and how the evidence base behind 
reconfigurations is so contested – for example, how is the evidence constructed, and by 
whom, at what point and to what ends? (Greenhalgh and Wieringa, 2011) How are services 
constructed as ‘failing’ or problematic? To what extent are such issues linked to ‘causal 
stories’ in which problems are (re)-constructed as amenable to human action (Stone 1989) in 
certain times and places? And finally, how are such ‘political’ issues shaped by and shaping 
of the identities of key players with respect to their conflicting view-points? 
 
The following studies of mergers and reconfigurations of provider services in the health care 
sector provide empirically significant themes which underline the ‘political’ controversies 
identified by Spurgeon et al (2010). Ahgren (2008) examined the merger of a Swedish 
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hospital from two existing hospitals in 1996. The ostensible motivation for the merger was 
that ‘bigger hospitals lead to lower average costs and improved clinical outcomes’. The study 
consisted of both qualitative and quantitative elements and concluded that it is not necessarily 
‘better to be big’ and that a great degree of turbulence was caused for the employees – and 
was still present a decade post-merger. Turbulence caused by forced merger is a recurrent 
theme in this literature, picked up by Cortvriend (2004) who looks at the effects of merger 
and demerger in an English PCT again focusing on employee perceptions of forced change. 
A distinction in this study is made between those clinical areas which are ‘cherry-picked’ for 
special treatment, and how employees here may experience increases in motivation, 
compared to the de-motivational aspect of working in a service area not singled out for 
increased financial or organisational focus.  
 
Mercer (2008) in another non-UK study emphasises the challenge of implementing change in 
the face of staff resistance. The study emphasises the importance of having clear united 
leadership in the face of limited evidence behind the effectiveness of the merger. Leadership 
and organisational culture clashes emerge as key themes in work by Fulop et al (2005) which 
focused on four in depth case studies 2-3 years post-merger. This highlights the key roles 
played by context, complexity and process manifested in ‘perceived differences in 
organisational culture’ and fears of ‘takeover’ by one organisation and values over another. 
The concept of ‘stated and unstated drivers’ behind the merger process is useful. Stated 
drivers included: internal management cost savings, safeguarding specialist units and 
guaranteeing service developments, ensuring the quality and level of service in light of 
external policy drivers, improve conditions and career prospects for staff and address 
recruitment and retention problems. Unstated drivers included: addressing managerial 
deficits, addressing financial deficits, local and national political context (in this case 
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pertaining to the status of one of the hospitals involved).  The study notes that the notions 
behind the mergers were often based on ‘simplistic notions of organisational change’ which 
failed to factor in the human effects that such change would have on staff and also that there 
was ‘little evidence that the economic and clinical objectives that formed the drivers for 
mergers are achievable’ (Fulop et al, 2005; p129) . 
 
Hutchings et al (2003) suggest that the role of outside management consultants employed to 
reduce management costs as part of service reconfiguration actually increase costs; at least in 
the short to medium term. The politically sensitive context of hospital reconfiguration is 
emphasised by Brown (2003) focusing on the Kidderminster General Hospital case which 
reached its apogee in the 2001 general election. The paper highlights the contextual factors in 
which  prospective reforms, closures or ‘downsizings’ take place and the importance of 
localism, symbolism, and ‘sense of place’ in relation to whether plans are supported or 
challenged by local communities. The economic context in which reforms are proposed is 
crucial – in the case of Kidderminster, ‘severe financial difficulties’ were behind the review. 
In a similar vein Parkinson (2003) places the proposed plans to reconfigure acute services in 
Leicester at the turn of the century, and the public reaction to these in a Habermasian 
framework to highlight the complex and competing claims of democracy, legitimacy, EBM 
and public attachment to certain services being delivered in certain sites regardless of the 
‘expert’ view. 
 
Choi and Brommels (2009) provide a focus on pre-merger decisions rather than post-merger 
contexts (which much other merger/reconfiguration literature examines). The long term 
forces driving merger include economic efficiency and research excellence, but the 
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importance of short term economic crises in putting the (unpopular in many circles) merger 
formally on the table as an idea to be pursued in reality is emphasised. This long term 
retrospective view allows the authors to show the role of local and economic contexts in 
delivering or denying large scale change, and creating the ‘window of opportunity’ which 
allowed the merger to take place when it did (Choi and Brommels, 2009; p251). They 
question whether there must be a ‘crisis’ in order to fundamentally change the decision logic 
of political organisations.  
 
Cameron et al (2007) study the reconfiguration of stroke services in Ontario, with a focus on 
the role of evidence in promoting these changes. While this paper is useful given its explicit 
focus on the role of evidence, the definition of evidence is narrow and the paper is based on a 
rather normative view of the implementation process.  They suggest that clinical evidence is 
used by clinical decision makers, and economists respond to economic evidence, but the 
authors rather uncritically accept this, so we learn little of the tensions inherent in the 
development and implementation of the stroke system and the epistemological role of forms 
evidence and the communities who construct and control these. An empirical finding of note 
in this study is the difficulty in implementing change in rehabilitation, long term and 
community care (Cameron et al, 2007; p9) which is a recognised problem in stroke care 
(Baeza et al, 2012a). 
 
Oborn (2008) in an example of a reconfiguration study offering theoretical insights, points to 
the socially constructed frameworks of legitimacy used by different groups to make sense of 
service change using the Kidderminster saga to differentiate between ‘moral legitimacy’ and 
‘cognitive legitimacy’ in the views of competing factions in contentious change. Oborn 
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suggests that there are a number of ‘irrational’ processes that are central to reconfigurations. 
(Oborn, 2008; p11) She explores the role of discourse to highlight how conflicting rhetorical 
strategies were used by the competing factions and how they tended to argue past each other. 
The ‘pro-change’ lobby appealed to the Discourse of medical science whilst the counter ‘anti-
change lobby’ were ‘expressed in moral terms, de-legitimizing the changes as partisan;’ 
favouring the medical establishment view at the expense of local views on wellbeing. ‘[A]t a 
fundamental level, “specialists” are constructed by interlocking discourses which privilege 
and maintain their positions of decision-making within their domain.’ Thus the political value 
of change and evidence is highlighted thereby illuminating how and why different groups 
rationalise policy objectives (Oborn, 2008; p17).  
 
Whether represented by service reconfiguration or provider merger, organisational change in 
health care is an inherently ‘political’ process in which evidence is just one of many elements 
(Spurgeon et al, 2010). Different factions; patient/public, clinical, managerial and political 
may use conflicting values and frameworks to interpret the utility of proposed changes 
(Alford, 1975; Denis et al, 2001). Different contexts may be more or less ‘receptive’ to 
change (Pettigrew et al, 1992). The clinical and managerial rationale behind reconfigurations 
and mergers, often based on potential patient outcome improvements and economic 
efficiencies is contested throughout the reviewed literature. There are both stated and 
unstated drivers behind proposed changes (Fulop, 2004). There is very little focus on the 
epistemological rationale behind service reconfigurations and the use of ‘evidence based’ 
Discourse. The transitional power dynamics as negotiated between policy makers, managers 
and different clinicians in the production of new ‘standardising’ protocols is not critically 
explored. The existing reconfiguration literature fails to explore service change with 
reference to public management theories of NPM and governance regimes. Therefore, despite 
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its empirical usefulness, this particular literature stream fails to increase theoretical 
knowledge around professional and managerial power, control, knowledge and identity 
conflicts relating to mergers and service change more broadly (Addicott and Ferlie, 2007). 
Dean (2010) argues that it is at precisely such times as whole scale reorganisation and change 
that these issues are ripe for critical analysis. 
 
2.6 Summary: EBHC, policy, management and service reconfiguration 
 
The role of EBHC as a locus to examine the shifting epistemic values of policy makers, 
managers and professionals is potentially fruitful because EBHC opens a window on the 
ways in which knowledge is constructed and codified as well as both the ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ approaches to its implementation (Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Ferlie et al, 
2011). Public policy making and public management in the New Labour era was based on a 
number of paradoxical assertions and conflicting issues of governance (Newman, 2001; 
2005). ‘Hard’ NPM tools based on increased measurement and interventionist management 
regimes sat alongside post-NPM ‘network governance’ (Rhodes, 2007; Pollitt, 2013) levers 
based on collaboration and the kind of ‘learning systems’ and reflective practice needed to 
embed long term cultural change based on evidence based principles cognizant of local 
contextual conditions (Davies and Nutley, 2000).  
 
Whilst there is a large literature focused on how the epistemic impacts of EBHC have 
changed relationships within the medical profession and with state actors at a macro-level; 
and of the challenges which policy makers and managers face in implementing EBHC 
policies, an important gap in the literature is a lack of understanding about how (both clinical 
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hybrid and non-clinical) managers – particularly at the strategic level interpret and use the 
discourse of EBHC in their interactions with senior clinicians and research leaders to achieve 
(what may be messy) local, regional and national policy goals. This is especially so with 
reference to service reconfigurations which have ‘politically’ polarising effects and for which 
the evidence itself is very much contested (Spurgeon et al, 2010) but which have been 
hitherto under-researched in theoretical terms. Recent studies focused on reconfigurations 
and health service mergers suggested that this literature frequently fails to build on many of 
the established literature streams reviewed above and (with notable exceptions) tends to be 
theoretically weak. Therefore there is scope in the literature for a theoretically driven study of 
large scale reconfiguration which focuses on the ways in which EBHC changes professional 
and managerial perceptions of valid evidence in service reconfiguration and also draws on 
wider concepts from the management and public policy traditions.  
 
A second area with scope for development is around the ways in which ‘actionable 
knowledge’ (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005) – in the form of ‘evidence based’ protocols 
impacts upon different managerial and professional groups within an organisation. In 
particular, building on work by Newman (2001; 2005); Ferlie et al (2011; 2013) and Ferlie 
and McGivern (2014) this thesis aims to develop theory by drawing on the work of Foucault 
and scholars with an interest in governmentality (Miller and Rose, 2003; Foucault, 2007; 
Dean, 2010) and focusing on how this may aid understanding in the disputed NPM and post-













Increasing numbers of authors have turned to the work of Foucault in recent times searching 
for more sophisticated ways of interpreting the interplay of politics, power, governance and 
changing conceptions of the state in contemporary society (Burchell et al, 1991; Power, 1999; 
Rose, 1999; Newman, 2001; 2005; Miller and Rose, 2008; Dean, 2010). Others have used his 
work specifically to focus on management and organizations (Townley, 1993; McKinlay and 
Starkey, 1998) and public administration (Bogason, 2005). Of most relevance for this thesis, 
is the development of governmentality scholarship in health care organisation and service 
delivery over the past decade (Doolin, 2004; Flynn, 2004; Sheaff et al, 2004; Waring, 2007; 
Ferlie et al, 2011; Martin et al, 2013).  
 
As described in the previous chapter, exposure to the work of these authors during the early 
stages of the PhD research highlighted that a Foucauldian framing might be apposite for a 
theoretically additive thesis focused on the role of evidence in influencing the reconfiguration 
of stroke services in London. This decision was deductively guided by a desire to explore the 
ways in which knowledge creation and discursive techniques of power may influence the 
development and implementation of evidence based regimes of practice (Dean, 2010) across 
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a specific biopolitical (Foucault, 2007) terrain. Other theoretical framings might have been 
chosen – for example, Addicott and Ferlie (2007) have discussed the utility of pluralist (Dahl, 
1957) and structuralist (Alford, 1975) approaches to power in organisational research in the 
NHS – however, post-structuralist approaches (Fairclough, 1992; Newman, 2001) appeared 
particularly fruitful for furthering understanding around the construction and implementation 
of evidence, and evidence based practice. 
 
This chapter will begin by introducing key aspects of Foucault’s (2007) work on 
governmentality and how these may be applied to contemporary health care policy making 
and management. A particular aim is to ground these theoretical constructs in contemporary 
debates around evidence based stroke care to emphasise the practical utility of this approach. 
Then the chapter will introduce an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean, 2010) as a framework to 
be used in this thesis to apply a governmentality approach to the analysis of the London 
stroke service reconfiguration. Following this the chapter will thematically review the 
governmentality influenced literature focused on health care policy and management which 
has developed since the 1990s and draw out a number of key foci and questions which may 





One of the advantages a governmentality approach is its historical sweep and concomitant 
interest in both macro- and micro-level features of how societies and individuals come to 
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function. Thus, when analysing how stroke care in London has been problematised and 
approaches to remedy this are designed; different governmental aspects can be examined. 
Essentially, it is possible to simultaneously view long term historical factors behind the 
growth and establishment of certain powerful groups and modes of knowledge, and also 
frame methods of understanding which relate to how this might influence the management 
and behaviour of individuals and how they function on a day to day level. Foucault taught a 
course at the College de France from 1977-78 where he developed and articulated his ideas 
relating to what governmentality might mean. Foucault suggests that for him, this word 
“governmentality” means three things: 
 
‘First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the 
tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has 
constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, 
discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and which 
has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses 
(appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of 
knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the 
process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle 
Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was 





Foucault emphasises that the state should not be viewed as an almighty, unified force, rather 
scholars should look at the ways in which government functions; how knowledge and power 
are created and directed via governmental channels and that rather than the state taking over 
society, a process of ‘governmentalization’ of the state has occurred (Foucault, 2007). This 
macro-level distinction has implications for how power functions at a micro-level. Dean 
(2010) cites the idea of government as ‘conduct of conduct’ pointing to the multiple meanings 
of the word conduct – firstly to lead, or to guide, perhaps in a calculated way he suggests. 
Secondly, conduct may be seen as a form of self-direction – how we conduct ourselves. 
Thirdly, we might conceive of the meaning of the word conduct when employed as a noun – 
i.e. behaviour, action (Dean, 2010; p17) 
 
Government at a macro-level functions as a way of ordering society. Modern liberal 
democracies are seen to function in the interest of their populations, and legitimacy is derived 
from this. This creates a compact between those who are governed and those involved in the 
systems which govern. An example here would be the post-war welfare state, and, pertinent 
to this work – the NHS. In England, the health needs of the population are assured – funded 
by general taxation. Likewise, the police service is provided by the government to protect the 
population from certain forms of danger. Compulsory education up to the age of 16 is 
provided by the government. Social security payments are provided to those out of work. In a 
liberal democracy there are debates about the values or otherwise of different levels of 
economic interventionism. Neoliberal critiques problematise Keynesian welfarism, and 
supposedly promote more laissez-faire paradigms which emphasise market rationality, 
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choice, enterprise and responsible autonomy (Dean, 2010). However, even within a 
neoliberal position, there is a general acceptance of the necessity of some form of 
government function for the benefit of the population. 
 
Government at a micro-level functions as a way of (self) ordering individuals. Part of the 
compact between those who are governed and those involved in the systems which govern is 
an understanding of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct at different times. 
Townley suggests governmentality can be understood as a ‘neologism derived from a 
combination of government and rationality’ (Townley, 1993; p520) – our values and conduct 
are shaped by a broader Discourse, the legitimacy and validity of which being derived from 
governmental apparatuses and ethical standpoints. We are free to function how we choose; 
however, we are constrained in our choices by the dominant Discourses of the regimes of 
practice in which we live – hence the significance of how we problematise ourselves in 
relation to dominant and countervailing forms of power (Foucault, 1986; Haugaard, 2002; 
p186). 
 
There are multiple interpretations of Foucault’s work and how it may be applied to the 
question of structure and agency; these include some which suggest that he allows for an 
autonomous subject (Archer, 2000; Han, 2002), some who argue that when ‘composed’ 
Foucault will allow a role for agency, and when ‘excitable’ not; whilst consistently denying 
the existence of an autonomous subject (Bevir, 1999; 2004) – pointing towards a concept of 
‘situated’ agency (Bevir, 2011). Power (2011) suggests that one of the most persistent 
criticisms of Foucault and his approach is a lack of a recognizable theory of action and role 
for agency at all. Others suggest that it is possible to infer different interpretations of 
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Foucault’s work at different stages of his career, as his interests change over time from 
archaeology to genealogy (Dews, 1984). Foucault himself suggested towards the end of his 
life: 
 
‘Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am 
more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the 
technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual 
exercises upon himself by means of technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 2000, p225)  
 
Foucault’s late work (as opposed to his middle period) concentrates on ‘practices of freedom’ 
as opposed to ‘states of domination’ (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998, p232; Foucault, 2000, 
p225). There is an implicit move from a focus on marginalization to problematisation 
(Gutting, 2011). His earlier work demonstrated how marginalised members of society were 
confronted by and constructed via a power/knowledge nexus emphasising disciplinary power. 
This clearly left little room for the role of agency. However the later work does not focus on 
the marginalized; rather, problematisation is Foucault’s way of focusing on ‘fundamental 
issues and choices confronting “mainline” (non-marginalised) members of a society’ 
(Gutting, 2011). In these cases, individuals do have the resources for some kind of self-
formation. McKinlay and Starkey (1998) term this process as a shift from subjection to 
subjectification - in that the self may transform itself and be a willing partner in the 
development and exercise of knowledge and power in some instances. There is a focus here 
on how ‘technologies of the self’ (McKinley and Starkey, 1998; Foucault, 2000) are applied 




Government then, can be understood both as an attempt to shape the conduct of others and 
that of ourselves. In liberal societies, government is inextricably linked with ideas of freedom 
– thus ‘counter-conducts’ or acts of resistance (Foucault, 2007; p202) are identifiable. The 
concept of governmentality can be used as a framework for understanding how the power at 
the macro-level (government) subtly functions at a micro-level whilst maintaining the idea of 
freedom throughout the various governmental systems. Having introduced some key aspects 
behind a conception of what governmentality may be understood to be, the next section turns 
to questions relating to how it functions with a focus on the development of EBHC. 
 
Biopolitics and the power/knowledge nexus 
 
The term ‘biopolitics’ expresses the governmental concept that human beings are viewed 
collectively as a species, and are governed as such, hence problems of how to regulate and 
improve conditions are rationalised on a population scale. Biopolitics is, for Foucault: 
 
‘the endeavour, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented 
to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human 
beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth-rate, longevity, race’ 
(Foucault, 2000; p73) 
 
These concerns for governing at the level (and in the interest) of the population are related to 
conceptions of security and the state. Foucault demonstrates the historical evolution of the 
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concept of state control in the population’s (health) interest with a three-stage example 
comparing how lepers in the Middle Ages were excluded from society, then how the Plague 
regulations imposed (disciplinary) quarantine measures on towns, whilst the Smallpox 
inoculation practices from the 18th Century drew upon novel forms of knowledge and 
calculation to manage the risk of disease in new ways (Foucault, 2007). These evolving 
examples demonstrate how the exercise of power and the centrality of a calculable population 
as a target of government became more sophisticated over time: 
 
‘The elaboration of a notion of the population was a gradual process that was both 
technical and theoretical, relying on the development of statistics and census-taking, 
and the techniques of epidemiology and demography... Population is an absolutely key 
term in the elaboration of the art of government at the end of the eighteenth century. 
This is because it figures and binds together two different trajectories. On the one 
hand, it provides the “life-administering power” of bio-politics with an object. On the 
other, it provides liberalism as a critical rationality with a government-limiting 
critique’ (Dean, 2010; p128) 
 
Biopolitical interventions are ‘linked to the phenomenon of the town itself’ (Foucault, 2007; 
p63) and the ‘most biopolitical of ends: [is] the maintenance of life and the wellbeing of the 
population’ (Dean, 2010; p142) making the study of the London stroke service 
reconfiguration apposite to theoretical development around the biopolitical theme. Whilst 
Ferlie et al (2011) suggest that evidence based guidelines leading to service reconfigurations 
might be a form of ‘biopower’ overall this is a neglected area in other studies found within 
Foucauldian literature in health care and management. Indeed a major theoretical contribution 
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this thesis makes to Foucauldian influenced health care management literature is to 
demonstrate the utility of interpreting service reconfigurations as biopolitical interventions 
(Foucault, 2007). 
 
Foucault (2007) describes how biopolitical interventions may be seen as ‘practices of 
security’ which draw on four distinct notions; case, risk, danger and crisis. The ‘case’ here is 
not the individual (or patient) case – rather it is ‘a way of individualizing the collective 
phenomenon of the disease… in the form of quantification and of the rational and 
identifiable’ (Foucault, 2007; p60). Following this, if a disease can be interpreted both at the 
group and the individual level, then the ‘risk’ in terms of mortality and morbidity for different 
segments of the population can be calculated. Next the variability of risk highlights which 
sub-groups from within a given population are in most ‘danger’ of suffering from a given 
disease – Foucault points to the danger faced by the under-threes living in urban areas posed 
by smallpox (p61). The final notion is that of ‘crisis’ which in Foucault’s example is 
described as a ‘sudden worsening, acceleration, and increase of the disease’ (p61). 
 
An understanding of ‘liberal’ rule is important here. Rose describes liberal rule as 
‘government at a distance’ (Rose, 1999; p49). Dean (2010) defines liberalism as ‘the critique 
of excessive government’ (p267). This approach suggests government has become an ‘art’, 
divorced from the figure of the sovereign – governing in the interests of the population whilst 
simultaneously limiting its apparent remit which in turn secures its own legitimacy. This has 
implications for how society is structured and policed and how health, illness and medicine 




In the ‘Birth of the Clinic’ (Foucault, 1975), Foucault conveys the genealogy of medicine and 
its symbiotic relation with government power. Rose allies this process with what he terms the 
development ‘the social’ (and we might term the general population, or society) to document 
how the influence of government flowed through society carried by expert knowledge and 
professional bureaucracies (Rose, 1999; p133). Rose also highlights the role played by 
numbers and statistics in the production of ‘objective knowledge’ and the legitimacy this 
brings to both professional groups and government in order to create discourses and 
behaviour conducive to state interest. This special kind of expert knowledge is free from 
direct political control and market influences (Rose, 1999; p133). The following passage 
(though long) is highly pertinent with respect to the connection of numbers with expert 
authority: 
 
‘When the authority of authority is secure, when authoritative judgements carry 
inherent authority, when the legitimacy of their authority is not subject to sceptical 
scrutiny and challenge, experts have little need of numbers. But where mistrust of 
authority flourishes, where experts are the targets of suspicion and their claims are 
greeted with scepticism by politicians, disputed by professional rivals, distrusted by 
public opinion, where decisions are contested and discretion is criticised, the allure of 
numbers increases. It is in these circumstances that professionals and experts try to 
justify their judgements on the ground of objectivity, and frequently frame this 
objectivity in numerical form. Numbers are resorted to in order to settle or diminish 
conflicts in a contested space of weak authority. And the “power of the single figure” 
is here a rhetorical technique for “black boxing” – that is to say, rendering invisible 
and hence incontestable – the complex array of judgements and decisions that go into 
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a measurement, a scale, a number. The apparent facticity of the figure obscures the 
complex technical work that is required to produce objectivity’ (Rose, 1999, p208) 
 
Recourse to scientism and faith in the power of numbers resonates with the methodology of 
the EBHC movement and is useful when evaluating how a governmentality framework might 
be applied to an attempt to account for its emergence. Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) suggest 
that traditionally two approaches have been used by social scientists to critique EBM - 
political economy and humanism - and that this is problematic. They suggest post-modernist 
approaches, and empirically based research as apposite to remedy the traditional failings of 
social science approaches to gaining a greater understanding of the implications of EBM. The 
application of a Foucauldian framework to the analysis of EBHC may potentially increase 
understanding of the power/knowledge relations both within the medical profession and 
between it and the government. 
 
Biopolitics is useful when conceptualising the role of epidemiology and both its theoretical 
application vis a vis the EBHC movement, and more specifically the idea of reconfiguring 
local health services on a population (as opposed to a personal) level. Epidemiology and 
aggregated numerical knowledge of a systematic nature sits atop the hierarchy of evidence in 
EBHC (Davies, Nutley and Smith, 2000; Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Epidemiological 
knowledge has traditionally been created and interpreted by clinicians, public health experts, 
statisticians, health economists and other health service research specialists. This knowledge 
is interpreted by governments to direct specific programmes of health reform. These 
programmes then require further monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness, feeding back 
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further information, knowledge and evidence to shape policy. This may be seen as a kind of 
power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie and McGivern, 2014). 
 
Surveillance and disciplinary power 
  
Having discussed the concept of EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus, this section considers 
the Foucauldian concepts of surveillance and disciplinary power. This is most famously 
understood in relation to Foucault’s work on Bentham’s Panopticon (Foucault, 1977). Rose 
suggests that the dystopian visions of 24 hour surveillance society which some analysts have 
interpreted as being heralded by Panopticism miss the point that Foucault was making – the 
Foucauldian reality is rather more subtle: 
 
‘Panopticism did not model a dominating totalitarian society: it was a diagram of a 
mode of power that sought to induce a certain relation of human beings to themselves. 
Discipline... was not a means of producing terrorized slaves without privacy, but self-
managing citizens capable of conducting themselves in freedom, shaping their newly 
acquired “private lives” according to norms of civility, and judging their conduct 
accordingly’ (Rose, 1999; p244) 
 
Disciplinary power coexists with governmental and sovereign forms of power (Dean, 2010) 
and can be seen as a ‘productive force’ (Hodgson, 2002; Brown and Lewis, 2011) 
highlighting the links between Foucauldian interpretations of power Elden (2002). EBHC 
represents an important shift in the governing of health care professionals (Timmermans and 
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Berg, 2003; Mykhalovskiy and Weir, 2004) and impacts upon subjective self-identity:  ‘it is 
when we are called upon to change our relation to government that we are also required to 
change our relation to ourselves, to change our subjective self-identity, and it is then that we 
become aware of the ways in which the political power of the state impinges on our 
individual lives, that we feel it’ (Burchell, 1991; p145). This theoretical standpoint is 
important when we look at recently prevailing themes in health care management and 
regulation such as audit, clinical governance, national advisory bodies and regulators and 
network organisational trends. These are reform programmes (Dean, 2010) which seek to 
change clinician behaviour. It is worth exploring these ideas further in relation to stroke care 
in England, and its governance. As highlighted earlier in this work, there have been a whole 
host of publications produced in recent years at a macro level by various clinical and 
government bodies examining the structural weaknesses of current stroke provision and 
potential roadmaps to improvement; The Department of Health (DH) published a National 
Service Framework for Older People (2001) and National Stroke Strategy (2007). The RCP 
also published National Clinical Guidelines for Stroke (2004), as well as the joint guidelines 
published with NICE in 2008.The National Audit Office (NAO) has also produced two major 
documents focussing on quality and cost-effectiveness; Reducing Brain Damage: faster 
access to better stroke care (2005) and Joining Forces to Deliver Improved Stroke Care 
(2007). Fundamental also, is the RCP produced a bi-annual National Sentinel Audit of Stroke 
for England Wales and Northern Ireland which has been published since 1998. This includes 
data from all hospitals in the 3 nations which admit and treat stroke patients giving a 
comprehensive picture of the state of stroke care in the UK (excluding Scotland). 
 
At a national level, guidelines prescribe best practice, thus the clinical autonomy enjoyed by 
previous generations of practitioners to choose methods of care outside of published accepted 
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best practice is reduced – knowledge created and validated at the epidemiological level 
trumps individual patho-physiological  rationality as a widespread modality of practice. 
EBHC (theoretically) aims to regularise standard treatment across the profession 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003).To relate back to the image of the panopticon, for the last 
sixteen years, the RCP has produced clinical audit reports which highlight the performance of 
every hospital in the country in relation to stroke – thus aspects of clinical performance are 
open (to varying degrees) to view – however, improvements have been slower in England 
than in other countries (Rudd, 2005). 
 
Performance can be measured by national audit and local clinical governance. In a 
Foucauldian sense, self-governance might be seen to take place (more or less successfully) 
within this context at a micro-level. Such developments open up questions about how these 
new forms of governance impact upon clinical-managerial relations and broader issues 
around health care policy and management. These will be explored in this thesis through a 
specific analytic approach introduced below. 
 
3.3 An analytics of government 
 
Foucault’s work offers not a ‘global principle for analyzing society’ (Foucault, 1978 – quoted 
in Burchell, 1991 p85) nor ‘general theory’ but rather a particular ‘ethos’ drawing on 
‘conceptual tools’ to explore contemporary political questions (Rose, 1999; p5). A number of 
influential scholars clustered around Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller and termed ‘London 
Governmentalists’ (McKinlay and Taylor, 2014) have applied Foucault’s thoughts on 
governmentality to contemporary social issues in highly innovative ways. Rather than a meta-
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theoretical approach, Governmentalists use Foucault’s ideas about neoliberal governance as a 
‘toolkit’ to perform analysis around empirical or historical questions (McKinlay and Taylor, 
2014; p15). In this vein, Miller and Rose (1992) propose a ‘problematics of government’ 
influenced by Foucault’s work. The authors offer ‘some elements of an “analytic” of 
problematics of government’ (Miller and Rose, 1992; p175) and they illustrate these through 
an investigation of liberalism, welfarism, and neo-liberalism. Central concerns are 
apparatuses of government, technical means of idea translation, knowledge and the role of 
state agencies in government. They cite three differences between their approach and that of 
the traditional sociology of state formation; firstly, they reject a realist approach, emphasising 
instead an approach which focuses on how those in authority have approached power and 
methods of governance. Secondly, they emphasise the role of language, to gain an 
understanding of both the systems of thought and systems of action behind government 
action. Their final concern is that of knowledge – not just of ideas, but rather of theories, 
experiments and techniques – ‘know-how’ (Miller and Rose, 1992; p177).  
 
They focus in turn upon, the programmes of government – emphasising that government is a 
‘problematising’ activity (Miller and Rose, 1992; p181). This prompts consideration of which 
problems are made visible, and which kept hidden at different points in time. A discussion of 
the technologies of government, and the need to focus on the ‘humble and mundane 
mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government’ (Miller and Rose, 1992; 
p183) is emphasised. The authors describe ‘inscription and calculation as technologies of 
government’ then ‘expertise and government’ with relation to the governmentalization of the 
state. Finally they provide a description of welfare provision in the UK and in particular of 
NHS management in the twentieth century within the context of the changing paradigms of 




Dean (2010) builds on the work of the London Governmentalists to provide an indicative 
framework to apply governmentality influenced approach to questions of policy. He terms 
this perspective an ‘analytics of government.’ (Dean, 2010; p30) This approach focuses on 
how ‘regimes of practice’ come in to being and function – exploring questions of knowledge, 
authority and power. This offers the analyst a toolkit to take a ‘critical approach by 
transcending moral judgements about the proper form of “good” and “democratic” 
government’ (McKee, 2009; p471). This thesis will employ features of this ‘toolkit’ to 
explore the role of evidence in the reconfiguration of London stroke services. It is therefore 
important in this section to highlight the key elements and specific forms of terminology used 
in this approach and how they apply this thesis. 
 
The first point to make is that an analytics of government aims not for ideal type 
generalisations but rather focuses on singularities of governing and conducting ourselves and 
others. It explores specific ‘regimes of practices’ and how they emerge, function and change 
over time: 
 
‘[R]egimes of practices or regimes of government... involve practices for the 
production of truth and knowledge, comprise multiple forms of practical, technical 
and calculative rationality, and are subject to programmes for their reform. It is 
important to realize that regimes of practice exist within a milieu composed of 




The term ‘regimes of practices’ refers to ways that key social functions of government  such 
as ‘curing, caring, punishing, assisting, educating’ are in effect done; within which, ‘regimes 
of government’ represent a subset of these regimes of practices focused ways of directing ‘the 
conduct of the self and others’ so relate to human behaviour. ‘Programmes’ are an ‘aspect of 
governmental rationality. These are explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes 
of practices by reorienting them to specific ends or investing them with particular purposes. 
Programmes often take the form of a link between theoretical knowledge and practical 
concerns and objectives’ (Dean, 2010; p268).  
 
An analytics of government challenges ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about the ways in 
which things are done. It encourages us to critically question why certain practices are 
normalised within for example a ‘health system’ and explore how and why the ideas behind 
these practices were introduced and prioritised over others. Different regimes of practices 
may compete and influence each other - for example, ‘regimes of calculation drawn from 
accounting and auditing’ (Miller and Rose, 1992; Power, 1999; Dean, 2010; p31) have been 
employed extensively in health and other public sector services to regulate practice and offer 
new forms of accountability which influence ‘professional’ practice in England over the past 
25 years as part of NPM reforms – this was discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
There is an interactive relationship between regimes of practices and different forms of 
knowledge - such as medicine - over time. The symbiosis between knowledge and regimes of 
practices is important in conceptualising how ‘programmes’ of reform to challenge regimes 
of practices are established: ‘the practices of curing, punishing and so on, are invested with 
multiple programmes that employ certain types of knowledge to reform or radically challenge 
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their operation, to reorient them to new goals and objectives and act upon the desires, 
aspirations, needs and attributes of the agents within them’ (Dean, 2010; p32). This is useful 
for furthering understanding around how knowledge and evidence impact upon regimes of 
practice and government in health care. 
 
An analytics of government commences then by studying how programmes of reform 
problematise or question the ways in which things have traditionally been done. For this 
present study, the programme would be the attempts to reform stroke care in England since 
the mid-1990s and more specifically the attempts made by the London SHA from about 2007 
to question the effectiveness of the delivery of stroke services in London and the subsequent 
work to design and implement a new strategy for delivering stroke care in the capital. This 
will in turn influence the regimes of government (the shaping of the conduct of health care 
staff involved in stroke care) employed to change aspects of the regimes of practice involved 
in the caring of stroke patients.  
 
However, Dean suggests that there is an intrinsic logic or strategy to regimes of practices that 
cannot be reduced to specific programmes for reform – rather, a key element of an analytics 
of government is to highlight the ‘disjunction between the explicit, calculated and 
programmatic rationality and the non-subjective intentionality that can be constructed 
through analysis’ of how regimes of practices function and influence behaviour (Dean, 2010; 
p32). We need to differentiate between the broad strategy of regimes of practice, and the 
programmes that endeavour to shape them and prioritise certain purposeful elements. 
Regimes of practice thus constitute an assemblage of functions and logics which cannot be 
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reduced to the desires of a specific actor, or programme ethos – but do have an identifiable 
‘matrix of ends and purposes’ (Dean, 2010; p32).  
 
Despite this rather technical language, an analytics of government basically represents a way 
to explore how we govern ourselves and others; and how we are governed by others within a 
multitude of different governmental regimes. It encourages a critical questioning of how such 
regimes are formed, how they then function, and finally how they are transformed (Dean, 
2010; p33). It is premised on an understanding of government in liberal and neoliberal 
societies as governing through freedom, rather than traditional forms of sovereign or 
disciplinary power (whilst accepting that both sovereign and disciplinary power coexist in 
contemporary forms of governing) seeing subjects as ‘living individuals, as members of a 
population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimized’ (Dean, 2010; p29). It 
sees governing as an ‘art’ that prioritises the (economic and health) wellbeing of the 
population above all else (Foucault, 2007). 
 
 Dean (2010) draws on the work of Deleuze in the designation of his ‘analytics of 
government’ framework, and his essay ‘What is a dispositif?’(Deleuze, 1992) The word 
dispositive has no direct English translation, but ‘social apparatus’ or ‘device’ seems to be the 
most useful way of understanding the word’s meaning. Deleuze’s language is figurative and 
refers to non-linear lines and folds of knowledge. He identifies four of the key lines which 




‘These apparatuses, then, are composed of the following elements: lines of visibility 
and enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, lines of splitting, breakage, 
fracture, all of which mingle and criss-cross and mingle together’ (Deleuze, 1992; 
p162) 
 
So these four strands of governing which exist independently converge on an analytic level. 
By considering them independently and interactively however, we can deduct a more 
comprehensive insight in to how methods of governing interact with each other in a historical 
and practical sense. 
 
For this thesis, as stated above, the key problematisation is the identification of stroke 
services in London as being below par and in need of improvement, the question then 
becomes – how is this to be remedied? What are the forms of knowledge, techniques and 
practices, identities and agencies, or ‘regimes of government’ employed to attend to this 
problem? (Dean, 2010; p40) Following Deleuze (1992), Dean defines four dimensions along 
which this can be analysed (Dean, 2010; p41). These have been adapted below to show how 
they might usefully be applied to this study: 
 
1. The examination of fields of visibility of government. What is the significance of the 
documentation created as part of the reconfiguration process? What data is published 
when and why, by whom and for what purpose? Which outcomes will be publicised 
and which will not? Who and what are to be governed by the reconfiguration? We 
must consider the public (as potential patients) and professionals here. Are there some 
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areas which receive more or less attention than others, both in a figurative sense; 
primary versus acute care, and a spatial or economic sense, i.e. are some communities 
excluded? 
 
2. The concern for the technical aspect of government. By what technical means are the 
values of the reconfiguration to be achieved, or ‘by what means, mechanisms, 
procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is 
authority constituted and rule accomplished?’(Dean, 2010; p42) what are the 
implications of the enhanced network control promised in the configuration – how are 
audit and clinical governance to be used and how will this be influenced by economic 
incentives and the role of leaders? 
 
 
3. The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity. Governmentality is 
the connection of government and thought. Essentially, what is the role of knowledge, 
expertise, rationality and interpretations of truth? ‘Programmes of conduct are all the 
attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of 
practices in the name of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of 
explicitness and cogency.’ (Dean, 2010; p43) Here ideas relating to the nature and 
value of evidence, knowledge, calculability and EBHC can be explored. 
 
4. The attention to the formation of identities. ‘What forms of person are presupposed by 
different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices 
seek?’ (Dean, 2010; p43) What is expected of the roles to be played by different 
individuals and how is their conduct to be reformed? What are the implications for the 
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medical profession; both at a senior decision making level, in its involvement in the 
reconfiguration plans, and at a practical level, in how it is encouraged to change its 
practice in order to improve service delivery? How are clinical and managerial 
identities impacted upon throughout organisations both by the reconfiguration process 
and after the process for those affected by the changes?  
 
Having described the central elements of an analytics of government and how they may be 
applied to the study of the reconfiguration of stroke services in London, there remain a 
number of important factors to make explicit about Dean’s approach. Firstly, he suggests that 
we should extract the ‘Utopian’ element of government. This refers to the belief that policies 
can be used to improve people, behaviour or societies in some way – an analytics of 
government ought to account for how the ‘art’ of government seeks to create a better world, 
or way of doing things (Dean, 2010; p44). Secondly, an analytics of government ought to be 
circumspect about the role of values and careful not to view regimes of practices as 
manifestations of values, but instead explore how ‘values’ are employed in governmental 
rationality: ‘values, knowledge, techniques are all part of the mix of regimes of practice but 
none alone acts as guarantor of ultimate meaning’ (Dean, 2010; p45).  
 
This leads to a final point – an analytics of government should avoid ‘global or radical’ 
positions. Unlike the work of critical theorists both in broader policy terms and for example 
within Critical Management Studies circles (e.g. Grey and Willmott, 2005), who tend to 
emphasise the alienating and coercive effects of management systems and increased 
surveillance and aim for some kind of liberation or emancipation, Dean suggests an analytics 
of government should not take a position on the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of the activity of 
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governing (Dean, 2010; p46). This rejection of a ‘radical’ position reflects Dean’s contention 
that a governmentality critique sees subjects and their ‘freedom’ as shaped within ‘states of 
domination’ – thus individuals undergo both forms of ‘subjection’ and ‘subjectification’ 
(Dean, 2010; p46). This resonates with the contention of Bevir (2010) that within a 
governmentality framework subjects operate through a ‘situated agency’ and are thus not 
autonomous and capable of ‘standing outside relations of power and forms of domination’ 
(Dean, 2010; p47).  
 
This does not lead to a value neutral approach however but a subtle form of criticism: 
 
‘This is a form of criticism that seeks to make explicit the thought that, while often 
taking a material form, is largely tacit in the way we govern and are governed, and in 
the language, practices and techniques by which we do so. By making explicit the 
forms of rationality and thought that inhere in regimes of practices, by demonstrating 
the fragility of the ways in which we know ourselves and are asked to know ourselves, 
and the tissue of connections between how we know ourselves and how we govern 
and are governed, an analytics of government can remove the taken-for-granted 
character of these practices. The point of doing this is not to make the transformation 
of these practices appear inevitable or easier, but to open the space in which to think 
about how it is possible to do things in a different fashion, to highlight the points at 
which resistance and contestation bring an urgency to their transformation, and even 





In this way, the political implications which flow from conducting an analytics of 
government are to highlight the contingency of forms of governing and management by 
problematising the dominant ways in which things are done. Rather than standing against all 
forms of domination, it offers an analysis of where, when and how specific forms of 
government and domination develop and allows us to question these – but not a ‘general 
prescription of what the result of such questioning might be’ (Dean, 2010; p50).  
 
There are of course many other ways of applying Foucault’s work on governmentality to 
health care policy and management analysis. Significant scholarship over recent years has 
done so in myriad way – this literature is discussed in the following section. 
 
3.4 Health care management studies drawing on governmentality 
 
A review of the contemporary literature utilising key governmentality or broader Foucauldian 
themes applied to health care is presented below. This is useful in highlighting the analytic 
and thematic trends which have developed in this literature over the past two decades and 
distilling these into theoretically informed areas which will be described (see table 4) and 








Table 4: Foucauldian influenced health care studies 
Foucauldian theme Questions/foci 
 
References 
Neoliberalism and the 
politics of health care 
How are health care policy, 
management and professional power 
problematised in neoliberal thought? 
Moon and Brown, 2000; Light, 2001; Joyce, 







How do new forms of governance 
impact on traditional forms of 





Pickard, 2009; Levay and Waks, 2009; 
Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Harrison and 
Dowswell, 2002; Gilbert, 2005; Flynn, 2002; 
Doolin, 2002; Chamberlain, 2010; Martin and 
Learmonth, 2010; Brown, 2011; Dent, 2003; 
Waring and  Currie, 2009; Waring, 2007; 





Does disciplinary power highlighted 
by a Foucauldian critique foster 
‘docile bodies’ or can this power be 
‘productive’?  
 
Numerato, 2011; Iedema and Rhodes, 2010; 
Martin et al, 2013 ; Gilbert, 2001 ; Dent, 2006 ; 
St Pierre and Holmes, 2008 ; Sheaff et al, 2004 
EBM as a 
power/knowledge nexus 
 
Epistemic apparatus and systems of 
knowledge – how are these 
constructed and implemented?  
Ferlie and McGivern, 2014; Ferlie et al, 2011; 
Ceci, 2004;Komporozos-Athanasiou et al, 2011 ; 
Hasselbladh and Bejerot, 2007 ; Greenhalgh and 
Shaw, 2008; Winch and Creedy, 2002 
 
Neoliberalism and the politics of health care 
 
Osborne (1993) draws on governmentality theory to present medicine as ‘field of 
government’ and produces a historical critique of the development of medicine and 
government in Britain in relation to liberal and neoliberal political rationalities. He argues 
that neoliberalism heralds a new form of medical government in which ‘physicians are 
enrolled – alongside managers certainly – as something of administrators and economists 
themselves’ (Osborne, 1993; p353). In this way, the roles played by medics, and the identities 
they take on are increasingly to be shaped by management and economic rationalities 
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reflecting the broader political circumstance. This is linked to Quality Improvement and audit 
(though not EBM in this early paper) initiatives. Likewise, Johnson (1995) produces an 
overview of various theoretical debates related to how best to conceptualise professional 
relations both within medical groups and with the state, and an eloquent argument as to why a 
Foucauldian approach is potentially more useful than the traditional medical sociology 
approaches offered by of Freidson (1973), and Abbott (1988). Johnson uses Foucault’s 
rejection of the state as a defined, identifiable entity, and the insight that we may conceive of 
the state as an amorphous collection of apparatuses, knowledge and control mechanisms – 
thus eliminating the duality of profession/state which Freidson places at the heart of his 
thesis. Johnson’s achievement is to demonstrate that the complex interpretation of the 
relations which constitute the state inherent in a governmentality approach is sophisticated 
enough to highlight the weakness in Freidson and Abbott’s respective paradigms, whilst 
retaining their indubitably useful components. 
 
Light (2001) applies a governmentality approach to critique how the managed competition 
ethos at the heart of the Conservative party’s NHS reforms of the 1980s and 1990s impacted 
upon the ‘conduct of conduct’ of health care professionals emphasising fragmentation and 
failed regimes of accountability. Once more taking a macro-level approach focused on 
Conservative reforms from 1992-97 and building on the work of Miller and Rose (1990) 
Moon and Brown (2000) discuss ‘spatializing language’ as an ‘art of government’ through 
which they emphasise the importance of ‘local’ decision making and responsive management 
symbolically distancing government itself from the act of governance (Moon and Brown, 
2000; p74).Power is seen to be dispersed as the role of local level players in the quasi-market 
are rhetorically engaged in decision making on behalf of local populations. Drawing on 
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empirical data based on interviews with Health Authority managers, Joyce (2001) highlights 
the neoliberal continuation of governance from Major to Blair governments and suggests: 
 
‘Using the Foucauldian framework of “governmentality” it can be seen that the 
discourse of commissioning, rationing and priority setting in the NHS, and the 
institutional practices in which it is embedded, operate at a much more fundamental 
level than surface political activity would indicate... radical change in the governance 
of health care only comes about through a shift in the problematisation of liberal 
governance, not merely in the transition of one political regime to another’ (Joyce, 
2001; p612) 
 
Building on the work of the London Governmentalists and an interest in political power 
‘beyond the state’ this first application of governmentality influenced work opened the door 
for a new critique of the shifting health care governance and its impacts upon managers and 
professionals. This is discussed below. 
 
Macro-level policy developments: resistance and control 
 
There is a wide literature which focuses on the impact of management reforms upon the 
medical profession (Numerato et al, 2011) and the merging of managerial and professional 
jurisdictions (Waring and Currie, 2009). An important section of this literature draws on 
Foucauldian themes and governmentality in particular. A number of studies do this with a 
focus at the macro-level of policy developments and draw on earlier work by Johnson (1995) 
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and Osborne (1993). Pickard (2009) for example draws on a governmentality critique to 
demonstrate the contingent and fluctuating nature of professional-government relations in 
contemporary health care policy focusing on what she terms as ‘restratification’ of the 
medical profession demonstrated with reference to the ‘professionalization’ of GPs with a 
Special Interest. Restratification refers to the process by which some doctors take on 
managerial responsibility over their peers; which along with the adoption of EBM and other 
‘externally validated procedures’ leads them to subject themselves to ‘liberal rationalities’ 
(Pickard, 2009; p255). She highlights the importance of ‘advanced liberal’ Discourses such as 
‘accountability, transparency, efficiency and consumerism’ in reconstructing professional 
identities in alliance with ‘managerial rather than occupational autonomy’ (Pickard, 2009; 
p264). Dent (2003) suggests the professional-managerial dividing line is being eroded (p108). 
Combining a governmentality critique of micro-level doctor-manager relations with an Actor 
Network Theory approach he demonstrates the collective and tactically advantageous ways in 
which professionals become ‘enrolled’ or ‘enmeshed’ in managerial Discourse and come to 
accept managerial as well as clinical responsibilities – crucially, they remain ‘less accessible 
to the disciplinary power of management’ than other non-professionalised staff in other 
studies by Townley (1993) and Fournier (1999) (Dent, 2003; p123). 
 
Flynn (2002) explores the introduction of clinical governance to the NHS through the prism 
of governmentality. The policy is interpreted as an attempt to increase oversight of the 
medical profession thereby augmenting control and surveillance. Flynn emphasises the 
disciplinary elements of modern society and organisational life (p163) and the self-governing 
aspect of control following Dean (2010). Individuals become ‘co-opted’ into audit culture as 





‘[A] clear example of placing the responsibility on clinicians and incorporating them 
as active participants in their own (self-) surveillance, and distancing this process from 
conventional notions of bureaucratic or managerial control’ (Flynn, 2002; p164) 
 
Flynn notes that governmental allusions to ethical or professional values (for example by 
highlighting the unacceptability of wide variations in clinical practice (p164)) may be central 
to the ‘responsibilisation’ and co-option of professionals into these self-surveillance regimes. 
He suggests that clinical governance might be seen as a move towards ‘encoded knowledge’ 
linked to the concept of ‘soft bureaucracy’ (Courpasson, 2000).  Once more focused at the 
macro-level, Martin and Learmonth (2012) present a critical account of ‘leadership discourse’ 
in UK health policy and argue that it aligns the subjectivities of staff with policy intensions 
making ‘implementation not just everyone’s responsibility, but part of everyone’s sense of 
self’ (Martin and Learmonth, 2012; p281). They suggest that the extension of surveillance 
may have malign consequences – particularly for staff near the bottom of the hierarchy 
(Martin and Learmonth, 2012; p287). 
 
A number of empirically grounded studies drawing upon robust micro-level data focus on the 
intricacies of resistance and control within and between managerial and medical communities 
drawing on governmentality frameworks. Timmons (2003) explores the ‘failed’ 
implementation of an ‘electronic panopticon’ aimed at increased surveillance and regulation 
of nursing practice in the NHS. His study focuses on the resistance which the programme 
faced whilst noting the simultaneous compliance from some quarters – he terms the 
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relationship between the nurses as subjects of the computerised systems for the production of 
care plans and the programme itself as ‘resistive compliance’ (Timmons, 2003; p145). 
Resistance manifested itself not in an outright refusal to use the systems, but rather a 
tendency to delay and engage in critical discourse with respect to the systems. More effective 
means to increase control over nursing practice were linked to external threats of litigation 
(more than internal disciplinary measures) and recourse to the nurses’ ‘own culture and 
values’ which is linked by Timmons to the effects of governmentality, as well as direct line 
management by senior nurses: 
 
‘[T]he management of these hospitals had an interest in extending surveillance of 
nursing practice, this was not (largely) happening. This was because the nurses were 
able to ignore or circumvent the surveillance capability of the computer systems, as 
they knew there were few effective sanctions that the management were prepared to 
use to secure full compliance with the system. One of the ways in which they were 
able to sustain this position was by deployment of rhetorical strategies based on the 
perceived “fundamental values” of nursing.’ (Timmons, 2003; p151) 
 
So the surveillance failed because management lacked the ‘hard’ techniques to enforce 
compliance, but also – and more importantly – the systems failed to align with the nurses’ 
ethical desires, and they could reject the system by presenting their professional identity as 
antithetical to the aims of the management. This suggests that the disciplinary power of the 
surveillance technique is hindered by an inability to demonstrate the furtherance of 
professional goals resulting in ‘resistive compliance’. Further studies have demonstrated the 
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resistance of professionals to new forms of governance which fail to account for ‘experiential 
knowledge’ and professional values (Chamberlain, 2010; Brown, 2011). 
 
Doolin (2002) extends understanding of this issue with his single case study of government 
attempts to ‘control, curtail or influence’ the professional autonomy of clinicians in a New 
Zealand hospital. He explores how ‘enterprise discourse’ was accepted, resisted or subverted 
by clinicians. It is important to emphasise here that this discourse emanates from a political 
and management angle – like some of the political targets resisted in the Timmons (2003) 
Brown (2011) and Chamberlain (2010) studies cited above – in contrast to EBHC which, as 
argued in the previous chapter, whilst linked to management rhetoric may be seen as being 
more closely aligned to clinical goal setting (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). It might be 
suggested that this is significant in fostering support amongst clinicians (Ferlie et al, 2011; 
Ferlie and McGivern, 2014). A further important point relates to how clinicians perceive the 
effects of policies will impact upon them in relation to colleagues and management: 
 
‘Reaction to the introduction of the new identifications for clinicians depended to a 
large extent on whether individual clinicians perceived themselves as controlling or 
using the organizational changes to improve their own position, or that of their clinical 
service, or as being controlled by them... resistance arose from the positioning of 
clinicians as subjects within an alternative, medical professional, discourse 




Where changes can be capitalised upon by professionals (on behalf of themselves or their 
services) they are more likely to be accepted, rather than resisted or subverted. There are two 
points which follow on from this – a management Discourse which may be interpreted as 
being aligned to medical, nursing, and professional goals (such as EBHC) is potentially better 
placed to exploit this, and secondly, the jurisdictional position (Abbott, 1988) of different 
professional disciplines may be significant in influencing the extent to which organisational 
changes may be seen to improve or hinder the relative position of clinicians and their 
services. For example, a service with a historical low status (e.g. stroke medicine) may be 
more amenable to management Discourse than a historically high status service such as 
surgery. Indeed, an empirical finding of Waring’s (2007) ethnographic study of patient safety 
programmes in an English hospital is that surgery alone was the one department he studied 
which refused to enhance their Quality Improvement techniques by drawing on the resources 
of the management intervention (Waring, 2007; p172). His findings overall suggest that 
doctors increasingly come to ‘adapt’ their regulatory practice. He suggests they are 
perceptibly performing a form of self-surveillance which ‘ultimately serves to negate the 
need for more or better management’ (Waring, 2007; p164). He speculates that it may be 
useful to consider how management Discourse is permeating the medical profession as a 
form of governmentality rather than focusing on ongoing extensions of general management 
over medicine. Again like EBHC, it might be argued that there is an ‘ethical’ element to the 
instigation of patient safety regimes – whilst they clearly are linked to Discourses of 
management they also appeal to the professional desire to achieve good practice. 
 
Harrison and Dowswell (2002) describe an increase in ‘bureaucratic accountability’ and 
‘professional restratification’ amongst GPs in the North of England and find very little 
evidence of resistance to the apparent reduction in autonomy faced by these GPs (Harrison 
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and Dowswell, 2002; p221). They suggest this is an example of Foucauldian ‘panoptic 
surveillance’ linked to a state strategy of bureaucratising medicine drawing on the political 
economy of EBM which they link to financial pressures on the NHS, the co-option of senior 
level clinical elites, the effects of protocolisation via NICE and NSFs and finally the role of 
medical managerial hybrids who ‘are more likely to behave as managers than as clinicians; 
that is, their role is primarily determined by social structure rather than professional 
socialisation’ (Harrison and Dowswell, 2002; p223). Gilbert (2005) likewise emphasises the 
disciplinary power of management encroaching over clinical remits which ‘colonizes 
professional activity’ and challenges professional autonomy in a nursing context highlighting 
the extension of managerial control using a governmentality framework.  
 
Levay and Waks (2009) attempt to move beyond the control/resistance framework with their 
work on ‘soft autonomy.’ They suggest that the pursuit of transparency in health care is more 
complex than suggested by the traditional management/professional divide. They draw on the 
work of Abbott (1988) to highlight the jurisdictional claims of competing professions and 
disciplines and Freidson’s stratification thesis (1994; 2001) signifying the different roles of 
elites and ordinary practitioners. They show empirically how professionals actively involve 
themselves in the practice of making their work ‘auditable’ – but this does not lead to 
disempowerment, or a loss of autonomy – ‘on the contrary, they still managed to control 
many of the premises and criteria of evaluation. Professionals were neither independent in 
evaluating their own work, nor in the hands of external evaluators, but enjoyed a negotiated 
“soft” professional autonomy’ (Levay and Waks, 2009; p523). In a similar vein  Kuhlmann 
and Allsop (2008) offer professional ‘self-regulation’ as a useful concept to understand 
change in professional governance which again aims to transcend the control/resistance 
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framework which permeates much of the literature around managerialisation, professionalism 
and governance.  
 
Challenging the resistance and control framework 
 
‘[C]oncepts such as co-optation, adaptation, negotiation or resistance remain located 
within the cultural incorporation/opposition, in other words hegemony/resistance 
framework and tend to situate the result of the dynamics between professional practice 
and managerial logic on a continuum between resistance to and compliance with 
managerialism. We suggest that this conceptualisation tends to overemphasise the 
importance of a conflictual model and fails to adequately capture the more complex 
role played by the boundary fields of epidemiology or EBM.’ (Numerato et al, 2011; 
p637) 
 
Numerato et al (2011) suggest that the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ central to social theory 
and reflected in the sociology of health care writings has tended to marginalise calls for 
greater consideration of epidemiological perspectives that emphasise how professional 
autonomy (rather than managerial surveillance) may be extended. Furthermore, questions 
related to professional ethics and medical responsibility in the construction of a quality health 
care system as ‘collective good’ require further exploration (Numerato et al, 2011; p638).  
 
Iedema and Rhodes (2010) suggest that organisational surveillance may potentially ‘open up 
an ethical space of self and mutual care on the part of those subject to it’ (Iedema and 
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Rhodes, 2010; p200) so that disciplinary power may be productive rather than repressive by 
leading to a process of subjectification rather than subjection where agents actively emulate 
the regulation of discipline, reflectively and creatively responding to reality (Iedema and 
Rhodes, 2010; p203). Rather than shrinking the space in which professionals have to operate 
freely – ‘being seen’ may conversely expand such space in areas which may have previously 
been hidden (Iedema and Rhodes, 2010; p211). In this way, a disciplinary practice such as 
audit for example may be welcomed by professionals if it chimes with their ethical desires: 
 
‘For surveillance to be experienced as subjugating it needs to be iteratively confirmed 
as operating within that intention and no other on the part of those who wield it. This 
means that surveillance is not self-evidently alienating, and that it can engender 
feelings of care and being cared for. These arguments offer a warning against 
oversimplifying the dynamics at play when surveillance is practiced, as well as against 
overstating the effects of the surveillant gaze’. (Iedema and Rhodes, 2010; p212: 
emphasis added) 
 
This moves the debate onto the interaction between discipline and governmentality in 
contemporary health care. A crucial contribution to the interpretation of this debate is 
provided by Martin et al (2013). They first draw attention to the ways in which disciplinary 
power and governmentality have been applied to contemporary health care studies, but as 
alternatives, or even contradictory ways. For example Rose’s (1993) classic early work 
applying governmentality to social problems emphasises a strong distinction between 
disciplinary power and the enactment of governmentality (Martin et al, 2013; p7; Elden, 
2002; p248) whilst Elden argues that Foucault’s work shows ‘no strict differentiation 
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between the two concerns’ (Elden, 2002; p248). Martin et al (2013) highlight the dominance 
of macro-level Foucauldian inspired critiques which draw upon theories of disciplinary 
power and governmentality and suggest there is a lack of scholarship exploring this at the 
micro-level, and how it may impact upon influencing professional behaviour. This leads to a 
questioning of how ‘discipline and governmentality interact in complex contemporary 
governance’ (Martin et al, 2013; p7). Empirically they then demonstrate that whilst the 
standardizing regimes of disciplinary power (surveillance, panoptic gaze, increased 
monitoring and accountability) are significant in influencing clinical practice – they rely upon 
techniques of governmentality for successful implementation by speaking to ‘professional 
subjectivities’ and finding their power in ‘their appeal to professional values and rationality’ 
(Martin et al, 2013; p16). They noted the importance of clinical leadership, transformative 
narratives and discursive forums promoting professional reflective practice in creating 
contexts which mediated the disciplinary power of regimes of Quality Improvement and 
patient safety and rendered them open to inculcate an ethical impact upon the agency of 
active professional subjects. Moreover, this occurred as a form of communal negotiation 
rather than as an individual phenomenon (Martin et al, 2013).  
 
This is not merely about control versus resistance then; rather it is about the interplay 
between disciplinary power and governmentality. Sheaff, et al (2004), employ a 
governmentality approach to investigate Clinical Governance procedures in Primary Care, 
arguing that these are less formalised than in acute care settings. Professional ownership of 
the ‘ambiguous’ governance procedures is key. The study concludes that little may have 




‘[M]edical networks still influence GPs more than NHS managers do. The profession 
continues to exercise self-regulation as a lesser evil than managerial control... 
Professional governmentality and discipline remain the backbone of medical self-
regulation.’ (Sheaff et al, 2004; p 100) 
 
Rather than Foucauldian ‘docility’ it was the recourse to ‘discursive disciplines’ which 
legitimated clinical governance regimes allied with positive incentives which were significant 
empirically in this study (Sheaff et al, 2004; p 101).  Dent (2006) argues that professionalism 
in health care has become ‘responsibilized’ relying more on ‘disciplinary logic’ than 
autonomous expertise: ‘however, any managerial ascendancy is offset by the governmentality 
role of the medical profession’ (Dent, 2006; p459). This is linked to rhetorical policy moves 
towards patient choice. Gilbert (2001) and St Pierre and Holmes (2008) explore disciplinary 
power and processes of ethical construction of nursing identities through Foucauldian 
analysis producing contrasting pictures of how nursing practice and subjectivities are 
fostered.  
 
EBM as a power/knowledge nexus 
 
A further development within the health care literature draws upon Foucauldian analytic 
methods to explore the episteme of EBHC and considers how systems of knowledge are 
constructed and implemented in what is termed the ‘power/knowledge nexus’ (Ferlie et al, 
2011; Ferlie and McGivern, 2014).  Ceci (2004) explores how knowledge and truth are 
understood from a Foucauldian perspective in a paper which investigates retrospectively 
lessons to be learned following an enquiry in to a number of deaths of patients following 
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paediatric cardiac surgery in 1994 in Canada. She questions the nature of knowledge and 
knowing amongst different professional groups in an attempt to increase understanding as to 
why nursing concerns with an individual surgeon’s practice were not acted upon. This 
approach details the context of credibility in professional relations and what defines and 
limits nurses’ actions. Ceci cites the Foucauldian disjuncture between truth and knowledge, 
with the implication that truth is constructed by specific forms of knowledge which may be 
accepted by one practical community and disputed by another. She suggests that the 
relatively weak power of the nurses meant that their concerns were easily disregarded, and 
that those in ‘privileged positions’ derived via institutional and epistemic authority set the 
agenda vis a vis  what reality and truth are conceived of within the context of the inquiry into 
the performance of the unit. There is a danger of over-extending authority and 
underemphasising accountability in health care if this imbalance of power relations in truth 
construction is ignored. 
 
Shaw and Greenhalgh (2008) employ a discourse analysis technique to investigate the 
contextual factors (historical, cultural, economic, and epistemic) which drive health care 
research. The authors suggest that a government led ideology in the interests of ‘UK plc’ has 
pushed bio-scientific RCT centric agenda onto the research community since the 1970s in 
order to create an economic driver for the nation. They place the role of primary care in this 
context and question in whose interest this specific ‘science’ functions. They argue that 
‘health research policy shapes, and is shaped by, a knowledge-based economy discourse.’ 
(Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008; p 2510) Analysis of government documents confirms this 
trend. Income generating science dominates research. This increases the power of an 
academic medical elite based at influential institutions. Epidemiological and quantitative 
methodologies drive health research and define the parameters in which research discourse 
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occurs and medical elite leaders are identified. This is significant when considering the role 
of EBM in creation of knowledge and evidence and the construction of health policy. 
 
Winch and Creedy (2002) apply a governmentality approach to how nursing is being changed 
by the evidence-based health care movement in Australia. The authors use Dean’s (1999) 
analytics of government framework very fruitfully. They argue at the macro-level that 
evidence based guidelines: ‘produced by the governmental technique of the systematic 
review are pre-eminent in any “truth” taxonomy of health-care as it validates and promotes 
knowledge that has been reviewed according to the principles of positivist science’ (Winch 
and Creedy, 2002; p157). At the micro-level this leads to ‘active fashioning of the self’ as 
individual nurses change their outlooks and practices in light of this new knowledge and 
affiliated trends. The authors suggests that new forms of visibility of nursing are apparent due 
to the pervasion of evidence based nursing – increased nurse led research and practical 
reflexivity – ‘mapping of nursing work’ is essential for ‘the public scrutiny required of liberal 
political government’. The new ways of practicing nursing may lead to an increase in the 
influence of ‘science’ at the cost of traditional ‘intuitive’ methodologies of practice. This 
scientific dominance extends into new codes for the production of nursing knowledge – the 
authors suggesting that evidence-based research work is now the only paradigm for 
researchers to employ to avoid becoming ‘invisible’.  
 
Ferlie et al (2011) compare two different cancer networks – using urology service 
reconfiguration as a tracer issue to evaluate the applicability of a governmentality approach to 
analysis - and find evidence of a shift towards hybrid forms of governance with Foucauldian 
elements co-existing with surviving hierarchical elements. They suggest it is possible to 
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discern five themes of Foucauldian health care governance as potentially influential in 
driving health care policy; the existence of a power/knowledge nexus and the 
institutionalisation of EBM, self-regulation and surveillance within central frameworks 
(clinical governance), transparency of data (audit), reformed identities at work (clinical 
managerial hybrids), biopolitics and the government of populations – suggesting:  
 
‘Population level evidence based guidelines leading to service reconfigurations across 
territories are a form of biopower’ (Ferlie et al, 2011; p12)  
 
The authors question whether cancer care is specific (high levels of investment, closeness to 
the biomedical trials world) in these findings, or if other clinical (and non-clinical) arenas are 
structured in similar ways in health care. Further work by Ferlie and McGivern (2013) 
extends this analysis. They apply an ‘Anglo-governmentality’ perspective to case studies of; 
(1) NICE – to explore macro-level governance and the institution of the power/knowledge 
nexus via ‘pervasive grey sciences’ behind evidence based guidelines; (2) sexual health 
clinical network – to explore the micro-level process of ‘subjectification’ undertaken by local 
governing agents drawing on Foucault’s work on ‘technology of the self’ and add to this by 
applying Foucault’s work on ‘pastoral power.’ This work is of significance in the debate over 
the relationship between disciplinary power and governmentality (Martin et al, 2013): 
 
‘In the local sexual health network, NPM style line managers have been supplanted by 
professional-managerial hybrids who identify with the EBM agenda. These hybrids 
adopt a hands on and energised style in local enactment. They draw upon the 
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disciplinary power of local clinical audit against national standards and clinical “peer 
pressure” to internalise and comply with evidence-based standards. These hybrids 
exhibit long term tracks of career development consistent with a technology of the self 
perspective, migrating to more managerial roles and perhaps even identities over time. 
They can be seen as using a form of “pastoral power” in relation to their clinical 
peers.’ (Ferlie and McGivern, 2013; p36)     
 
A further finding is how the ‘grey sciences’ conform to a different pattern than the 
‘accountization’ identified by Miller and Rose (2008) – they find again a ‘hybrid’ clinical-
economic knowledge base in their NICE case study (Ferlie and McGivern, 2013; p37). Other 
governmentality studies which explore the power/knowledge nexus related to EBM include 
Hasselbladh and Bejerot (2007) who analyse macro-level Swedish health care reforms and 
the role of ‘grey sciences’ in the development of technologies of agency and performance 
(Dean, 2010) and Komporozos-Asthanasiou et al (2011) who compare the different ways in 
which (evidence based) stroke care has been reformed in Canada and the UK and the relative 
importance of rhetorical ‘knowledge translation’ strategies through a discourse analysis 
approach.  
 
In summary, this review identified a number of significant foci and questions pertinent to 
empirical exploration using a Foucauldian influenced theoretical approach to contemporary 
health care policy and management. These were presented in Table 4 alongside a number of 
key research questions. The review began with a discussion of important texts published 
between 1993-2001 which focused on concepts around neoliberalism and the changing 
political state of health care in the light of the Conservative administrations since 1979. 
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Drawing on the seminal work of the London Governmentalists a number of scholars began to 
apply Foucault’s work on governmentality to explore how health care politics and 
professional power were problematised in neoliberal thought.   This literature fusing 
governmentality theory with contemporary health care management issues was followed by a 
new set of authors from the start of this century. These included Organisational Studies, 
Management and Health Service Research scholars who began to apply governmentality as a 
framework to unpack the ways in which managerialisation encroached upon traditional forms 
of medical autonomy often drawing on the (non-health focused) Organisational Studies work 
of Zuboff (1988); Reed (1996); Townley (1993); and Clegg (1994). Whilst the 1990s scholars 
attempted to apply Foucauldian thought to macro-level historical political changes in policy 
and governance, this following cohort came to focus more heavily upon issues of resistance 
and control – or the ‘hegemony/resistance framework’ (Numerato et al, 2011).  
 
These studies also included empirical elements and a concern with micro-level interactions 
rather than just macro-level concerns. A key interest of this literature then became how to 
account for the blurring of the boundaries between management and medicine for doctors 
who take on management positions and implications for professional autonomy. An 
important thematic point relating to Foucauldian theory which emerged here rested upon the 
extent to which authors emphasised the disciplinary elements of the governmentality 
framework and how this may be seen to have led to an internalisation of management 
Discourse by health care professionals. Discussions around ‘co-optation’ (Waring and Currie, 
2009); ‘adaptive regulation’ (Waring, 2007); ‘resistive compliance (Timmons, 2003) and 
more overt forms of resistance are explored. A further theme that developed focused more 
overtly on the ways in which a governmentality critique may account for the realisation of 
ethical desires for professionals with a stronger closeness to Foucault’s later work relating to 
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‘technologies of the self’ (Ferlie et al, 2011; Ferlie and McGivern, 2013; Martin et al, 2013) – 
this approach down plays the conflictual ‘hegemony/resistance framework’ and is worthy of 
further exploration. There is another important but smaller concern developed in the literature 
which focused upon EBM as a power/knowledge nexus within a governmentality framework 
– mostly at the macro-level (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008; Ferlie and McGivern, 2013), but 
also with some studies focused on the micro-level – these studies explore the epistemic 
apparatus constructed and employed to aid the implementation of evidence based regimes of 
practice and can potentially shed light on and help progress from the  ‘hegemony/resistance 
framework’ (Numerato et al, 2011) by offering an important insight into the ways 
disciplinary power and governmentality interact with active subjectification and technologies 
of the self for health care professionals and managers.  
 
It is worth noting that there are some surprisingly under-researched issues identified in this 
review. The first point is that there is preponderance to apply Foucauldian theory to uni-
professional groups (e.g. doctors or nurses) but few attempts are made to question how 
changes in governance arrangements impact in inter-professional terms within and across 
multi-professional or disciplinary teams. Linked to this, there appears to be little research on 
how governance changes impact upon staff with different power positions within 
organisational hierarchies. There appears to be little research on how EBHC as a Discourse 
affects managers (as opposed to clinicians) and also, whilst many studies take a macro-level 
view of governmentality in health care and/or a micro-level interest in professional relations 
– few studies apply Foucauldian theory to explore strategic level change and service 







This chapter introduced Foucault’s work on governmentality and discussed how it interacts 
with key themes identified in his analysis of modern societies. Dean’s (2010) analytics of 
government framework was introduced and its potential utility as a tool to perform an 
analysis of the reconfiguration of stroke services in London was described. Finally, a review 
of the key contemporary Foucauldian influenced health care management texts was described 
highlighting the themes of changing forms of governance, impacts upon autonomy and the 
role of EBHC. 
 
The chapter built on the previous literature review chapter suggesting that the process of 
‘standardisation’ (Timmermans and Berg, 2003) central to evidence based health care may 
be interpreted as a form of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977), which ‘operates through 
processes in which individuals are measured and compared, using certain norms or standards, 
to produce hierarchies of differentiation and impose a value on them’ (Brown and Lewis, 
2011 p871). It might be suggested that the formalised ‘protocolisation’ and increased data 
monitoring central to programmes to reform health care (EBHC, QI, Patient Safety, clinical 
governance, medical audit) have opened up medicine and health care more broadly to the 
performative gaze of government actors and agencies. However, these programmes are not 
necessarily omnipotent but may be adapted by those they target (Doolin, 2002; 2004; Pope, 
2003; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Timmons, 2003; Thomas and Davies, 2005; Waring, 
2007; Brown and Lewis, 2011).  The process of ‘enactment’ of evidence based health care 
(Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005) is influenced by not only disciplinary power, but also by 
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forms of governmentality which impact upon the subjectivities of clinicians and managers at 












This chapter has a number of aims. Primary amongst these is to describe and justify the 
research design. The approach is qualitative, and based on a case study design which focuses 
on macro-level change in stroke care design across London. Within this there is a second 
embedded case study focusing on change at the micro-level in one London hospital. The 
chapter will detail the three chosen data collection methods and justify the rationale behind 
these choices. It will describe the chosen methods of data analysis and reflect on the strengths 
and limitations of the overall methodological approach. 
 
In the first section the research question will be re-stated alongside a discussion of the 
epistemological approach behind the research. Then the research design will be presented – 
this will include a discussion around the research model and timeframe, sampling and 
selection issues, and a discussion of the ethical concerns that arose as part of this work and 
how these were handled. Following this, the chapter will describe in detail how and when the 
different data were collected and analysed. It will reflect on the problems encountered at 
different points over the five years spent producing the thesis, how such problems were 
overcome, as well as discussing how these factors and others – such as the researcher’s 
subjective views and beliefs may have impacted upon the results presented in the later 
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chapters so as to provide the reader with as thorough an account of the research process as 
possible.  
 
4.2 Philosophical approach 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the following research question: 
 
What was the role played by evidence in the reconfiguration of stroke services in London? 
 
This is an interpretive question that is better suited to qualitative than quantitative 
methodologies (Savage, 2000; Britten, 2005). It requires the researcher to make a number of 
important decisions in terms of what ‘evidence’ is considered to be and which ‘evidence’ will 
be analysed, as well as a consideration of who creates, interprets and uses this ‘evidence’ and 
for what means. Beyond this, the researcher has to make decisions about how to interpret the 
data generated via the chosen data collections methods – how should actions, and both 
written and spoken words be interpreted? How ought contrasting accounts of specific 
phenomena be analysed, presented and resolved – if indeed they are resolvable? Reflecting 
this, the researcher must be clear about their ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
justify these. 
 
My approach rejects the belief that an objective, knowable reality exists, and the role of 
social science research is to employ empiricist techniques to uncover and present this reality. 
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Rather, my starting premise is that each of us constructs our own reality, and that therefore a 
universal, objectively knowable truth, such as those prioritised in the natural sciences is 
questionable, and the importation of such techniques to social science research is problematic 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Bowling, 2009). The aim of qualitative research is to 
interpret people’s subjective experiences and convey a collective reality; and specifically in 
this piece of research, to highlight how evidence is used and interpreted by different 
individuals and communities and how this impacts on organisational and strategic decisions.  
 
As part of the preparatory work for the thesis a number of different methodological 
approaches to qualitative research were considered. Ultimately an approach following 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) is applied to the research. These authors suggest that social 
science research should be reflexive, and take into account the various different ways of 
doing research, their respective merits and drawbacks, and emphasises that when performing 
research and analysing data, the researcher ought to reflect upon the various different 
methodologies that could be used in order to produce a rounded picture of the area s/he is 
studying. An important decision was the extent to which the research methodology should 
prioritise induction or deduction – both are employed in this thesis, the inductive element 
follows some of the principles of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) especially 
those of ‘theoretical sampling’ and the ‘constant comparison’ method of data analysis. The 
latter of these aids a reflexive response to emergent findings whilst working through the 
research. This is helpful when allied with a clear theoretical framework to which these 
inferences may be applied to reflexively tweak and refine the theoretical approach. Problems 
may arise when this is done free from any organising theoretical base – relying on ‘common 
sense’ and an objectivity that can be legitimately questioned. So whilst there are useful 
concepts to be extracted from a Grounded Theory approach; these have a greater coherent 
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utility when applied alongside a reflective, critical approach based on established, explicit 
theory (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). 
 
This thesis requires a wide perspective of the macro political factors external to the political 
process driving change forward internally. For these reasons, Critical and Postmodernist 
approaches which contextualise historical and social factors (Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000; 
p110) are apposite to this study with its governmentality approach. Alvesson and Deetz 
(1999; p111) have highlighted the relevance of Foucault’s work for a critical research 
approach in management studies. They suggest that most management research is built on 
modernist foundations and that the aim of critical research here is to challenge the status quo 
and the ‘instrumentalization of people and nature through the use of scientific-technical 
knowledge’ (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999; p13). Another theme of interest in critical research is 
how information is not only distributed, but produced, and how expertise, claims of truth and 
power dynamics can be interpreted and understood within this context (Alvesson and Deetz, 
1999; p47). 
 
There are dangers in taking a purely critical approach that prioritises an ‘emancipatory’ truth 
(Dean, 2010); likewise, the contention that knowledge is always interest driven can be seen as 
rather reductionist and driven by a non-reflexive urge to highlight negative societal features 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000). So a critical approach must be tempered by an awareness of 
these dangers, and must be sufficiently reflexive to counter them. In this light, such an 
approach complements a governmentality critique (see section 3 of chapter III). A major 
drawback of  some postmodernist approaches and how they incorporate empirical data is that 
they tend to focus more on how not to do research than how to do it (Alvesson and 
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Skoldberg; 2000). However an understanding of the themes underlined by a postmodernist 
approach is clearly essential to my study. Hence, Doolin (1998; 2004) adopted a ‘critical 
interpretevist’ approach in his Foucauldian influenced study looking at resistance to 
information system implementation on the part of clinicians in a New Zealand hospital. This 
approach reflects the socially constructed nature of organisations and their reality (Doolin, 
2004) and also that: ‘interpretevism asserts that the positivist methodology of the natural 
sciences is inadequate for the understanding of human action’ whilst critically questioning 
assumptions behind the organisational status quo (Doolin, 1998).  
 
Furthermore, the question of reflexivity and its importance needs to be highlighted. Steier 
(1991) employs a constructionist approach to explore reflexivity, or ‘a turning back on 
oneself.’ He focuses on the question of how the language of others and their ways of 
constructing meaning can be understood by the researcher. Steier views research as a 
‘translation process’ on various levels both between researcher and reciprocator and internal 
to the researcher. Therefore research becomes a process of invention and intervention. Steier 
presents a compelling method to reconcile this paradox: ‘to see research as a co-constructive 
process’ between the researcher and the researched: 
 
‘”The system” is one that emerges in a hermeneutic merging in the investigative 
process, and includes the researcher, and his or her modelling processes (making 
research autobiographical), co-constructing that system in conversation with an 




By being aware of the centrality of the researcher in this process, research can become 
reflexive. At the heart of this approach lies a cognizance that reality is constructed, and that 
together, the researcher and reciprocator create a shared understanding of this reality. The 
role of language and its context specificity and potential ambiguity has to be understood and 
acted on reflectively by the researcher. Researchers bring their own interpretation of 
another’s interpretation of a reality but being open about this and not employing the fallacy 
that they are ‘discovering’ the verifiable reality. Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) broaden out 
a conception of reflexivity that cuts across interpretive levels, suggesting a kind of ‘quadri-
hermeneutics’ – based on elements from Grounded Theory, Hermeneutics, Critical and 
Postmodernist theories – essentially, ‘reflection occurs when one mode of thought is 
confronted by another’ (Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000 p247). This approach has much to 
recommend it as it may allow the researcher to be conscious of the benefits and pitfalls of the 
various approaches to empirical work and wider theoretical implications to the collection, 
framing and analysis of qualitative data. 
 
In philosophical terms, this thesis employs a reflexive critical stance in line with the aims of 
the analytics of government (Dean, 2010) approach. This framework encourages the 
researcher not to take the spoken or written word ‘at face value’ – rather it emphasises an 
exploration of language and discourse in its complexity – focusing on the ‘non-subjective 
intentionality’ of governmental reform programmes. This makes it an inherently interpretive 
endeavour. Actors possess a ‘situated agency’ (Bevir, 2010) in that they are influenced by, 
yet also influence, aspects of developing regimes of government and practice. So in the 
analysis of generated data, it is important to explore what is made visible, or left opaque and 
challenge this – in this way, discourse is not examined uncritically – but neither is it 
discounted. Language may be imbued with more than one meaning at the same time – 
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discourse may be built upon ambiguities that have organisational significance. An approach 
which combines inductive and deductive analysis with a critical awareness facilitates 
exploration of these types of concerns. The following section will now detail the 
fundamentals of the research design in greater depth. 
 
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
The research combined semi-structured interviews, observations of meetings and 
documentary analysis. The aim was to understand more about behaviour in its institutional 
context (Green and Britten, 1998).The chosen approach enabled an examination of the 
implicit and explicit implications and motivations behind individuals’ actions rather than 
quantification. The research consisted of two case studies (I and II). Case study I focused on 
the macro-level policy and governance changes of the reconfiguration of stroke services 
across the whole of London. Case study II was embedded within case study I and focused on 
the micro-level policy and governance changes in one London hospital (given the 
anonymised pseudonym: Kenworthy hospital) following the changes negotiated, designed 
and implemented at a pan-London level. This case study approach focused in detail and in 
depth (in both practical and thematic terms) on the processes and principles behind service 
delivery changes – what Stake (1995) might term ‘particularisation.’ Figure 2 below, 




Figure 2, case study design 
 
There was a gap between the timing of the key strategic decisions behind the reconfiguration 
(2008-09) and my PhD enrolment (2009-14). This had an impact on the selected 
methodology, as it meant that part of the study was approached historically as opposed to 
contemporaneously. This historical approach to the study of reconfigurations is quite 
common in the social science literature relating to health care reconfigurations and mergers 
(Fulop et al, 2005; Cameron et al, 2007; Choi and Brommels, 2009) and indeed there are 











n Documentary analysis: policy documents, 
project documents, consultation 
documents, implementation documents  
(2009-2014)
Case study I: macro-level interviews with 
elite stakeholders (n23) (2011-12)
Case study II: micro-level interviews with 
staff from Kenworthy hospital (n22) 
(2011)
Observations of meetings of the pan-




they did is useful. Furthermore, by analysing public documents and combining these with 
retrospective semi-structured interviews with decision makers exploring drivers and 
objectives of change, it is possible to critically engage in the examination of ‘stated and 
unstated drivers’ behind change (Fulop et al, 2005). There are disadvantages too, and authors 
have argued that a longitudinal approach to reconfiguration studies is preferable (Spurgeon et 
al 2010). However, for practical reasons (due to when this PhD was commenced), I was not 
able to start my data collection before the stroke reconfiguration process began.  
 
Qualitative research should aim for a richness or ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1994; Walker, 
1980) which lends qualitative work a level of transferability, or theoretical generalisation 
(Richie and Lewis, 2003). This concept of transferability ‘represents the extent to which 
findings of a particular study may be applied to similar contexts’ (Murphy and Dingwall, 
1998; p195) and provides a useful way to approach the issue of ‘generalisability’ in 
qualitative research. There are myriad views on the extent to which case studies and 
qualitative findings overall can be generalised. Case studies have high internal validity but 
lower external validity (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). It is often argued that case studies are 
useful for highlighting local causality, but not for the development of more general 
theoretical claims (Bowling, 2009). Miles and Huberman (1994) highlight the value of 
methods such as ‘looking for negative evidence’ and accounting for this in increasing the 
robustness of qualitative data, yet remain sceptical about generalising from single or small 
number case studies.  
 
A counter view is offered by Flyvbjerg (2006), who lists five commonly cited 
‘misunderstandings’ that critics of single or small number case study methodologies raise; (1) 
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that knowledge independent of context – i.e. that which is general, or theoretical is of greater 
worth than knowledge which is context-dependent and based on concrete, or practical 
experience; (2) that generalisation from single case studies is impossible – thereby inhibiting 
the contribution of case study methods to scientific development; (3) case studies are best 
suited to hypothesis generation rather than hypothesis testing; (4) that case studies predispose 
researchers to verification rather than falsification – and thus express an inherent bias; and (5) 
that it is hard to effectively summarise case study research, making theoretical development 
based on general propositions very difficult (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p3). He defends a case study 
approach from these ‘misunderstandings’ very effectively by rejecting the existence of (1) 
non-contextually mediated knowledge: ‘predictive theories and universals cannot be found in 
the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more 
valuable than the search for predictive theories and universals’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p7). Next he 
(2) argues that generalisation is overrated in scientific development, and that ‘the force of the 
example’ is frequently underestimated – citing Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law of 
gravity as an example of this from the natural sciences so that generalisation from one case is 
indeed possible so long as the case is well selected and the methods used to conduct the case 
study are sufficiently rigorous. Intense observation of a small scale phenomenon may be 
more instructive than the use of large random samples. Thus different problems require 
different methods of analysis   (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p10). 
 
This in turn leads to the third point – (3) single or small number case studies can be used to 
test hypotheses if the researcher’s goal is richness of information; by selecting an atypical, or 
extreme case, the researcher may learn more about underlying processes, procedures and 
actions than selecting a series of representative or random samples, as the former may be 
more likely to illuminate the deeper causes of particular problems whilst the latter may 
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simply describe the symptoms and frequency of such respective problems (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
p13). The fourth point is dealt with by listing studies by proponents of small-N research such 
as Geertz (1995) amongst others who had their initial theories challenged by conducting case 
studies suggesting that (4) when done diligently and reflexively case study research generates 
multiple compelling explanations which challenge and reframe early hypotheses – 
emphasising falsification over verification for researchers in many instances (Flyvbjerg, 
2006; p21).  With respect to the final point he  concedes that (5) summarising case studies is 
difficult (less so outcomes); but that this difficulty is based more upon the reality studied than 
the method employed and that furthermore ‘good studies should be read as narratives  in their 
entirety’  (Flyvbjerg, 2006; p25). Other authors also defend the robustness of single and small 
number case study methods. For example Mays and Pope (1995) argue that single case 
studies can demonstrate ‘features or categories relevant to a wide number of settings’ and are 
strongly compatible with examining processes within organisations (Pettigrew, 1997; 
Langley, 1999; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). Likewise Tsoukas suggests that: 
 
‘[E]xplanatory idiographic studies are epistemologically valid because they are 
concerned with the clarification of structures and their associated generative 
mechanisms, which have been contingently capable of producing the observed 
phenomena’ (Tsoukas, 1989) 
 
Using a positivistic framework then, a single, or double case study design would be seen to 
be difficult to generalise from, and the design would therefore be a weakness, though from 
other more interpretive perspectives, the ability to dig down deeply into the contingent nature 
of organisational processes and broader themes (such as knowledge and power) is valuable. 
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Furthermore, as part of the data analysis stage of this work, it was possible to consider the 
application of the theoretical framework and analytical methodology to other published 
studies of reconfiguration to test the extent to which the approach was transferable following 
Mitchell (1983) and Bryman (1988), in the spirit of ‘analytic induction’ rather than 
‘enumerative induction’ focusing on transferability or generalisation in terms of theory rather 
than population. 
 
Having now explained the philosophical approach to the research and indicated the research 
design, the next section details how the research progressed in the field. 
 
4.4 The research strategy 
 
This section explains and justifies the methods used to collect, analyse and interpret the data 
presented in this thesis. Following the principles of triangulation (Mays and Pope, 1995; Yin, 
2009), multiple methods of data collection were employed. These included 45 semi-
structured interviews alongside documentary analysis and observations of meetings. 
Interviews may allow the interviewer to explore how respondents define their own positions 
and views – sentiments which cannot be observed such as ‘feelings, thoughts, intentions’ 
(Patton 1980; p196) can be explored in this media. Documentary analysis aids an 
understanding of how organisations might wish to justify their positions and decisions at a 
corporate level – though as Atkinson and Coffey (1997; p128) advise, documentary data must 
be placed within their organisational settings and cultural contexts. Finally, observation may 
allow health researchers to study what occurs in the ‘black box’ (Murphy and Dingwall 1998) 
and allows us to analyse decision making in a way that reading about how decisions were 
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made, or discussing with decision makers how they arrived at policy decisions does not. 
Whilst recognizing that triangulation is not a panacea – it does not automatically grant 
validity to findings, indeed it may bring further problems for researchers (Silverman, 2010; 
Sim and Sharp, 1998) creating confusion rather than clarity, this research follows the 
principle that in broad terms: ‘People are complex and should be studied by watching them, 
joining in talking and reading what they write’ (Pope and Mays, 1995). 
 
As with most qualitative research, the processes employed needed to be flexible (Marshall, 
1996) at times as goals changed in response to unexpected findings in the field with positive 
and negative consequences. The following subsections will describe the work done as part of 
the thesis, how it was done, when, where, why and who with. It will describe how much data 
was generated, how it connects with the research question, how it was analysed, and also any 
problems encountered. This will be structured by data source– beginning then with interviews 
(2011-2012), followed by documentary analysis (2009-2014), and finally observations (2010-
2012). 
 
4.51 Interviews (2011-2012) 
 
This section describes the rationale behind the choice to conduct 45 semi-structured 
interviews, the sampling and selection strategies employed; how these developed over time 
and how and why they deviated from the original research design. Then the data analysis 




Britten (1995) suggests that the types of question which are well served by qualitative 
interview techniques relate to; behaviour or experience, opinion or belief, feelings, 
knowledge, sensory/perception and background or demography.  The choice of semi-
structured interviews was considered most appropriate because structured interviews with 
‘mostly fixed choice’ responses would not allow a deep enough examination of the issues of 
interest for this thesis; for example,  complex, potentially ‘hidden’ notions relating to power 
structures or the application of knowledge. Likewise, interviews that covered just one or two 
topics would have been inappropriate, as the research question encompassed a broad thematic 
interest in a number of issues, and just as structured interviews might be superficial, there 
would have been a danger that unstructured interviews might have become too focused upon 
minutiae which in turn may have mitigated against broader thematic analysis.  
 
Hence the choice of the semi-structured interview as the most apposite method of primary 
data collection for this study – consisting of a loose structure with open ended questions that 
were designed thematically to extract the most relevant information from the respective 
informants. This interview data was supplemented with observational data and documentary 
data in an effort to ‘triangulate’ the findings and add greater contextual information and 





Figure 3: Case study I: the macro-level (NHS London, 2008d) (the graphic is taken from, 





PEG: Programme Executive Group 
LCG: London Commissioning Group 
CAG: Clinical Advisory Group 
 
 
Members of all the above groups with the exception of the patient/carer group and the PEG 
were interviewed – however I did interview both Project Managers with responsibility to report 
to the PEG. The first step was to conduct an informal interview with an NHS manager via a 
personal contact in November 2009 which was very useful in confirming a number of points 
around the potential interest in pursuing study into the reconfiguration. Further informal 
conversations with new colleagues on the EIS project at around the same period were also 
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useful in this regard. Informed by analysis of the NHS London documents in early 2010, an 
initial research design was instigated that focused on approaching members of the respective 
reconfiguration panels to be interviewed. These were, in order of importance; the central 
project board, the clinical expert panel, the finance and commissioning panel, the patient 
representative panel, and the JCPCT. Individuals on these boards were purposively selected 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 1998) because they were closely involved in key decisions around the 
design and implementation of the reformed stroke service. There was also an element of 
opportunity to these choices; because through professional EIS project contacts there was a 
good chance of securing interviews with certain members of these (first two) boards in 
particular.  
 
And so it proved, interviews were secured with 8 members of the project board, 8 of the 
clinical expert panel and 5 of the commissioning and finance panel. Along with other 
informants identified through the pan-London Stroke CAG observations and case study II 
very good coverage of the key professional and managerial figures involved in the 
reconfiguration was achieved. The table of those interviewed as part of the macro-level study 
is presented below: 
Table 5: Case Study I Informant list 
Job title Relevance/experience Role 
Stroke Nurse 
Specialist 
Clinical expert panel, project board and Stroke 
Clinical Advisory Group (permanent) 
Professional 
Clinical Director for 
Stroke in London  
(Doctor 1) 
Clinical expert panel, project board and Stroke 






Clinical expert panel, project board and Stroke 




Kenworthy hospital and Clinical expert panel 
and Clinical Advisory Group 
Professional 
Public Health Expert 
(Doctor 4) 
Clinical expert panel and Project Board Professional 
Specialist Registrar 
(stroke) (Doctor 6) 
Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Medical Director for 
the Stroke Project 
(Doctor/Manager 1) 
Project Board Chair (clinical), CEO of a London 
Hospital and Clinical expert panel 
Professional 
Ward Manager 2 and 
nurse 
Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Clinical specialist 
physiotherapist in 
stroke (AHP 1) 
Clinical expert panel Professional 
Assistant Medical 
Director 
London Ambulance Service, Project Board Professional 
Stroke Network 
Director 1 
Finance and Commissioning Panel, Stroke 




Stroke Clinical Advisory Group (occasional) Managerial 
Stroke Network 
Director 2 
Project Board Managerial 
Stroke Network 
Director 3 
Finance and Commissioning Panel Managerial 
Network Project Lead 
(Network Project 
Manager 3) 
Stroke Clinical Advisory Group (permanent) Managerial 
Senior SHA Manager 
(SHA Manager 1) 
NHS London Senior manager Managerial 
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Stroke Project Lead 
(SHA Manager 2) 
Project Board Chair (managerial)  and 
Commissioning and Finance Panel and CEO of 
a London PCT 
Managerial 
Project Manager for 
stroke project 
NHS London, Project Board Managerial 
Clinical Services 
Manager for stroke 






Commissioned by Kenworthy hospital to 
prepare HASU bid 
Consultancy 
Management  
Consultant Lead for 
Stroke Project 
Project Board (Consulting Company)and 






Clinical expert panel and Stroke Clinical 
Advisory Group (permanent) 
Charity 
Charity Director Project Board Charity  
 
 
Unfortunately, none of those cited as patient/carers consented to be interviewed when 
approached. Whilst I did interview two representatives from stroke charities, I am aware that 
the lack of PPI interviews represents a limitation of the study. In mitigation, as important as 
the patient voice is to health services research, my primary analytical focus was on how 
managers and professionals interpret and use the discourse of evidence in shaping services 
and care for patients. I also failed to interview any of the members of the JCPCT despite 
multiple attempts to invite them to take part. I was disappointed about the reluctance of any 
of those I approached from the JCPCT to take part – however, I did manage to review the 
relevant meeting agenda items, minutes and supplementary papers of this important board. A 
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limitation of my research that I am aware of is however, is its inability to engage beyond this 
official account of the site selection meetings from the perspective of the JCPCT.  
  
The interview schedule was piloted in early August 2011 with a London stroke consultant 
leading to some small amendments. Formal interviews began shortly after this in late August 
that year. The interview schedule was loosely based around the four strands of the Dean 
framework (2010), but included open ended questions about informants’ experiences of the 
reconfiguration, permitting a ‘responsive’ interview technique (Rubin and Rubin, 2011) 
through which distinct topics and themes emerged and were pursued within each interview 
and also over the 16 months of the interviews. By the end of 2012 theoretical saturation point 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) had been reached with the macro-level data in that the interview 
data was generating no new empirical or conceptual information. A decision was then taken 
to cease the interview process.  
 
Case study II: the micro-level 
 
Alongside the analysis of macro-level pan-London change, it seemed important to learn more 
about how the reconfiguration affected staff delivering care at the micro-level, to discover 
how views of the reconfiguration might converge or diverge  between elite level 
professionals and those tasked with delivering care. Kenworthy hospital was purposively 
sampled (Patton, 2002) as it was one of the eight new HASU sites in London and undergoing 
organisational change as part of the reconfiguration. Semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with the following staff between September-December 2011. The staff  were purposively 
sampled to provide a wide range of professional and management perspectives on the 
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implementation of evidence based stroke care and the effectiveness of different tools in 
achieving this. Details of the staff interviewed are given below: 
 
Table 6 Case study II informant list 
Job title Relevance/experience Role 
Stroke research nurse Kenworthy hospital Professional 
HASU Coordinator (and nurse) Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Staff nurse Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Health Care Assistant Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Stroke Consultant (Doctor 3) Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Stroke consultant (Doctor 5) Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Specialist Registrar (stroke) (Doctor 
6) 
Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Consultant Radiologist Kenworthy hospital Professional 
General Practitioner Regional PCT Professional 
Occupational Therapist (I/P) Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Speech and Language Therapist 
(I/P) 
Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Dietician Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Occupational Therapist 
(Community) 
Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Psychologist Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Physiotherapist (I/P) Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Occupational Therapies Lead Kenworthy hospital Professional 
Stroke care coordinator 
(community) 
Kenworthy hospital Administrator 
Ward manager 1 (and nurse) Kenworthy hospital Managerial 
Ward manager 2 (and nurse) Kenworthy hospital Managerial 
Clinical Services Manager Kenworthy hospital Managerial 
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Matron (Care of the elderly 
including stroke) 
Kenworthy hospital Managerial 
Director of stroke and care of the 
elderly services 
Kenworthy hospital Managerial 
 
The original research plan for the PhD data collection had been to interview the Kenworthy 
staff once using the EIS designed interview schedule (see appendix G), and through these 
interviews identify key figures and invite them to a second interview using the PhD interview 
schedule (see appendix F). In December 2011, whilst following this plan, very quickly some 
unanticipated problems were identified with this approach alongside a realisation that there 
was the potential to exploit a rich data source that had not been considered for the PhD 
previously.  
 
Firstly, following the original plan of re-interviewing EIS informants at Kenworthy for the 
PhD, two members of staff were interviewed for the second time and we found it was not a 
good use of our collective time to ‘rehash’ ground we had already covered in the EIS 
interview. However information which emerged from the initial EIS interview had been 
drawn on in both subsequent interviews. This allowed questions to be targeted and framed in 
ways that allowed a deeper exploration into specific areas. However, if in the analysis of the 
interviews, the contextual information gained in the first interview (for the EIS project) and 
other interviews with other Kenworthy staff was not drawn upon, then the information 
gleaned from the PhD interview felt less ‘whole’. This was a clear impression which emerged 
from early reflections and attempts to analyse and think about themes from these interviews. 
In order to avoid this there were two options: (a) use the first (EIS) interviews too in my 
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(PhD) analysis or (b) go over the same ground for the sake of verifiable completeness. The 
latter would have been time consuming and tiresome for both the informant and interviewer. 
 
Furthermore, reflecting upon the analysis of my early (macro-level) PhD interviews new 
similarities in emergent themes in both the EIS and PhD data were noted.  In the EIS 
interviews the focus was on evidence based practice and how it has been implemented – all 
Kenworthy respondents spontaneously referred to the London reconfiguration as this had 
been a major driver in these processes. In the PhD interviews, the focus was on the London 
reconfiguration and how the changes it has heralded have been implemented - all respondents 
spontaneously referred to policy and management instruments/implementation methods used 
to make practice more evidence based. 
 
These findings were discussed with my supervisors and a decision to use the data from the 
interviews performed at Kenworthy as part of my PhD analysis was made. These were 
supplemented by some interviews with staff who were missed as part of the EIS work (they 
were unavailable to be interviewed when I was at the hospital in the Autumn but were willing 
to be interviewed in the Winter), and a small number of specifically focused further 
interviews with particularly important informants identified via the EIS interviews and CAG 
observations as being worthy of interviewing further for the PhD. These final interviews were 
conducted at Kenworthy in December 2011, reaching saturation point shortly before 
Christmas that year once no new relevant data was felt to be emerging from the micro-level 




Nevertheless, this decision had some ethical and methodological implications which needed 
to be addressed. Firstly, ethics; an exemption from the need for formal NHS ethics from 
GSTT in May, 2010 and KCL ethical clearance in June 2010 had been achieved (see copies 
of ethics/R&D letters and documentation in the appendix of the thesis) – but as part of this 
arrangement, it was agreed that the work would require local Research and Development 
clearance from each Trust or Commissioning group whose staff members were interviewed 
or observed. Given that now, data collected for the EIS project at Kenworthy was also to be 
used for the PhD work, the advice of the KCL governance board was sought around issues of 
consent. The advice received was to contact each informant, explain the situation and ask for 
retrospective clearance to use their EIS data for the PhD project – which was subsequently 
done.  
 
Methodologically, it made sense to recode the Kenworthy data that had been generated 
through the EIS interview schedule using the same process developed for the macro-level 
PhD data analysis – therefore keeping two separate data bases in Nvivo (QSR International, 
2009) – the data for the EIS project being analysed more inductively and collaboratively with 
my research team; whilst the data for the PhD were analysed using a more deductive 
approach based on Dean’s analytics of government and done so independently – this 
approach is discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Overall, 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 41 different individuals across 
the macro-level and micro-level studies. The interviews generally lasted about 60-70 minutes, 
and all but one was done face-to-face (one being done over the telephone). Handwritten notes 
were taken during the interviews to aid memory of real-time perceptions and interpretation. 
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For most interviews these notes were then typed up shortly following the interview for a 
number of reasons; firstly, to aid critical reflection on the progress of the interview and 
underline the key themes that seemed important at the time, secondly to aid reflection on the 
significance of the interview compared to other recent data analyses as a form of ‘constant 
comparison’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as often a number of days or even weeks might 
elapse before receiving the transcribed documents, and due to other work commitments there 
may have been delays before it was possible to begin formally coding the data. Thirdly, this 
process aided reflection on aspects of the interview schedule – leading to future 
improvements – for example, the questions related to ‘identity’ were often difficult to phrase 
adequately or express – reflecting on the interviews immediately after them helped to address 
this over time. Finally, immediate typing of the key points of the interview acted as a kind of 
safety net should any digital data be lost (thankfully this did not occur).  
 
Most interviews generated about 10,000 words. The interviews were digitally audio-recorded 
following consent being sought from each informant. The audio files were sent electronically 
to a professional transcriber, transcribed and returned by email. The transcribed MS Word 
documents were then anonymised and uploaded to Nvivo 8 software. The two macro-level 
and micro-level files were analysed separately so that distinctions between the two datasets 
might be discernible, but the analytical technique and processes were the same. 
 
The Research Question focuses on evidence, so analytically, the challenge was to deconstruct 
the different ways in which ‘evidence’ impacted upon the London stroke reforms. This was 
achieved by allotting primary codes along the four broad deductive ‘lines’ of the analytics of 





 episteme  
 identity 
The interview data analysis also generated numerous other inductive themes.  These 
secondary codes could be functional (e.g. audit and standards, measurement, acute, rehab, 
professional relations) or theoretical (e.g. conflict, specialisation, medical dominance, 
biopolitics, soft power). This allowed the data to be organised in a logical, manageable 
fashion, and highlight the relevant significant text from each of the different interviews. The 
next process was to print out primary and secondary coded data from Nvivo and review the 
different textual strands thematically – developing tertiary themes and conceptual points – for 
example, EBHC as a disciplinary power and/or as a form of governmentality (this then 
developed further following reading the Martin et al (2013) paper focused on similar themes) 
and the paradox of freedom/control and discipline/desire – again, influenced by the wider 
literature – for example Foucault’s later histories of sexuality and theories of technologies of 
the self (Foucault, 1986) and Starkey and McKinlay’s (1998) exploration of these themes in 
an organisational context.  
 
The process then centred on building these fragments into a larger theory – going between the 
data and the wider literature iteratively and exploring deviant cases – for example, a key 
finding was the compatibility of managerial and professional goals and techniques of power 
in reforming stroke care which is evident throughout the reconfiguration process with a major 
exception linked to the selection of HASU sites – this phenomenon was therefore explored in 
detail and the reasons for the conflict were identified and discussed (Pope and Mays, 1995). 
The ‘ethical’ and ‘economic’ rationales linking the mutual compatibility of managerial and 
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professional goals became apparent through this process of breaking the data down then 
building it up again by a process of ‘de-contextualisation’ then ‘re-contextualisation’ (Tesch, 
1990) by exploring themes and extracting them from one data source and building it up 
alongside another.  In this way the results began to take shape thematically as dominant 
findings emerged from the case study I and II data sets, triangulated with observation and 
documentary source data. These results were written up and different schemas were trialled to 
identify the best way to present the data. This was however, a long and iterative process. 
 
Some of the interview data were incorporated easily into one broad ‘line’ of the analytics of 
government, but much of it cut across two or more of the four ‘lines’. The importance of the 
episteme and techne codes and the ways in which these spread into other codes was 
significant in aiding conceptual development with regard to the ‘non-subjective 
intentionality’ (Dean, 2010) of the reforms. It took a long time to develop this insight 
however – for a long time a key concern was to explore the four strands of the framework 
(almost) independently. Indeed other scholars have taken such an approach when drawing on 
the work of Dean – for example Winch and Creedy (2002) in a health care (evidence based 
nursing) context. 
 
It felt deceptively attractive to structure the results around the four analytical lines of the 
analytics of government framework (an early idea was to produce four distinct chapters in 
this way and indeed numerous drafts in this form were produced) but each time, the work felt 
rather flat when structured in this way. It became more apparent through this phase of trial 
and error result writing that whilst it is relatively easy to show ‘lines of visibility’ for example 
across certain aspects of the data –these ‘lines’ are contextually illuminating only when 
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considered in tandem with epistemic, technical and identity ‘lines’. The analysis developed a 
major focus on epistemic operationalisation – or how evidence may be understood in 
different ways and having different functions. To illustrate this: as a primary code episteme 
cut across many areas and reflected a circularity found in EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus 
(Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008; Ferlie et al, 2011). So, by episteme, the analysis explores 
evidence of practice – i.e. qualitative and quantitative data related to actual practice – this 
data makes current practice visible and can be used as a technique of control of/by/for 
managers and professionals which in turn impacts upon their respective identities. Likewise, 
evidence for practice – i.e. guidelines, research papers, policy directives – makes best or 
chosen practice visible,  is useful as a technique guide professionals and enable changes of 
practice (in either disciplinary or desire terms) and also impacts upon the subjectivities of 
individuals and their respective identity work.  
 
Thus, the process of data analysis of the interview data was a long one – especially when 
incorporating the observational and documentary data. It was important to reflect back on the 
points of similarities and difference between the three data sources and explore how these 
supported or challenged the emergent interpretations across the whole data set. In this way 
the structure of the analytics of government was an advantage as an heuristic device in that 
the data sources were coded across the four strands of the analytics, which made triangulation 
(whilst not problematic) certainly manageable. Paradoxically however, managing to ‘go 
beyond the data’ and generate any kind of significant ‘conceptual leap’ (Klag and Langley, 
2013) only occurred once I ceased thinking about the data in such a controlled and structured 
manner by really focusing on the ‘non-subjective intentionality’ (Dean, 2010) of the stroke 




4.52 Documents (2009-2014) 
 
There are four distinct types and sources of documents that have been integral to this PhD. 
They have been handled in different ways – reflecting contrasting strategies at different times 
of the research process. These include official London health care reviews carried out by 
various expert panels since 1992; official documentation produced by the Health care for 
London team as part of, or alongside the (preliminary and final) stroke strategy for London 
reports of 2008; and finally, documents focused on the decision-making process of the 
JCPCT and JHOSC in giving the green light to the stroke (and trauma) reconfiguration plans 
in 2009; documentation produced in support of LMDS and SINAP audits and other 
documents focused on data measurement and implementation – provided via the meetings’ 
observations and through discussions and through work at Kenworthy hospital. These will be 
discussed in turn.  
 
The first significant documentary resource that the thesis draws upon is official policy 
documentation focused on three high profile reviews of London health care since 1992. A 
formal content analysis (Bowling, 2009) of these documents was performed (and is presented 





Table 7: London Health Care Reviews 
Year Title Publication details 
1992 Tomlinson Report HMSO 
1997 Turnberg Review Department of Health 
2007 Health care for London: A framework for Action NHS London 
 
Having studied the large quantity of documentation produced as part of the reconfiguration 
programme (some aimed at the public, some at practitioners) as part of the early work of the 
PhD – in effect, becoming acquainted with the field a decision was made to focus on how the 
policy Discourse around evidence based health care had developed in key official policy texts 
relating specifically to the needs of London. These three texts were selected for three reasons. 
Firstly, they focus on London health care and how this has been problematised (Dean, 2010) 
and point to an evolving strategy around framing problems and presenting solutions for 
different political administrations (the Major government, 1992; early New Labour, 1997; 
and late New Labour, 2007) they therefore might shed light on NPM, post-NPM and network 
governance influenced policy making. Secondly, if a choice is made to locate the effective 
‘birth’ of EBM with Sackett and colleagues’ (1996) BMJ articles, then there is one review 
which pre-dates this (Tomlinson), another which is almost contemporaneous (Turnberg) and 
a third which is carried out a decade later (Darzi) – so this might shed some light on the 
permeation of ‘evidence based’ health care and policy making and its respective importance 
for professionals, managers, policy makers and the public. Thirdly, the years 1992-2007 
represent a significant time in the development of stroke care in both policy and research 
terms – with advances in the evidence base behind the effectiveness of thrombolysis for 
stroke patients (NINDS, 1995) and stroke unit care (SUTC, 2007), so reviews over this 




Official policy documents are useful for analysis because they seek to influence views, 
beliefs and actions (Martin and Learmonth, 2012; p283). However, it is clear that there is 
more than one way of interpreting these documents and that my findings are necessarily 
subjective. For this reason it is important to be clear about the systematic methods by which 
the documents were analysed. I conducted a series of textual key word searches using the 
following key terms: 
 
 Evidence; evidence based; evidence-based 
 Stroke 
 Close; closure; merge; merger 
 Reconfigure; reconfiguration 
 
These terms were selected to reflect the focus of the research question around the evidence 
and motivation behind the stroke service reconfiguration. Multiple readings of the texts 
focused on how ‘evidence’ was framed and interpreted were conducted, and how stroke was 
considered (if at all). The primary aim was to explore what motivates change – for example, 
economic drivers and/or service ‘quality’. A secondary aim was to understand more about the 
potential progress of an ‘evidence based’ Discourse (both in general and stroke specific 
terms) developing in regional health care policy making across different political 
administrations. There was also an interest in presentational development – how did the 
different texts present their findings (graphs, tables, photos, referencing style) and what 
different types of stakeholders were invited to contribute; also who were the authors and who 
was the apparent audience? This approach was influenced by the Appleby et al (2011) King’s 
Fund Report which highlighted the development of London health care ‘problematisations’ 
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and accordant reviews. Methodologically, it takes a similar approach to that of Martin and 
Learmonth (2012) and their analysis of the discourses of administration, leadership and 
management (2012; p283).  This systematic approach was useful for these formal policy 
documents because it allowed a comparative study of policy discourse progression over time. 
There are some potential limitations to this approach. Bowling (2009) for example suggests 
that content analysis ought to have two coders to limit the subjective nature of the process; 
that content analysis merely tests the ability of the researcher to enforce their own theoretical 
biases (Bowling, 2009); and finally counting the frequencies of a phenomenon 
decontextualizes its meaning. In response to these criticisms, firstly, it must be conceded that 
there is an inherent subjective element to content analysis (and indeed all interpretive 
qualitative research), but that through discussion with my supervisors, and a reflexive 
approach this is consciously acknowledged (additionally it is the case that double coding 
would be inappropriate for individual PhD study). Second, the chosen theoretical approach, 
drawing on Dean’s (2010) framework is very clear about the four dimensions that structure 
the study – here focusing in particular on fields of visibility and epistemic development in 
official policy review documentation. Finally, to counter the third complaint, the analysis 
endeavoured to go beyond a mere tally of relevant words and present the findings within a 
broader context to enrich an understanding of the significance of the findings. 
 
This section now discusses the other three types of documentary data drawn upon for the 
thesis. These were not formally analysed as the Tomlinson, Turnberg and Darzi reports just 
discussed because they were used more as a background resource rather than as a key 
analytic resource. Nevertheless, these documents were all significant to the work of the thesis 




Since early 2010, shortly after the commencement of the PhD, all the available documents 
published on the NHS London website connected to the stroke reconfiguration have been 
systematically downloaded. 91 documents were downloaded and read as part of this process – 
detailed notes were made on these papers. Much of the documentation relating to the stroke 
reconfiguration from the Health care for London website was produced in support of the 
work led by the project team around the development of the proposed stroke strategy for 
London – many being technical appendices. The strategy documents themselves - there were 
two – preliminary (NHS London June, 2008) and final (NHS London November 2008)- were 
particularly useful in guiding my understanding around how stroke was problematised, how 
evidence was seen as central to this and the technical challenge and project management tools 
that would be used to guide the reconfiguration.  
 
These documents provided me with a good initial understanding of the strategic approach of 
the project team to managing the various aspects of the reconfiguration. They were aimed at 
both a public audience keen for greater detail than appears in the strategy booklets, and also 
at providers and commissioners – for example there is voluminous information for providers 
around how to bid for HASU, SU and TIA status alongside overviews of commissioning and 
finance arrangements. Following consideration of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages, a decision not to formally code these documents or download them into Nvivo 
was made. The reason for this decision was that many of these documents were technical 
appendices of limited value to detailed content analysis - rather they were best utilised as a 
background resource to firstly inform the development of the interview schedule and 
secondly to triangulate (Yin, 2009) with specific emerging themes from the observations and 
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interviews. These technical appendices were used strategically to bolster awareness of 
specific issues and as a counter-resource to other data, rather than using all the documents 
systematically. For example, they were very useful to return to when considering the 
importance of the ‘site selection’ issue (see chapter VI section 1) which emerged through 
interviews with senior clinical and managerial stakeholders as part of case study I. 
 
This same interest in the selection of HASU sites led to the third documentary source to be 
discussed here. 31 PDF files relating to the decision making of the JCPCT in the key January 
and July meetings in 2009 where the site selection decision was made, including minutes, 
agenda items, presentations and various annexes were analysed. These documents discussed 
the project management strategy, public consultation and JHOSC processes from the JCPCT 
point of view. Analysis of these documents proved invaluable as they articulate the official 
‘story’ of how a number of key decisions were made – they show that the recommendations 
of the project board were followed by the JCPCT, and the importance placed by the team on 
presenting the reforms as ‘evidence based’ with full ‘clinician support’ and strategies to 
manage the public consultation. These data provided an important resource for comparison in 
concert with the interview data generated around these topics – especially given the 
difficulties encountered in engaging members of the JCPCT to be interviewed. Again, as with 
the NHS London documentation, a decision was made not to systematically code these 
documents as this was deemed to be of limited value – their key utility lay in strategic 
illumination of specific issues. 
 
The final documentary resource included papers and guidelines which emerged from the 
observational work, interviews and informal discussions at Kenworthy hospital. These 
157 
 
centred mostly around the London Minimum Data Set (LMDS) and SINAP data requirements 
and auditing tools and are discussed in chapter VI section 3 and chapter VII section 3. These 
documents show the priorities which the commissioners and networks in conjunction with the 
project team, and then the pan-London Clinical Advisory Group used to measure 
implementation and fidelity with the new regimes of practice (Dean, 2010). The differences 
in focus between organisational and clinical standards and inter-professional distinctions are 
useful here. Again, these technical documents were not applicable for systematic coding but 
were rather used to guide informal discussions and formal interviews with key informants, as 
well as a tool to juxtapose gaps between official goals and the interpretations of those who 
used them. Other key stroke focused national publications and documents generated by the 
DH, RCP, NICE, the NAO and other bodies have been analysed to inform the broader 
knowledge base around the specific London reforms and are referred to throughout the body 
of the thesis where appropriate. The next key data source to be discussed is observational 
data. 
 
4.53 Observations (2010-2012) 
 
The third and final key data source that the thesis draws upon is observations of the pan-
London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group (CAG) meetings conducted over a two year period. 
From September 2010 to September 2012 I attended each two hour bi-monthly CAG meeting 
as a non-participant observer. I also attended an 8 site HASU meeting in July 2011, and a 
local network meeting at a London hospital also in 2011. As part of my early research into 
the stroke reconfiguration process and immersion in the documents described in the previous 
section in early 2010 I began to develop an interest in the work of the five sector specific 
stroke networks. Through a link on one of the networks’ websites I sent a rather speculative 
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email asking a number of questions about the work of the stroke networks in London. My 
email was passed on to a senior project manager for one of the stroke networks. This project 
manager was extremely helpful and after some email correspondence we met for an informal 
talk in Summer 2010. She provided the key administrative support to the CAG and suggested 
that it might be useful for my PhD to observe the work of the CAG. This was agreed by her 
line manager (the Network Director) as managerial lead for the CAG and by the Clinical 
Director for Stroke for the city (as clinical lead for the CAG).  
 
Although I had already secured an exemption from the need for formal NHS ethics clearance 
via GSTT and KCL ethics clearance in May 2010, I needed to secure local governance 
approval from the trust of each of the informants I spoke to – this was a rather time 
consuming process as they came from across the 31 different PCTs plus further acute trusts – 
each with separate local governance arrangements. To compound this, the CAG was 
governed by a particular PCT which was not used to requests such as mine, plus it was 
undergoing structural reform as part of the new coalition government’s reforms. Eventually I 
was granted retrospective clearance to use data from the CAG meetings I had attended – 
thanks in a large part to the support of the senior project manager and the managerial and 
clinical leads for the CAG who wrote in support of my request.  
 
At the start of each meeting, all the participants introduced themselves – including me, and I 
stated that I was doing a PhD study into the reconfiguration. It was made clear by the Chair 
that if anyone had any objections to my presence – then it would be fine to raise them. 
However, nobody ever did – in fact most people (when chatting informally before or after the 
meetings) could not understand why I wanted to sit through such long meetings when I did 
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not have to. I was very careful to say nothing in the meetings, but I was included in the email 
distribution list for the two years I observed the meetings (after the round table 
introductions), and offered copies of the documents discussed (Appendices H and I show a 
draft of one of the minutes of the meetings and also an agenda).  
 
The meetings were peripatetic and held in different network buildings across the capital. 
They generally lasted just over two hours. There were usually between 10-20 attendees. The 
meetings were chaired by the clinical director for stroke (deputised for by another consultant 
when he was not there). A network director sat alongside the clinical director – she was an 
important member of the group – offering a management view; reflecting the commissioners’ 
viewpoint around the topics of discussion – often she would be joined by network directors or 
assistant directors from other London regions. In addition to this there were usually about 
five other HASU lead consultants, a stroke nurse specialist (also clinical lead for her SU) and 
other nursing and therapies representation – both in-patient and community. There was a 
senior London Ambulance Service representative who spoke very often with respect to issues 
around ambulance care. There was frequent attendance by a stroke charity representative – he 
provided an insight into some of the public relations’ impacts that policies might have – 
alongside the network director – the professionals often deferred to their knowledge here. 
There was no GP representative (contrary to the mandate published in the NHS London 
documentation around the need for this). A consistent theme discussed by the panel was the 
need for more attendees from Stroke Units (as opposed to Hyper Acute Stroke Units), nurses, 
and rehabilitation experts (both in–patient and even more so community base), and 
discussions around strategies to reach put to these individuals and communities. Over the two 
years of observations, this did appear to be slowly addressed – especially as rehabilitation 
issues became more significant, as the HASU and SU pathways became more embedded over 
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time. Administrative support and in depth knowledge around many of the data collection 
issues was provided by the senior project manager. Senior medical voices tended to dominate 
the discussions, but challenges to this were respectfully received. There was a good gender 
balance across the group. Often, outside speakers were invited to present on certain topics – 
these would often be data presentations reflecting progress or problems with the new model – 
other-times contingency plans – for example, there was an interesting presentation on the 
potential impact that the Olympic Games in 2012 might have on the functioning of the model. 
 
My motivation for attending the meetings was firstly; to learn more about the ways in which 
different stakeholders interacted with each other in a pan-London setting – I felt this was 
important to do given that much of my focus was on historical data and actions – observing 
how different professionals and managers interacted contemporaneously was useful in 
triangulating with documentary and interview data. Secondly, I wanted to inductively learn 
more about the issues that the nascent implementation process was creating and how the 
participants responded to them. Thirdly, I wanted to analyse these interactions and emerging 
issues and themes, and through longitudinal and iterative engagement with Dean’s analytics 
of government (1999) framework, develop theory deductively.  
 
I chose not to analyse this data in Nvivo for a number of reasons. Firstly, the amount of data 
itself was relatively small and conducive to reading and re-reading in paper format. Secondly, 
given the delays in securing ethical clearance to use the data and the potential that I would 
not be able to use the data at all, my approach was to be reasonably pragmatic, and use the 
observational data as a triangulatory resource behind the documentary and interview data. My 
approach to the thesis was not primarily ethnographic- it could never be, as a large focus of 
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the PhD was essentially retrospective – but analysis of this data was highly valuable in 
illuminating a number of key themes which are discussed in detail (chapter VI section 2). 
 
Certain key themes around control of clinical practices; firmness around standardising 
procedures and collecting data to show processes were working to prove the viability of the 
London model within a potentially hostile economic environment emerged consistently from 
the data collected and analysed. The group also functioned on an informal level – as well as 
the agenda items, they would often discuss non-minuted issues, often related to repatriation 
from a HASU to an SU, or examples of patients not being sent to HASUs where the protocol 
would suggest they ought to have been. Other examples of informal parts of the meeting were 
when the lead would provide information about meetings he had had with senior politicians, 
or commissioners, or the progress of studies commissioned to highlight the clinical and or 
economic effectiveness of the model. So, rather than use the observational data as a primary, 
detailed resource from which I draw many vignettes and examples in the thesis, I used the 
data more as a triangulation tool to inform my detailed analysis of the interview data – both 
thematically and conceptually. 
 
A clear advantage of conducting the observations was that it gave me informal access to all 
the members of the CAG – almost all of whom were interviewed as part of case study I. It 
also meant that when interviewing them, I had a prior understanding of them and has ‘seen 
them in action’ in the meetings, and could discuss particular pertinent points. In particular, I 
developed a good relationship with the clinical and managerial leads from Kenworthy 
hospital via the meetings – I normally sat alongside the clinical services manager and we 
would chat before and after. Spending this time with these individuals over the two years was 
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extremely valuable, as I was able to gain a greater understanding of how they presented their 
domestic issues at a pan-London level, and how their closeness with the pan-London CAG 
was used (in particular by this manager) back at Kenworthy. It also meant that I could 
understand both macro-level (case study I) and micro-level (case study II) issues in greater 
context in particular with regard to the identity strand of the analytics of government 
framework. 
 
I have frequently reflected on how my presence at the meetings may have elicited some kind 
of Hawthorne effect (Mayo, 2014) on the participants. I tried to minimise this by being as 
unobtrusive as possible, and through becoming a regular face at the meetings, hopefully I 
blended into the background. Of course it is possible that certain topics or discussions were 
avoided in my presence – in the same way that some points were not included in the official 
minutes. There are three further points to make here however. Firstly, the meeting minutes 
were to be made publicly available – these were not strictly private meetings. Secondly, I 
attended other meetings with some of the participants on numerous occasions (as a 
participant) and noted no different approach, manner or style which points towards a level of 
consistency, and thirdly, an overriding sense I took from the observations was the almost 
evangelical zeal that many of the participants had for the stroke reform project, and an 
appreciation for anyone who shared an interest in this and a desire to ensure that the project 
succeeded. So, whilst my presence may have had some effect on the participants and how 
they might compose themselves, as far as possible, I am confident this was not so great as to 




I ceased attending the meetings in September 2012 because analysis of the data suggested I 
had reached saturation point (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) with respect to interaction, thematic 
and conceptual data after two years of regular attendance at the meetings. I was invited to 
attend a further meeting in December 2012 to feed back some perceptions to the group which 
I was happy to do – focusing mainly on my genuinely positive findings about their 
professionalism and dedication and group efficiency as opposed to my theoretical 
development about inter-professional and management-professional relations and 
development of systems of control through the reified stroke episteme, as I felt the former 
was both more readily comprehensible and practically relevant to the audience through a ten 




This chapter placed the study in its epistemological context and justified the selected 
methodology. It demonstrated the coherence between the key research question and the 
theoretical approach to collecting and interpreting the data. The research described was 
discussed and its strengths and limitations were discussed. Finally, the three main data 
collection strategies were reflexively described and the analytical process was explained in 
order to provide the reader with an understanding of how the results which follow in the next 














The first empirical chapter of this thesis explores how London stroke services were identified 
as problematic during New Labour’s third term. Using a governmentality approach (Foucault, 
2007) an ‘Analytics of Government’ (Dean, 2010) is conducted to examine the forms of 
knowledge, evidence and governmental techniques which were used to construct specific 
issues related to stroke care as ‘problems.’ The chapter will commence by drawing on 
documentary analysis of the Tomlinson (1992), Turnberg (1997) and Darzi (2007) reviews 
into London health care to demonstrate the evolving impacts of Evidence Based Health Care 
(EBHC) in influencing the episteme through which strategic level decision making in health 
care may be seen to develop. These three high profile reports focused on London health care 
services offer a useful method to examine the ‘fields of visibility of government’ (Dean, 
2010, p41) over health care in London and how they shifted over 15 years of policy making. 
Through these documents the chapter will explore the ways in which language, data 
presentation and political assumptions developed as evidence, specialist knowledge and 
clinical legitimacy became more important to strategic health care policy making. Interview 
data with those involved in the Darzi inspired reconfiguration will also be drawn on to 
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explore how management and governance techniques were selected and employed as part of 
this process.  
 
The construction of stroke care as a ‘pan-London’ issue for the first time will be introduced 
and the professional and managerial aspects behind the traditional problems of high quality 
stroke care delivery will be discussed. The development of measurement programmes to 
chart and shape improvement initiatives and explicate traditional weaknesses and how this 
contributed to a powerful new episteme for stroke care is then discussed. The chapter 
explores the interprofessional aspects that emerged from the development of the specific 
London stroke care episteme and then critiques how the consensus for change was made and 
questions the strength of the evidence behind what was to become the ‘London stroke 
model’. 
 
5.2 Section 1: Framing the problem 
 
The Tomlinson Review was published in 1992. Bernard Tomlinson was a retired pathologist 
and Chairman of the Northern Regional Health Authority when commissioned by William 
Waldegrave to inquire into ‘London’s health service, medical education and research’. His 
report followed a King’s Fund Report in 1991 which concluded that 5,000 beds should be 
closed in the capital, there were too many doctors employed, overall costs were too high and 
that NHS care in London was particularly inefficient (cited in: Appleby et al, 2011) The 
review contains 5 simple tables of data and two maps, but the majority of the report is in 
black and white text. There are no illustrations, photos, or illustrative quotes from the ‘over 
1,000 individuals’ the team spoke to. The word ‘evidence’ appears eight times in the 28,000 
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word text. The phrases ‘evidence based’ or ‘evidence-based’ do not appear at all reflecting 
the fact that the evidence based movement in health care was yet to establish itself in policy 
discourse. The word ‘stroke’ appears only once in the text and is described a ‘chronic’ 
condition (p9). A key passage of the text is cited below: 
 
‘A number of inner London hospitals are already in financial difficulty as their high 
overheads, and the mismatch of the scale and nature of their services to current 
demand, place them at a disadvantage in the reformed NHS. It is essential that work 
be put in hand now to plan for a more appropriate level of capacity, and to rationalise 
the many dispersed specialist services. Closures and mergers will be necessary.’  
Reference 1; Tomlinson Report (1992; p6) 
 
The report emphasises economic rationalisation rather than clinical excellence. Frank Dobson 
commissioned Leslie Turnberg to review London health services in 1997. Turnberg had just 
retired as head of the Royal College of Physicians, and again, like Tomlinson, was expected 
to be independent of London health care politics. The presentation of his review consisted 
predominantly of written text, although it did include 3 maps, 3 graphs and 3 tables. The 
word ‘evidence’ appears 42 times and ‘evidence-based practice’ also makes an appearance – 
suggesting a shift in the importance of the Discourse of evidence in health care politics 
through the 1990s. The word ‘stroke’ does not appear in the main body of the text – however 
the ‘Stroke Association’ is credited as a contributor to the report under ‘Other Organisations 
and Associations’ in the final appendix. Over 200 organisations were invited to submit 
written evidence alongside a ‘programme of meetings and visits’. Over 1,500 letters were 
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received from the public. The authors rejected the notion that London has too many beds; 
however they were clear that the makeup of acute services in the capital needed to change: 
 
‘We have spent much time assessing a number of specific plans for rationalisation of 
hospital services and have made what we hope will be helpful proposals. We realise 
that such difficult and usually controversial issues evoke strong reactions. We believe 
however that our proposals are realistic and rational given the circumstances which we 
discovered.’  
Reference 2; Turnberg Report (1997; p.i) 
 
The words ‘closure’ and ‘merger’ are used repeatedly through the text – often in the context 
of countering many of the plans drawn up in the Tomlinson Report. The seeds of what would 
become NHS London are planted here – in a call for a stronger strategic force to coordinate 
care in the capital - along with a commitment to the establishment of more accurate data 
capture and management systems: 
 
‘The sheer quantity of information available is overwhelming and information 
management systems are urgently required. We recommend further work on the 
institution of accurate information systems which will provide relevant data about 
problems and needs and ways in which these are being met locally and for Londoners 
as a whole. Any good planning system will be dependent on reliable information.’ 




This emphasis on information and data became central to New Labour policy making. This is 
emphasised in the Darzi review. The Darzi London review – Health care for London, a 
framework for Action was commissioned by David Nicholson as Chief Executive of the 
London SHA in Autumn 2006 and was published in July 2007. A key factor to note is that 
whilst Tomlinson and Turnberg respectively had been selected as ‘independent’ non-London 
based retired and supposedly objective arbiters of change; Darzi, as an eminent practicing 
surgeon and academic based at Imperial was quite clearly not. That was a strategic decision 
explained below in an interview with a senior NHS London manager: 
 
‘London has a history of failed strategies...  So my thinking about it was to look at, not 
in a terribly academic way, but just to try and think about why have all these previous 
attempts failed?  And to try to counteract some of those. So, first of all, it was 
important to have somebody with a degree of knowledge, clinical knowledge to set 
out, you know, what’s wrong with what we’re doing now.  So what had happened in 
the past, somebody from somewhere else has come, done a big report, gone off, 
lobbed it over the wall, right?  So is it any wonder that then it doesn’t get 
[implemented] – so this was the Health care For London, as a study, or as a review 
was done by a practicing clinician, international repute, working in London...  And he 
recruited, with our support, 250 clinicians to work with him.  So there was a degree of 
authority to what he had to say, that I don’t think was present in previous reviews.’ 




This manager presents the decision made by the SHA to ask Professor Darzi to lead the 
review as a practicing London clinician as a strategic choice to learn from many years of 
failed London reforms that had tended to lead to ‘conflict without change’ (Smith, 1982). The 
Darzi review was unlike its predecessors in the amount of support garnered from health care 
professionals. The report involved senior London medical leaders subjecting themselves and 
their colleagues to scrutiny rather than being ‘objectively’ scrutinised by an eminent outside 
observer. This produced collective ownership of both clinical problems and strategic 
solutions: 
 
‘[Darzi] tried to assimilate clinical evidence both from this country and abroad to try 
to broaden the evidence base of what he was doing...  I think [the Darzi report had] a 
degree of authority that others didn’t have, a degree of ownership from the clinical 
community within London that others didn’t have.  And a commitment from me and 
the leadership team here to follow it through into implementation.’   
Reference 5; SHA Manager 1 
 
Darzi’s work on London therefore had clinical credibility and ownership amongst London 
health care leaders and the commitment of the SHA. There is an attention to aesthetic 
presentation to his report which contrasts profoundly with the work of Tomlinson and 
Turnberg. Physically, the Darzi report is brightly coloured, glossy, full of photos (of NHS 
staff and patients working together, of gleaming new hospitals, scientific looking lab-
technicians, post-natal women doing yoga, hi-tech scanners, syringes, fruit and vegetables, 
caring and responsive  (photogenic) paramedics, pharmacists and happy elderly people). In 
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total there are 41 photos, 28 data tables, 15 graphs, 12 models, 3 graphics and 6 maps. There 
are multiple short quotes from ‘event participants’ peppered through the document and also 
copious use of scientific and academic references cited at the end of each section. This may 
reflect that over time, in IT terms it has become easier to produce more user-friendly and 
attractive literature to make cases to the public. This may be linked to the expertise of 
Management Consultant companies being involved in the production and presentation of 
such documentation. However, in terms of the shifting Discourse around health care, the 
centrality and increased use of the word evidence to the case for change compared to 
Tomlinson in particular is striking. The word ‘evidence’ appears 35 times; a classic example 
being cited below. The word evidence appears 4 times conjoined with ‘based’ (i.e. ‘evidence-
based’). The word ‘stroke’ appears 83 times in the document. 
 
‘This report makes recommendations for change. It is based on a thorough, 
practitioner-led process, and rooted in evidence [emphasis added] – gathered from a 
wide range of people and organisations from the world of health care and from the 
NHS’s partners in local government and beyond, from thorough reviews of the 
literature and data, and from the use of a range of analytical modelling techniques. It 
also reflects a major exercise to hear what Londoners say they want from their health 
care system. It sets out a compelling ten-year vision for health care in London.’ 
Reference 6; Health care for London, a framework for Action (NHS London 2007; p4) 
 
The emphasis on practitioner led, evidence based change rooted in comprehensive public 
consultation represents a nuanced, focused approach to strategic change in health care 
delivery allied to a strong, effective and committed SHA force. The case is made to highlight 
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historic problems in stroke care – the solutions to which are additive in that increased funding 
will produce improved outcomes in contrast to the discourse of earlier reports such as 
Tomlinson, which focus on closures and mergers.  
 
A crucial dimension of Darzi’s report is his success in placing London stroke care in an 
international context – this is intimately linked to the role of evidence. EBHC exists within 
and promotes a discourse of performative practice. Evidence is produced, evaluated and 
ranked in order to direct practice in rational ways. Proponents of EBHC create ‘regimes of 
calculability’ (Dean, 2010). These regimes may be used in politically significant ways. The 
Darzi Review:  A Framework for Action (NHS London, 2007) and the subsequent work of the 
Health care for London programme which was instigated to implement Lord Darzi’s vision 
around 6 initial improvement projects (one of which was stroke care) can be interpreted as an 
explicitly evidence based approach to health service reconfiguration. When Darzi’s work is 
juxtaposed with that of Tomlinson and Turnberg it becomes evident that this is a novel 
development in the long history of attempts to reconfigure London health care. The 
problematisation of stroke care in London involves the designation of stroke in the capital 
within an international performative space in which it is made visible as a failing service. The 
inadequacies which are made apparent by international comparative data herald ethical and 
economic imperatives to garner support for change.  
 
The Darzi Report problematised stroke care in London authoritatively and comprehensively 
becoming thereby successful in creating a space in which dissent became effectively illogical 
(Newman, 2001). This is significant because previous (and subsequent) attempts to 
reconfigure London health services have been hamstrung by popular dissent and a lack of 
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public legitimacy (Jones, 1993; Clover, 2013). The stroke reforms generated legitimacy for 
change, and this is the exception rather than the rule historically (Spurgeon et al, 2010). 
Below are a selection of graphs, data tables and maps taken from publications produced as 
part of the Darzi Review and the voluminous Health care for London Stroke Project 
documentation. These are presented in order to demonstrate the construction of new fields of 
visibility (Dean, 2010) of stroke in the Capital. 
 
Figure 4:  ‘Simple Stroke Statistics’ Appendix 4; Preliminary Stroke Strategy. Appendix 
Title: Scale of the problem. (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
 
This graph (Figure 4) places UK stroke performance in an international context. It highlights 
the poor performance of UK stroke services in 2002. It visually highlights that amongst this 
set of OECD countries, the UK is objectively worse than the majority of its international 
comparator countries. The next chart (Figure 5) highlights that mortality from 
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Cerebrovascular disease (CVD) in the UK from 1999-2002 was plateauing at a higher rate 
than the selected comparator nations. 
 
Figure 5: ‘Mortality from CVD, international Comparisons 1992-2002’ Preliminary Acute 
Stroke Strategy for London (p12) (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
 
These charts suggest that UK performance in stroke care in international terms is substandard 
and not improving. The next chart (Figure 6) highlights the extent of variability in stroke 





Figure 6: ‘2006 Sentinel Audit, London’ Preliminary Acute Stroke Strategy for London (p4) 




These sites are never referred to individually or identified. Figure 7 below then places 
London Strategic Health Authority (SHA) performances within the context of national 
performance. A context in which stroke care in London is variable and often suboptimal is 
created by these charts. Here is clear, irrefutable evidence which highlights clinical and 





Figure 7: ‘Variable Performance Within SHAs’ Preliminary Acute Stroke Strategy for 
London (p14) (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
 
This method of presenting a case for change in health care in London heralded by Darzi and 
the Health care for London project was new. International and national evidence was used to 
make stroke failings and variability visible to stakeholders and lay groups. It highlights the 
power of comparative clinical data and the presentational techniques used are sophisticated in 
terms of making complex arguments more accessible than previously had been the case in 




The Darzi Review of London health services of 2007 and the subsequent work of Health care 
for London was both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the two most recent 
preceding reviews into London health care (Tomlinson and Turnberg) firstly, in terms of how 
the Discourse of scientific evidence and employment (and presentation) of international, 
national and local data was used to depoliticise decision making; and secondly, in terms of 
assimilating the views and assent of clinical leaders in the capital in the case for change. This 
reflected the growing importance of the Discourse of EBHC and its potential to establish a 
shared episteme for professional and management communities to further strategic health 
care policy making. This may be linked to the development of a ‘biopolitical’ (Foucault, 
2007) approach to stroke care in London. 
 
Biopolitics is a term for a form of politics ‘concerned with the administration of the 
conditions of the life of the population... The concept of the population as a living entity 
composed of vital processes is essential to biopolitics. Biopolitical interventions are made 
into the health, habitation, urban environment, working conditions and education of various 
populations’ (Dean, 2010, p266). The reconfiguration of stroke services in London 





Figure 8: ‘Stroke Incidence in London’ Preliminary Acute Stroke Strategy for London (p28) 
(NHS London, 2008e) 
 
 
Figure 8 above forms part of a series of maps produced as part of the London Stroke Strategy 
work by the London School of Economics and published in the strategy documents. Other 
maps chart ageing, ethnic minority groups and deprivation by concentration and highlight 
how extensively (or not) the areas in which these different populations are located are served 
by London hospitals. These represent tangible ways in which stroke as a problem which 
affects people within the population was made visible and placed in to specific contexts 
linked to ageing, ethnicity and social deprivation. The impact of this was to present stroke as 
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a disease which affects certain, defined populations. This in turn highlighted the 
responsibility of strategic health care leaders and stroke specialists to respond to these 
population challenges. This validated intervention and radical action. 
 
Stroke, as a modern, treatable disease is relatively recent concept - because it was historically 
difficult to treat stroke remained a hidden affliction (RCP, 2007). Population maps such as 
the one above building on the increased data collection introduced by audit techniques such 
as the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) Sentinel Stroke Audit make inequalities visible and 
therefore politically open to challenge. Darzi emphasised that this inequality of provision had 
to be challenged in the foreword to his report: 
 
‘London is one of the greatest cities in the world... The inhabitants of a world-class 
city should not have to settle for anything less than world-class health care...However, 
we know at present that whilst there is excellence in health care in London, that 
excellence is not uniform. There are stark inequalities in health outcomes and the 
quality and safety of patient care is not as good as it could, and should, be.’ 
Reference 7; Health care for London, a framework for Action (p2) 
 
The conception of stroke in London in bio-political terms highlights the political, 
professional and managerial problem of variation in outcomes across the city’s hospitals. A 
biopolitical view of London as a city sets a frame for the clinical response. A concern for 





‘[In London prior to the reconfiguration] we had extremely good quality services, and 
extremely poor quality services all existing side by side.  So those inequalities were 
there, the national stroke strategy pointed a way of changing things.  The Darzi Report 
actually also for London, also used stroke as an example of an area that needed 
reform...   And I think they chose [stroke and trauma], because the evidence was 
strong, that the way you treated patients made a difference.  Secondly, because they 
had the evidence that there were big variations in the quality of care.  And thirdly they 
thought that actually it was a potential quick win that they could put in place.’ 
Reference 8; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
An evidence based approach to health care emphasises an ethical dimension which makes 
acceptance of service inequality difficult for strategic level managers and professionals who 
take a macro-view of health care. Fundamental to the problematisation of stroke in 
biopolitical terms at this specific point in history (2006-8) was the fact that for perhaps the 
first time there was a powerful, unified and financially well-resourced Strategic Health 
Authority in London committed to a limited number of targeted health improvement goals – 
of which one was stroke: 
 
‘[I]t wasn’t so much  once in a lifetime opportunity, this was about saying, ‘We have 
this new strategic health authority for London who has a responsibility for looking 
after the strategic health as it were, of Londoners.  And we are going to do these things 
because it will make a difference.’ So there was a, that was definitely a very powerful 
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move and there was quite a lot of identification with doing things once for London 
because all of us who had worked in London had struggled with, ‘How do you get the 
NHS to collaborate effectively across London?’ And we had failed.  So that statement 
that we are going to do this, albeit top down, which of course some people don’t like, 
is a very powerful thing, because  lot of people had struggled to make change happen 
without doing that’ 
Reference 9; SHA Manager 2 
 
The SHA leadership framed the problems associated with stroke care in Pan-London terms in 
collaboration with senior clinicians and public health academics. There is however, a clear 
indication in reference 9 just above that the level of collaboration within the NHS in the city 
which was required to ‘make a difference’ would require a degree of coercion liable to 
prompt resistance from institutional and professional interests. It suggests that increased 
control would be necessary to deliver change across such a large population. Closely allied to 
this was the development of a shared episteme which problematised stroke care in London in 
biopolitical and evidence based terms. The way that stroke services were characterised in the 
capital as failing in collective, organisational terms sought to validate a pan-London SHA 
response which promoted increased control of services as a solution to service variation and 
poor international comparison status. However, this was about more than just systems, or 
organisational failings – there were also failures of micro-level regimes of government 




So far it has been suggested that the problematisation of stroke services in London was built 
upon two propositions. Firstly, that stroke as a disease can be effectively managed. The 
international data presented by Health care for London as part of the ‘case for change’ amply 
demonstrated that international comparative data highlights that other countries treat stroke 
more effectively than the UK whilst the National Audit Office Report of 2005 (NAO, 2005) 
highlighted that this cannot be explained just by economic factors. Secondly, prior to the 
reforms, within London, some providers produced high quality care (i.e. 90% compliance to 
evidence based criteria in the RCP NSSA) whilst others did not (40% compliance in the 
Audit) (see figure 6 above). In biopolitical terms, stroke care for Londoners was shown to be 
particularly unequal. The problematisation of stroke services in London produced a new 
approach to thinking about how to govern stroke care professionals in order to standardise 
and regulate patient care. Evidence of practice and the collection of data were central to this 
process. A senior manager in the SHA observed: 
 
‘The evidence of what needed to be done differently [in stroke] was strong and there 
was a compelling sort of clinical case for change and clinical leadership to go with it... 
And on top of that, it was obviously – our performance was getting worse, not better’.    
Reference 10; SHA Manager 1 
 
Stroke performance had become calculable and disparities in performance were demonstrable 
and it was possible to construct the case for change, the regimes of calculability to monitor 
those changes, and achievable metrics of success. The use of evidence based performance 
data in stroke might be viewed as an attempt to reduce professional ambiguity and thus 
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interpretive spaces or agency for clinical teams or health care organisations to deviate from 
specified practice. The problematisation of stroke along evidence based lines in London was 
an attempt to frame stroke care as a ‘canonical practice’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991) in which 
a shared episteme was developed to agreed standards  – once this was achieved then strict 
measurement cycles could be employed to assure compliance and theoretically reduce 
performance variation (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003).  
 
This was not primarily a commissioning or general management drive but established in 
partnership with stroke professionals. In London, the role of senior stroke specialist 
consultants, and their embrace of measurement techniques was important. There are a number 
of key professional leaders who participated as clinical expert panel members. They were 
invited to do so because they had developed or were evidently striving to develop high-
performing stroke units in the capital themselves prior to the reconfiguration and had been 
involved in clinical research and (in some cases) the development of the RCP Stroke Audit. 
Consultant 2 is a good example of this. He speaks below of ‘change management’ and the 
power of narratives in convincing senior managers at his hospital to back him in leading 
change: 
 
‘I learnt with the NHS Modernisation Unit, and also some personal reflections, how to 
persuade people is, is going to get stories, you can’t get numbers.  And you’ve also got 
to do the basics of change management.  So you’ve got to put in some groundwork, 
which is essentially communicating the idea that there’s a problem in the first place.  
People were complacent and didn’t feel there was a problem.  So we did the Sentinel 
audit, we came in the bottom quartile.  That concerned people.  But still numbers...  
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And then we told a particularly powerful individual story of an experience that in 
younger stroke patient has, survivor had had – and that one story was enough in terms 
of, instead of the numbers to get us going in the service.’ 
Reference 11; Doctor 2, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This consultant displays political awareness and an understanding of successful techniques to 
manage change – by utilising narratives as well as hard statistical data to push an agenda of 
stroke service improvement at a local level. Both means and ends behind the framing of 
stroke as a ‘problem’ were shared by managers and clinicians. Doctor 3, who is also a 
successful stroke leader in the capital, suggests below that there were ‘unstated drivers for 
change’ (Fulop et al, 2005) from his point of view as well as the stated drivers – or the 
narrative given to managers: 
 
‘Well I think there are two ways of looking at that - there is the way that is always 
projected to the purchasers and the NHS managers at large, which is that stroke 
services in London failed to meet optimum standards as set by the Royal College of 
Physicians...  I think there was possibly another agenda which is that the stroke 
services that were good were in the wrong place... I don’t know whether it was a 
genuine attempt by people to optimise services because they’re altruistic. But I mean... 
I was in the position of having a reasonably well functioning stroke service in the 
London suburbs.  There were actually very few of those.’ 




The clinical leaders in London who collaboratively shaped the reconfiguration appreciated 
the power of the data produced by the RCP and were aware of the authority that this added to 
their position and how it could be used to highlight the need for change. They also were 
aware of potentially ‘hidden agendas’ and how strategically this may impact upon their own 
institutions. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter when the 
decision making issues around the site selections of hospitals to be provided with Hyper 
Acute Stroke Units is examined. The key point to conclude this section is that both clinical 
and managerial communities were aware of the political utility of problematising stroke in 
the way they chose to by drawing on scientific and performance data to highlight that stroke 
outcomes were both calculable and susceptible to improvement. Both communities were 
aware of the importance of narratives, stories and specific discourses in reducing the 
ambiguities of goals of reform in certain contexts, and hiding ambiguities in other contexts 
driven by the development of a shared episteme.  
 
5.3 Section 2: The push for standardisation 
 
The reconfiguration programme – including the establishment of the various panels, the 
production of accompanying literature such as that of Health care for London and the Darzi 
Report, and the public consultation exercises represent elements of the technical drive to 
problematise stroke in London within a newly defined episteme committed to standardising 
stroke care processes and outcomes.  A key technical element of the problematisation of 
stroke was to highlight and question variation in performance across the city, and to make the 





‘[T]he biggest single thing we could do to deliver quality in the health service is to 
take out all the variation.  And actually, you know the stroke project in London took 
out the variation and there’s nothing special about stroke. It was just a systematic way 
of taking out a variation’ 
Reference 13; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
Audit is useful as a technical tool for improving health care (Grimshaw et al, 2001; Boaz et 
al, 2011). Without the RCP stroke audit, it would not be possible to compare English 
performance internationally nor London hospital performance regionally. Nevertheless, audit 
data alone in London had proven to be insufficient to overcome professional, institutional and 
managerial inertia in response to poor performance. 
 
‘[I]t was amazing to me that people who were performing really badly consistently in 
the Sentinel audit... [produced] no kind of institutional response to a poor score...  it 
seemed to be that they weren’t asked to present at their clinical governance group, 
there was no internal response to the fact that they had a really poor stroke service...  
But really again they...  seemed to be hitting a bit of a brick wall at getting services 
improved... the poor ones had really made no improvement year on year on year, you 
know, for six years of the Sentinel audits, they hadn’t moved upon them. In fact some 
of them had got worse.’ 




This quote demonstrates the limited utility of stroke audit data in its pre-reconfiguration form. 
Audit as a measurement tool was professionally owned – hospitals were obliged to facilitate a 
response which was sent to the Royal College of Physicians and analysed and subsequently 
published. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters – stroke audit in London is 
transformed by the reconfiguration to become a much more effective tool in both clinical and 
managerial terms. This respondent suggests the audit ‘failed:’ 
 
 ‘[T]he audit had failed... that audit never really fed back an effective change in a 
systematic way across a town, for example.  So a big bang was probably an alternative 
approach.  And, of course, there were financial incentives [in the new London 
model].’ 
Reference 15; Doctor 4, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
The RCP Sentinel Stroke Audit was essentially passive as a programme designed to reform 
services because for a number of years organisations were able to ignore poor reports. It was 
a system of measurement that was insufficiently meaningful to key decision makers within 
hospital trusts, PCTs and SHAs. The historically weak position of stroke as a specialism and 
its proponents’ perceived lack of influence in jurisdictional terms (Abbott, 1988) 




‘Stroke historically has been a geriatric speciality, but it’s not been a glamorous 
speciality. And historically there’s been very little in terms of investment into it as a 
speciality.  Now clinicians were always arguing that more attention has been brought 
to bear on stroke.  But, to be honest, I think a lot of clinicians were a little bit 
disenfranchised with the entire process.  They saw other things, other specialities 
getting a lot of attention, and quite rightly, but not a lot towards stroke. And it took a 
bit of political manoeuvring for it to, for people to suddenly realise that how, what 
could be done for stroke and what wasn’t being done for stroke, what – almost, not 
half-hearted, but what suboptimal advances had been made, for instance, stroke units 
being put up but not everyone getting to the stroke unit.’ 
Reference 16: Doctor 5, Kenworthy Hospital  
 
A key factor therefore in changing this situation, and increasing the influence of stroke care 
data was to create a ‘big bang’ and link audited stroke care performance with prospective 
financial inducements for institutions: 
 
‘[R]emember that we’ve got 31 PCTs in London to commit an additional £20 million 
for stroke care.  So on the basis that we were putting all that money in, we’d better 
demonstrate that we’re doing something with it.  And you don’t get the money unless 
you demonstrate that you’re meeting these qualities.’  





Extra money is linked to standardised performance for institutions as a way to engender 
support from senior hospital management. This highlights the role of targeted, interventional 
commissioning to promote clinical improvement and an explicit link between hospital 
finances and clinical performance against evidence based benchmarks measured by more 
prescriptive data collection. This also suggests that economic and ethical drivers for change 
can be mutually inclusive and appeal to both professional and managerial stakeholders. So, 
variation of performance was highlighted as a key target of the London Reconfiguration of 
Stroke Services. This was shown to be the case through clinical audit data, but clinical audit 
of stroke itself was seen to be insufficient in eliminating variation across providers. Therefore 
a crucial element of the proposed new regime of government (Dean, 2010) was to link audit 
data with increased funds from commissioners to incentivise hospital management to 
prioritise stroke in new ways within their institutions. Audit becomes monetised and a 
significant concern for managers as well as clinicians. Clinical performance therefore 
becomes subjected to greater managerial surveillance. Paradoxically, hospital managers too 
now would become more dependent on clinical performance to validate their own positions 
as part of this new regime of government. This impacts upon the subjectivities of those 
involved – as discussed below. 
 
 
It has been suggested here that the presentation of stroke care as a variable, and essentially 
failing service in London was a political strategy pursued by policy makers, managers and 
elite professionals with a number of implications. The idea that some services are 
demonstrably better than others in the city (see figure 6 once more) placed failure and success 
in the realm of human behaviour (Stone, 1989) and organisational systems and therefore 
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amenable to improvement through systems augmentation and individual agency. Leaders 
(principally professional rather than managerial) were selected from successful hospitals to 
be involved in designing the new regimes of government. This implicitly created a distinction 
between ‘better’ and ‘worse’ professionals and institutions – this impacted upon the 
subjectivities of these leaders and on rank and file staff. It also tied stroke care into a 
performative London-wide discourse in which all professionals submitted to greater data 
interrogation and regimes of measurement. The below quote captures a number of issues 
related to failure, staff subjectivities and pre-reconfiguration problems effectively, and is 
representative of many of the views expressed by respondents involved as clinical experts in 
the reconfiguration process: 
 
‘I think there had been some units where stroke had been never a priority for the 
individual institution; I think the awareness of stroke as a specialty was quite poor in 
those institutions.  I think there was no internal clinical leadership from a stroke team, 
pushing these forward.  But that wasn’t always the case, and we came across some 
places where the stroke clinician had basically been fighting for years and years and 
years.  And in fact for me Kenworthy hospital was a really good example of that.  You 
had a really good clinical lead who was really passionate about stroke, that could not 
get Trust engagement for any kind of reorganisation internally, any kind of financial 
commitment from your staff, but a real desire for him to see things improve.  So there 
was a bit of a range actually. And there were some Trusts and some clinicians who 
frankly couldn’t have given a monkey[s] about the stroke care and it really wasn’t 
their priority, they were much more focused on their geriatrics covering neurology 
work and it was a bit of a Cinderella service.’ 




The first point here is that in failing institutions (vis a vis stroke care) stroke was not 
prioritised and the blame for this is laid at the door of the stroke team, and in particular – the 
leaders of the team (rather than institutional management). This prompts two points – firstly, 
the importance of leadership in promoting clinical change, and secondly, for clinical leaders 
such as this informant, that the agency for change and hence the responsibility for promoting 
this resides with leaders and professionals –individually and collectively. She then suggests 
however that leadership and commitment per se are not always enough, citing the case of 
Kenworthy hospital (which will be explored in much greater detail elsewhere in this thesis) 
where organisational inertia hindered the leadership drive and application of agency was 
overcome by structural disinterest. The final sentence is of great interest however – some 
organisations and clinicians marginalised stroke and therefore provided substandard care 
because stroke did not fit into their own agendas or perhaps align with their chosen 
professional identities as geriatricians or neurologists.  
 
This view suggests that professional leadership is an important factor in service 
improvement; professionals have the agential power to push for change, but may choose not 
to perhaps linked to their own ‘identity work’ (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003) and how 
stroke as a specialist discipline correlates with their own subjectivities. However, ‘failure’ is 
more than just a professional agency issue – it is also structural – some institutions have 
tended to hinder and suppress the agency of stroke clinicians to deliver improvements in care. 
Traditional stroke care failure was identified as a problem linked to both professional agency 
and managerial indifference. The following quote highlights the moral imperative to 




‘[I]f my family would have lived around here five years ago, if [a family member] 
they had a stroke, I would have driven up to Burridge hospital.  And, you know, if 
five years ago if they’d had a stroke in Porterfield, I would have driven them up to 
Deane hospital.  So, but actually, you know, to not do anything about that is 
completely reprehensible if you know that’s the case.  You can’t be the chief 
executive in a hospital where you wouldn’t want people you knew come in to have, to 
be looked after.  It’s just not; you should resign if you’re happy to accept that sort of 
terrible situation’. 
Reference 19; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
Stroke leaders (managerial and professional) involved in the design of the reconfiguration 
programme in London highlight the ‘ethical’ imperative which compels them to challenge 
inadequate stroke care. Once it is clear that better outcomes are possible for patients – then 
not to strive for those becomes ethically questionable and impacts upon the subjectivities of 
those involved in delivering and shaping stroke services. A further organising logic which 
influenced the development of the new episteme of stroke care in the London reconfiguration 
programme was economic efficiency and the traditional inefficiencies of the status quo ante: 
 
‘[W]e spent as much as the highest spenders in Europe per individual stroke patient, 
but were getting significantly worse outcomes. So the issue did not necessarily seem 
to be a lack of spending on stroke care, but the fact that it wasn’t being delivered well 
across the board and outcomes were just not improving.’ 




In organisational and management terms, stroke traditionally had delivered a poor return. 
Therefore changing the current arrangements was attractive and drew on language 
emphasising ethical and economic logics: 
 
‘And it wasn’t too expensive. In fact it might have been cheaper and it made a real 
difference.’ 
Reference 21; Network Director 2 
 
The discourse around value for money permeates the responses of many informants whether 
predominantly clinical, managerial or otherwise (for example patient group representative – 
see Reference 23 below). There was a palpable sense that the service could deliver so much 
more in terms of both patient health and economic outcomes – so as well as being ethically 
wrong not to provide evidence based stroke services, it was also uneconomic. This had been a 
key element of the National Audit Office (NAO) report findings in 2005: 
 
‘So I didn’t know anything about stroke before I came to manage it, but if you read 
that report [NAO Report] and you go, ‘This is shocking.’ ‘It is utterly appalling.   We 
have to do something about it and we can.’  And so the, the fact that it was so 
compelling, that something needed to be done and could be, certainly made a big 
difference in terms of stroke.’ 




The charity representative below locates the sense of frustration felt by patients within the 
NHS as an organisation fusing the ethical and economic elements of failure: 
 
‘[O]n learning that actually significant disability might have been reduced or avoided, 
not by a huge extra expenditure and finance but simply by the NHS getting its flaming 
act together and organising itself effectively – the comment from many stroke 
survivors was that they felt cheated.  They felt that they were the victims of NHS poor 
organisation. So that was a powerful...  driver for us to try and force through and 
pressurise change’ 
Reference 23; Charity Representative 1, Stroke Project 
 
This sense of patients feeling ‘cheated’ provided a powerful narrative to make the case that 
change was needed and concretised the professional and managerial arguments for change. 
The location of failure within professional actions and organisational (hospital level 
management) structures had implications for the ways in which the regime of government 
which emerged to rectify these historic problems was framed and how power was distributed. 





5.4: Section 3: Building a consensus and accounting for conflict 
 
It has been suggested in this chapter that the Darzi review of London’s health services was 
more successful than previous reviews such as Turnberg and Tomlinson for a number of 
reasons; Darzi’s review was more thoroughly embedded in the Discourse of EBHC and more 
inclusive of the practicing London health care community and focused more on additive 
change as opposed to rationing and closing services – essentially the focus is on ‘evidence 
based’ quality improvement rather than economic rationalisation of services. For the first 
time, in NHS London and the Health Care for London project, there existed a powerful, well-
resourced central SHA with the remit and desire to push through change. However, in spite of 
all this, NHS London leaders faced cynicism and scepticism from many in the hospital stroke 
community at the outset: 
 
‘[A senior clinical manager] and I got all the stroke physicians in London together in a 
room.  So you would have expected that group to be like fantastically enthusiastic and 
supportive, wouldn’t you?  You know, out of all the things that they could have 
picked, they picked our speciality, they’ve poured all this money into it, they’re going 
to make it – and they just sat there, they were all like that – saying, “No it’s not going 
to happen, it’s not going to work, it can’t be done, nobody will follow it through.’ 
Reference 24, SHA Manager 1 
 
There are a number of reasons why clinicians might be expected to be less enamoured with 
change than the manager in Reference 24 above had hoped they would be – though she was 
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clearly disappointed by the level of cynicism. The Darzi report painted a vision for the future 
health care landscape in the capital which included increased concentration of specialist 
services in fewer centres and a push to reduce beds in District General Hospital style 
providers and increase the role of ‘polyclinics’ and care delivered close to patients’ homes 
(Darzi, 2007). Though the plans for stroke and trauma were more successfully implemented 
than those for primary and community care (Appleby et al, 2011) at the outset, fear and 
cynicism were not unreasonable first reactions from professionals faced with upheaval: 
 
‘[I]f you look carefully at what Ara Darzi had described for London, he essentially 
described London as being run by three kind of, three to four teaching hospitals in the 
centre of London... And I think people saw that having a hyper-acute stroke unit gave 
you your place as the major acute hospital round the outside.’ 
Reference 25; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
Although Darzi set out a ‘vision’ for London, his report was not explicit about exactly which 
hospitals will provide which services, and although much was made of concentration of 
specialist services, much less was made of the corollary  - the down-grading of non-specialist 
providers. Some hospitals grasped the implications of this more completely than others - as a 
management consultant involved in putting a bid together for Kenworthy hospital observed: 
 
‘[T]he hospital felt vulnerable, it could see that change was coming and it was 
beginning to realise in a way that it hadn’t previously, that the DGH was dead.  But 
actually if it had a future, if it had a future [then it was] as a major acute hospital.’ 
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Reference 26; Independent Management Consultant, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Significant here, is how stroke increases in importance as a disease type for board level 
managers within London’s hospitals. However, the vulnerability felt by certain institutions 
(as outlined in reference 26) and the cynicism of many stroke physicians (cited in reference 
24) still needed to be overcome to legitimise the concrete responses to weaknesses identified 
and plans suggested to overcome these by the Darzi report. The SHA drew on the skills of 
Management Consultants to lead the Health care for London stroke project and bring 
stakeholders together to discuss the implications of change and prospective models of 
delivery: 
 
‘[T]here were some very big stakeholder events which were organised by Health care 
for London and they invited all the clinicians involved, the public, stroke survivors, 
the voluntary sector, all the networks were involved.  So I think there were at least 
three and possibly four large stakeholder meetings where progress of the project was 
discussed.  There were then sort of workshops in the afternoon where particular 
questions were asked of tables and people were invited to, to contribute. And certainly 
I know that a number of the clinicians who disagreed with the model attended those 
stakeholder workshops...  [They] were given the opportunity to have their views 
presented and heard.  But they are in the minority. If they were in the majority I don’t 
think the model that we’ve got would have been chosen.’ 




The technique of holding stakeholder meetings was useful in engaging with staff and the 
public and generating legitimacy for the proposed solutions. As this respondent suggests, 
critical professionals aired their concerns, but were in the minority. Perhaps equally 
significant was that the Health care for London team managed the process very skilfully: 
 
‘And I think that’s one of the points of why it worked in London because what we 
then did; we had our first pan London conference. And that was attended by 
representatives across London... And we mixed everyone up and we eventually 
workshop[ped ideas]... But we kind of had the answers in our back pocket... And we 
were able to ... [guide] that conference to an answer that we had already, I suppose, 
decided on.  But you were getting 150 to 200 people almost agreeing on 99.9% of 
what the problem was and how to solve it... And there was a lot of issues around the 
5% and 10%. [but] everyone agrees on the 90 odd percent.’ 
Reference 28; Management Consultant Lead for Stroke Project 
 
This sense of strategic coherence to the project was very strong. Numerous informants cited 
the role played by the Management Consultancy leadership in keeping the focus firmly on the 
goals of the project and creating consensus amongst professionals representing institutions 
that had often been hostile to each other. Informants warmly cited the project management 
skills of the management consultants, but also their ‘independent’ status – without 





‘We weren’t going to say Morris hospital should go, the Dempsey hospital should 
stay, Edwards hospital should stay, Arnott hospital – we wouldn’t play with that.  But 
what we would do was play with, was robustly say it is absolutely correct that there 
should be a smaller number of HASUs in the centre and a larger number of HASUs in 
the outskirts.  That we could come out with.’ 
Reference 29; Stroke Charity Representative 2 
 
Such an’ independent’ voice, focused on the patient experience allied to the project 
management knowledge of the management consultants employed by NHS London was key 
to transcending the traditional institutional debates and building consensus amongst those 
consulted on how to turn Darzi’s vision into reality. Nevertheless the remaining part of this 
chapter presents data that highlights firstly; the interprofessional and epistemic implications 
of constructing stroke as an ‘emergency’ condition in London and how this shapes the 
London model of care and competing forms of evidence. Then secondly, the contingent 
nature of the London model itself with the aim of challenging the ‘taken for granted’ 
elements of regimes of government and practice (Dean, 2010). 
 
The metrics used to problematise stroke as an acute, emergency condition impacted upon the 
kinds of evidence considered more or less valid for the designation of the London model of 
stroke care in the capital. It is suggested here, that the Randomised Controlled Trial type 
‘gold standard’ evidence prioritised in medically dominated Evidence Based Medicine 
Discourse had more legitimacy amongst the key leaders (professional and managerial) 
driving the reconfiguration than evidence produced by the AHP or nursing communities. This 
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led to a marginalisation of rehabilitation and community based care evidence in particular 
and a focus on acute care reform. This in turn suggests that different types of evidence 
created and championed by separate epistemic communities impacted in variable ways in the 
framing of stroke care as problem in London. This in turn influenced the shape of the London 
model further down the line.  
 
The first point to make is that there was a consensus amongst many respondents that there 
was not only just more evidence (by volume) around acute care interventions and strategies in 
stroke than for either preventative or rehabilitative interventions, but also that this evidence 
was of a higher quality: 
 
‘[T]he evidence base was predominantly around thrombolysis and acute interventions 
in the period immediately post the stroke.  And the evidence base for rehab was 
absolutely crap.’   
Reference 30; SHA Manager 2 
 
‘Well actually that’s [acute care] where the evidence was strongest, that if you make 
the change, you’ll see the quickest results, benefits.  [Therefore] it was perhaps the 
easiest thing to do.’  




The sense that there was more evidence for acute interventions and that it was of a more 
convincing nature than that for post-acute care created an environment in which it became 
pragmatic to focus on acute interventions. Nevertheless, there were contrary views expressed 
by participants in the reconfiguration to say that there existed good evidence behind 
rehabilitation interventions. This was expressed in documentary evidence submitted by the 
Allied Health Professions Federation (AHPF) as part of the wider consultation process on the 
shape of the London model in May 2009. The AHPF coordinated the response of The College 
of Speech and Language Therapists, The College of Occupational Health Therapists and the 
College of Paramedics and stated that that the London reforms must consider the whole 
pathway for stroke care more effectively and ensure that AHP staffing issues were 
sufficiently prioritised – both in the hospital setting and in the community (AHPF, 2009). 
Informants also suggested that therapies evidence and influence was marginalised: 
 
‘You know, it was wildly criticised... [the focus on acute care] I’d say, from the stroke 
community, you know, particularly people in the rehab end, because obviously there’s 
a lot of evidence based [research] around rehab.  So it wasn’t a very popular decision.’  
Reference 32; Network Director 3 
 
These data overall suggest it is quite rare to find dissent from those involved around how 
stroke was problematised which makes the above quote of significant interest. It reflects a 
view articulated by members of the rehabilitation community that their knowledge base and 
expertise were marginalised in the process of identifying problems with stroke in London and 
prioritising solutions. The respondent below was particularly eloquent on this subject. A 
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physician, his background was as a Care of the Elderly Doctor, who had spent many years 
building up integrated hospital and community services for stroke patients in his sector of the 
city: 
 
‘From a rehab background, I can see that it’s politically correct to focus on holistic 
care and all that.  And I’m totally signed up to it. But I’ve been convinced by all of the 
evidence, both randomised trial and observational and the recent stuff that, you know, 
if you get acute care right, you have a different condition, in fact, with lots of people 
going home early and it’s much cheaper.’ 
Reference 33; Doctor 4, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
He argues both in evidence based terms, and building on his tacit or experiential knowledge, 
that it made sense to concentrate resources and focus on the acute phase of stroke care as it 
would lead to the most effective quality of care improvements and economic savings. This 
argument may become self-perpetuating. For example; acute care has the strongest evidence 
of efficacy, therefore it should be prioritised. Next, in order to justify this prioritisation, a 
tighter audit regime is required in order to measure performance in formal terms. Thus it 
becomes harder for proponents of care that is perhaps more difficult to measure (prevention, 
rehabilitation, community therapies) to challenge this performative agenda. 
 
This leads to questions around the scope of the reconfiguration as a whole. Amongst 
respondents there was dispute around this point – but overall a consensus that although the 
focus originally was to reconfigure the entire stroke pathway – from emergency to 
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community care (and prevention), the reconfiguration instead morphed to focus on acute 
care:  
 
‘[T]here’s the HASU, the first 72 hours and then there’s the kind of long term care, 
rehabilitation, survivorship, all that stuff. And we wanted in the strategy, when we 
published the strategy; we wanted to give equal weight to all three of those bits.  But, 
but frankly the institutions got so excited about the 72 hours that we spent, you know, 
certainly 50% of our time dealing with that 72 hours and not as much time setting high 
standards about prevention, primary and secondary prevention and rehab  got, not kind 
of forgotten, but, but downgraded in terms of its importance.’ 
Reference 34; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
Although there was a rhetorical commitment to ‘whole pathway change’ based on evidence 
based criteria in the official documentation of the reconfiguration, in reality this does not 
appear to have happened. Indeed, the publication of the Stroke Rehabilitation Guide in 
November 2009 recognises the acute focus of the work done by NHS London and the need to 
develop rehabilitation services further ( NHS London, 2009a; p7). Reference 34 above 
suggests that the institutions ‘got so excited’ about the acute phase of care that the project 
team spent half their time on this area of stroke care. This highlights the messiness of the 
process in many ways and the disparities in institutional power of different players involved – 
especially the dominance of certain powerful hospitals. These issues will be discussed in the 
next chapter at more length in relation to the ways in which the site selection of the HASUs 
gained significance. However, it is worth being explicit here. The London model required 
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increased funding targeted at stroke (£23m P/A); it also required increased specialisation at a 
reduced number of London hospitals. This created a spectre of competition between London 
hospitals as well as community services. Guided by the performative values of EBHC and 
tariffs linked to outcomes, it was the acute providers which had the most to gain or lose from 
the reconfiguration. These institutions also employed the individuals with the most structural 
and normative legitimacy (Lockett et al, 2012) in the city (stroke specialist consultants) – 
many of whom were intimately involved in the production of academic knowledge related to 
stroke care and key roles on clinical advisory panels.  
 
Medical evidence around acute care interventions was seen as the strongest evidence base to 
drawn upon and therefore dominated the establishment of the new stroke care episteme for 
London. This ensured that most of the extra funds provided by the PCTs went to acute care 
providers (hospitals). This form of ‘medical dominance’ manifested itself in not only 
epistemic terms but also the group dynamics of decision making. A therapist involved as a 
clinical expert panel member described her experience on the panel in the following terms: 
 
‘I would describe it as one of my most uncomfortable professional experience[s]; 
because I kind of felt that I was there to tick a box, ‘Oh we’ve got an AHP 
representative on there.’  ... I felt completely the minion.  And it wasn’t, it’s nothing 
about the personalities, it was just the fact that it was so medically dominated, I felt 
quite pleased with myself for managing to get a couple of sentences in per meeting 
and there is no way on this earth, I didn’t have, I didn’t have counter evidence to offer 




Reference 35; AHP 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
The marginalisation of therapy voices during the process of discussing clinical prioritisation 
was noted by other (theoretically impartial) respondents – particularly managers: 
 
‘[E]veryone thought rehabilitation was important, but it was all terribly difficult and 
we didn’t have a consensus of rehabilitation leadership as to what the right answer 
was.  So it would – maybe the regret is that we didn’t work harder to find those 
powerful clinical voices that said, ‘Yes it’s very difficult because there is no consensus 
about what the, what the rehab delivery model ought to be, but I’m going to nail my 
colours to the mast and we should do it this was across London.’ And maybe we 
should have looked harder for those clinical leaders. But believe you me, they didn’t 
emerge naturally’ 
Reference 36; SHA Manager 1  
 
These respondents suggest that personal dynamics and ‘leadership’ in terms of sense-making 
(Pye, 2005; Weick, 2005) are important in expressing a case for a particular epistemic view 
point and that they were lacking amongst the AHP community. A subtle distinction about 
medical leadership is made below: 
 
‘Well I think it’s fair to say there was  a very strong focus and leadership, which does 
mean that you have to say, ‘We’re doing this, we’re not doing that.’ ... I think it’s 
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wrong to think that it [the reconfiguration process] was dominated by doctors, but it 
was dominated by rehabilitation doctors who decided to do something  outside of 
rehab as well [i.e. focus on acute interventions].’   
Reference 37; Doctor 4, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
Overall then it appears that medical evidence was prioritised over other forms (i.e. therapies’ 
evidence) in the way in which stroke care was problematised in London. Despite an initial 
commitment to reform the whole stroke pathway, in reality the chief focus was on the acute 
(medically dominated) part of stroke care. This is linked not just to differential epistemic 
persuasion and calculability issues, but characteristics around ‘knowing’ (Ceci, 2004) and 
issues of leadership, as well as the structural interests of powerful (acute care) institutions. 
The dominance of medical evidence shapes the coherent episteme in which these reformed 
regimes of government are developed in general terms prioritising acute care redevelopment. 
However in terms of specific models to deliver the new episteme there were a number of 
options which were devised - these are now explored.  
 
The remainder of this chapter compares official documentation relating to the proposed 
solutions to the problems of stroke care in London with the perceptions of key informants 
involved in the construction and evaluation of the competing models. This analysis will distil 
some of the key technical principles behind the resultant model and demonstrate how clinical 
evidence and managerial priorities may interplay with one another. This section will firstly 
describe the three different models of delivery developed by Health care for London and the 




An important point with respect to the London reconfiguration was that nothing on the same 
scale had been attempted before – no other city of this size had attempted to rationalise and 
specialise stroke services in this way (though there are smaller scale comparable examples 
such as the work done in Ontario cited in the Health care for London literature). This clearly 
has implications for an evidence based approach to decision making in that there is little to 
draw on in terms of ready-made, tried and tested models to import or copy. Therefore the 
clinical expert panel came up with three different potential models which are presented in the 




Figure 9: ‘Options for configuration of acute stroke services’ Taken from Preliminary Acute 
Stroke Strategy (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
 
These different models offer different advantages and disadvantages and are described in the 
official documentation thus: 
 
 ‘Model 1: A large number of small-sized (five to eight beds) HASUs situated within 
SUs, some of which will cater for thrombolysis and others which will not. Model 2: A 
large number of medium-sized (10-14 beds) HASUs situated within SUs, catering for 
all patients within the first 72-hour stabilisation period, and then transferring patients 
to adjacent SU beds or repatriating patients to a SU nearer to home. Model 3: A small 
number of large-sized (20-28 beds) HASUs, catering for all patients within the first 
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72-hour stabilisation period, and then transferring patients to adjacent SU ward or 
repatriating patients to a SU nearer to home’ 
Reference 38; Preliminary Acute Stroke Strategy (p6) (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
The key issues are that model 1 was the closest to the status quo ante and therefore required 
the least change, but also the smallest extension of specialisation – it also (by having different 
admissions procedures for potential thrombolysis patients compared to non-thrombolysis 
patients) potentially  perpetuated variability and  placed a significant diagnostic burden on the 
London Ambulance Service (LAS); in contrast, models 2 and 3 offer greater standardisation 
by admitting all stroke patients to HASUs (regardless of whether they were candidates for 
thrombolysis or not). At an early stakeholder event the project team invited participants to 
evaluate the various potential models using criteria developed by the clinical and social care 
panel and commissioning and finance panels respectively. This led to the following set of 
criteria and weighting of factors by importance: ‘Quality of service 39%, Continuous 
improvement 14%, Critical mass 9%, Travel times 9%, Health inequalities 8%, 
Implementation 8%, Cost/ efficiency 7%, Network working 6%’ (Appendix 22 Health care 
for London, Evaluation Criteria Process; NHS London, 2008f; p5).It was agreed that this list 
would ‘be used to evaluate the best option from the proposed models as well as evaluating the 
options for the configuration of stroke services across London’ (Appendix 22 Health care for 
London, Evaluation Criteria Process, NHS London, 2008f; p6). Section 5.6 of the 




‘A preliminary analysis of each option has been completed and this points to model 
three as being the ‘gold standard’ option... Quality of service was weighted at 39% by 
stakeholders, and model three will deliver the highest standard of care in both HASU 
and SU settings. The fundamental reasons for this are: (model three) 
• signals and delivers a step-change in the level of care; 
• has a greater ability to recruit and retain highly skilled multi-disciplinary teams due 
to the size of each unit; 
• results in a greater consistency of care experienced by patients.’ 
Reference 39; Preliminary Acute Stroke Strategy (p52) (NHS London, 2008e) 
 
Model three equated to roughly 6-9 HASUs for the city. The use of the term ‘gold standard’ 
is significant as it has strong connotations with evidence based medicine (e.g. Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). The use of such terminology is deliberate; however, those involved in the 
processes of model design and evaluation acknowledge in the interviews that there is no ‘gold 
standard’: 
 
‘Now, was there an evidence base that said around seven was the right answer?  I 
don’t believe there was.  Was there an evidence base; was there at least a strong an 
evidence base in clinical evidence terms that 12 to 16 might be the right answer, which 
was one of the things that was being discussed at the time?  Yes, so if you look at the 
evidence base about hyper acute care, at the time we were doing what we were doing, 
nobody had hyper acute units of anything like the size that ours needed to be in order 
210 
 
to achieve around seven as the answer.  Nobody did... But no evidence underpinned, 
so far as I am aware, the scale that we decided to operate at.’   
Reference 40; Stroke team project manager 2 
 
The interview data consistently affirms that there was a paucity of data as to the best way to 
roll out HASU care for a densely populated city of 8 million. However, there was a belief that 
treating increasing numbers of stroke patients at fewer individual units would probably be 
beneficial: 
 
‘They [Programme Executive Group] were very strongly weighed by the fact that you 
needed a certain number of patients to treat.  In fact, the only evidence and the 
literature about the intensity of activity having an impact on outcome in stroke, it 
came from a study from Germany, Peter Heuschmann and Co who showed that in 
hospitals which treated more, thrombolysed more than 50 patients in a year, that the 
outcomes were better than those where they did less than 50.  There’s some evidence 
from myocardial infarction and some of the other conditions, about the intensity. And 
certainly some evidence from surgical specialties, but there wasn’t specifically for 
stroke.   And the numbers were rather arbitrary’ 
Reference 41; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This view was confirmed by other members of the clinical expert panel, for example the 




‘So there was one paper that documented about thrombolysis and the fact that the 
more cases you did over the number of 50 per unit, you were probably safer and had 
less mortality... But interestingly, since then, there’s an opposite piece of evidence 
from the implementation of thrombolysis in Europe that shows that actually even new 
units can do it safely.’ 
Reference 42; Stroke Nurse Specialist Clinical Expert Panel 
 
Overall there was contestable clinical evidence around HASU numbers and overall 
designation but a belief that staff experience of treating certain volumes of patients may be 
advantageous, but little of it stroke specific. In the end, the model involved compromise for 
key professionals and pragmatism around staffing levels and on-call rotas: 
 
‘So a model was put into place with the eight hyper acute stroke units and another 
sixteen stroke units in addition to the eight.  And so a total of twenty-four stroke units, 
which many of us, including myself, argued was not right.  What we did agree was 
that we needed a centralised, a hub and spoke model that we couldn’t continue to 
provide the sort of level of care in every single hospital. And that was a pragmatic 
thing, it wasn’t based on evidence.  It was based on the evidence that actually we 
needed to get people into stroke units, they need to be seen by specialists and they 
need to have access to thrombolysis.  And that was important to do regardless of 
whether it was 10 o’clock on a Saturday night or 10 o’clock on a Monday morning.’ 




Rather than clinical evidence driving the modelling, key informant interview data suggests 
the challenges of staffing 24 hour thrombolysis (and non-thrombolysis) acute stroke care 
cover were central to the decision making process around the constitution of the London 
model. The concerns and decisions are around the most pragmatic ways to manage 
organisations so as to be able to utilise staff specialist skills as efficiently as possible. This 
was about rigidity, control and standardisation – in the new system, there could be no 
distinction between ‘10 o’clock on a Saturday night or 10 o’clock on a Monday morning’. 
The relationship between clinical evidence and organisational reforms was mediated by 
workforce concerns: 
 
‘[I]t was much more about workforce, much more about workforce.  So if you were 
going to have a 24/7 rota of people who could really read the scans and give the drugs 
and/or just provide immediate care for people who had had stroke, even if they 
weren’t eligible for thrombolysis. And you wanted that and if you were going to have 
that where it was best, that people either present on site or they knew the person they 
were talking to on the phone, then you needed at least eight doctors who were able to 
do it to give you a  24 hour rota at consultant level.  And actually all the better if you 
had more’  
Reference 44; SHA Manager 2  
 
Linked with quality of care is staffing levels and round the clock consultant cover which 
draws more heavily on organisational data and staffing pragmatism than ‘gold standard’ 
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clinical evidence. A further key development at this stage which became ever more 
significant was a firm management commitment to stick to an agreed model once chosen, 
irrespective of complaints from clinical colleagues: 
 
‘[T]here might be two or three other ways in which you can do it.  But what you do 
want is, you do want a relatively purist model once you’ve gone for it.  So if you have 
too much compromise, you end up the worst of both worlds.’   
Reference 45; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
Regardless of the strength or type of the evidence used to justify the chosen model, the senior 
team leading the project were clear that compromise in delivery was a danger to be avoided. 
These data also suggest a split between professional and managerial stakeholders around how 
model selection decisions would be made. Managerial firmness and disinclination towards 
compromise raises suspicions for senior clinicians: 
 
‘There was no evidence at all behind that sort of figure or that sort of, that 
mathematics.  We came up with what we thought was a more appropriate model for 
London.  They then disappeared into a huddle and out of it came the fact that we’re 
going with eight.  And, you know, that’s exactly what Darzi said.  And my view was 
that it was likely that actually they felt that they couldn’t go against what Darzi had 




Reference 46; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
Here professional resentment at managerial power appears to be manifested ‘they then 
disappeared into a huddle’. This is in contrast to the sense of shared values expressed by 
stakeholders earlier in this chapter. It is significant that the official documents emphasise the 
centrality of clinical evidence behind the decisions around the formulation of the London 
model, but the interview data down plays the validity of this evidence – indeed – counter 
examples are offered and the centrality of work force and control issues are emphasised. The 
dissatisfaction expressed by clinical leaders with the model and its ‘management ownership’ 
is emphasised. This nascent split between professionals and managers becomes more 
pronounced in the following chapter which documents the fractious issue of site selection for 




In this chapter it has been suggested that there were two important ‘shifts’ in the fields of 
visibility heralded by the London stroke care reconfiguration. Firstly, there was a move to 
interpret stroke performance in an international context and to present the state of health care 
in London also in an international context. By demonstrating that better outcomes for stroke 
are possible in other countries, stroke care implicitly became a problem amenable to human 
action (Stone, 1989). The second key shift, closely aligned with the first, is to present stroke 
outcomes across the city in markedly ‘biopolitical’ (Foucault, 2007) terms. Stroke care was 
made more high profile and presented as a pan-London issue in statistical terms for political 
effect. Rather than focusing merely on institutional level data to show that site A treats stroke 
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effectively, whilst site B does not, the problematisation heralded by Darzi created a context in 
which stroke care becomes a London issue.  
 
Thus the types of evidence used to problematise stroke in London in this way at this time 
were particular and worthy of consideration. Statistically significant, scientific evidence of 
international best practice was used to highlight London’s deficiencies. Epidemiological 
evidence drawing upon aggregated data was used to problematise stroke care in London. 
These forms of evidence are powerful because they had high levels of epistemic legitimacy 
for both senior academic clinicians and senior strategic health care managers and 
commissioners. These were used to highlight current deficiencies, illuminate potential 
solutions, and point to verifiable ‘regimes of government’ (Dean, 2010) to assure that 
performance can be measured (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). This biopolitical frame 
simultaneously captures the population and the professions delivering stroke care, whilst 
making subjects of both to this reconfigured stroke Discourse. 
 
The techniques of government used to pursue these changes were linked to increased 
measurement (Power, 1999; Newman, 2001) and an attempt to reduce ambiguity 
(Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003) around the potentialities to treat stroke. The RCP NSSA was 
cited as a key force in the identification of stroke care variation. It has been suggested that 
stroke was problematised along two dimensions: firstly, an ethical dimension with 
implications for the subjectivities of professionals; secondly, an economic or efficiency 
dimension. In this chapter, the importance of professional leadership to the problematisation 
of London stroke care has been introduced along with the themes of standardisation 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003) of care and ‘calculability’ (Dean, 2010; Miller and Rose 
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1992). These important themes will be developed further in the following empirical chapters. 
The issue of calculability has two different ‘power’ implications in how stroke in London was 
‘problematised’. Firstly, it establishes medical dominance over nursing and therapy 
professional groups in jurisdictional terms (Abbott, 1988); secondly, it heralds an effective 
utilisation of what might be considered a managerialist discourse for all staff, including 
medical staff (Osborne, 1993). This emphasises an interventionist role for management 
(Ferlie et al, 1996). It also highlights intra-professional distinctions –as hybrid clinical-
managerial leaders at pan London, and regional network levels assume new roles with 
distinct implications for professional power dynamics which are complicated and nuanced. 
The ‘problematisation’ of stroke care prompts the organisational barriers faced by stroke 
specialists to be highlighted and subsequently dismantled – this increases power and 
significance for these specialists in significant ways – they get clinical priority status within 
the hospital (Pickard, 2010) which is highly significant and to be explored further in later 
chapters. 
 
It was finally shown how a consensus was built between key strategic managers, clinical 
leaders, ‘independent stakeholders’ and hospital staff around a new coherent episteme of 
evidence based stroke care for London – the contingent, and historicist (Bevir, 2010) nature 
of which was remarked upon. The following chapters will explore these issues further both at 










The previous chapter focused on how stroke services were conceptualised as a London-wide 
problem. The forging of a shared understanding at the pan-London, or macro-level around 
stroke as an evidence based acute clinical speciality, requiring a standardised response from 
the capital’s hospitals was discussed with data to show how consensus amongst stakeholders 
was encouraged. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the previous chapter highlighted the compatibility of 
professional and managerial goals related to the ways in which stroke care was problematised 
and service standardisation was prioritised. Section 5.3 however examined some inter-
professional tensions related to the prioritisation of medical evidence over AHP evidence, 
and also highlighted the contingent nature of the evidence around the different possible 
models of delivery proposed to deliver reformed stroke care which pointed towards some 
professional dissatisfaction with SHA managers’ firmness around the designation of the 
London model (see reference 46) .  
 
The key aim of this chapter is to chart how the regimes of practice (Dean, 2010) were 
developed to ‘solve’ the ‘problem’ of London stroke care as designated in the previous 
chapter.    This chapter focuses on how the SHA management team designed and legitimated 
the key organisational tenets of the London model of reconfigured stroke care. Section 6.1 
discusses the bid and evaluation process for Hyper Acute Stroke Unit (HASU) services and 
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how the competing criteria of service quality and patient access developed into what is 
termed here as the ‘site selection controversy’ which again highlighted disparities between 
professional and management communities hinted at in section 5.3. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 
discuss how managerial and professional goals were effectively realigned following the site 
selection phase to focus on controlling the delivery of the new model of stroke care. Section 
6.2 focuses on how the new regime of audit developed through the selection phase and into 
the implementation phase of the programme and discusses the role of measurement in 
achieving standardised services. Section 6.3 introduces the concept of ‘interventional 
commissioning’ and highlights the active role taken by managers and professionals to achieve 
improved standards across London’s new stroke service providers.   
 
Three data sources are drawn upon in this chapter. The first is documentary evidence 
including that produced by the Health care for London Stroke Project Team. The team 
published a large amount of data as part of the reconfiguration including drafts and final 
copies of the strategy, appendices of performance standards, service specifications, inequality 
assessments, public consultation documents and responses, commissioning responsibilities, 
economic data and also guidance for Trusts in the bidding processes to become a HASU, SU 
and TIA service provider. These documents in effect establish the ‘rules of the game’ for 
those taking part in the reconfiguration and the variety of considerations undertaken by the 
various panels and teams. In addition, the analysis is also informed by the meetings minutes 
from the Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts (JCPCT) and the Joint Health Overview 
and Scrutiny Committee (JHOSC) – [the latter of which are made up of local councillors] and 
power point presentations of senior managers delivered to these groups.  These documents 
paint an ‘official picture’ of publicly accountable bodies charged with overseeing the actions 
of the SHA in its delivery of Stroke (and Trauma) reconfigurations in London. These 
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documentary sources are used to establish the formal processes and interpretation(s) of the 
bid procedures. Secondly, the chapter draws extensively on the interview data of those 
stakeholders involved at senior and advisory levels across the stroke project board, clinical 
advisory panel, and commissioning and finance panels. The third data source is observational 
data produced through attendance at pan-London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group (CAG) 
meetings over a two year period which detail how stroke leaders oversaw implementation of 
the new regimes of government at a pan-London level – how they interpreted the data they 
were collecting, encouraged further data collection and attempted to guide and firmly 
establish the new stroke care episteme in the city’s HASUs and SUs. 
 
6.2 Section 1: The site selection process 
 
Having discussed how the London HASU model was selected in section 5.3, in this section 
the focus turns to how the sites to host the 8 HASUs, 24 SUs and 24 TIA services were 
chosen. Firstly, the official process will be described, drawing on Health care for London 
documentation. Analytically, attention will be paid to the forms and types of evidence used to 
measure the performance of different London units on the one hand, and arguments over the 
best way to distribute these units in the reconfigured model on the other. The technical 
implications of these processes will also be discussed as interview data is introduced to 
illuminate how the resultant issues were managed and interpreted. 
 
All London hospitals wishing to be considered for the status of; ‘Stroke Centre’ (providing 
HASU and SU services), ‘Stroke Unit’ (providing acute inpatient rehabilitation) and/or TIA 
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services (providing rapid diagnostic assessments and access to specialists for high-risk 
patients following a TIA) were invited to submit ‘an expression of interest bid’ by mid 
October 2008 (Appendix 4, Health care for London, Acute Stroke Services Designation, 
Overview of designation process, 2008g p2). It is the site selection process around the first of 
these ‘Stroke Centres’ with which this chapter is concerned. A key document produced by 
Health care for London is Appendix 7: Acute Stroke Services Designation, Evaluation 
process (2008h) and from this document there are two important graphics which highlight the 
key evaluative processes. They are reproduced below in figures 10 and 11: 
 




Figure 11: ‘Bid and configuration evaluation process’ (NHS London, 2008i) 
 
With reference to figure 10 above, the details of the respective ABCD criteria are published 
in Health care for London, Appendix 6.1: Acute Stroke Services Designation, Designation 
criteria for provision of a HASU service (NHS London 2008i). It is worth highlighting two 
factors with reference to the standards. Firstly, they correlate with the bid evaluation box 
displayed in figure 11; they refer to clinical quality, continuous improvement and network 
working and they require either evidence of current attainment (e.g. via audit data) or 
evidence of management plans to achieve attainment in the future. Secondly, they are 
relatively ‘objective’ measures and relate to individual institutions. This means that the 
project team could evaluate both the quality of current services in each bidding hospital and 
the level of commitment to improving future services secured by local level management. 
Therefore levels of current performance and commitment to improving future performance 





The effects of this are exemplified by Tonge hospital in particular. This hospital has 
traditionally been a creditable performer in terms of stroke performance as validated by RCP 
data and was geographically well placed to host a HASU service (as one of the largest and 
most clinically comprehensive Trusts in its respective sector). However, stroke service 
development had been clinically led by professional staff and developed in conjunction with 
medical, nursing and therapy teams based in hospital and community services with very little 
general management involvement over a number of years. By common consensus, this 
hospital submitted a very poor bid which according to both professional and managerial 
informants was not considered to reflect the true standard of current and potential clinical 
care which the trust was capable of delivering: 
 
‘[Management arrangements for stroke] just hadn’t kept pace with [clinical team 
development] at all. So that was painfully apparent in the bid process. And it was 
picked up on explicitly that it was very clear that management was not supporting 
stroke adequately here.’ 
Reference 47; Doctor 2, Clinical Expert Panel  
 
This particular Trust was invited to re-submit its bid by NHS London (and was successful). 
Technically specific managerial skills were needed to produce successful bids and provide 
assurance to commissioners that the proposed increased funding would be spent adequately. 
Without strategic coherence around how the London standards were to be met, individual 
stroke services struggled to navigate the bid process. The bid process invited the Trusts to 
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demonstrate that they took the management of stroke services seriously and were willing to 
invest the time and skills into ongoing planning of stroke services – which hitherto had been 
rather rare at some Trusts. It also committed the Trusts in writing to deliver standardised care 
to an agreed specification moving forward which was an important factor in the reconfigured 
London model.  
 
By demonstrating how they meet the new designation criteria, Trusts were required to 
provide plans that detailed how new staff members would be recruited, trained and appraised; 
how emergency and radiology departments would link up with HASUs and prioritise stroke 
patients; how discharge systems would be devised to repatriate stroke patients to SUs closer 
to their own homes following the first 72 hours in the HASU. These are organisational 
competencies and the policies devised to achieve them were produced for external scrutiny. 
The practice of making this all explicit in submitted documentation was a new phenomenon 
in stroke services. It premised the new reconfigured regime of government for stroke care in 
London – a ‘managerialised’, standardised and specialised service meeting commissioner 
devised criteria and demonstrating ongoing achievements. Performance was to be monitored 
and measured in new ways and to new extents. 
 
The ABCD standards provided ‘calculability’ (Dean, 2010) and produced scores for the bids 
of the different trusts and were in themselves uncontroversial to both professional and 
managerial expert communities. Theoretically the standards allowed the independent expert 
panel and JCPCT to make evidence based decisions about which Trusts either currently did, 
or had demonstrated the potential ability to provide stroke services which would meet the 
designated criteria in the future. They were based on quality. The problems arose when the 
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quality scores of each Trusts bid evaluation were modified by the requirements of the 
configuration evaluation (see second part of figure 11 above). The three key criteria here 
were; travel times, health inequalities and cost efficiency. These criteria are based largely on 
access. They proved to be highly controversial, and seemingly more subjective than the bid 
evaluation criteria. This tension between quality and access as key components in the criteria 
around the site selection for the HASUs is now enunciated in more detail. The thesis now 
focuses on how the configuration evaluation process opened up the strategic goals of the 
SHA to the gaze of London’s clinical stroke community – with controversial repercussions. 
This section begins with a discussion around how and why ‘eight became the magic number’ 
for HASU sites. 
 
It is possible to take an evidence based approach to the bid evaluation process in which stated 
criteria were linked to clinical quality and organisational commitments. These elements may 
be measured numerically and ranked from highest quality to lowest quality bids. It is also 
possible to take an evidence based approach to the configuration process based around travel 
times, health inequalities and cost efficiency. Crucially however, the criteria for evaluating 
health inequalities and cost efficiency remain relatively obscured in both the Health Care for 
London literature aimed at the general public, and the guidance documentation produced for 
providers involved in the bidding process. The ambiguity behind these concepts and how they 
were to be applied was highly significant: they were defined and evaluated by strategic 





‘[I]f you put quality criteria [first], you get one group of eight [hospital sites suitable 
for HASU care].  If you put access criteria [first], you get a different group.  So 
making the best of those two was difficult and required adjustments to both.’   
Reference 48; SHA Manager 1 
 
The two different forms of evidence and ranking criteria clash – necessitating ‘adjustments’ 
to either the model itself or the evaluation criteria. This was the first key problem which those 
leading the selection process encountered. The apparent rationality of the two separate 
criteria helped to depoliticise decision making gaining legitimacy from professionals and 
Trust managers – hence the consensus behind the process for selecting the sites. However, the 
‘adjustments’ made by the SHA were necessarily value based rather than evidence based. 
These ultimately required ex post interventions from SHA decision makers. Despite the lack 
of strong clinical evidence behind the 8 site HASU model (as established in the previous 
chapter), senior SHA managers were determined not to deviate from it. However, they did 
have reasons for this: 
 
‘[M]y attitude to it at the time was if we don’t dig our heels in and say it’s eight, I’m 
not interested at all unless it’s eight, it will end up being fifteen, it won’t end up being 
nine… [I]f we’re not careful, from that we’ll get a mushrooming of numbers, then we 
won’t have the results that we’re looking for. So the answer’s eight.  So that was top 
down, one size fits all.  And the reason for that was to prevent the traditional London 
solution of saying, ‘Well we’ll have both.’’ 




This demonstrates that the decision to robustly maintain the commitment to the 8 site HASU 
model was not based solely on clinical evidence but rather, it represented a management 
judgement based on a determination to avoid the mistakes of prior reconfigurations.  Rather 
than clinical evidence, it was strategic management judgement that ensured the selected 
model did not become ‘watered down’ by the traditional institutional interests that had 
dominated London health care planning. The approach of the SHA was not consensual or 
deliberative around this question of site numbers, but firm and dictatorial.  
 
A review of the consultation responses received by members of Parliament and local councils 
is instructive here. Predictably perhaps, those London MPs whose constituencies were 
granted a HASU as part of the proposed model were in favour of new configuration whilst 
those who did not were quicker to cite problems with either the evidence behind the model, 
the number of HASUs or indeed the consultation process or the work of NHS London more 
generally – the same was true of councils – reflecting an understandable desire to protect 
local establishments (NHS London, 2011a).   
 
A significant piece of evidence related to how the LAS might perform in relation to different 
hospital configurations. There is a strong evidence base that the sooner potential stroke 
patients are delivered to hospital following a stroke and assessed for eligibility for 
thrombolysis treatment then the more likely that treatment is to be effective (Lyden, 2008). 
For this reason, a clear criterion of the configuration evaluation was for all Londoners to be 
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within 30 minutes of a HASU (in a blue lighted ambulance). A good deal of modelling work 
was produced by the London Ambulance Service (LAS), however this was equivocal: 
 
‘[T]he LAS could do virtually anything. The problem was not the LAS, the problem 
was not timing, the problem was public acceptance of any decisions’ 
Reference 50, Stroke Charity Representative 2 
 
This is significant in that the first aspect of the configuration evaluation criteria (travel times) 
may not be definitive. Therefore, in reality, discussions around ‘access’ were about more than 
evidence based ‘emergency’ criteria – they were about redistributing resources and services 
for strategic ends – and crucially, this was an implicit rather than explicit commitment of the 
SHA which had serious implications for the ‘jam’ in London’s doughnut: 
 
‘So the history of London, as you know, is that, in fact a doughnut was what it was 
described as.  So what’s happened in London is basically the jam where all the 
services were, and round the edge of the doughnut where all the population was, there 
was very little. So what we needed to do was have services around the edge of the 
doughnut and less jam in the middle.  Quite logical, except for the services on the 
edge, quite challenging, some of them, in terms of getting them to where they needed 
to be...  And then the one in the jam, obviously [central London hospital unsuccessful 
in securing HASU status] very world leading edge services, they’d been really 




Reference 51, Network Director 3, Commissioning and Finance Panel 
 
Problematically, the services in the centre historically tended to be of a higher standard than 
those at the periphery. The political reality created by the establishment of a powerful central 
London SHA for the first time legitimated by the Darzi review meant there was a 
commissioner consensus to move services from the centre and the traditional powerful 
London teaching hospitals out to less central locations. Nevertheless, as the following quote 
demonstrates this commitment was implicit rather than explicit: 
 
‘We didn’t set out to close down specific hyper acute units, but it was a likely 
outcome of the process that some people who had been providing hyper acute care 
wouldn’t subsequently because we were being very deliberative about the location in 
order to meet the 30 minute access time, we needed people – so that was also 
innovative.  So in London at least there’s a long history that we have excellent 
teaching hospitals in the centre of town and not such excellent hospitals around the 
rim.  But most of our population lives round the rim and most of the strokes happen 
around the rim, because that’s where the older population is. And it was a deliberate 
commissioner decision that we needed to have hyper acute care round the rim and not 
just in the middle.’ (Emphasis added) 
Reference 52; SHA project manager 2 
 
The SHA led the agenda around shifting resources and expertise to the rim rather than the 
middle. This approach clearly had implications for staff working in high performing central 
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units in the centre that faced down-grading following the reconfiguration. Significantly the 
evidence based Discourse cited above around the 30 minute access times is questionable. 
Reference 52 highlights how a strategic management goal to have ‘hyper acute care around 
the rim and not just in the middle’ used the Discourse of evidence based decision making by 
explicitly linking these decisions to ‘30 minute access time’ but as reference 50 highlights – 
the LAS modelling evidence did not necessarily back this decision up. Therefore, although, 
as claimed, the SHA ‘didn’t set out to close down specific hyper acute units’ they in effect 
chose to do so. The criteria for these decisions were based on management judgements about 
the configuration of London’s hospitals going forward but the language used to justify these 
judgements draws on clinically influenced Discourse and is presented in neutral, pragmatic 
and evidence based terms.  
 
There are significant implications which follow from this; in epistemic terms, commissioners 
used the Discourse of evidence based decision making to depoliticise and justify management 
decisions – this highlights how arguments grounded in the language of EBHC can be used by 
managers (Mykhalovskiy and Weir, 2004). It hints at the skill commissioners may have 
developed in utilising what was originally a primarily clinical or professional Discourse. The 
use of this Discourse however led to accusations that the independence of those tasked to 
make the final decisions, and the criteria they were empowered to use was counter to that of 
the published process which in turn alienated some professionals – particularly those 
involved in the reconfiguration process with links to sites to be downgraded.  There was a 
commitment shared by senior SHA managers to move some stroke specialist services away 
from central London providers towards hospitals on the periphery. Traditionally, the 
powerful central London providers (teaching hospitals with academic links and charitable 




‘[T]eaching hospitals are richer, they have more money and therefore they can afford 
to develop good services partly because they have the funding base, but also partly 
because they, a lot of them were academic centres.  So, for example, Arnott hospital 
and Edwards hospital both have academic departments with an interest in stroke and 
therefore those academics have built up their departments to be very strong.   Morris 
hospital didn’t have an academic department at the time, but they had been in receipt 
of a huge amount of money from charitable funds to build up their stroke service. So 
they had a fantastic Rolls Royce service because they got two million pounds from the 
League of Friends.  Hospitals in the periphery simply don’t have access either to the 
academic departments or to that level of funding.’ 
Reference 53; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
Therefore given the SHA’s goal to standardise care and reduce health inequalities, there was 
a need to consider access to services (not just for patients as emergencies, but also for 
families and carers to visit relatives and friends in hospital) and maintain a firm position in 
the face of opposition from central London providers. The decision of the SHA to couch such 
decisions in EBHC Discourse may be interpreted as an attempt to depoliticise contentious 
decisions – however it may appear to have created a rift between some of the leading 
professionals and the senior SHA managers which threatened to derail the reconfiguration.  
 
So far this chapter has demonstrated the tensions between the bid criteria and the 
configuration criteria and the conflicting evidence based and value based judgements 
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required to reconcile the two. There were two further issues related to the bid process which 
complicated matters further. This chapter now focuses on how these issues became apparent; 
and the management techniques used to resolve them. There was a rather antagonistic fall-out 
from this that led to claims of ‘goalpost shifting’ from a number of senior professionals 
involved in the process as the clinical expert/strategic management divide grew through this 
difficult part of the reconfiguration. 
 
All the relevant Trusts submitted their bids in late 2008. These were independently ranked by 
an external (non-London based) clinical expert group. However, there was a problem with the 
results: 
 
‘So some [independent experts] from York, some from Bournemouth, that came 
together on specific days and went through all of the bids, and they scored them based 
on quality and various other criteria.  It was again very robust.  And at the end of that 
we ended up with, you know, a real kind of list, rank list of providers for each of those 
three packages.  The problem that then raised its head was that actually sometimes due 
to the quality of the bid process within each Trust. Some of the Trusts that clearly 
provided good services had provided terrible bids. And the other problem was when 
you mapped the services geographically, all of the good bids and all of the good 
services were in the middle hole of the doughnut of London.’ 




‘[W]hat came out was a result which caught all of us by surprise frankly. And for 
which we hadn’t got a plan, which was that no units in [a specific geographical] third 
of the city passed either the hyper acute or the stroke unit assessment.  And at that 
point therefore we had to adopt a different model of deciding which units would be in 
and which units would be out.’ 
Reference 55; Project Manager 2, SHA 
 
The bid evaluation scoring system designed by the clinical and managerial leaders of the 
project to ‘score’ bids failed to achieve ‘acceptable’ results for stakeholders. Despite the 
months of planning and deliberation, it proved problematic to capture the requisite data to 
demonstrate in evidence based terms which London hospitals were currently or prospectively 
capable of providing stroke care at the level demanded by the new London model. Depending 
on one’s view, the results of the bid configuration were either unreliable and highlighted the 
technical difficulties in accounting for the complexities of measuring performance using the 
selected metrics; or, demonstrated that the quality of London stroke care was even lower than 
expected across large swathes of the city – requiring a different approach to the problem. 
Either way, the project team had stumbled into unexpected territory – meeting the minimum 
standards presented more of a challenge than was presupposed and the strategic goal of 
spreading the jam of the London doughnut out towards the periphery appeared more difficult 
than the SHA leadership had anticipated. At this point the senior management team did 





‘You know, there would have been a concern about that in [a specific area of] London 
with the highest deprived population not getting a service.  So there was, where do 
people live who have strokes?  And can they get there in thirty minutes?  There was, 
‘Let’s put stroke with trauma.’ And then, what, from people’s perception of London, 
feels right, like the right location.’ 
Reference 56; SHA Manager 2 
 
There is a strong consensus generated from the interview data that between the collation of 
the scores for individual bids being evaluated and the proposed reconfiguration being put out 
to public consultation and then ultimately the JCPCT - at least two ex post considerations 
were added to the model which guided the decision making process. The first was to co-
locate HASUs with specialised trauma services (which were undergoing a simultaneous 
reconfiguration likewise prompted by the Darzi review). The second was to co-locate HASUs 
with specialist neuroscience services. The first point to state here is that there appears to be 
little compelling clinical evidence to justify either of these co-location decisions. The second 
point is to reflect on the language used by the SHA manager in reference 56 – especially at 
the end of her comments – she talks of ‘people’s perception[s]’ of what ‘feels right’. These 
are subjective value judgement terms based on sentiment, or strategy rather than science. 
These are ex post quasi-evidence based decisions (in that they appear to be based on 
intuitively sensible criteria) which ultimately proved acceptable to the JCPCT which agreed 
the SHA recommendations, but alienated a number of stroke care professionals hitherto 
committed to the bid and configuration processes, some of whom stood to lose out by having 




‘[T]he big controversy at the time was around HASUs, and actually it had gone from 
being a really transparent, really robust process that everyone believed in, to being a 
bit make-it-up-as-you-go-along and find evidence where you need it because it 
justifies your political end basically. So it suddenly went from being very transparent 
to being very suspicious both for us and for a lot of other units, even though they had 
neurosciences on site.’ 
Reference 57; Stroke Nurse Specialist, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
For some clinicians involved at a senior level, a strong emphasis was placed on the 
commitment to the evidence based criteria in the bid evaluation process whilst they suspected 
that for the SHA management it was little more than rhetoric, or expediency, and this caused 
consternation: 
 
‘[The SHA Chair was] essentially saying, ‘Well we’re now going to change the rules 
about accreditation.’  So it wasn’t based on evidence.  In other words, their quality’  
Reference 58; Doctor 5, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
‘[It was] like a rabbit out of a hat and it really was that startling – and I recollected 
being at the meeting in which decisions were taken.  The message was delivered from 
on high, by which I took to be [the SHA Chair], that there has to be co-location, which 
significantly advantaged one of the hospitals and disadvantaged another’ 




This nominally ‘independent’ voice in the process who stated that he had no institutional axe 
to grind suggests in reference 59 that the SHA Chair unexpectedly changed the selection 
criteria in order to justify a strategic decision with relation to HASU location. Rather than 
evidence guiding policy, this appears to be policy guiding evidence. The legitimacy gained 
by framing the reconfiguration in evidence based terms was endangered when senior SHA 
management began to use the discourse of evidence based decision making to justify 
decisions which professionals rejected as having a firm clinical evidence base: 
 
‘So some of the decisions that the JCPCT made seemed to be around which units had 
neurosciences on site.  And yet when the clinical group had agreed the clinical 
standards based on the evidence, we decided not to link neurosciences’.  
Reference 60; Stroke Nurse Specialist, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This quote is intriguing in epistemological terms as it shows the autonomy the clinical panel 
enjoyed in drawing up the agreed clinical standards in the first place ‘we decided not to link 
neurosciences’ highlighting the constructed nature of scientific knowledge and the dominant 
position of experts in validating regimes of knowledge and interpreting evidence. In technical 
terms, the power of the senior management community is highlighted by how they were able 
to interpret and present evidence to the JCPCT by emphasising the importance of on-site 
neuroscience facilities regardless of the a priori position of the clinical experts. A 
justification is given for the co-location of HASU and Trauma services in the National 




‘It was also felt that there should be a HASU at each proposed major trauma site to 
maximise the use of clinical expertise (particularly in the neurosciences) and 
investigative facilities. NCAT endorses this proposal and believes pursuing it will 
deliver significant benefits to patients.’  
Reference 61(NCAT review, 2009; p2) 
 
Some SHA managers reject these accusations of ‘goalpost shifting’- they assert that this 
perception is linked to communication issues and the pace of change: 
 
‘The discussion about should we go for this co-location thing, was done at the 
beginning. And I think the mistake we probably made was in thinking that we could 
follow it through to the same pace.’ 
Reference 62; SHA Manager 1 
 
‘I don’t think the goalposts were moved. I think what happened was that, it wasn’t 
explained clearly enough at the beginning.  A bid is not an assurity that you’re going 
to get it. It’s a bid; it doesn’t mean you’re going to get it.’ 




There is an implication (from some SHA management respondents) in the interview data that 
those who complained about the legitimacy of the site selection process were doing so out of 
a sense of injustice at the down-grading of stroke services at their own particular respective 
site(s) and that they were merely demonstrating institutional loyalty (see reference 71). The 
sentiments of a leading clinician whose hyper-acute service was down-graded are expressed 
below: 
 
‘I felt personally angry and bitter about the fact that a unit that had been working 
highly effectively was being closed. And again, I mean, just it seemed to me to be 
nonsense when you’re trying to build capacity within the capital to – and there’s very 
limited capacity starting.  You don’t get rid of the things which are working well in 
the hope that you’re going to grow something good elsewhere.’ 
Reference 64, Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel   
 
There is a painful irony for key members of staff working at this site – due to the strategic 
goals of managers concerned with reducing the concentration of services in the centre and 
spreading services out to the periphery of the city – their highly successful stroke services 
were down-graded in the interests of stroke care throughout the city as a whole. However, 
there was a symbolic element to this SHA decision; it highlighted that no service (or 
provider) was ‘above’ any other, and that biopolitical requirements of the city were 
prioritised over institutional interests. The dangers linked to the down-grading of high 
performing stroke units however were that the skills of those working at these hospitals 
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would be potentially lost. It also alienated and angered some professionals who had served on 
the clinical expert panel: 
 
‘And I remember at one point, because everyone else was being very polite, why the 
hell have we wasted six bloody months?  You might as well have said ‘I want it there, 
there and there, and we’ll just build the building and train the people up and put them 
in.’  But as [we] and everyone else said, ‘It does not take three months to train 
somebody, it can take ten years to build up a unit.’’ 
Reference 65, Doctor 5, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This sense of disillusionment runs through many of the interviews with clinical expert panel 
members and expresses the sentiment that if the process was not to be based on evidence, 
then the bid evaluation process was just some form of ‘charade’. The problem with the 
approach outlined in reference 65 of course is that such an unsubtly dictatorial approach 
would have been likely to have faced massive opposition and lacked the requisite legitimacy 
to deliver a realistic degree of change.  
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the specifically ‘evidence based’ way that stroke 
was problematised engendered clinical legitimacy for the proposed remit of the 
reconfiguration. It was also shown that medical evidence was prioritised above other forms of 
evidence (specifically therapies evidence). The clinical legitimacy of the reconfiguration 
enabled SHA managers to depoliticise the discourse around the need for service redesign 
(which would impact upon different institutions) in more or less positive ways in order to 
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minimise the kind of resistance that stymied prior attempts to rationalise London health care 
delivery. Furthermore, the promulgation of medical knowledge enabled medical leaders to 
exert key influence in the redesign.  
 
A key concern of this chapter has been to focus on the relationship between senior SHA 
managers and senior stroke professionals and analyse how and why their respective goals 
converged around the bid evaluation  criteria whilst  they diverged around the configuration 
evaluation criteria and present this within the frame of ‘evidence based’ decision making. The 
aim of this section is to reflect upon the point at which the clinical-managerial consensus 
broke down in order to analyse what this suggests about the relationships amongst and 
between these elite level decision makers. This is why the metaphor of the ‘shifting 
goalposts’ is so pertinent. The most senior manager responsible for leading the project below 
describes the point where she was instructed by her own superiors within the SHA to ‘shift 
the goalposts’ in relation to linking the HASU location with that of the Trauma centres: 
 
‘Then the third problem that we had... during this process [is the SHA] NHS London.  
So where you have major trauma, you had to have HASU.  And we hadn’t said that at 
any stage, so neither major trauma nor HASU had said this.  The meeting we had, 
where we were told, ‘You’ve got,’ me and [the person] who led for trauma, we were 
told, ‘You’ve got to make it work.’  There was no, there was no give.  This was an 
instruction... Yes and we tried arguing back and they said, ‘No you’ve got to do it.’  




Reference 66; SHA Manager 2 
 
Crucially, in terms of management style, although this manager ‘tried arguing back’ senior 
SHA management left her and her Trauma colleague with no opportunity to dissent. She was 
clearly unhappy about the decision and very open about the ex post nature of the decision but 
resolved to follow the SHA orders. Highly significantly, there was a requirement for the 
project team to justify this decision after the fact and produce evidence to demonstrate why 
this ex post decision was legitimate: 
 
‘But we were asked to look at   was there an evidence base which actually could be 
used to justify for frankly the decision that those places that had major trauma also had 
to have a hyper acute unit in.  And actually I think the answer was frankly, ‘no,’ 
although there were lots of characteristics about the kind of hospital you would need 
for each of them that would be similar...  So was there an evidence base that said these 
two must be in the same place as each other?  No, there are no interdependencies 
really between hyper acute stroke care and major trauma care’ 
Reference 67; Project Manager 2, SHA 
 
‘So we put together, yes we put together an argument as to why you had to have 
trauma and stroke together.  It took a bit of time because you kept on having to say 
‘Well there is no argument.’...we’d produce the piece of paper as to why it had to be 
together… If someone had said they’d got to be separate, we could have forced it 
through as well.’ (Emphasis added) 
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Reference 68; SHA Manager 2 
 
References 67 and 68 explicitly highlight how senior project managers were asked to find 
evidence to justify an already made strategic decision (as opposed to using evidence to guide 
strategy). Both managers in references 67 and 68 concluded that there existed no such 
evidence but nevertheless ‘put an argument together’ to suggest that there was. Reference 68 
above is very stark in terms of the dominant position held by the SHA and the confidence it 
felt it had in its abilities to lead change regardless of the evidence and the opposition. 
Appendix 1 of the Decision making processes and criteria to be used by the JCPCT to agree 
future service provision arrangements advises in section 5.3, under the heading ‘Strategic 
Coherence:’ 
‘We recommend that a configuration will be approved which:  
  
 enables a co-location of hyper acute stroke units with major trauma centres.  
 
 ensures all major trauma and hyper acute stroke services are located on hospital sites 
which could be significant providers of specialist acute services (major acute 
hospitals) in the future.’ 
Reference 69 (NHS London, 2011c, App 1; p4)  
 
 There is a clear irony in the paradoxical situation of managers being asked to construct an 
evidence based case to justify a key tenet of an ‘evidence based’ reconfiguration for which no 
strong evidence exists. At least one of these managers feels that this is ‘a right bugger’ but 
242 
 
goes along with it and suggests that managerially it would have been possible to construct a 
case for the polar opposite position: ‘If someone had said they’d got to be separate, we could 
have forced it through as well.’ There are two implications that might be drawn here – one of 
which highlights the strength of the evidence based movement and extent to which evidence 
based Discourse has permeated health care policy making and a second which hints at the 
weakness of the movement. Firstly, decisions appear to be more legitimate when framed in 
‘evidence based’ language and accompanied by documentation and managers are expected to 
provide this for their strategic decisions. Secondly though, the power of evidence based 
Discourse is susceptible to being undermined and exploited by managers in order to further 
strategic or local political goals by presenting decisions as evidence based when no evidence 
for them in fact exists. This furthermore highlights that for all the documentation produced by 
the project team around criteria for bids, ability to reach data set standards and use of 
evidence based Discourse, management consultant derived ‘weighted bid’ standards, the 
involvement of independent expert panels, Joint Health Overview Scrutiny Committees, the 
JCPCT and public consultation exercises; when it came to the most strategically delicate 
decisions: 
 
‘The power lay very strongly within a cohort of two or three people within the 
strategic health authority’.  
Reference 70; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
The implications of this power tussle are not straightforward. Those who felt most aggrieved 
by the process are those whose own services were down-graded in the reconfiguration. 
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Indeed it might be argued that part of the role of the cohort of two or three people within the 
SHA was to dissipate power throughout the capital by challenging the traditional dominance 
of one of the capital’s most powerful hospitals. Once more this points towards a biopolitical 
(Foucault, 2007) outlook for the SHA: 
 
‘I think there were some people relatively in the centre of it who don’t understand 
cabinet responsibility actually. And so, you know, you join a cabinet knowing that you 
input into the decisions of that cabinet. But they’re not always unanimous. And 
actually if, if at the end, if at the end of the day you’re not prepared to accept the 
cabinet view for staff, then you have to leave really. And I think some people, slightly 
naively, thought that, you know, in some ways their job in the cabinet was to bat for 
their organisation, not to, not to bat for 12,000 stroke patients in London. And actually 
the job is to bat for 12,000 stroke patients in London.’ 
Reference 71; Doctor/Manager 1, Stroke Leadership team 
 
This quote captures the sense that the reconfiguration was to a degree concerned with 
transforming stroke care in London in biopolitical terms with impacts for the subjectivities of 
clinicians who were required to think of stroke care in network, or city wide terms rather than 
institutionally. Whilst this goal holds attractions for the SHA, it is also understandable that 
institutional loyalty maintains a residual call on clinicians involved in building up successful 




The following sections of this chapter describe how consensus between the professional and 
managerial communities was restored in the technical delivery and implementation methods 
designed for the new London model of stroke care. 
 
 
6.3 Section 2: The new regime of audit 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the technical means by which the goals of the 
reconfiguration were pursued at a (macro) Pan-London level. Building on the data already 
presented around the role of evidence in firstly; the problematisation of stroke services in 
London and secondly; the strategic decision making process around where to locate HASU 
care, this section will explore the role of evidence in the implementation of the new ‘regimes 
of government’ (Dean, 2010) of London stroke care. This section analyses the increased role 
of audit central to the reconfigured stroke service in London and its compatibility with both 
professional and management goals. This focus on audit is then critiqued in relation to the 
drive for standardisation in and of services and a concern with the ‘hard’ policy and 
management tools employed to achieve service standardisation.  
 
The first point to emphasise is that prior to the reconfiguration there was no specific London 
data collection process for stroke care. All Trusts were obliged to return data on a bi-annual 
basis to the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) as part of the National Sentinel Stroke Audit 
(NSSA). The audit had an organisational element and a clinical element – based on a 




From 2010-12, the Stroke Improvement National Audit Programme (SINAP) replaced the 
NSSA. It was commissioned by the Health care Quality Improvement Partnership (HQIP) 
and run by the RCP Stroke Programme for the Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party (ICSWP) 
and endeavoured to cover all hospitals treating stroke patients with a specific focus on the 
first 72 hours of care. From December 2012, the Sentinel Stroke National Audit Programme 
(SSNAP) was established which aims to collect the relevant data that providers need to 
supply to comply with the NICE quality standard and Accelerating Stroke Improvement 
metrics and other NHS outcomes measurements. The aim is to collect a ‘minimum dataset for 
every stroke patient, including acute care, rehabilitation, 6-month follow-up, and outcome 
measures in England, Wales and Northern Ireland’ (RCP, 2014). 
 
Stroke governance audit procedures underwent a radical change between 2010-12 as all 
London hospitals were mandated to record over 100 data fields electronically in real time for 
every single patient detailing clinical and organisational elements of their care over the first 
72 hours from admission and submit these as part of the RCP  Stroke Improvement National 
Audit Programme (SINAP). Alongside this national professionally led development 
extending audit, in London, there was a managerially devised London Minimum Data Set 
(LMDS) organisationally focused audit which monitored the ability of the new HASU and 
SU sites to meet the criteria against which they were now to be judged (and paid): 
 
‘That [the decision to request data from providers] was me saying we’ve got to collect 
some data on this because otherwise we’re not going to know if – so the 
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reconfiguration made a number of assumptions, and unless we collected, started to 
collect data, we would have no idea as to whether or not those assumptions were right, 
wrong or, you know, or moderate.’ 
Reference 72; Network Director 1 
 
There is a justificatory element to it – there is a desire to measure and account for change in 
order to demonstrate the efficacy of the new regime. The LMDS derived from a number of 
the key elements of the ABCD standards developed as part of the site selection process 
detailed in figure 10 – see also appendix B. The LMDS was an attempt to pragmatically 
construct a new ‘truth’ (Dean, 2010) around the accuracy of the assumptions upon which the 
reconfiguration was based. As the following quote from another Network Director 
demonstrates, although it generated dissent amongst those tasked with completing it due to its 
labour intensiveness, the audit regime played a central role in the reconfiguration: 
 
‘I think it’s a very, very onerous task at the moment and it’s the one thing that they 
[individual units] absolutely almost throttle me over having to do it because it’s in so 
much detail... But that is certainly [something] that I would recommend continue.  As 
soon as you take your eye off the ball, things will slip. And I think building in regular 
monitoring of quality standards is really, really important.  It’s the only way that you 
can maintain a high quality service.’ 




The quote above illuminates a number of important issues: firstly, the audit developed from 
its early days to require significant time and effort from the staff of each unit; secondly, the 
identification of the imposition of the audit lies with Network officialdom. The Director 
quoted in reference 73 draws on jovial yet violent language to describe how audit impacts 
upon the relationship between those who request and those who complete the audit data. The 
regime of audit was established by the Networks and leads to a potentially fraught dynamic. 
The third point is the most significant however and is expressed time and again by both 
managerial and clinical respondents – if you take your eye off the ball, things will slip and an 
ethos in which there is regular monitoring of quality standards is the only way that high 
quality services can be assured permanently. There is a deep seated fear that without constant 
monitoring, the gains made in stroke care may be lost and intensive audit is a crucial tool in 
ensuring compliance to the expressed goals of the reconfiguration.  
 
Audit and measurement against explicit standards are at the heart of the new model. An 
element of this relates not merely to the ethically motivated drive for higher clinical standards 
in the interests of patients, but also a commitment to demonstrate value for the extra money 
secured from the 31 London PCTs: 
 
‘[Y]ou have to measure them [the providers] to know whether you’ve got it 
[improving standards].  And on the money business, if we were going to put the 
money in, so actually it was an awful lot about workforce. So the way you get the 
standards is by getting the workforce, a) there and, b) working well.  And... all that 
stuff, so the units going live and getting the money was all about, ‘Well do you 
actually have the nurses in post?’  So it got very – so, but part of the feature was the 
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standards, the second of which is we were going to put money in; we needed to know 
that we were getting value for our money.  And third of which is, that we had had this 
audit process and [Doctor 1] had been around, so there had been people who 
understood that measuring things was one of the ways you drove up standards. And 
then we had the stroke networks who had the capacity to crawl all over people.  So 
there were a combination of different drivers’  
Reference 74; SHA Manager 2 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, a key element of the reconfiguration was the 
increased stroke workforce across London’s hospitals. A large proportion of the extra funds 
went to pay the wages of the new stroke specialist staff. An important focus of the new audit 
was therefore around justifying that these new staff members were indeed actually carrying 
out the roles for which the extra funding had been intended. This is significant – this element 
of measurement is not punitive for stroke specialist staff – rather it is potentially positive for 
them because it opens up the gaze of the Networks and the SHA to the staff establishment 
numbers on the unit – the subject of this key element of the audit is the organisation 
(represented by staff establishment numbers) rather than the performance of the stroke 
specialist staff. The second element – ‘are they working well?’ has greater disciplinary 
implications for unit staff clearly, but the key starting position for the nascent audit was 
establishing that ‘nurses are in post’ and that local Trust management is not reneging on the 
financially significant staffing assurances that were key to successful attainment of HASU 
and/or SU status. The third point, relating to Doctor 1 and the work he had previously done 
around clinical audit and standardisation points towards the increasing symbiosis between 
professional and managerial goals at the centre of the audit regime. The penultimate point 
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and in particular the language used with respect to the Networks having the ‘capacity to 
crawl all over people’ is very stark and demonstrates the central role of the Networks in 
implementation from the point of view of the commissioners. The final point articulated in 
reference 74 is also significant in highlighting the multi-factoral nature of audit in the London 
context. It acts upon multiple stakeholders and is flexible enough to be interpreted and used 
in a multitude of ways. 
 
Once early audit data began to highlight positive change it became an important motivational 
tool for senior managers vying to suffocate opposition to the model: 
 
‘And then we started to get, see some of the outcomes.  Then people eventually got, 
you know, gathered a degree of pride in what had been achieved. And so you have like 
a tipping point, don’t you, and think, ‘Okay I’m going to oppose this; it’s not going to 
happen.  Well okay it’s going to happen, I don’t like it.  Actually this is really good for 
London and it’s good for patients.’   And people can see that.  And then once you’ve 
got that, you have a, like a domino momentum then.  And then everybody wants to 
show people that this is working, they like to show, they like to gather the evidence 
and they like to show that it’s working and that’s where we’ve got to now.’ 
Reference 75; SHA Manager 1  
 
Audit data was used to validate the ethical underpinnings of the reconfiguration – the new 
regime of practice was producing a new, better ‘truth’ of London’s stroke services – in this 
context, dissent, or antipathy to the model became increasingly illogical, thus limiting 
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conflict (Newman, 2001). Furthermore, the onus shifted to others working in the system to 
match the gains made elsewhere in order to demonstrate that they too are capable of 
improving outcomes in a comparable manner. The LMDS and SINAP requirements merged – 
symbolising professional and managerial compatibility: 
 
‘We basically suggested to the clinical advisory group that if everybody in London 
added these ten questions to their user defined fields, so their free bit of SINAP and 
everybody completed SINAP, we would be able to get all of this information.  You’d 
all know, on a month by month basis, how you were doing against each of the quality 
standards that’s within your contract.  You’d all be able to answer your Department of 
Health reporting requirements, you’d all participate in the national audit, you’d all 
meet your ASI [Accelerating Stroke Improvement] quality measure data 
requirements.’ 
Reference 76, Network Project Manager 3 
 
Aided by the pan-London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group and the Networks, the LMDS was 
merged into the electronic reporting requirements for the new RCP SINAP audit – providers 
were encouraged to collect both clinical and organisational elements and respond to the 
multiple calls for data in one single electronic return (for every single patient) merging the 
requirements of separate improvement programmes. Building on the pride that the impressive 
early outcome measures were engendering, clinical auditors were able to radically expand the 
comprehensiveness of the prior RCP audit into stroke and merge the borders between data 
collected for management and professional rationales. This is an important step that blurred 
251 
 
the boundaries between professional and managerial communities as ownership of the 
comprehensive SINAP audit data is contested: 
 
‘[U]p until now it’s been clinically led.  But what’s happening is that the SINAP data 
is owned by the management, by the organisation... The organisation is now saying, 
‘This is our dashboard, this is how we’re doing, these are our performance indicators.’  
Commissioners are looking at it and saying, ‘Why are you not doing that?’ etc.  When 
I had my performance review meetings monthly, we’re looking at SINAP data and 
why have you not done that and so on.  So the measures in SINAP are clinically 
owned.  They’re put forward by clinical groups; they’re measured by clinicians still.  
But it’s turning into a, something by which managers are being judged.  So my general 
manager now, you know, she’s having the performance review meetings and she’s 
having to explain why we’re not meeting the door to needle target or whatever it is.’  
Reference 77; Doctor 2, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
The comprehensive nature of the SINAP audit data, its real-time nature and electronic format 
and rapid dissemination to various stakeholder groups represented a significant change in the 
management of stroke services in London. Performance was made much more visible and 
clinicians and managers in turn therefore became much more accountable (Timmermans and 
Berg, 2003). There appears to be some kind of ‘reciprocal enrolment’ (Osborne, 1993) of 
managers into a professional regime of government (Dean, 2010) here. Furthermore the 




‘So if you believe in evidence-based medicine, as I do, then you believe that people 
should follow guidelines and be measured against it and get good at that... A lot of the 
easy things can be taken away and systematised, and I think one of the things you’ve 
got in a HASU is people stopped bothering with – well there are still people who try 
and tinker and say, ‘I always do it this way.’   But really the HASU is a production 
line... And there’s no time to not just follow the guidelines and get on with it.  And it’s 
about where health services are going to have to go, because you’ve got to be more 
productive.’ 
Reference 78; Doctor 2, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This quote highlights a managerial ethos central to the EBHC movement – professionals must 
follow guidelines and produce data to demonstrate that they are doing so – clinical 
knowledge can be codified to the extent that the HASU becomes a production line. 
Professionals have no time to challenge established guidelines and must become more 
productive. There is a strategic element to this: 
 
‘[W]e deliberately built in all of this from the beginning, the whole point of the 
Sentinel Audit, going forward, was that we believe in quality, and if you have 
managers being judged as well according to quality, that protects the quality from any 
pressure to move resources elsewhere.  And stroke, in particular, is very vulnerable to 
that.’ 




This account suggests that clinical audit of stroke was designed by clinicians to ‘capture’ or 
‘colonise’ (Power, 1999) Trust level management so that resources would become protected 
in order to establish a base level from which professionals could pursue quality outcomes in 
clinical care. Rather than audit being an externally imposed tool of non-clinical managers 
pursuing political, strategic or economic goals it appears to be more akin to a professionally 
led imposition of disciplinary regulation which establishes a space for clinicians to realise 
their ethical desire for quality of care for stroke patients.  
 
Another consultant talks of a more managerially focused generation of medics using data to 
encourage providers to promote quality in order to serve the requirements of commissioners: 
 
‘So you’ve got the breed of people, almost managerial people coming through, and so 
they were initially able to turn around and say, ‘Well actually let’s look at this, length 
of stay for hips, we’re going have to do better.’ PCTs and SHAs went, ‘Well actually 
you’re very bad in terms of value for money for this, we’ll go to another place,’ and 
therefore hospitals have to look at themselves in more detail and say, ‘Right, we’re not 
actually performing very well on this, we need to do better, how are we going to do 
better?’  And then that, you know, it does bring people – and clinical people, into the 
mix, and asking, ‘Well how can we get this better?’’ 
Reference 80; Doctor 5, Kenworthy hospital 
 
This informant suggests there is a kind of generational shift in professional subjectivities – 
and that quasi-manager/doctors (or hybrids) (McGivern, 2006) are able to arm themselves 
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with evidence from clinical processes and push for change. This idea is reflected elsewhere in 
interview data and observation data – three key senior consultants who were very active in 
the London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group meetings were, or had been, intimately involved 
in the establishment and/or current running of the National Stroke Audit Programme at the 
Royal College of Physicians – their shared agenda related to the transformative value of audit 
making performance visible was relayed through the meetings and also confirmed in 
interview(s). In this interpretation of clinical-managerial relations, the commissioners are the 
potential allies of the hospital based clinicians – in league against the (non-stroke focused) 
Trust general managers – in effect, by using patient quality data effectively doctors may be 
enfranchised to use the potential threat of the commissioning of services being withdrawn to 
ensure a stronger voice in discussions with general managers around service delivery and 
resource allocation within Trusts.  
 
There is also a practical clinical value to the enhanced data collection regime: 
 
‘The data we gather, we – obviously about length of stay.  We look at readmission 
rates,  are they working, how many patients do we actually have readmitted – were 
they the TIA, stroke or other conditions in the first, in those first weeks after they’ve 
gone home that we’re looking at.’ 
Reference 81; Ward manager 2 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
Again this highlights the value to clinical and managerial staff of having increased 
measurement and driving improvement strategies. This also demonstrates that a key element 
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of clinical audit regimes being accepted and valued lies in their relevance to staff (Dixon 
Woods et al, 2009; Iedema and Rhodes, 2010). There is a further element to the increased 
audit regime however, described below by a Network Director: 
 
‘I mean it [the London model] is sustainable but not if it’s, if it’s not monitored, 
people will do their own thing... But it is, you know, it’s a classic.  It is a paradox 
because... if you’ve got that sort of central ring holding it all together, that enables 
people to become powerful in their own fiefdom.  Whereas if they can’t report back to 
a central thing, who’s going to take any notice of them?’  
Reference 82; Network Director 2 
 
Greater control of professional practice through increased monitoring is essential to stop 
people doing ‘their own thing’. The data is reported back to a central ring – but this 
accountability effectively increases the power of those under surveillance. This is indeed 
paradoxical – whilst the problem stroke specialists faced before the reconfiguration was a 
lack of power and/or recognition within many London hospitals because stroke was 
frequently a low organisational priority, they are able to adapt to the increased surveillance 
regime and use this as a tool to further their agenda(s) and ensure that they are indeed taken 
notice of – through increased control they may experience greater freedom and influence 
(McKinlay and Starkey, 1998).  
 
The onerous nature of the audit regime was aligned to an imperative of increasing the 




‘[I]f you replicated that [the extensiveness of SINAP] through all of the NHS, the 
structure of the cost to the NHS would be very different!  You know, and in that sense 
it’s too much.  But there was, there was a very clear view that, that the, particularly for 
those hospitals which had failed on quality, that the [push] up to get them to be a good 
enough was a big ask.  And it wasn’t going to happen overnight.  And they did need to 
be supported and monitored and audited through that process.  So there was quite a lot 
of drivers for making it happen, because otherwise the standards would never arise 
because we’d been doing Sentinel audit for years and look what had happened.’ 
Reference 83; SHA Manager 2 
 
The new surveillance regime placed burdens on Trusts in terms of ensuring data collection 
compliance. This is linked to an understanding that the less intensive NSSA failed to break 
down the barriers to effective stroke care and that for a number of previously low performing 
Trusts, the road to achieving care on a level produced at the highest performing Trusts would 
be long and rocky and a recognition that monitoring is essential to the achievement of 
standardised services.  
 
A key goal of the increased audit regimes was to standardise care across the city. The aim of 
standardisation of stroke services in London was lifting low level performers (as identified by 
the NSSA and via the bid process) to the same levels as the city’s high level performers. This 





‘The most controversial decision that was taken...  where everybody said, ‘This is a failing 
hospital, their bid was useless, you know, it’s never going to work, they will never be able to 
provide the service to the right standard.’  And the answer is, if we don’t have one there, 
there’s a hell of a long way between the [closest other hospital with a HASU] and the next 
nearest place out [of London] somewhere.  So we’ve got to make it good enough.  The way 
we – so in the end the way we dealt with that opposition was to say, ‘We won’t give them the 
money and we won’t give them the designation until independently they’re evaluated as 
having met the standard.  And that, to an extent, dealt with people’s concerns about it.’ 
Reference 84; SHA Manager 1 
 
New services were commissioned on the understanding that universal quality markers would 
be met. Those tasked with implementing the changes had to emphasise this to the senior 
managers of traditionally weaker hospitals: 
 
‘They were being commissioned on the basis of these standards being delivered.  So 
there was some work with myself and the network director to go to particularly the 
poor performing Trusts and really make sure that the chief exec and senior 
management really understood that they would not be getting the London tariff until 
they achieved those standards. And they wouldn’t be designated as a providing stroke 
unit care until they met those standards.’ 




The target group for this message is senior hospital managers (not stroke professionals) and 
the argument is emoted around the needs of patients juxtaposed with the reputational and 
economic implications for the Trust as a whole if the standards were not met. Standardising 
care and uplifting the quality of services expected by historically low-level performers began 
to repair the ruptured relationships between SHA management and certain senior 
professionals whose own services at Burridge hospital had not been designated HASU status: 
 
‘Arnott hospital was a failing Trust, poor quality, a million miles away, and you’re 
going to shut the wonderful services at Burridge hospital and rely on a crap service in 
Arnott hospital. And again in the end, what people rallied round really to do with that 
was to put the resources and the expertise in to Arnott hospital to help them meet the 
standard. So, [Doctor 1] as an individual, was very, very sceptical about the Arnott 
hospital - and Burridge hospital was his service.  And he, in the end, and I mean 
absolutely to his credit, fantastic leadership behaviour really, to say, ‘Actually I’m 
going to make this work.’  He put the resources and effort in to getting Arnott hospital 
up to standard.’ 
Reference 86; SHA Manager 1 
 
The above quote demonstrates strong clinical leadership and a commitment to the 
development of effective stroke services beyond institutional boundaries – knowledge around 
how to successfully achieve high standards was shared through the system and crucially, 
services were not accredited until fidelity to mandated specifications was demonstrated. This 
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was a universal requirement through the city – indeed one Network Director emphasised that 
it was easier to ‘do everybody rather than just select’ and importantly, it was linked to 
organisationally focused payment incentives: 
 
‘[H]aving a very concrete model that people had to follow in order to be able to get 
the additional funding through the tariff, was probably the most important thing [to aid 
implementation].   
Reference 87; Doctor 1 
 
The ethos around the universal application of the model is highly significant as it meant that 
the requirement to demonstrate that standards within care were met was extended throughout 
the city – to high performers as well as low performers – hence the increase in audit. 
However, the auditable standards were designed in a manner which protects (stroke 
specialist) professional staff: 
 
‘[I]n order to achieve the additional uplifted tariff, they’ve got to have certain things in 
place...  So they’ve got a protected staffing group. And that operates completely 
differently from every other service...  And I think they know that, they can’t say to 
me, ‘Oh, you know, but we’ve had five staff cut from our budget,’ because if they’ve 
had five staff cut from their budget, I have to go back to our commissioner and say, 
‘You know, they’ve cut staff, they’re not meeting their ratios,’ and they’ll have a 
contract conversation with the business manager of the Trust, because that’s protected 
through the tariff arrangement in the contract.  So it’s not really – the clinical team 
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would be in trouble if there’s no staff on the ward.  It will be, it won’t be the 
clinicians’ responsibility for that service... [S]o we’ve protected them.’ 
Reference 88; Network Project Manager 3 
 
For the Networks, PCTs and the SHA, the standards around organisational compliance to 
staffing establishment numbers were key. There is an assumption built into the London model 
that clinical staff will deliver high quality services if the economic and organisational barriers 
which they claim have previously held them back are removed. Standardisation (and audit) 
therefore was not perceived as an attack on the autonomy of professionals and consequently 
limiting and likely to invite resistance, rather standardisation was presented as a technique to 
protect specialist stroke services (from non-stroke focused hospital management). Viewed 
this way, standardisation and audit disciplined organisational and management behaviour 
rather than professional behaviour and potential resistance was countered by pecuniary 
incentives at the Trust management level.  
 
These standards impact upon HASU level mangers (as will be explored further in the 
following chapter) – promoting a firmness of approach which echoes that of the SHA senior 
leadership around 8 as a ‘magic number’ for HASUs explored earlier in this chapter. For 
example in the exchange below, the clinical services manager for stroke explains why an 
organisational standard without clinical evidence (the requirement for all patients to be 




Interviewer: ‘But if clinically it doesn’t matter, what’s going on in that hour 
between 71 and a half and 72 and a half makes such a difference?’ 
 
Informant:   ‘Well we would fail to have seen somebody in 72 hours.  So it’s, 
we would all perceive that as a failure, even though if we took a deep breath in and 
actually it’s not making any clinical difference. I just think if you get, and I know I 
differ from [the consultant stroke lead at the site] on this, he’s much more, ‘I’m doing 
what’s clinically relevant,’ you know, ... I’m very, very keen that we do not drop the 
ball, and I slightly feel if we, you know, 95% isn’t good enough because I think if you 
start accepting 95%, you’ll look around and it will be 85%.’ 
Reference 89; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
This perception that if standards are allowed to slip just slightly or if control is ceded at all, 
then there is a danger of more severe tailing off in standards recurs throughout the interview 
and observational data. Standards and protocols impose a uniformity across all HASU sites 
and impact upon supervisory staff in multiple and conflicting ways. Although the informant 
is aware that clinically, there is no difference between 71 and a half and 72 and a half hours, 
the standards impose a pressure upon her to ensure her organisation is capable of achieving a 
performance standard in order to validate their position as a valued HASU. 
 
This section on standardisation and the increased prevalence and influence of audit represent 
the major themes which arose from the observations which were performed of the London 
Stroke Clinical Advisory Group (Stroke CAG). The group consisted of mainly HASU clinical 
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leads (mostly doctors), a senior nurse and management and network representation. A large 
amount of time was spent designing and discussing elements of the LMDS and the 
organisational and clinical standards of which it should consist. The group had the power to 
designate areas that ought to be measured and audited and the acceptable 
percentage/proportion of compliance in order to receive the respective element of the London 
Stroke Tariff. This then had to be agreed with a senior commissioning board. Some standards 
changed during the years I attended the meetings – for example, a 30 minute standard for 
door to needle time for thrombolysis was felt to be counter-productive clinically by numerous 
members of the panel and the panel successfully campaigned for it to be replaced with a 45 
minute standard instead. The interactions of the group demonstrated a consistent picture of 
medical dominance – it was the senior consultants who spoke for the most time, with the 
most authority – who might occasionally disagree with and challenge each other – but were 
rarely challenged by any other members of the group. However, over time, it became clearer 
that these senior doctors were employing a ‘management’ discourse based on two key 
themes; ensuring that other clinicians followed the strict new protocols without exceptions; 
and that data was collected to provide evidence that this was being done. These doctors were 
acting as managers – but managers with a desire to defend the new pan-London jurisdiction 
of stroke care in a time of economic turbulence and politicking and highlight to 
commissioners that the model would be successful and sustainable. 
 
The standards were clinically designed. Likewise the group could discuss and influence the 
regularity of peer review visits – there was a consensus that although implementation of the 
standards was progressing well towards the end of my observations – HASU managers and 
clinicians were desirous that the visits continued because they saw the visits as an important 
way of defending their (particularly nursing) staff from being sent to cover staff shortages 
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elsewhere in the hospital. As well as discussing the elements that would make up the 
standards by which they would be audited, the group spent a large deal of time discussing 
how to ensure that firstly the data was collected, and secondly how to counter resistance to 
the rigidity of the London model. With respect to the first point, there was feedback each 
month to the central clinical team around the burden of data collection: 
 
‘There are audits coming out of your ears aren’t there?  It feels a little bit at the 
moment like we’re, like we’re auditing everything that potentially could move.’ 
Reference 90; Senior AHP, Kenworthy hospital 
 
Different units responded in different ways in terms of employing administrative or nursing 
staff to complete the data returns but it was clear that to the senior clinical and network leads, 
ongoing data collection and ensuring its continuance was essential to the role of the CAG. In 
most meetings, clinicians offered stories about resistance expressed by colleagues to 
following the rigid London model. For example, a requirement of the model is that all 
potential stroke patients have to go to a HASU – even if they are in-patients at hospitals 
without a HASU: 
 
‘[I]f you have a hospital stroke having just had your coronary arteries done and you 
have a stroke, you cannot go to [the SU in that same hospital], you would have to then 
get into an ambulance and go to a hyper acute stroke unit that may be up in wherever.  
Well that’s complete and utter nonsense.  And there’s no evidence to suggest that 
that’s what you should do.’ 
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Reference 91; Doctor 4, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This type of rigidity caused much resistance and multiple discussions at the meetings, but 
from the clinical lead, supported by the networks, there was a commitment that perverse as it 
may seem, such firmness was essential in order to ensure compliance to standards. Once 
more this highlights the compatibility of professional and managerial goals and the shared 
reverence for a ‘one size fits all’ episteme and controlled approach to managing the design 
and implementation of the new regimes of government (Dean, 2010). Alongside this rigidity 
there was an ethos of collective, interventional support for providers to help them achieve the 
requisite implementation standards – this is described in the following section.  
 
 
6.4 Section 3: Interventional commissioning 
 
A key element of the London reconfiguration was the constructive, interventional aspect of 
the commissioning of the new services which was central to the push to improve and 
standardise care across all sites – in particular those starting from a lower base point. This 
was a pragmatic decision based on the poor standard of many of the submitted bids for the 
commissioning of HASU status: 
 
‘We took the view, in Stroke, that actually we were not seeing something which was 
reflecting excellent hospitals with poor bids, that actually the poor bids often reflected 
[poor stroke services], not so – it’s not a judgement on the care provided by individual 
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clinicians, but poorly organised, poorly supported units... So we decided that the right 
thing to do in the first instance was to support, to decide that unit was going to be in 
and to provide them with support through principally the stroke networks... [We took] 
a commissioner interventionist approach... But actually, so, so was there a master plan 
that that’s how we were going to deal with it?  No.  Was there a management theory 
underpinning it?  No.  We made pragmatic judgements in the face of how things 
played out, often things that were unexpected. ’ 
Reference 92; Senior Project Manager 2, SHA 
 
Table 8 below  is taken from an NHS Implementation Options Power Point document from  
2009(Appendix D reference 55) in which it is stated: ‘The external evaluator panel scores 
showed that only one potential HASU and 3 potential Stroke Units would be able to meet all 
essential ‘launch criteria’ by October 2009’ (NHS London, 2009b). This meant that the 
‘below the line’ providers (of which there were many) would need extensive aid to get then to 










Table 8: ‘Implementation Options’ (NHS London, 2009b) 
 
 
The focus at the commissioning level was not on individual clinicians’ integrity or actions – 
but poorly organised hospital services. Furthermore, the methods chosen to tackle these 
problems were designed and led by commissioners working closely with the local Networks, 
the pan-London Stroke CAG and the implementation team. The supportive, collaborative 
approach pursued by these stakeholders is highlighted below:  
 
‘[W]e’ve worked with them [HASUs] really, really closely.  And encouraged them 
and supported them and congratulated them, been in there with them.  We’ve had all 
the measurement criteria, you know, the assessment, the criteria that we assess them 
against, but we’ve supported them in being able to reach it.  So it’s not like saying, 
‘Right you’ve got to do that, and we’re going to come in and see how you’ve done it.’  
It’s, ‘How can we, with you, get to this standard? Alright, we won’t assess you next 
week as planned, because clearly you’re going to be there the week after, it’s stupid to 
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assess you...’  So it’s being realistic. Being realistic with people and what can we 
achieve.’ 
Reference 93; Network Director 2 
 
Once more the approach was heavily reliant on the production of evidence of practice, or 
performance measured against published criteria, but the ethos around achieving this was 
‘realistic’ and extremely supportive rather than punitive. It was not about judging units as 
substandard; rather it was about encouraging them and enabling them to achieve the requisite 
metrics. The seemingly paradoxical juxtaposition of freedom and standardisation is discussed 
below: 
 
‘So the crucial things in the stroke standards, I think, were mostly about staffing 
levels, how quickly a patient needed to be seen for a  particular sort of assessment, 
how many nurses you had to have, how many therapists, how the doctors have be 
organised for their rotas, those kinds of things.  And people had, so people had 
complete freedom, for example, about how they met the requirement to always have a 
consultant available within whatever the time requirement was.  And different people 
did it differently... All we cared about was that they met the standard. So, and that 
would, and whether people were allowed to be innovative in that way was not to do 
with whether they were a good unit.  And we were studiedly neutral on that, as long as 
they met the standards’ 




Within rigid standardised frameworks, clinicians were given the space to innovate freely, and 
‘enact’ evidence based guidance (Mykhalovskiy, 2004; Ferlie and Fitzgerald, 2005) at the 
unit level in order to design and deliver care to stroke patients as they best saw fit. This also 
meant that local issues can be addressed locally. For example in a number of networks, 
consultants working at hospitals which had SU status, but not HASU status were invited to 
work on the HASU at a neighbouring Trust at certain points each month. This approach had 
the triple advantage of augmenting or maintaining the acute skills of the respective 
consultant, sharing knowledge across multiple sites and teams and also aiding HASU 
providers to ensure that consultant shifts were continuously covered. Clinicians and managers 
had the opportunity to design and tailor solutions to local problems – hence the seemingly 
disciplinary burden of increased monitoring, standardisation and measurement were 
presented (and felt) in productive or emancipatory terms for those working at HASU and SU 
level. 
 
The increased levels of involvement of the commissioners and the links with standards and 
income for the Trusts were recognised as important factors in the successful implementation 
of the London model: 
 
‘[The commissioners’ role has] been fairly critical as well, you know, holding the 
purse strings and they’ve got involved almost for the first time actually in terms of 
assessing the quality of the services which have been delivered to them.  So they 
usually will come on the inspection visits, the assessment visits with the clinicians.’  




Having agreed to fund stroke services with an additional £23m per year as part of the 
reconfiguration the commissioners, working through Health care for London and alongside 
the Networks and professional leadership took a constructive approach to improving care 
delivery in stroke care – however, this was clearly backed up by being able to withhold 
elements of the increased tariff if standards were not achieved. The ‘stick’ of withholding the 
tariff was seen by both senior SHA management and clinical leaders as an essential element 
of the London model: 
 
‘And people not getting their money unless they do what they’re told [drives change]!’  
Reference 96; SHA Manager 1 
 
‘Exactly how that money [the extra £23m per year] was used was fairly early decided 
on that it would be linked to the tariff... And that was certainly something which I 
think the clinical advisory group supported from the beginning. And I think it has been 
the most important driver.’ 
Reference 97; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
These key professional and managerial stakeholders involved in the design of the systems for 
standardisation linked to Trust payment emphasise the importance of the ability to reward 
good performance and punish poor performance. However, the Network Directors involved 
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in the application of the policy suggested that in reality the systems which exist are not 
conducive to an effective withholding of payments: 
 
‘I wrote this letter, basically saying it’s just not good enough, you know, ‘I expect to 
receive this information,’ you know, reminding him of the times that we’d asked for it, 
‘I expect to receive this information by the end of the week. If we do not receive this 
information, we will be recommending to the commissioners that the tariff uplift is not 
paid for the period of time between,’ I think it was going to be from February through 
to August.  So it was a significant period of time and they would have lost a 
significant amount of money.  To be frank, money would never have been taken away 
because of the, because of the way everything is.  In fact it was a slightly empty threat.  
[Emphasis added] But it was a threat enough to make them [submit the required 
information]’ 
Reference 98; Network Director 1 
 
A problem therefore is the level of complexity involved in the tariff payment system which 
inhibits its practical effectiveness. However, the threat of withholding the tariff – even though 
it might be ‘empty’ – appears to be sufficient to challenge resistant behaviour by individual 
managers and Trusts in general. This is another aspect of exposing providers to the gaze of 
commissioners, networks and other Trusts – there is a peer-pressure element to the role of 
payments as symbolic markers of compliance and quality which emphasises a logic of 
subjectification rather than subjection. The stroke networks are heavily involved in this 
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aspect of governance. Their role will be explored in more detail in the following chapter 




This chapter first focused on the decision-making process around where and how to locate the 
new London HASU services. The bid evaluation process was shown to ‘open up performance 
to the managerial gaze’ to a new extent across London’s proposed stroke services. However 
the professional and managerial consensus over quality criteria which allowed bids to be 
ranked ‘objectively’ was not matched by the configuration evaluation which included much 
more subjective criteria – highlighting the contested nature of decision making in 
reconfigurations (Spurgeon et al, 2010). The debate around quality and access as markers to 
guide the site selection was then highlighted in relation to the rigidity of the central SHA 
management demands that London accommodated no more than eight HASUs. The metaphor 
of ‘shifting goalposts’ was explored in relation to how the original criteria for choosing stroke 
service sites was changed by senior SHA executives in the light of unexpected results from 
the bid evaluation.  
 
This led to an exploration of the relations between SHA managers, stroke project managers 
and senior stroke care professionals and the contrasting institutional versus pan-London 
outlooks expressed by each. This is interesting because it highlights elements of consensus 
and conflict between managerial and professional goals (Numerato et al, 2011) alongside the 
existence of a central SHA executive with increased managerial power, displaying ‘top-
down’ NPM style leadership (Hood, 1995; Ferlie et al, 1996) whilst also demonstrating 
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elements of ‘reintegration’  (Dunleavy et al, 2006). Again, this points towards a complex 
governance regime in policy making under late New Labour (Osborne, 2006). The contested 
nature of ‘evidence based’ health policy making (Carr-Hill, 1995; Nutley and Davies, 2000; 
Goldberg, 2006; Greenhalgh and Wieringa, 2011) and the impacts this has on professionals 
(Freidson, 2001; Armstrong, 2002) was also highlighted here. 
 
The next section of the chapter reviewed how within the reconfiguration the standards set and 
audited were jointly designed by professional leaders and network and SHA managers and 
signed off by commissioners linking the concerns of the LMDS and SINAP. This highlights 
managerial and professional compatibility (Southon, 1994; Numerato et al, 2011). The model 
of stroke care that was constituted was intentionally inflexible and intensely monitored. There 
was a strong ethos that improvement through standardisation (Timmermans and Berg, 2003) 
was possible and that furthermore audit could be used to protect the resources secured to 
improve stroke and enable stroke professionals to deliver ethically satisfying high quality 
care (Iedema and Rhodes, 2010). The third section of the chapter explored the concept of 
‘interventional commissioning’ which demonstrated ‘reintegration’ of governance regimes 
(Dunleavy et al, 2006) and highlighted that alongside the increased regimes of audit, data 
collection and increased surveillance, there existed a space for providers to innovate and 
tailor care and that commissioners and central overseers provided support to improve local 
services (Dopson and Ferlie, 2005).   
 
The next chapter will focus on the reformed regime of government at Kenworthy hospital in 









Alongside an interest in change at the pan-London level, this thesis is also concerned with the 
effects of the reconfiguration at the micro-level – change that occurred for staff delivering 
stroke care to patients at the HASU and SU levels. This chapter explores how decisions and 
action at both levels shape and are shaped by each other. The aim here is to build on chapter 
V which focused on stroke care ‘problematisation’ (Foucault, 2007), and chapter VI which 
was concerned with the designation of the ‘solution’ to this problem at the macro-level by 
exploring implementation of the new regimes of government (Dean, 2010) at one hospital 
which was radically reformed by the London programme.  
 
The first section will contextualise Kenworthy hospital, highlighting the scale of change 
between pre- and post-reconfiguration stroke services at the provider level and introduce 
institutional level conceptions of what ‘success’ and ‘viability’ in stroke services were 
interpreted as for those with both professional and managerial responsibility for such 
services, and why the hospital chose to bid for HASU status. The second section details how 
the jurisdictional effects of increased stroke care ‘specialisation’ at Kenworthy hospital 
impact upon the professional practices between stroke specialists and non-specialists; and 
also the relationships between different professional groups (medical, nursing and AHP) 
delivering specialist stroke care at the hospital – with a particular focus on how perceived 
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inadequacies in nursing care (identified in section 1) were handled. This section also 
discusses the ways in which stroke specialist staff at Kenworthy interpreted the discourse of 
evidence based stroke. The final section describes the role of the stroke networks in aiding 
implementation of the new model of care to ensure that the requisite standards were met.  
 
Three main data sources are drawn upon in this chapter. The first is interviews carried out 
with staff at Kenworthy hospital around the decision to bid for HASU status and the ensuing 
changes engendered by this and provides a micro-level perspective. The second data source is 
interview data with stakeholders involved at senior and advisory levels across the stroke 
project board, clinical advisory panel, and commissioning and finance panels – focused on 
implementation and the role played by the clinical networks in particular. In addition to this, 
the chapter also draws on observation data taken from the pan-London Stroke CAG meetings, 
to which two key figures (professional and managerial) from Kenworthy were significant 
contributors.  
 
7.2 Section 1: Contextualising Kenworthy hospital 
 
Kenworthy hospital serves a population of over 500,000 with a Trust-wide staff of over 
4,000. It was successful in its bid for HASU status in 2009. It is not a central London 
teaching hospital like the majority of the HASU sites, but rather based in a more suburban 
location and is not a neuro-specialist centre. This is of significance as it meant that the 
hospital had to invest very heavily and very rapidly in terms of medical and radiological 
resources as part of the London plan to arrive at a point at which the minimum standards 
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were achieved – more so than other, better established sites. Care of the Elderly Services 
(including Stroke services) were provided by the local community health service on the site 
of Kenworthy until the year 2000 when the acute trust took over responsibility for running the 
service. However, compared to the configuration of stroke care found at Kenworthy after 
2009, the services offered to stroke patients were rather disjointed and rudimentary. As 
highlighted throughout the UK in the NHS London literature reviewed in the first empirical 
chapter, Kenworthy had a comparably poorly staffed, non-exclusive ‘proto-stroke unit’ with 
23 beds, often blocked by non-stroke patients which meant that many stroke patients never 
made it to the stroke unit until many days post-stroke.  In Table 9 below, data for pre- and 









Beds 23 50 
(16 HASU, 34 SU) 
Stroke admissions Approx. 400 p.a. Approx. 1300 strokes p.a. 
Approx. 1600 including TIAs  
Consultants 1 3 
Junior doctors 1 8 
Occupational 
Therapists 
1.66 qualified + 2.0 
assistants * 
7.65 whole time equivalent 
Physiotherapists 2.0 qualified + .66 
assistant whole time 
equivalent 
8 whole time equivalent 
Speech and Language 
Therapists 
1 whole time equivalent 3.84 whole time equivalent 
Dieticians 0.1 whole time 
equivalent 
2.0 whole time equivalent 
Psychologists 0 1.5 whole time equivalent 





It is clear from Table 9, that stroke activity increased substantially following the 
establishment of HASU status and also that a very large number of new staff were recruited 
(over a relatively short period). These are important factors which impacted upon service 
development at the hospital. 
 
Firstly however, it is valuable to consider the historical and structural context in which 
services developed at Kenworthy in order to understand the different ways in which the 
various professions key to stroke care delivery ultimately came to be impacted upon in 
distinct ways. Compared to London’s major central hospitals, Kenworthy hospital is 
relatively new, opening in the 1970s and faced more of a conflicted ‘institutional identity’ 
somewhere between a District General Hospital (DGH) and a specialist acute provider. As a 
management consultant involved in the stroke services bid on behalf of Kenworthy observed: 
 
 ‘[T]here was always a debate within Kenworthy, ‘Are we a local acute hospital? Or 
are we a specialist hospital?’ And Kenworthy had always had kind of pretentions by 
virtue of, partly the people it recruited when it was built... [It] had a lot of new 
ambitious doctors, it had the [Medical Research Council funded Clinical Research 
Centre] MRC, it had clinical research.  And I know the people who were attracted 
there initially didn’t move.’ 
Reference 99; Independent Management Consultant, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Although the hospital is in a suburban location and has many of the characteristics of a ‘local’ 
hospital, or a DGH, there has existed a historical strategic drive to aspire towards more than 
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this, and indeed towards increased specialist status. A number of informants linked this to the 
existence of the allied research centre. The presence of the research centre is crucial to 
understanding an important element of development of Kenworthy hospital. Although the 
Clinical Research Centre was closed in the 1980s, a tradition for excellence in rehabilitation 
and therapies had been established and impacted upon how nascent stroke services 
progressed over subsequent years even after the MRC had been closed down: 
 
‘So we’ve always had more therapists than most DGHs. And speech and language 
therapy was also part of that.  We had a lot of speech and language.  I mean there were 
times in the, in my early days here in the sort of the nineties and the noughties, when 
many of my colleagues running perfectly good stroke units elsewhere, had a speech 
therapist for a couple of hours a week, whereas I had a full time one, it was unheard 
of.’ 
Reference 100, Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
The relevance of this situation is that it encouraged the establishment of a cadre of highly 
qualified, well trained and ambitious Allied Health Professionals (AHPs – e.g. 
physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech and language therapists) within Kenworthy 
hospital. These therapists are central to effective stroke care delivery (and normally in short 
supply traditionally in English stroke care) and therefore provided the Kenworthy stroke 
service with a clinical advantage over other sites in the capital, and also a high quality base in 
therapies from which to build on when the increased funds following the reconfiguration 
arrived. The high standard of AHP provision and interest in research allied with a well-
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respected lead consultant with a profile within the national and London wide stroke physician 
community gave the trust a potential base to work from as stroke services gradually improved 
through the years from 2000. 
 
Unfortunately, strong as the AHP presence and reputation was, the nursing standards at the 
hospital were considered weak by the informants interviewed for this thesis. The hospital 
suffered a serious scandal in the mid-2000s in a speciality not allied with stroke – but there is 
a feeling well expressed by all professional groups and managers that nursing at the hospital 
has been poor too often – particularly in Care of the Elderly: 
 
‘I think that the old care of the elderly nurses will often… have been shunted into an 
area because nobody else will manage them properly.  We don’t accept that anymore.’ 
Reference 101; Matron Kenworthy hospital 
 
Many of the pre-existing (i.e. before the reconfiguration) nurses are described by colleagues 
as not very dynamic, rather uninspiring individuals who have ended up in Care of the Elderly 
services not through having a passion for the role, but because it is a kind of graveyard for 
poor nursing staff who have traditionally been unchallenged by management into performing 
to a higher standard. An element of the reconfigured service therefore focused on challenging 
these traditional institutional features, however, the legacy of these perceived strengths 
(therapies, medical leadership) and weaknesses (nursing); permeates these data, so that 
analytically, it will be useful to explore the ways in which the reconfiguration and the 
challenges it brings affects these distinct professional groups. It is essential to understand that 
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the different staff groups are starting from different perceived points of competence at the 
moment at which the new regimes of government are introduced and therefore the episteme 
and techne (Dean, 2010) of the new regime may impose different challenges upon separate 
staff groups. 
 
A further key theme which percolates these data is the sense of stroke service development as 
a kind of ‘strategic grab’ on behalf of the hospital which links back to reference 99 and the 
identity of the hospital itself and the dialectic between specialism and localism: 
 
‘[O]ur director was very supportive of the stroke project [bid for HASU status].  There 
was also the agenda in that there’s a lot of competition amongst the Trusts in the outer 
areas of London as to who is going to be the major acute centre, because again there is 
a tendency for smaller hospitals to downsize and for the bigger hospitals to grow... [I]t 
was looked upon very favourably by the management as an agent for upgrading the 
whole hospital to a large acute centre’ 
Reference 102; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
The theme of local sector-wide competition is emphasised in particular by senior 
professionals and the director level manager involved in the preparation and delivery of the 
business case forwarded to NHS London for HASU status. The director with responsibility 




‘[I]t was in the wind that stroke was going to be a big, you know, there was a few 
things that are going central aren’t they, the vascular stuff and the stroke.  So we knew 
that for our future it is vital that we are a major acute.  Otherwise we would be sucked 
up by Arnott hospital, we thought at the time, which isn’t now likely to happen.  But at 
that time that was possible. Wilder hospital was moving to be a Foundation Trust and 
you think, ‘Hmm what’s going on there?’  So you either are going to be taken over or 
you’re going to survive. And the only way to survive strategically was to be an acute, 
a major acute.  And so the stroke business case was important to the Trust’ 
Reference 103; Director, Kenworthy hospital 
 
The historically conflicted view as to whether Kenworthy should see itself as a DGH or a 
major acute hospital in some ways was resolved thanks to the work around stroke specialist 
service delivery. The stroke business case made stroke care important to the trust in ways 
which it had not been in earlier years because it is seen as a way of establishing the 
organisation as more important in strategic terms to the capital than it would have been had 
stroke gone elsewhere. This competitive ethos between the local hospitals is remarked upon 
by informants – essentially a choice of being ‘taken over or surviving’ was fully understood 
by the lead clinician for stroke at the hospital who described it thus: 
 
‘I think it was the coincidence of, the coincidence of opportunity with aspiration.  So 
the fact that the hospital wanted to be a big acute hospital, is somebody saying, ‘If you 
bid right for this contract, you’re going to have 54 beds technically paid for by an 
outside agency which is going to bring hundreds of people in here and everybody will 
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say that this is a hospital where you go for strokes.’   And that will bring everything 
in... So they’ve actually brought vascular surgery in here, and because vascular 
surgery has come here, that’s going to mean that they will have to have 24/7 radiology 
and, you know, the whole thing has all come together.’ 
Reference 104; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
There was clear ‘buy in’ from the senior medical stroke team for the strategy pursued by the 
hospital. There is an entrepreneurial flourish to this respondent’s language ‘business through 
the door’ and an explicit awareness of the importance of the extra funds provided by an 
‘outside agency’. This collaboration between clinical and general management leaders was 
important, but for the Director leading on the bid for the hospital, the key knowledge broker 
was an independent management consultant who brought extra skills to the process: 
 
‘[W]e actually pulled somebody in... who is a strategic, he used to be a chief exec, so 
he’s one of these people that comes in and works with Trusts.  He... was the one that 
was looking outside and saying, ‘Geographically we are absolutely bang on, we are 
right in the right place, they cannot, they can’t not use us because they come to us 
because we are easy to get to,’ and geographically when you look at the potential 
places, we have to be the one.’ 




There is a recognition that specialist, strategic management knowledge was needed for the 
bid – someone who could apply understanding around how strategic case processes are 
interpreted at the centre as well as by the bidders, and that spending the extra money to bring 
this knowledge in house would be valuable in ensuring the bid had a good chance of success: 
 
‘[M]ost Trusts are heavily operational.  They’re not - they don’t tend to be very 
strategic because it’s all about the crisis today and next week...  And what I was trying 
to say was, ‘Look, you know, things are not going to be as they always were.  They’re 
going to move – special stuff is going to move to tertiary centres... So that’s a key 
element to your strategy which they hadn’t really been thinking about... [A]nd you get 
a kind of critical mass of those kind of services [e.g. stroke]. And then you become the 
default [hospital for other services]’. 
Reference 106; Independent Management Consultant, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
This subtle understanding around how competition in the NHS of the late New Labour period 
functioned, and the reliance on external, management consultant knowledge to give a 
strategic edge and presentational flourish to the application process was important. The 
management consultant employed by the Trust, and quoted here was an independent Public 
Sector specialist who had worked for many years in hospital administration and management, 
and at the Department of Health as a civil servant and policy advisor. His political judgement 




‘[I]t was very clear from Darzi’s work that he wanted these specialist centres and then 
little sort of polyclinics in a little part.  So what we did not want to be was 
[unimportant]; we really wanted to become one of the players. ‘ 
Reference 107; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Driving the process was a desire to become ‘one of the players’ and the default option to 
colonise further specialisms on the back of the success of securing stroke specialist status. 
This sentiment clashes with the collaborative, network approach emphasised at the macro-
level in earlier chapters (whilst chiming with the competitive edge to these relationships 
across different organisations). Post reconfiguration stroke services now have an explicit and 
quantifiable value to the management of London hospitals because they need multiple 
ancillary services in order to function at the requisite ‘gold’ standard designated by national 
and local guidelines and the funds for these services is guaranteed by the commissioners. 
However, whilst the changing profile of stroke has large impacts on the external strategy 
making of individual hospitals, it also impacts upon the importance of stroke and the 
subjectivities of those delivering strake care within organisations. Stroke service delivery is 
now central to the successful clinical, economic and organisational functioning of Kenworthy. 
This changes a number of key dynamics within the hospital (in the stroke team and beyond). 
Stroke staff outlined the differences between before and after the reconfiguration in stark 
terms: 
 
‘It was ridiculous [before the reconfiguration].  I mean, it was a completely undoable 
job, so we campaigned and we got one whole speech therapist.  But now to work 
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somewhere where we’ve got four speech therapists, eight physios, seven-and-a-half 
OTs, psychology and dieticians – it is brilliant, really brilliant.  And I do feel we have 
really improved stroke care – I mean, not us personally, but the London Stroke Model 
has really improved the way stroke services are delivered, so it’s lovely to be part of 
that.’ 
Reference 108; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Thus stroke has a higher profile following the reconfiguration which in turn increases the 
power which stroke clinicians and managers potentially have to influence practice elsewhere 
in the hospital. The quote above demonstrates this in relation to AHP staff establishment 
numbers focused on rehabilitation. This section has described the context behind the micro-
level study at Kenworthy hospital. The following section describes some of the intra- and 
inter-professional changes heralded by the altered regimes of government associated with the 
London stroke care reforms. 
 
7.3 Section 2: The implementation of the new regimes of government at 
Kenworthy 
 
Stroke patients now have a much  better organised journey into the hospital in that they side 
step the procedures which apply to other patients; the ambulance teams call ahead, specially 
trained nurses await the blue-lighted arrival and speed the patients through A and E straight 
to Radiology where they get immediate scanning priorities. This change impacts on the 
workloads of others in different ways. For example, A and E input is greatly reduced, but 
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pressures on Radiology increase. The effects of some of these shifting work practices and 
clinical priorities are demonstrated in the following quotes which detail elements of conflict 
between stroke consultants and radiology consultants around how the radiology service 
facilitates the increased burden of stroke scanning it now faces. Rather than increase their 
own hours to facilitate the new stroke service plan, the radiology consultants pass the 
augmented work load on to their registrars – but this is problematic for the stroke specialist 
consultants: 
 
‘Oh the registrars grumbled that there would be more work and that’s true, but that’s 
in the whole scheme of things it doesn’t have a great deal.  Most of these cases would 
have come to them anyhow. And now at least they can, you know, if they do get home 
and they are called about a non-thrombolysis brain at two in the morning, they don’t 
have to drive in and do it.  They can look at it at home.  So there’s been a trade-off.  
They’ve got a few more cases but they don’t necessarily have to come in.’ 
Reference 109; Radiology Consultant, Kenworthy hospital 
 
‘I think there is still resistance, for example, we have accepted that the thrombolysis 
rota is consultant based and all the people on the rota are basically happy with that. 
Radiology have still not accepted that it would be nice to have a consultant reporting 
the scans.  So there’s all, there’s resistance from the registrars, but at the same time, 
the consultants have not said, ‘Okay well that’s simple; we’ll just have a consultant on 
call every night.’  The consultants have not been prepared to go down that road.  I 
think we’ll get there.’   
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Reference 110; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
In effect the radiology department is busier as a result of having more stroke patients and 
greater pressure to prioritise and report on these cases within minutes in order to meet the 
requirement that all candidate thrombolysis patients receive treatment within the requisite 
time frame. The desire from the stroke consultant in reference 110 is for the radiologists to 
offer 24 hour consultant on call cover to do this. However, the proposed solution from the 
senior radiologists is technological – in that the on-call radiologist registrar can read the scan 
at home rather than coming in to the hospital to do so – negating the need for consultant 
cover. There are two points worth noting in the light of this. Firstly, with respect to the 
collegial nature of consultant decision making and workforce planning within the hospital – 
despite the confidence expressed in reference 110 that ‘we’ll get there’ the stroke consultant 
(notwithstanding the increased importance of stroke to the organisation) has no power to 
force the radiology consultants to change their practice in line with his own desire that they 
offer consultant on call coverage for thrombolysis decisions. The second point is that there is 
a change to consultant working patterns within the stroke team not replicated at a senior level 
elsewhere within the hospital which is linked to the explicit requirements of the London 
stroke care model: 
 
‘The consultant used to do a twice weekly ward round on a stroke unit. And it was... 
what we used to call a ‘parachute walk around,’ so we used to parachute in and then 
see the patients and then scarper.  Not scarper, but, you know... And that has changed.  
Now, for instance, on the hyper acute service, a consultant goes round every day.  This 
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is a Sunday, okay, I’m sitting here having done a ward round, having done a TIA 
clinic to high risk patients and I’ve got to go off and do another walk as well.’ 
Reference 111; Doctor 5, Kenworthy hospital 
 
As part of the new regime of government (Dean, 2010), there has to be a consultant led ward 
round every single day, so there has to be greater consultant presence – this is now monitored 
and made visible to the RCP, networks and commissioners by real time electronic audit for 
every single patient. The reconfiguration has aligned the goals between the stroke clinicians 
and Trust management linked to the prioritisation of stroke care in the light of the London 
Minimum Standards and is seen by both management and medical communities as a 
productive change: 
 
‘[O]nce he [Doctor 3] knew that the management were behind him, he was prepared to 
get on board and go the extra mile.  So instead of being somebody who was kind of 
very difficult in all these big political meetings and saying, ‘My service is crap, and 
it’s all your fault because you won’t give me any money,’ he actually was then 
prepared to come in at weekends’ 
Reference 112; Director, Kenworthy hospital 
 
Both the goals and means of the senior stroke physicians and Trust management coalesce 
through the protocols, targets and tariff rewards of the new London model. As these 
physicians come to specialise ever more closely and exclusively in stroke and stroke alone, 
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these consultants talk about how the new stroke rules work in their favour and inspire 
furtherance of dedication – they see these technical developments in productive rather than 
disciplinary terms – despite the fact that in many ways their working practice may be viewed 
as more restricted and certainly more closely scrutinised. However, whilst the consultants 
recognise that the prioritisation of stroke care may cause resentment amongst their non-stroke 
specialist colleagues, it is the therapy team managers who voice these feelings of unease most 
eloquently: 
 
‘[Y]ou can see the other teams where they have no money and no staff; they look at it 
like, ‘Oh... [you have everything you need] up there, so stop gloating about it.’  And 
then you can see the difference in attitude. I mean we have a very good team, so we 
can joke about it, you know, in stroke you’ll have everything what they don’t have.  
So I think you’ll find that the dissatisfaction is quite apparent.’ 
Reference 113; Occupational Therapy Lead, Kenworthy hospital 
 
There is expressed resentment about the increased power and influence of stroke services 
within the hospital from other groups – most frequently articulated by therapies managers 
who have to designate staff to both stroke specialist and non-stroke areas of the hospital and 
express unease about consistently prioritising stroke at the expense of other services – for 
example another AHP manager felt uneasy about the potential knock-on effects that stroke 
specialisation might have for other non-stroke patients in the hospital. Significantly, in 
contrast to the AHP leaders’ experiences, the specialist stroke medical consultants do not face 
such conflicted remits – they bat for stroke and stroke alone – they have more staff to aid 
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them in this goal and no real need to consider care beyond the speciality of stroke. These two 
themes; namely stroke staff increases and different levels of integrated specialisation within 
and across different professional groups now discussed with a particular focus on nursing, as 
it is in nursing that the staff numbers increase most significantly, and also within nursing that 
the traditional institutional handicaps at Kenworthy hospital noted in section 7.2 are most 
prevalent. 
 
One of the key problems with stroke care diagnosed in the NHS London work was that it was 
understaffed across all professional groups. Therefore much of the increased finance for 
stroke in London was focused on increasing staff numbers: managerial, medical, nursing and 
AHP. A second important issue was to increase the specialisation of the staff tasked with 
caring for stroke patients. As detailed in the LMDS documents, the staff increases were 
connected to negotiated standards related to different elements of care which impacted 
differently on the respective various professional groups. A recurrent theme in the interviews 
with senior stroke team members at Kenworthy related to the difficulties faced in trying to 
integrate such a large number of new nurses into the unit and inculcate a stroke specialist 
ethos following the reconfigured model of care in such a short period of time. There are two 
particular issues here; firstly the lack of suitable candidates available to fill the posts; and 
secondly, the historic challenges the hospital has faced around nursing culture. 
 
The speed of the expansion of stroke care at Kenworthy caused problems in particular around 
nursing recruitment which leads to problematic issues related to recruitment per se and high 




‘[W]e've got 98 [nursing] staff on the stroke unit; we were all brought together in a 
flash, which has brought with it lots of challenges... we just over kind of accelerated 
the recruitment process because we had to get people into jobs and we are now paying 
the price for that.  But [although] it... paints a pretty grim picture; it's not that bad.  It's 
a small proportion of the staff; however, it's significant enough for me to have to make 
a change.’ 
Reference 114; Matron, Kenworthy hospital 
 
Given the short turnaround time between winning the contract to provide HASU care and 
opening the unit, and the fact that within London, the number of stroke nursing opportunities 
increased rapidly due to the reconfiguration making recruitment particularly competitive for 
hospitals, it is unsurprising that the hospital struggled to fill the posts. In response to this, the 
hospital recruited a large number of nursing staff from abroad. In order to standardise the care 
offered by the rapidly expanded nursing team, the hospital commissioned a special 
competency programme based on the London nursing standards from a local university and 
all the nurses are required to undertake the course: 
 
‘I've been very clear with [the] University is that we need something... that is kind of 
old fashioned in its approach; it's not a touchy feely academic course, all about 
reflection and that kind of stuff.  It is actually about hard facts, giving them some work 
to do, giving them the hard facts, testing their understanding of that and then, through 
a series of ward based competency assessments, assessing how those staff have been 
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able to turn all that information...  And it will happen, I'm hoping, for most of them, 
for some of them it won't... [A]s long as they are still good, caring, compassionate 
nurses, I might put them somewhere else.  They might be better suited on this rehab 
part of the unit rather than on the fast action part of the unit.  So we will find 
something to meet their skill set unless they're a disaster zone.’   
Reference 115; Matron, Kenworthy hospital 
 
There is a notable disdainful tone in much of the discussion around the competencies and 
abilities of nurses at Kenworthy from senior figures which is not replicated with reference to 
other professional groups – exemplified by the use of the term ‘disaster zone’ for example 
above – and a desire to get back to nursing basics – ‘not touchy feely stuff’ – based on ‘hard 
facts’ and ‘testing’ and increased discipline. This type of language is also used by other 
respondents and perpetuates a narrative in which nursing is seen as failing which links back 
to the historical narrative of the poor nursing culture at the hospital: 
 
‘The nursing has got a lot better, but they’re still our weakest link and we have, I mean 
it’s really difficult to know what to do about that...  Again I think there’s a difference 
between the professions.  The therapists are very self-motivated.  They will ask 
questions, they will go and look up answers, they will set up teaching groups for 
themselves, they will make themselves aware of what’s going on.  The nurses don’t 
seem to do that.  Again I may be being very nasty to the nurses, it may well be that 
they spend so much time wiping bottoms and cleaning up vomit and that sort of thing 
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that actually they don’t have the energy and that is fine, because when push comes to 
shove nobody else does that work and that’s their ultimate goal.’ 
Reference 116; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
There is a disciplinary element to the discourse used to characterise the stroke nurses work at 
Kenworthy which occasionally veers towards the disdainful. The nurses seem to suffer from 
rather disparaging attitudes from senior nursing managers and senior medical colleagues. In 
comparison to the doctors and the AHPs, there is a sense that the nursing staff are lacking of 
the agency and motivation to achieve the requisite competencies. Whilst the doctors and the 
therapists appear capable and willing of transforming their roles and practice to become more 
skilful and evidence based (increasing their professional status within the hospital in the 
meantime), there is a sentiment expressed here that the nursing staff are unwilling to push 
themselves further than the minimum to learn new skills, and indeed cannot be trusted to 
improve themselves in order to meet the required standards (so need to be disciplined into so 
doing).  
 
At Kenworthy the changes in regimes of government introduced by the reconfiguration 
programme impacted upon different professional groups in different ways. The medical 
consultants now delivering specialist stroke care have responded to their new circumstances 
by actively extending their specialist status – expressing dissatisfaction with other (non-
stroke) consultants – for example the radiologists for not increasing their respective 
responsiveness to the needs of stroke patients. They express pride in increased presenteeism 
and the benefits that daily consultant led ward rounds will have for their patients. In contrast, 
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the narrative around the development of nursing may be characterised in less successful 
terms: the historically low quality geriatrics nursing pool was rapidly expanded reflecting the 
needs of the timeframe of the reconfiguration leading to the recruitment of nurses who fail to 
share the ethos expressed elsewhere (i.e. amongst other professional groups) around evidence 
based stroke care and proactive professional development. To work within the parameters of 
the new regime of stroke care, the nurses need interventional remedies (competency training 
and close monitoring). The position of the AHPs falls somewhere between those of the 
medics and the nurses – on one hand they have the resources and staff numbers they 
previously could only dream about, and the opportunity to foster new specialist roles within 
stroke care, but on the other hand, they are under new increased levels of surveillance which 
place increased pressure on their professional group and at the same time, their managers 
come under pressure with relation to prioritising stroke above all other areas with potentially 
detrimental effects for non-stroke patients for whom they still have a professional 
responsibility. 
 
It is important to emphasise that increased regimes of measurement and management do not 
just impact upon the nursing staff – all staff face a radically augmented regime of 
accountability following the reconfiguration than they did prior to it. An increased 
management presence is represented by an amplification of protocols which cuts across 
professional lines: 
 
‘[Y]ou've got to have a standard that we work to and we measure people against.... 
you know, when you’re setting up a unit like this... [you introduce a] standard 
operational policy and then protocolise [it]’ 
295 
 
Reference 117; Matron, Kenworthy hospital 
 
‘I mean it’s just made the nurses aware of the fact that we simply are not prepared to 
accept any excuses, this has to happen.  With the thrombolysis and the targets around 
thrombolysis, we have a review meeting every month.  The nurse and the doctor who 
saw the patient are named. And if we don’t thrombolyse them within 45 minutes, we 
want to know why, ‘Give us your reasons.’’   
Reference 118; Doctor 3, Kenworthy hospital and Clinical Advisory Group 
 
As the accepted processes for all staff are re-written into local protocols which reflect the 
LMDS and then SINAP requirements it permits benchmarking of actual performance against 
ideal, agreed standards. This is important as it makes individual and team actions visible both 
within the HASU at Kenworthy and outside the hospital via ongoing audit. Standards are 
more explicit and failure is made more public – professionals have to be able to account for 
their actions in new forums within a strict framework in which senior clinical figures ‘simply 
are not prepared to accept any excuses.’   Alongside this, managerial accountability increases 
as new tiers of stroke specific management are introduced – most obviously in the shape of 
the new clinical services manager for stroke – a role which previously did not exist prior to 
the reconfiguration. 
 
The Clinical Services Manager operationally manages the stroke service as a distinct service 
and ensures that the performance targets are met, which in turn shields the Director and lead 
consultant from such a role. Secondly, she also plays an important discursive role supporting 
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staff working in the stroke service who may be managed externally (her background as a 
therapist is potentially important here). There are also new levels of nursing management 
introduced as the ward expands; the new matron (with responsibility for care of the elderly 
services, who supervises three senior nurse ward managers). There is a research nurse post 
established and the nurse led role of HASU coordinator with responsibility for repatriation 
issues and data returns. 
 
Of all the changes, perhaps the most significant is the augmented control and surveillance 
introduced by the increase in clinical performance measurement against LMDS and SINAP 
standards: 
 
 ‘I mean it’s an absolute nightmare, I have to say and I’m constantly having to spend 
money and extra money on people to input and feed the beast, which is just, well  
horrendous.’ 
Reference 119; Director, Kenworthy hospital 
 
Despite the external costs and frequent lamentations around the increased audit, there is an 
expression from professionals within the hospital that unlike other government imposed 
targets (the 4 hour A and E wait being the classic example offered), these targets are 
clinically relevant. Furthermore, because they are clinically relevant and appear to focus on 
clinical outcomes (as opposed to ‘political’ process measures), they strike a chord with a 
governance narrative for clinicians and do not face serious resistance. However, one of the 
297 
 
stroke consultants suggested that the burden is increasing beyond clinically focused data 
towards process data which adds burden to his workload and is not the best use of his time: 
 
‘[W]hat happens is we write down the time that person entered hospital from the A  
and E records, the time that person was first seen by a member of the stroke team, the 
time the person actually arrived on the ward.  So this is we’re having to put down, as 
clinicians, on the ward round, as opposed to say someone from admin being able to do 
it.’ 
Reference 120; Doctor 5, Kenworthy hospital 
 
There is a sentiment here that elements of the increased audit regime stray into bureaucratic 
overload and a focus on process recording. This highlights a distinction between ‘productive’ 
and ‘counter-productive’ elements of increased audit – where audit enables clinicians to meet 
previously troublesome (and clinically important) benchmarks then it is looked upon in 
favourable (productive) terms, but where it just the increased demands of audit fail to do this, 
it is seen in less favourable (disciplinary, or counter-productive) terms. However the 
productive power of increased audit for certain groups within a profession may in turn have 
disciplinary effects on other (less senior) colleagues. For example, one of the more junior 
doctors suggested that he and his colleagues felt under pressure from the ‘bosses’ 
(consultants) to meet targets as these data items reflected back on the consultants and led to 




‘I think there is probably a kudos to getting things done as quickly as possible. And I 
know that the consultants have quite a healthy competition with other stroke units and 
they’re constantly comparing numbers and data with say, for example, Burridge 
hospital or Deane hospital and they’re quite pleased that they’re doing more and 
they’re doing them [treating patients] quicker and so on and so forth... I think they are 
motivated by targets in terms of, you know, driven by the fact that certain percentages 
have to be seen and thrombolysed within half an hour, 45 minutes.’ 
Reference 121; Doctor 6, Kenworthy hospital 
 
There is an element of professional pride for the consultants in being seen to meet their 
targets and potentially ‘beat’ rivals - the increased visibility both inside and outside of the 
hospital acts as a productive force for ambitious consultants. This in turn leads to pressure for 
the juniors not to make errors and demonstrates increased consultant control across the 
thrombolysis process in this example. When asked about the ramifications of failure to meet a 
target this junior responded thus: 
 
‘[T]here’s frustration.  I mean lots of temper loss and – nothing quite too bad.  But 
there’s obviously frustration that things haven’t moved forward unless there is a good 
enough reason.’ 




The pressure to perform, and lack of a place to hide if and when targets are missed or 
assessments are failed arose as a strong theme amongst the informants – especially for this 
manager with exclusive managerial responsibility for the target delivery: 
 
‘I would die of shame. I mean I don’t want to overstate that, I would actually, I think, 
die of shame if we failed an assessment.  I really, I would take it very personally, you 
know, and I really do feel, I couldn’t bear it, couldn’t bear it if we missed.’ 
Reference 123; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Reference 123 offers an indication of the extent to which the surveillance process has 
permeated the subjectivity of this manager. She has ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 
the overall targets (medical, nursing and AHP) are adhered to and when I interviewed her for 
the second time above, she had just completed a highly stressful peer review audited visit led 
by network and SHA officials. She appears to have internalised the pressure manifested by 
the new audit regime. A significant insight around how such pressure may seep downwards 
within the organisation due to pressure and stress is highlighted in reference 124, along with 
an explanation around why despite the negative elements of surveillance she remains 
convinced of the necessity of the new regime: 
 
‘[T]here was a lot, it was very difficult at the beginning because the therapists were all 
crying in the corridors and saying, you know, they felt really, they felt like they were 
being watched and they were being monitored and, you know, everything they did 
was… well, yes.  Welcome to 2010 – you are being monitored, you are, you know, 
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and… my love, if you think you’re monitored and under pressure, spend an hour with 
me, you know.  It is, but I mean, I think I’ve really, I really believe it’s the right thing, 
because, you know, those standards and the evidence is there and if we were not 
being… you know, if we haven’t got…  We ought to be delivering the service to 
golden standards because it’s the right thing to do, but actually, you know, if we 
weren’t being monitored and weren’t being watched quite so closely, and it is micro 
management, you know, then I think things would slide and slip.  I mean, they just, 
they just would, you know, so…’ 
Reference 124; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Despite the pressure it causes her (reference 123), the same informant in reference 124 
suggests that this inherently discomforting force is simultaneously of productive value for her 
as a manager because without it ‘things would slide and slip’. Audit here functions then as a 
disciplinary power, and whilst she clearly dislikes some elements of it and the pressure which 
it submits her to, at the same time she is very willing to use the same pressure on 
subordinates in order to achieve the mandated goals of the new regime of government. Her 
senior nursing colleague agreed that despite being critical of elements of the ‘bloated’ audit 
regime, it is necessary because it ‘pushes’ them to improve care. So the disciplinary, 
pressurised nature of increased surveillance can be channelled in productive ways by 
managers in order to improve practice. This is particularly so with respect to nursing at 
Kenworthy. These data consistently show how respondents highlight the ways in which the 
external audit demands allow them to monitor the competence of the nursing staff locally. 
There has been a cultural shift focused on increasing the detail of documentation that the 




‘When we first came, [the documentation would state] ‘I went to see a patient, assess 
patient. They need to be thrombolysed.’  That was about all you got, two lines across 
the notes.  Now it’s, ‘I went to see the patient, did an HSS, I did an assessment, did a 
CT scan, decided in discussion with the consultant, the decision was this, the decision 
was that, transferred to the unit.’  And you’ve actually now got a history of what was 
actually done, which was much, much better.’ 
Reference 125; Ward manager 2 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
  
There is a strong sense expressed by both senior nursing and medical figures that a key tool 
allied with external audit lies around making the nurses responsible, accountable and 
identifiable for their actions and potential failings. This in turn appears to be internalised by 
the nurses and their managers: 
 
‘I have to make sure that I work together with the managers to make sure wherever we 
are failing as nurses, it has to come out.’ 
Reference 126; HASU coordinator (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
Clearly then, an important element in challenging the cited historic weaknesses in nursing 
care at Kenworthy has been the increasingly stringent audit regime – making practice – both 
successful and unsuccessful – more visible to all and open to increased control. However, the 
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position and experience of AHPs is different. Many therapists expressed a sense of 
dislocation around the metrics used to measure their performance: 
 
‘How many of these patients, on which days are the patients appropriate for 45 
minutes [of therapy]? So if the patient is unconscious or is unwell because if they have 
infection the patient isn’t appropriate, right.  So a patient’s there [on the SU] for a 
month and for ten days he was unwell or five days he was unwell, we didn’t give that 
therapy because he was medically so unwell or for whatever reason... So, in fact, 
occupational therapists, we worked very hard, it was extremely stressful, but there are 
problems with this when this 45 minutes end, their expectations.  Some of them are, 
you know, we felt that it was a bit too much, because in fact according to our 
calculations we did 90% but on the Sentinel, it came out at 57 or 53, I forget, it was a 
huge disappointment that was, but you know that you’ve done the right thing.’ 
Reference 127; Occupational Therapy Lead, Kenworthy hospital 
 
Formal audit, as part of the new regime of stroke care focuses more heavily on medical and 
nursing interventions than it does on therapists’ work. However, the two main criteria which 
are focused upon in audit terms (45 minutes of rehabilitation per day, and recording of an 
AHP assessment within the first 72 hours) are both problematic for AHPs. Firstly, it was 
suggested that there was no strong evidence base to specifically demonstrate that 45 minutes 
daily rehabilitation is beneficial. And secondly, the 72 hour therapies assessment target leaves 
little discretion for the AHPs in interpreting it and allowing for patient co-morbidities for 
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example. Nevertheless, the AHPs at Kenworthy expressed a commitment to increasing their 
commitment to evidence based working. 
 
Perceptions of what evidence based practice is and what an evidence based practitioner might 
be are simultaneously shaped by the wider (educational and professional) discourse in which 
practitioners are exposed to dominant trends and disciplined into becoming certain 
professional types (Lambert, 2006). In turn, this exposure via dominant educational 
paradigms may lead to promulgation of the discourse to subordinates, or juniors: 
 
‘Basically since I started my MSc it’s kind of opened up my mind that how much we 
do not use evidence in therapy. And we read about it all the time, you know, we attend 
journal clubs and things, but no one actually ever thinks of how to practically apply it 
in the setting.  And that is one of the things that I actually kind of learned from my 
research, being at university, is how we should be applying this knowledge that we are 
getting...  And so I’ve been trying to promote evidence based practice since – I think 
it’s kind of, and so being in a senior position kind of allows me to kind of do a lot of 
training with the junior therapists.’ 
Reference 128; Occupational Therapist, Kenworthy hospital 
 
The evidence based episteme appears to be dominant in education strategies applied to 
modern health care training – this transcends just medicine and includes therapies and 
nursing. Exposure to this episteme during training and promotion of them to the next 
generation is linked to how health care professionals on the HASU discursively develop their 
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subjectivities as stroke specialists. Respondents describe an educative framework in which 
they (as seniors) inculcate juniors within the dominant Discourse. The respondent above has 
the agency to make such decisions as to whether or not to promote evidence based care – she 
is free to decide how to direct her practice - but she sees part of her role as a senior as being a 
proponent of evidence based care. There is also a coercive element to this discourse, but 
coercion is justified because evidence based actions, standards and guidelines are there to 
protect patients – highlighted by the following quotes: 
 
‘It’s, first and foremost I think it’s the patient care and safety.  And also they are 
standards that are set within the stroke network which have to be met.  So according to 
these standards we are also actually being assessed according to the evidence that has 
been given that – so if you don’t meet, if you don’t practice evidence based 
treatments, you’re bound to fail on your standards, so it brings down the whole, the 
Trust as a whole.   So I think those are the motivations’. 
Reference 129; HASU coordinator (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
‘So you don’t want it to be ruined by people just coming in and doing what they like’.  
Reference 130; Ward manager 1 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
Open dissension towards guidelines and surveillance is difficult if such managerial tools are 
explicitly understood as protecting patients – resistance, or counter-conducts (Foucault, 2007) 
then becomes ethically questionable. Furthermore, the network link with guidelines adds 
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local and regional credibility to the new regimes of government and practice, and finally, the 
implicit idea that failure will ‘bring down the Trust’ in some way, adds a further pressure to 
conform.  
 
Professionals at Kenworthy express a desire for discipline (from themselves and colleagues) 
in order to meet imposed goals as highlighted below. The digitally delivered and data heavy 
requirements of audit lead to a performative disciplinary framework (Spicer et al, 2009) 
centred on professional reflexive action: 
 
‘It’s our professionalism and we also need to feed back to the Department of Health 
the things we’re actually doing.  So we’re actually achieving governance within our 
own unit.  We’re actually monitoring ourselves, we’re actually achieving targets, and 
we’re quite open if we’re not achieving, and what we actually do to change.  You can 
have eight very good weeks or something and then very bad week. So what happened 
in that bad week?  How do we tackle that week?  How we are doing and prove what 
we’re doing and it’s about developing ourselves.’ 
Reference 131; Ward manager 2 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
The increased audit regime heralded by the reconfiguration (where previously there was ‘a 
sea of vagueness’ around stroke care performance) points towards a colonising effect (Power 
1999) whereby the practices and goals of the audit regime are internalised by (some) staff. In 
reference 131 above, part of the desire to follow guidelines and feed them back to the centre 
is emoted as a manifestation of ‘our professionalism.’ This indicates a form of reflexive, 
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disciplined professionalism aligned to a specific shared episteme of modern stroke care. 
Frequently the ethical attachment to the importance of evidence based practice is deep and 
seemingly heartfelt, as presented below: 
 
‘[W]hen I’m using something that is evidence based, I’m confident and proud of 
myself that whatever I’m giving for my patient at that point in time, as long as I know 
that’s the right thing to do for my patient and that I’m giving them the better care 
possible.’ 
Reference 132; Stroke research nurse, Kenworthy hospital 
 
This ethical commitment to the values of evidence based care demonstrated by most 
respondents at Kenworthy may be used by general and professional managers to ensure that 
standards are adhered to – thus making such ‘ethical subjects’ either more susceptible to 
managerial coercion, or less dependent upon the need for it. This is not to say that through 
these data respondents do not reflect on the nature of the evidence behind guidelines critically 
(‘guidelines not tramlines’ - is a term used by one senior consultant to demonstrate his 
appreciation of this) and the difference between politically and clinically motivated targets, 
more critical voices tend to emanate from more senior figures – it is those lower down the 
hierarchy who may come under greater stress from the increased and visible performative 
nature of the new stroke care regime. The pressure to perform, and to be seen to perform is 
high in the new stroke service. Transparency of data aligned with personal pride disciplines 
performance at the apex of the stroke service in the hospital and the pressure is felt lower 
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down – for example a senior nurse leader talks of the need for juniors to ‘buck up or get out’ 
and a SLT suggests that failing to meet the guidelines is not an option: 
 
‘I think it’s because it’s from high up, you know, we’ve got a very high supportive 
like management high up.  But then saying that, because we have such high – the 
management have such high visions; it can cause stress lower down.’   
Reference 133; Dietician, Kenworthy hospital 
 
There is a ‘hard’ management style discernable at the Kenworthy stroke service, committed to 
achieving the agreed standards and staff are not free to fail to meet the guidelines – the 
regimes of government heralded by the reconfiguration emphasise increased performativity 
and calculability for doctors, nurses, AHPs and stroke service managers. So the values of 
evidence based stroke care are embedded in the staff working in the Kenworthy stroke unit. 
Evidence based health care as manifested as the new stroke episteme is represented as a 
disciplinary force with both productive and repressive power, yet resistance to the new 
regime is seemingly low despite the pressure on staff to perform being clearly greater than 
prior to the reconfiguration. This challenges concepts of clinical autonomy: 
 
‘I think people will talk to you about, you know, are you allowed to have autonomy to 
do things badly?  And that’s ultimately the bottom line, is do you allow people to give 
suboptimal treatment? And I think what we’ve established is, no you’re not allowed to 
give suboptimal treatment.’   
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Reference 134; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
This is an interesting quote because it presents the view of one of the senior clinical decision 
makers of the London programme for reform highlighting the problems with traditional 
conceptions of clinical autonomy. Essentially, if autonomy means freedom to deviate from 
the agreed episteme of stroke care delivery – then such autonomy following the 
reconfiguration has become unacceptable. The concept of autonomy here is shown to be 
rather subjective and linked to professional value judgements explicitly emphasising the 
importance of patient care whilst implicitly highlighting the new control of senior 
professionals over their colleagues. It is important to reflect on the fact that prior to these 
changes, the staff had little power or autonomy to achieve gains for their patients due to 
structural and organisational barriers. Indeed: 
 
‘I won’t say that I’ve lost that autonomy because I’ve never ever had that time.  You 
see.  I was one and a half for 23 patients.’ 
Reference 135; Occupational Therapy Lead, Kenworthy hospital 
 
‘I really can’t make any excuses now because the resources are... there now.’   
Reference 136; Ward manager 1 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
Autonomy is a relative concept dependent upon structural and institutional factors impacting 
on the situated agency of actors.  It is linked to ethical, professional values around local 
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discourses of patient safety and best care. How (and by whom) EBHC is defined in relation to 
the question of autonomy is significant – these data suggest that it is a complex and 
contradictory relationship which can shift dynamically amongst different professional and 
managerial groups – but that traditional control versus resistance (Numerato et al, 2011) 
narratives are very much open to question. The changes at Kenworthy as a result of the 
reconfiguration can only be understood in the context of what went before. These changes are 
multi-factoral and highly complex, but it is apparent that both clinical and managerial staff do 
appear to face new challenges to those they previously encountered; which has impacted on 
their subjectivities in sometimes contradictory ways.  
 
Having focused closely on change at Kenworthy so far in this chapter, the final section 
reviews the role of the stroke networks in the implementation and functioning of the 
reconfigured stroke service in London. 
 
7.4 Section 3: Network governance 
 
The National Stroke Strategy of 2007 (DH, 2007) recommended the extension of the existing 
local cardiac networks into stroke care. In London there were five sector specific stroke 
networks responsible for distinct geographical areas. The aim of the networks was to improve 
and standardise care across all providers within each network through local collaboration and 
sharing of best practice. The literature produced as part of the reconfiguration process 
emphasised their ‘neutrality’ as an ‘unbiased’ link between commissioners, clinicians, 
managers and patients (NHS London, 2008a; 2008b); focused on increasing the speed of 
improvement of care for patients. They were dedicated to the ‘development of strategy, 
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clinical and service user engagement, pathway development, brokering and facilitation, 
transforming evidence into practice, driving improvement through benchmarking and 
performance monitoring and developing service specifications’ (NHS London, 2008a).  The 
three network Directors interviewed were full time managers with backgrounds in health care 
as therapists/nurses, other network staff interviewed had non-clinical backgrounds. The roles 
of the networks expanded in the roll out of the new regime of practice and included close 
monitoring of the performances of their local trusts against LMDS and SINAP criteria.   
 
Numerous informants emphasised the importance of the five sector specific Stroke Networks 
in the implementation of the London model of reconfigured stroke services. The networks 
were funded by the Department of Health and local commissioners and held no institutional 
alliance to any providers and thus had an independent status which was useful in terms of 
legitimacy, but also they held no line management responsibilities over provider staff which 
meant that their influence had to come through collaboration, discursive influence and 
negotiation: 
 
‘If somebody asks me what my job is, external to the health service, I say I do 
arbitration, facilitation and negotiation.  Not necessarily in that particular order.  But I 
would say, rather than a buffer, we are actually the conduit, we bring everybody 
together.  So we provide the commissioning viewpoint and expertise to the clinicians 
and we provide the clinical expertise to inform commissioning.  And I think that’s 
critical.  We’re the ones who put them all in the same room.’ 




There is an assumption that commissioners and providers have inadequate knowledge of the 
roles played by each other and that therefore the networks were established to mitigate 
against these disparities in knowledge (Rhodes, 1997). This also functions at a Trust to Trust 
level as peer reviews are carried out by clinicians from neighbouring hospitals which 
elucidates best practice and common problems. However, from senior managers suspicion 
was expressed around what a ‘network’ is and does: 
 
‘I think the worst side of networks, which is, ‘Oh let’s all get into a nice cosy group 
where we all do things together and we’ll call ourselves a network because then we 
might get away with the fact that we can’t stand each other’s guts, because we never 
have been able to and now we can’t still.’  That’s not what that was about, because 
this was quite a focused piece of work, that where they went into the units before they 
were allowed to go live, before they got their money, was not, was not, was hard 
edged. So I think the strength of it comes through, through – the words I would use is, 
aren’t ‘networks,’ but it’s  about peer support and peer review rather than the different 
connotations with the word ‘networks’... That clinical leadership, peer review and peer 
support is the thing that’s driven the standards and I think that’s tremendously 
powerful because we always compare ourselves first with our peers. And that’s the 
thing. And that the networks provided some facility and supportive infrastructure to 
enable that to happen.’ 




This quote is worthy of detailed analysis for a number reasons. Firstly the description of a 
‘nice, cosy group’ hints at a disdain for the discursive non-hierarchical nature of this form of 
governance within the NHS which departs significantly from the command and control form 
of management espoused by this and other senior SHA managers elsewhere within the 
interview data. There is an indication that this manager views a certain traditional concept of 
network governance in rather negative terms and furthermore disingenuous as it is an attempt 
to conceal the fact that ‘we can’t stand each other’s guts’. This suggestion points to deep 
seated and long-term competition between local NHS organisations and mistrust which 
marginalises the ability to collaborate. The role of the networks emerged in a majority of 
interviews carried out for the thesis - usually focused on the implementation phase of the 
reconfigured stroke service model – but this manager is the only informant to offer such a 
critical standpoint about the ‘softness’ of networks as a governance technique and also to 
emphasise the traditional enmity between some NHS providers. Finally it is notable that she 
suggests it was the ‘hard edged nature’ of the stroke reforms that enabled the networks to 
escape such a negative fate and ensured that a competitive, comparative element of peer 
review was built into the constitution of the stroke network’s remit. This does not correlate 
with the views of other respondents – in particular those running the networks. The network 
Directors themselves downplayed the ‘hard edged nature’ of their roles and emphasised the 
ways they used ‘soft skills’ to influence high profile hospital Chief Executives over whom 
they possessed no authority: 
 
‘And my message to Stancliffe hospital’s CEO was, ‘This is going to be really 
embarrassing for Stancliffe hospital if you’re the only HASU that isn’t able to open on 
the dates that it was agreed that you would be open.’ And he said to me, ‘So we are 
the only HASU, are we?  I’d heard,’ he said, ‘I’d heard a rumour that Wilder hospital 
313 
 
were struggling as well.’  And I said, ‘Yes you’re right, they are struggling but they 
are opening beds and you will be the only [one not to open].’  And he said, ’Well you 
need to come and see me on Monday.’  I went to see him on Monday; we talked it 
through, the HASU beds were opened 1st February. And, you know, but it’s 
interesting isn’t it, that as an organisation, I have no statutory authority over anybody. 
And yet I can phone up any of the chief execs within my patches. And I get into see 
them within a week, which I think is quite interesting, and that shows the influence, I 
think, the networks have.’ 
Reference 138; Network Director 1 
 
This network director expresses slight incredulity at the extent of her influence over 
hierarchically powerful teaching hospital CEOs. This reference is particularly revealing as it 
demonstrates how there is a competitive element built into the nominally collaborative ethos 
of network working – opening up performance across networks of affiliated trusts again 
increases transparency and accountability. Alongside this there is also the potentially shaming 
element of being recognised as performing below the accepted grade of your peers for the 
corporate outlook of the trust. 
 
At the HASU level, the networks facilitated practical staff development initiatives which 
fostered collective learning: 
 
‘We also then had closer working relationships with the other HASUs which was 
never there before; every hospital was sort of independent.  But we now meet monthly 
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with the other HASUs and we’ve actually put together a competency pack for all the 
staff to be developed on.’ 
Reference 139; Ward manager 2 (and nurse), Kenworthy hospital 
 
Again this facilitates the standardisation agenda at the heart of the London model and 
demonstrates the practical benefits of network governance to staff tasked with implementing 
the reforms. For staff such as the ward manager above, the influence of the networks is 
essentially positive in enabling him to collaborate with peers from other sites and increase 
staff competences. His manager, in the following quotes explains how she uses the rhetorical 
power of the network to push her own agenda: 
 
Informant:  ‘I mean what’s been, what’s been really helpful for me is the, I can 
kind of use the network like the bogey man, and I certainly do that with, more with 
seniors to me than juniors.  So I will... 
 
Interviewer:  So in terms of defending your staff ratio... 
 
Informant:  Oh absolutely. 
 




Informant:  You know, ‘I’d love to help you, love to give up some nurses, I just 
can’t get it past the network.’ And I’m quite shameless about that.’ 
Reference 140; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
In keeping with the increased audit regimes, an important focus for the organisational 
pressure which the Networks bring to bear is centred on Trust management by constraining 
the abilities of non-stroke specialist managers to remove stroke specific manpower resources. 
In this sense the pressure is not aimed at the clinical staff based on the HASU. The power of 
surveillance added to ‘soft’ negotiating skills (and the rhetorical threat of tariff payments 
being withheld) is employed to pressurise senior managers to dedicate sufficient resources to 
stroke care. In this way the Networks are mobilised and perceived as supportive partners by 
patient facing staff, and enable local stroke specific managers to portray them as ‘bogey men’ 
to senior general managers. The surveillance they offer is thus interpreted as a productive 
force. This is now explored in more depth. 
 
A striking element of the ethos of improvement through standardisation in these data is the 
seemingly paradoxical sense of increased freedom for clinical practice emerging via 
increased control of organisational systems. At the centre of the stroke reforms existed a 
powerful SHA executive team with direct line management over very senior staff (i.e. CEOs, 
Clinical Directors, Financial Directors) at all London PCTs and all (non-FT) NHS hospitals, 
and good links with the senior teams at the London FTs. This affords the executive team 




‘So your objectives for the year, every chief executive in London and every director 
here, I want to see where your contribution to taking these things forward figures in 
the top three things on your priorities.  So don’t tell me that because you’re, I don’t 
know, working field ABC, you don’t therefore have to have a, you know, so just 
because you’re a finance director doesn’t mean that you, this should be at the top of 
your list.  How are you, as a finance director, developing the stroke tariff in London?  
It should be at the top of your list just like you’re the chief nurse. What are you doing 
about the recruitment of specialist stroke nurses in London?  You know, if you’re the 
director of operations, what are you doing about making sure that there’s an operating 
environment that will support these changes?’  So those were the – I insisted on those 
being at the top of everybody’s objectives. And therefore, when their appraisal was 
done, if they hadn’t done it, then they wouldn’t get a good grading.’ 
Reference 141; SHA Manager 1 
 
So this senior SHA manager has great power to shape the context (Grint, 2005) in which 
stroke care is prioritised by senior hospital and commissioning management across the city. 
This may be achieved by the threat of punitive action – poor appraisal means a poor grading 
which in turn means a loss of bonus and/or reduced prospects for further promotion. This is 
not the ‘cosy chats’ of the Networks amongst local clinicians and managers – rather it is 
strong, clear ‘top down’ management of senior managers in order to brush away 
organisational barriers to implementation. Being senior within the SHA, she can set the 
strategic goals for the city and rely on the Clinical Director (for stroke) to manage the clinical 
or professional elements of change. The fact that the (now) Clinical Director for stroke in the 




Informant:  ‘I think weirdly, I mean in the early days of the stroke project, [the 
Clinical Director for the city] was very pro maintaining it at Burridge hospital, very 
pro, and understandably, it was his unit, it was the highest performing unit in London, 
why would you want to shut it, you know. He was very sceptical about the access, 
very sceptical about Arnott hospital.  So when he was appointed to the job, before we 
confirmed the job, I saw him and said, ‘If you’re going to do this job, you’ve got to 
not, you’ve got to forget about keeping Burridge hospital [HASU open],’ and he’d 
come round to the view that the right thing to do was take forward the eight.   
 
Interviewer:  And in terms of the credibility then? 
 
Informant:  Then it’s fantastic, because then if anyone wants to say, ‘Well I 
don’t like this because I’m losing my singlehanded neurologist from Nether Wallop 
DGH,’ wherever it is, he says, ‘You want to share your pain with me, my friend?  I’ve 
just had to preside over the closure of the best unit in London, so what’s your 
problem?’’    
Reference 142, SHA Manager 1 
 
These two leaders collaborated to use their different positions, power bases and respective 
credibility to further the goals of the reconfiguration within their different (and crucial) peer 
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groups displaying impressive political awareness. The Clinical Director is responsible for 
reviewing the Pan-London Audit SINAP data: 
 
‘[The Clinical Director] asks for a copy of the full report for every provider, for each 
quarter, which I think is like – a bit mind-blowing. NHS London see it at a London 
level.  So what we do is, we consolidate the performance of all of the providers into 
one pathway, we report the model as a model.  So we say London’s hitting this 
marker, London is hitting this.  And we add everybody together.’   
Reference 143; Network Project Manager 3 
 
He effectively performs the role of a kind of clinical panopticon for stroke services and feeds 
the performance data back to the SHA and PCTs highlighting a hybrid professional and 
managerial form of identity: 
 
‘I think everybody worked together as a group and I think the [clinical/managerial] 
differences in where we come from were not relevant really’ 
Reference 144; Doctor 1, Clinical Expert Panel 
 
Both the strategic and clinical (or management and professional) leadership teams shared a 
commitment to improvement through standardisation based on a central belief in the value of 
measurement of organisational and clinical processes and outcomes. This was built around 
the increased surveillance regimes and data collection. However, the dictatorial ethos 
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expressed in reference 141 (relating to the management of managers by managers) implied by 
increased control is not replicated for professional staff – interestingly – as described at 
Kenworthy – the new framework of the London model in which professional staff find 
themselves operating, though much more standardised, protocol driven and generative of 
mountains of audit data is perceived in productive, or even ‘liberatory’ rather than 
disciplinary terms: 
 
‘I saw [a stroke consultant] months back now and he’d just had his week on call in a 
HASU, and he said it’s absolutely fantastic, because the whole, all the systems, all the 
processes, all the staff are in there, ‘And I go in and I do my doctoring bit. That’s all I 
have to do, because the rest of it works.’ So he felt it was a freeing up to enable him to 
be a really good doctor as opposed to the senior person around having to worry about 
everything.  So I guess, I guess it depends a little bit on what you – so, for [Doctor 1], 
who’s grown his unit over years, you can see how he might feel that some of that 
responsibility and accountability is taken away.  But for people who always felt that 
was a burden as opposed to a privilege, it’s very, very liberating for them... But it’s 
really interesting about increased surveillance implies that other people are doing it to 
them as opposed to people own it for themselves.’  
Reference 145; SHA Manager 2  
 
‘[I]n some ways [I feel my autonomy is] augmented [by the stroke reforms], because I 
have the authority of the Trust to basically drive through things that I feel are urgent, 
urgently.  So I suppose if you didn’t agree with it, I suppose my autonomy is 
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threatened by the four hour [A and E Target] wait, but it’s probably not threatened by 
[the stroke reforms], but that’s because this aligns with our clinical priorities, whereas 
the other thing doesn’t.’   
Reference 146; Doctor 6, Kenworthy hospital 
 
References 145 and 146 express very effectively how increased control over organisational 
systems which previously were beyond the remit of clinical staff ‘calms the water’ through 
which they operate and increases their ability to perform their roles to new high standards. 
This is ethically rewarding and represents the fulfilment of desire for these clinicians rather 
than an external imposition of discipline. As the manager who delivers reference 145 
concludes – where those operating within increased systems of surveillance feel they ‘own’ 
the data used to survey themselves, regimes of audit and surveillance may become  practices 
of freedom rather than domination – in Foucauldian terms, discipline may be reconsidered ‘as 
the price we have to pay for realising desire’ (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998, p237). 
 
This goes to the heart of why such burdensome audit has such acceptance and support from 
some clinical staff. The following exchange with a Network representative is revealing of the 
ethos behind the increased surveillance regime: 
 
Informant:  ‘If someone’s been flagged against a performance marker [i.e. a 
hospital is performing poorly], we’d look firstly at the volume of patients.  If it’s only 
four patients and one of them is not missed, it’s very difficult to performance manage 




Interviewer:  This is quite interesting, the language, ‘performance manage a 
Trust,’ do you see it that way rather than ‘performance managing clinicians’? 
 
Informant:  It’s definitely a Trust approach, I think... Because it depends on 
what measure you’re talking about.  And mainly because the clinicians and the clinical 
teams want to meet the performance measures.  So if there’s a barrier to meeting them, 
it probably hasn’t come from [the clinicians]’ 
Reference 147; Network Project Manager 3 
 
The primary subject of surveillance is the organisation rather than the clinical stroke team. 
For this reason the increase in the disciplinary nature of the reconfigured regime of practice 
for stroke care is designed to enable the clinical staff to provide excellent care for patients – 
hence there is little clinical resistance to increased managerial control. The second key issue 
which mitigates the perception of control is the freedom to innovate locally within the pan-
London disciplinary framework:  
 
‘Well it’s [the model] very, very restrictive, which I think is a good thing in terms of 
these are the performance standards.  There’s no negotiation, there’s nothing to talk 
about, there’s no room for manoeuvre, which is brilliant. I mean I probably, I’m the 
sort of person who likes a bit of structure within which I can then innovate... But, so 
things like we have to deliver thrombolysis within 30 minutes.  How we do that is up 
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to us, down to the things like every patient leaving the ward has got to have a joint 
health and social care discharge plan.  You know, how we did it, how we organised it, 
what it looked like, was entirely something we could create.’ 
Reference 148; Clinical Services Manager for stroke, Kenworthy Hospital 
 
Therefore there is a creative element to the model for some clinical staff – they ‘own’ 
processes and can innovate and develop their knowledge and competencies at the local level 
– they have the requisite ‘space of action’ (Daudi, 1986; Fairhurst, 2009) in which to ‘enact’ 
(Mykhalovskiy, 2003; Ferlie and Fitzgerald, 2005) the extensive new evidence based 
protocols whilst their involvement in increased data collection subjects their organisation to 




The chapter discussed the impacts of the implementation of the new regimes of government 
linked to the stroke reconfiguration programme at Kenworthy hospital. It was important to do 
this so that a picture of micro-level implementation could be aligned with the macro-level 
data collected as part of the thesis. The importance of a historicist (Bevir, 2010) approach 
was emphasised which highlighted the traditional comparative weaknesses of nursing and 
strengths of AHP and medical care delivery in stroke care at the hospital. An interesting 
finding was the impact that the HASU upgrade had through increasing the profile and 
importance of stroke care and by implication the jurisdictional power of the stroke care team 




The impacts of rapid increases in staff specialising in stroke care at Kenworthy were then 
discussed and the ways in which the ‘project of stroke specialisation’ for different staff 
groups impacted in different ways upon nurses, AHPs and doctors. Resistance to the new 
regimes of practice (Dean, 2010) was shown to be difficult (Newman, 2001). This was 
closely aligned to the increased regimes of management and measurement (Ferlie et al, 1996; 
Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003) which had disciplinary and ethical impacts on staff through 
the imposition of expressedly evidence based guidelines and targets. The chapter 
demonstrated how the goals of senior clinicians and senior strategic managers coalesced – 
both communities internalising the importance of measuring both clinical and organisational 
performance and holding hospital management to account. Thus increased surveillance – 
transcending management ideology and becoming central to professional practice, whilst 
potentially having negative impacts for lower status staff (Anthony, 1977) could 
simultaneously be presented  as a productive force rather than merely a disciplinary one 
(Brown and Lewis, 2009; Iedema and Rhodes, 2010) for members of the new specialist 
stroke team. This led to a discussion around the changing understanding of clinical autonomy 
for medical professional (Freidson, 2001; Armstrong, 2002; Timmermans and Berg, 2003) 
working under evidence based protocols. 
 
Finally the key roles played by the stroke networks were discussed in relation to the effective 
implementation of the reconfigured stroke model for London. The ‘soft power’ of the 
network directors was noted – they utilised ‘peer-pressure’ and indirect governance 
techniques – nevertheless this coexisted with the top-down ‘hard power’ of the senior SHA 
management team which did have a strong level of control over senior managers at the Trusts 
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and PCTs – this highlights the complexity of New Labour governance arrangements (Rhodes, 
2007; Pollitt, 2013) and the ways in which different ways of ‘governing’ may be coterminous 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Newman, 2001). It was shown how Trust level management 
was able to reflexively use the network as a ‘bogeyman’ to further the jurisdictional claims of 
stroke care within Kenworthy (Abbott, 1988) and the importance of the legitimacy of the 
clinical director in aiding the work of the network. 
 
These points will be explored further in the next chapter which offers a more comprehensive 















The central aim of this thesis as set out in the introductory chapter is to provide answers to 
this research question:  
 
What was the role played by evidence in the reconfiguration of stroke services in London? 
 
The aim of this discussion chapter is to draw on the data collected for the thesis in 
conjunction with reviewed literature to respond to this research question and extend empirical 
and theoretical understanding. The data collected for this thesis highlight that clinical 
evidence of and for practice were central to the development of a new framework of 
understanding, or episteme of stroke care in London. The operationalisation of the new 
episteme was an important factor in the implementation of the reformed regimes of 
government (Dean, 2010) of stroke care in London and influenced a significant part of both 
professional and management discourse and collective decision-making through the process 




This process may be broken down into three stages for analytic clarity. This is reflected by 
the narrative logic of the three empirical chapters and the sections of this chapter. The first 
stage drew upon clinical evidence in the form of international and national audit and registry 
data and academic studies – this framed perceptions of the problem of stroke care in London 
and the potentiality of solutions. Section one of this chapter focuses on the key role of 
professionals and clinical evidence in shaping the new episteme of stroke care in the capital. 
It also includes a discussion around the theoretical implications of considering service 
reconfiguration in biopolitical (Foucault, 2007) terms. It draws primarily on documentary 
data and key informant interviews to do so.  
 
The second stage of the reform programme drew on organisational metrics (both clinical and 
managerial) about current and future potentialities to show how different institutions could 
meet the criteria of the new episteme. Section two of this chapter examines how management 
control over stroke care in London was increased as part of the reconfiguration process by 
opening up stroke care to a central organising gaze in new ways. It explores the complex 
relationship amongst managers and professionals and how this might best be understood.  It 
draws on interview and observational data as well as NHS London documentary data to do 
this.  
 
The third stage of the reform programme relied upon ongoing LMDS and subsequent SINAP 
data to measure performance of providers against the agreed requisites of the new episteme. 
The third section of this chapter then discusses how the reframed episteme and new 
management techniques - based on principles of specialisation and standardisation of stroke 
care - impacted on staff subjectivities at the pan-London and hospital unit level. This section 
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8.2 Section 1: The role of evidence: increasing control through a reframed 
episteme 
 
The drive to regularise the frame of reference through which stroke (as a condition) was (re)-
conceived by patients, professionals, politicians and managers drawing on particular and 
specific’ encoded knowledge’ (Flynn, 2002) had the effect of reifying stroke into a specialist 
emergency condition with strict standardised protocols throughout the city.  In this way the 
London stroke reforms may be seen to demonstrate elements of EBHC as a power/knowledge 
nexus. A power/knowledge nexus is an ‘ensemble of institutions, associated knowledge 
bases, techniques and practices’ (Ferlie et al, 2011) which influence regimes of government 
and practice (Dean, 2010). EBHC represents a new manifestation of power/knowledge which 
may be seen to shape clinical practice and impact upon management techniques in specific 
ways (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005). Whilst the concept of EBHC as a power/knowledge 
nexus has been explored at a macro-level (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008; Ferlie and McGivern, 
2013) its impact and functionality remains relatively unexplored at meso- and micro-levels. 
 
An advantage of the present study is that it tracks the roles played by leading stroke 
professionals, boosted by international networks which placed them central to the epistemic 
community of stroke specialists. In effect, the data collected for this thesis permits an analysis 
of the power/knowledge nexus in action in a specific time and place – from problematisation 
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to delivery. A number of the key informants interviewed for this thesis were senior London 
based stroke clinicians involved not only in advising Professor Darzi on stroke for his initial 
review, but also in planning, developing, implementing and monitoring the delivery of the 
reconfiguration. These professionals – closely involved with the Clinical Expert Panel and 
subsequent pan-London Stroke CAG represented a specific ‘community of practice’ 
(Wenger, 1998; Ferlie and Dopson, 2005). Prior to and in conjunction with this, many of 
them had been involved in the production of internationally significant research, as well as 
work of the stroke specific audit work of the RCP, and guideline production via NICE. 
 
The section below begins by considering the mobilisation of evidence for practice; then the 
use of evidence of practice in the construction of the new stroke episteme in London and the 
development of the new power/knowledge nexus in the capital. 
 
Evidence for practice 
 
Evidence for practice includes published, academic studies with high credibility such as 
RCTs, systematic reviews, and other protocolised guidelines emanating from professional 
bodies such as the RCP, the Department for Health, or quasi-governmental bodies such as 
NICE (2007). It also includes localised and regional guidelines which adapt these – for 
example alongside the London Minimum Data Set. These sources of data prescribe best 




In the first stage of the reconfiguration the role of clinical evidence in the form of 
international and national audit and registry data and stroke research findings were central. 
These were used to legitimate the reification of stroke as an emergency condition which can 
be successfully treated – but all too often historically was not (see references 5, 6, and figures 
4, 5, 6). This type of evidence was crucial to the reconfiguration because it enabled the 
establishment of a well-defined, professionally mandated understanding of a specific 
episteme for stroke care in the capital. This use of epidemiological knowledge effectively 
strengthened professional values (Numerato et al, 2011). Allied to this, RCP stroke audit data 
was used to highlight national and regional variations in care to show the failure of 
standardisation efforts, and patient and carer narratives were given prominence (NHS 
London, 2007; 2008b).  
 
The use of such techniques to shape policy resonate with the findings of Ferlie and McGivern 
(2013) in their exploration of NICE’s work as part of a power/knowledge nexus in that we 
see a bounded pluralism, use of international research networks and dominance of leading 
professionals. There is also recourse to an ‘inspirational rationale’ or ethical imperative for 
professionals to achieve evidence based care and a commitment to ‘transparency’ (Pickard, 
2009) in methods used to achieve this (Ferlie et al, 2011). Together, the Framework for 
Action and the Acute Stroke Strategy for London (NHS London, 2007) publications utilised 
evidence from clinical research allied with both and professional and public feedback to 
problematise (Dean, 2010) stroke care in London in a specific way. This highlighted the 
potentialities of highly technologically advanced medical interventions (for example, 
thrombolysis) and targeted the traditional barriers of poor hospital organisation and 




Moreover, the clinical authorship of these documents was heavily emphasised so that the 
(appearance at least of the) problematisation of stroke care inadequacies in London became 
one of professional expertise rather than political or managerial decision making in contrast 
to both the Tomlinson and Turnberg Reports (see the first section of chapter V). In this way, 
the perceptions of the problems that hindered effective stroke care and the prospective 
solutions were tightly managed and closely controlled within a specialist, professional 
discourse (Weiss et al, 2007). There was no talk of financial rationalisation, or the need for 
mergers in contrast to the text taken from the Tomlinson and Turnberg Reports respectively 
(see references 1 and 2). Rather the language used in the health care for London literature 
was more centrally fixated upon  a form of Discourse that emphasised the  importance of 
clinical evidence (and implicitly, a form of rationality compatible to both professional and 
managerial stakeholders)and the pursuit of excellence (for all) – expressed by the recourse to 
phrases such as ‘World Class Care’ (Darzi, 2007). This is in contrast to other reconfiguration 
processes which are precipitated through an explicit desire to reduce costs (McKee and 
Healy, 2002; Brown, 2003; Parkinson, 2003).There was an ethical commitment to tackle 
health inequalities alongside promises of economic efficiency in biopolitical (Foucault, 2007) 
terms – combining claims to both moral and cognitive legitimacy (Oborn, 2008).  
 
This evidence based Discourse posited a dual economic and ethical rationality (Ten Have, 
2000), marrying both neoliberal and social concerns. EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus 
thus offered a ‘subjectifying logic’ (Martin et al, 2013) which utilised managerial (economic) 
rationality and professional (ethical) values and emphasised their compatibility (Southon, 
1994; Numerato et al, 2011). It had a rhetorical power which discouraged dissent (Goldberg, 
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2006) and a legitimating power which enabled its proponents to establish jurisdiction over 
specific fields of practice (Abbott, 1988; Timmermans and Berg, 2003). 
 
Professionals were charged with identifying the problems and designing the solutions – aided 
by project managers from NHS London and external management consultants. The values of 
transparency and calculability (Pickard, 2009) (see reference 14) were emphasised along with 
a sophisticated understanding around how to use emotive narratives (see reference 11) and 
the quasi-independence of charity groups (see reference 23) to engender lay support for 
change (Oborn, 2008). EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus here functioned by emphasising 
how variation in outcomes was both ethically problematic and practically solvable. 
Population level data and the power of numbers (Rose, 2006) made stroke care performance 
visible – highlighting variation and underlining the need for standardisation (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). Peer-pressure was used in both formal and informal terms to promote 
elements of competition and collaboration between professionals and institutions.  
 
Public consultations were performed in relation to the Darzi recommendations and stroke 
reconfiguration reforms in London. Meetings were held in public arenas and minutes 
published and detailed on the website of NHS London. PCTs and local authorities were 
invited to vote on the acceptability of reconfiguration plans. Third sector organisations were 
invited to be involved in the reconfiguration process, and patient voices were intended to be 
heard through selected ‘patient panels.’ (Farrar et al, 2013). Whilst the above appears to have 
elements of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000) or ‘associational democracy’ (Hirst, 
1994; Newman, 2001) the data gathered as part of this thesis suggests that in reality, citizen, 
or community power and public participation was really rather minimal and effectively 
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managed by the dominant managerial and professional forces involved in leading the 
reconfiguration – this is a consistent finding in studies of mergers and reconfigurations in the 
health sector (Spurgeon et al, 2010; p18).  
 
The SHA leadership drew on Management Consultancy project management skills (Hood, 
1995) to shape the consultation processes which effectively ensured stakeholder agreement to 
plans which the central team had already made (reference 28). In this way, the promotion of a 
coherent episteme based on clinical stroke specialist evidence and persuasive project 
management skills took the politics (and hence the contention) out of the subsequent public 
consultation and JCPCT decision making processes. As with the stroke charities and ‘expert’ 
patient panels – their independent input was based around legitimation of professional and 
managerial decisions and thus aimed at minimising dissent. In this way, the dominant 
Discourse of evidence based stroke care may be seen to have conflicted with that of the 
‘patient voice’ (Komporozos-Athanasiou et al, 2011) and whilst EBHC opened a window on 
clinical decision making for managers (Hasselbladh and Bejerot, 2007) it did not do so for the 
public. 
 
Evidence of practice 
 
Evidence of practice included audit and performance data focused on both clinical and 
organisational markers. Decisions around both these forms of evidence: what was published 
and when, who published it and how it was used; were political decisions collaboratively 
made by both professional and managerial stakeholders, and together they manifested a new 
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‘truth’ (Dean, 2010) about what stroke was, and what ‘good’ and ‘poor’ care would consist 
of. 
 
The clinical academic elite leaders emerging at the summit of the developing 
power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie et al, 2011) of the London stroke programme were willing to 
highlight fellow professional failings. Likewise, senior SHA managers were willing to signal 
organisational (or Trust management) weaknesses which were hindering stroke care in 
London (references 18 and 19). This dual identification of both professional and managerial 
inadequacies – in effect, evidence of practice - in stroke care services legitimated a new, 
increasingly disciplinary regime based on the dual principles of eliminating ambiguity 
(Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003) around exactly what stroke professionals should deliver as 
‘best’ or evidence based care and an extension of the performative transformational power of 
transparency and calculability (Dean, 2010) for organisational performance. 
 
The London stroke reconfiguration is best seen as a coordinated city-wide programme of 
reform aimed at transforming the regimes of government (Dean, 2010) of health care 
professionals and managers throughout the NHS in London. It is part of a larger process 
(Spurgeon et al, 2010) built on previous national programmes aimed at reform going back to 
the 1980s and the professionally led push for recognition of stroke as a new sub-speciality, 
and clinically significant advances such as the evidence base around thrombolysis delivery 
that emerged in the 1990s. It drew on the ongoing RCP sentinel stroke audit and the National 
Service Framework for Stroke, the National Audit Office report of 2005 and crucially the 
2007 National Stroke Strategy which formalised stroke as a speciality and committed to extra 




An interesting aspect of this macro-level push for ‘specialised’ status for stroke care, perhaps 
replicated in the London reforms was the marginalisation of therapies evidence for practice 
(Sudlow and Warlow, 2009) and the dominance of medical evidence for practice which 
shaped the new episteme in a particular (acute care) fashion (see references 30, 31 and 32). 
The ‘scientific colonisation’ of health research ensured that the ‘dominant model of scientific 
discovery being associated with medical, pharmacological or biotechnical worlds’ (Shaw and 
Greenhalgh, 2008) prioritised acute care developments with strong evidence bases such as 
thrombolysis delivery ensuring that the majority of time effort and money involved in the 
reconfiguration focused on highly dynamic medical interventions – at the expense of less 
well-evidenced therapeutic rehabilitation options.   
 
In this way, the shaping of the new episteme may be seen to have furthered medical 
dominance- specifically the position of academic clinical elites (Freidson, 2001; Armstrong, 
2002) at the expense of therapy communities in jurisdictional terms (Abbott, 1988). 
Credibility and ‘knowing’ is embodied within certain practices and communities which may 
serve to underscore traditional hierarchies and social positions (see reference 35). Likewise 
the institutional concerns of acute care providers were able to take precedence over 
community care providers – signifying the structural dominance of the acute sector over that 
of the more fragmented community and primary care sectors (see reference 34).  
 
Key senior medical informants interviewed for the thesis had been involved in guideline 
construction and audit rollout with the RCP and NICE and had links with one or more of the 
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key ‘independent’ stroke charities. To lesser or greater extents, these clinical experts were or 
had been involved in the production of internationally significant research into stroke, and 
had also had influential editorial pieces published in high impact journals. Their roles as 
experts were cemented by academic success and a political ability to engender trust through 
their actions. This made them credible stakeholders in clinical and academic terms - such 
professional credibility is linked to social positioning (Ceci, 2004).  Their involvement in 
audit and regulatory redesign may also instantiate (elite level) professionals actively shaping 
clinical practice through ‘re-negotiated mechanisms’ of control (Broom et al, 2000; Herk et 
al, 2001; Weisz et al, 2007). 
 
Senior SHA managers were aware that without the credibility of these clinical leaders with 
both structural and normative legitimacy (Lockett et al, 2012) then their efforts at reform 
could be compromised (see references 4 and 5). The leading clinical experts enrolled 
(Osborne, 1993) into the reconfiguration were likewise aware that without the patronage and 
power invested by the senior SHA managers, their ability to influence (stroke service) change 
at a pan-London level was considerably weaker (see references 15 and 16). In this way, elite 
clinicians and senior strategic level managers have a symbiotic relationship: effective health 
service management requires clinical knowledge, experience and legitimacy. Reciprocally, 
professionals (especially those representing emergent sub-specialisms) require strategic 
managerial or governmental power to aid their jurisdictional battles (Abbott, 1988; Johnson, 
1993; Pickard, 2010) within the broader system. Leading stroke professionals thereby 
appeared willing to subordinate the clinical autonomy of their (less senior) colleagues in 
order to secure and increase the professional autonomy of stroke as an emerging discipline 
(Armstrong, 2002; Timmermans and Berg, 2003) utilising an evidence based Discourse 




The establishment of the clinical expert panel, and its significant overlap with the project 
board as part of the reconfiguration was crucial in creating an institutional framework for 
‘truth production’ (Dean, 2010) and rules of understanding (Ceci, 2004). The London stroke 
reconfiguration highlights that EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus may become self-
perpetuating by setting the context through which policy was shaped, understood, developed, 
and subsequently reviewed and then amended. In this way, clinical experts mandated best 
practice - drawing on the emergent grey sciences of information science, systematic review 
and health economics as identified by Ferlie and McGivern (2013). However, other 
techniques to secure ‘moral legitimacy’ (Oborn, 2008) were utilised in this process – stroke 
charities for example were incorporated to add an element of ‘independence’ and the support 
of the ‘patient voice’ (see reference 29) to these processes potentially upsetting rational 
evidence based transfer discourse (Komporozos-Athanasiou et al, 2011). Furthermore, certain 
metrics relating to evidence of performance were selected to highlight the variability of 
service provision in the capital and also point towards strategically significant ‘quick wins’ 
(see reference 8) as new markers by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms – key 
amongst these would be thrombolysis rates, stroke specialist unit admission rates, and 
average length of stay (Rudd, 2012). 
 
The section above highlighted how a new episteme of stroke care was developed for the 
capital which successfully painted the prospects for reforms in a positive light for all 
stakeholders; it built on previous historic programmes to reframe stroke care, drew on the 
establishment of a nascent Pan-London power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie et al 2011) using 
EBHC principles to justify strategic change, and crucially served to control perceptions about 
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how to effectively improve local stroke services.  The language of EBHC depoliticised the 
political nature of strategic decisions (see references 28 and 29). EBHC offered a legitimating 
Discourse to justify contentious decisions which shaped the way agents responded to policy 
developments (Fairclough, 2000; Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005; Oborn, 2008). The data in 
this thesis have shown that some of the decisions presented as ‘evidence based’ were often 
only loosely, or partially so – rather, representing an ‘expert consensus’ (Klein, 2000; Nutley 
and Davies, 2000) (see chapter V section 3). However, at a macro- or meso-level (pan-
London) an emphasis on the evidence based nature of the reforms limited dissensus, whilst at 
a micro-level (Kenworthy hospital) it would come to justify cultural changes to the 
approaches professionals used to care for stroke patients. This is explored theoretically 
below. 
 
Conceptualising service reconfigurations as ‘practices of security’ is useful because as with 
the application of the Discourse of evidence based health care, such concepts may 
depoliticise potential and real political resistance to change. By building on Foucault’s (2007) 
four notions; case, risk, danger, crisis which were introduced in chapter III; and applying 
empirical data from the London reconfiguration this section seeks to theoretically extend 
understanding of reconfigurations as particular biopolitical interventions. 
 
First comes the ‘case’; specific diseases only become conducive to biopolitical interventions 
at certain points in time – this is linked to scientific knowledge and the development of 
evidence. So there needs to be sufficient data on incidence rates, research on causes and 
effects and treatment options, international comparisons – all research for practice in other 
words – as highlighted in chapter V section 1; and figure 8 and reference 7 in particular in 
relation to stroke care in London. How the case is defined is important. The work of NHS 
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London in making stroke visible as a particular London problem through the Darzi review 
and the Stroke Strategy documentation is illustrative of this.  
 
Next, the ‘risk’ is calculated through analysis of research for and of practice. Audit data can 
be used to highlight actual morbidity and mortality rates – this may be RCP stroke audit data 
or HES data for example. As highlighted by figure 8, incidence rates can be graphically 
displayed to shape perceptions around where problems are located. This technique of 
manipulating epidemiological data is useful in expressing a conception of ‘danger’ whereby 
certain London suburbs with high concentrations of elderly (and some ethnic minority) 
populations represent communities for whom stroke is a greater risk than other communities. 
This permits an examination of health and social inequalities across a certain defined area and 
prioritises epidemiological data and statistical techniques. 
 
The fourth factor is that of a ‘crisis.’ Unlike Foucault’s examples of leprosy, the plague or 
small pox, stroke is non-communicable. However the construction of a crisis is an important 
facet in generating legitimacy for reconfigurations – in clinical terms. The ‘crisis’ needs to 
appeal to the sensibilities of key stakeholders – for example, the sense of stroke survivors 
feeling ‘cheated’ by poor care as articulated by the charity representative in reference 23 is 
powerful in helping (alongside strong epidemiological and economic data) make the strong 
case for change. 
 
The reconfiguration set out to, and may be seen to have achieved its goals (at a pan-London 
level and at Kenworthy) in transforming the way stroke was conceived at a London 
population level following this model of ‘case, risk, danger, crisis’ . Central was the ability to 
reframe the episteme related to disease; treatment; success and failure. Stroke became 
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reframed as a London problem – rather than a national problem (NAO report, 2005; National 
Stroke Strategy, 2007), nor a hospital or individual problem. This process is centrally 
concerned with discursive power leading to the establishment of new standards, or norms 
through which stakeholders can agree how to resolve the ‘crisis:’ 
 
‘[N]ormalisation is less concerned with establishing a model than with reaching an 
understanding regarding the choice of a model. The essential question is not the 
production of objects that can act as a standard but the establishment of procedures 
that will lead to a general agreement regarding the choice of norms and standards. In 
discourses of technical standardisation all norms of terminology, of spatial 
measurement and of quality are interdependent, and this interdependence arises from 




The Foucauldian concept of biopolitics then is useful in demonstrating how legitimacy for 
reconfigurations can be generated and establishing an agreed discourse, or language through 
which specific policy problems are understood and subsequently tackled. However, the 
concept is also of use beyond the ‘problematisation’ stage. The SHA management possessed 
a ‘biopolitical’ ethos as demonstrated in reference 9 ‘to make change happen… albeit “top 
down”’ change that may have riled some stakeholders; this included downgrading the best 
performing stroke unit in the capital – a symbolic act that highlighted that no institution was 
larger than the biopolitical goal of standardised care across the whole city. This process 
required a form of reflexivity in policy making and consideration of how to organise care for 
the population and a shift to ‘bat for 12,000 London stroke patients’ rather than institutional 




Through the reconfiguration and implementation process, as the generation of data increased, 
the focus was not just on the patient level data – but upon the professionals and managers too. 
This required professionals to recognise the legitimacy of the programme, and it also required 
technological innovations to monitor institutional behaviour. The biopolitical approach 
established and then legitimated ‘government at a distance’ (Dean, 2010) to monitor the 
agreed norms and standards once agreed. This reconfiguration was not carried out centrally – 
in that the Department of Health was ‘hands off:’ rather it had devolved biopolitical 
responsibility to the SHA to manage the care of Londoners. Reconfigurations which 
successfully draw on the Discourse of evidence based health care, such as the London stroke 
service reconfiguration may serve to depoliticise resistance because service changes function 
as ‘biopolitical’ interventions and therefore garner moral and cognitive legitimacy (Oborn, 
2008). This is important because it realigns traditionally antagonistic goals.  
 
The next section focuses on how the new episteme of stroke care in the capital was 
operationalised to control the response of clinical and managerial stakeholders whose work 
was to be transformed by the reforms. 
 
 
8.3 Section 2: Increasing managerial control of the new episteme 
 
EBHC as a power/knowledge nexus functioned as a policy tool to shape the reconfiguration 
by aligning and legitimating clinical, managerial, strategic and political stakeholders together 
around a common set of values (Sabatier, 1998; Oborn, 2008). Many of these values were 
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articulated explicitly in official documentation and cluster around an ethical drive to improve 
patient care and outcomes centred on augmenting ‘caring’ practices (Dean, 2010) influenced 
by scientific knowledge and rationalist logic leading to a reification of stroke as a sub-
specialism which impacts upon both clinicians and (hospital and commissioning) managers 
(see p5 of Preliminary Stroke Strategy for London – NHS London, 2008). These values were 
underpinned by management practices which focused upon the construction and removal of 
organisational barriers to this prior-identified ‘best care’. Rather than being presented as 
antagonistic to professional values – the ‘compatibility’ of economic efficiency and bounded 
competition for example and were seen to serve and guarantee new forms of professionalism, 
validated standards and autonomy (Southon, 1994; Joyce, 2001) together with a focus on 
improving patient outcomes.  
 
The techniques utilised to promote the adoption of these values focused upon limiting dissent, 
controlling professional responses and increased surveillance. This was implicit, and was not 
prominent in the official literature. An interest in these techniques emerged more from the 
data collected in interviews and observations. The latter of these proved to be heavily 
concerned with how to ensure stricter compliance with the new care protocols and achieve 
increased data returns and to formally and informally report back to central powers on 
adherence to the new regimes of government. 
 
There are two major themes explored in this section, firstly, the push towards greater 
managerial control and oversight of stroke service provision in the capital and the techniques 
used to establish this; and secondly, the impacts that these processes had upon inter-




Furthering management oversight 
 
The reconfiguration process opened up stroke care in London to the centralised gaze of 
management in new ways establishing new regimes of government (Dean, 2010).  In the first 
stages of the project as described in the previous section (problematising stroke care in the 
capital, and then devising a strategy to improve care) the goals of powerful (medical) 
professionals advising senior SHA and PCT managers were closely aligned and highly 
compatible with each other (Southon, 1994). They had a shared understanding about the 
direction of travel they wished to pursue in stroke services and agreed about the broad shape 
they wanted the reconfigured service to have – a reduced number of increased specialist 
centres (Ferguson et al, 1997; Farrington-Douglas and Brookes, 2007) delivering evidence 
based stroke care centred around the mantra that ‘time is brain’ (Gomez, 1993; Saver, 2006; 
Baeza et al, 2012a) prioritising thrombolysis delivery and stroke unit care. 
 
Whilst, (as highlighted in references 31 and 32) there was a dissonance between the 
perceived credibility of the medical and AHP claims to legitimising knowledge and 
deployment of evidence (Ceci, 2004), until the site selection controversy (see chapter VI 
section 1) there was no breakdown between professional and management stakeholders at the 
centre of the process. Both groups professed an interest in calculability and increased 
measurement along NPM lines (Hood, 1991; Ferlie et al, 1996; Pickard, 2009) in the 
pursuance of standardisation and improvement (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Hence the 
unity of purpose in how the problematisation of London stroke services was framed, and the 
agreement around the process of managed competition process for HASU status. Chapter V 
section 3 demonstrated how the consensus for change was established; drawing on 
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management consultancy skills lent legitimacy by patient association support. The lack of 
definitive clinical evidence behind the superiority of any of the three proposed models (Klein, 
2000; Nutley and Davies, 2000) was also discussed and the reality that organisational and 
skill set (staffing) concerns (Spurgeon et al, 2010) were central to the modelling process.  
 
The HASU site selection process was based on two evaluative criteria: the bid evaluation and 
the configuration evaluation (see figure 11). The effect of the bid evaluation was to open up 
stroke management procedures for clinical care and organisational prioritisation of the 
London hospitals bidding for stroke specialist status to the gaze of the SHA, networks and 
other coordinating stakeholders such as the stroke CAG. This in effect created a new practical 
evidence base that was of benefit to both the clinical and managerial stakeholders driving the 
process from the centre. The bid evaluation process required NHS Trust level management to 
describe and commit to how they would meet the new designation criteria for reconfigured 
stroke care. This entailed extensive documentation around clinical quality, continuous 
improvement and network working commitments. The production of such documentation 
was only achievable by submission to the new regime of government which represented an 
explicit acceptance of the new stroke programme (Dean, 2010). Hospitals were free to 
compete with each other for the right to provide the new service – however, they would be 
successful only by conforming to the strictures of the new orthodoxy of care as inscribed by 
the clinical experts and authorised by the strategic managers. 
 
In this way, competition between London’s providers was encouraged, but in the service of 
standardisation rather than variance reflecting the complexity of New Labour governance 
arrangements (Newman, 2001). This was welcomed by stroke clinicians (at both elite 
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(strategic) level and at Kenworthy) because it raised the profile of stroke and increased its 
importance within an institutional context. Evidence based clinical guidelines became 
significant for senior hospital managers with respect to stroke care in a new way (and 
potentially for some trust managers for the first time) – thus a regime of increased 
calculability could be seen to serve and further professional interests (Iedema and Rhodes, 
2010).  
 
Increased baseline and projected data collection related to provider performance was thereby 
welcomed by stroke professionals as it was perceived not as a managerially led invasion of 
clinical autonomy, but a safeguard for ring-fencing minimum standards (and an assurance of 
staffing levels and investment in stroke care). In this way it has resonance with the concept of 
strategic adaptation, or reverse managerialisation (Waring and Currie, 2009) and serves as an 
example of an emergent professional sub-specialist group willing to develop clinical practice 
guidelines in order to increase its own jurisdictional power (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). 
 
An example of this was articulated by the Kenworthy Clinical Services Manager at one of the 
Clinical Advisory Group meetings where she argued for the continuation of strict ‘peer 
review inspections’ involving Commissioners, Network officials and senior clinical leaders 
from neighbouring Trusts. She argued that these were a valuable organisational tool for her 
because they maintained the visibility and profile of stroke services at Kenworthy. She 
therefore wanted them to continue beyond their scheduled phase concerned with embedding 




For professionals working in stroke care, this then meant that increased surveillance could be 
presented as a productive rather than an exclusively disciplinary force (Brown and Lewis, 
2009; Iedema and Rhodes, 2010) and was therefore less likely to be met with resistance. 
Senior Trust level managers also welcomed this surveillance because it was linked to 
increased financial rewards through raised tariff payments and allowed them to meet their 
data reporting and patient outcome commitments. Increased levels of evidence and data 
would be perpetually required of the trusts and produced by them to regulate performance 
and demonstrate compliance with the new regime of government (see references 73 and 74).  
 
At the same time however – the increased pressure of surveillance increased the demands on 
both professional and managerial stroke specialist staff at Kenworthy. This disciplinary force 
impacted upon both higher and lower status staff (as demonstrated in chapter VII). 
Furthermore, the ethical imperative of the Discourse of EHBC meant that counter conduct 
(Dean, 2010) lacked a credible narrative inhibiting resistance against the new dominant 
clinical-managerialist position (Newman, 2005). In this way, a ‘management ideology’ which 
permeates the subjectivities of staff so effectively – binding them into restrictive practices 
from which they cannot dissent may become pervasive with possible problematic 
connotations –especially so for lower status staff (Anthony, 1977; Martin and Learmonth, 
2012).   
 
The developing London episteme of stroke care (in the form of evidence and data measured 
against ‘best practice’) became ever more deeply embedded as a central apparatus of control. 
Whilst in some ways EBHC and NPM share a difficult relationship with often conflicting 
goals (Hood, 1996), these data pointed to a shared reverence for the power of numbers and 
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the value of rational measurement systems and ongoing audit (Ferlie et al, 1996; Power, 
1999; Dunleavy, 2004; Rose, 2006) in establishing mutually accommodating frameworks to 
control how health care professionals and managers responded to and interpreted changing 
clinical and organisational priorities. Verifiable data on an increased number of interventions 
in stroke care was a key resource enabling senior professionals and managers to shape and 
then run the reconfigured service (see reference 93) at both the meso-level (pan-London) and 
micro-levels (Stroke Unit).  
 
The LMDS was introduced and monitored by the clinical networks. It was initially seen as a 
project management tool to ensure adequate progress towards the new clinical and 
organisational goals. However, through the process of implementation, the monitoring 
continued and was transformed into a real-time performance management tool reporting 
centrally to the RCP in the form of SINAP (see reference 76). The clinical director of London 
stroke services (also the clinical lead for the RCP Sentinel Stroke Audit) came to receive 
reports in real time on all the acute stroke admissions across the capital detailing over 100 
data codes covering the first 72 hours of an admission (see Appendix C). The RCP then 
possessed the power to cascade reports down to networks, trusts and commissioners and also 
publish named hospital reports on its website for public view. This is a further example of the 
‘circularity’ of EBHC as a functioning power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie and McGivern, 2013).  
 
The position and power wielded by the RCP was enhanced as it controlled much more detail 
on the practice of clinical teams and by implication hospital management arrangements than 
ever before through professional control of the audit (Broom et al, 2000; Herk et al, 2001). 
This detailed knowledge of individual hospital performance, held by and interpreted by the 
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RCP significantly empowered (elite members of) the profession (Armstrong, 2002). In this 
sense, the data could be used at a micro-level as ‘measurement for improvement’ amongst, 
across and within clinical teams, but it could also be used politically to push for change as 
‘measurement for judgement’ (Berwick, 2001; Timmermans and Berg, 2003) through 
commissioners. The increased surveillance and use of audit represented a form of 
colonization (Power, 1999); and ‘active professional involvement leading to soft autonomy’ 
drawing upon Levay and Waks’ (2010; p523) ideal typology. This also enabled the medical 
profession to influence nursing and AHP practice by setting the parameters of the data 
collection and thereby establishing what was considered best practice in stroke care with 




Whilst there is a focus in much of the literature on the conflictual relationship between 
managers and professionals (Numerato et al, 2011), the data generated by this thesis suggests 
that the definitional distinctions between ‘professional’ and ‘managerial’ identities were 
amorphous; those within each group were significantly stratified; and the relationships 
themselves were more consensual than conflictual in nature. The narrative in London was not 
of managers imposing change on reluctant clinical staff which set each community neatly 
against each other. Rather it was of elite, structurally powerful strategic level managers 
enfranchising an efficient project management team alongside elite, clinically respected 
leading professionals creating a consensus around the clinical and organisational barriers 
which traditionally inhibited standardised high quality outcomes for patients in one specific 
clinical specialism. This led to a focus on challenging organisational (hospital level 
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management) practice in order to facilitate clinical practice change at the clinic level in 
pursuance of a quality health care system as a ‘collective good’ (Numerato et al, 2011; p638). 
 
Observational data centred on the Clinical Advisory Group highlighted that whilst clinically 
led; the group was managerially focused – concerned with data metrics and committed to 
standardising professional practice through organisational protocols. In socio-cultural terms 
(Numerato et al, 2011), the professionals who constituted the panel may be seen to have been 
operating through a framework of ‘managerial hegemony’ in which performative 
management values were internalised, and management discourse had become elemental to 
their identities (Joyce, 2001; Doolin, 2002; Numerato et al, 2011) as professional leaders of 
the stroke specialist discipline. Hybrid, clinical-managerial roles blurred the lines between 
professional and managerial identities and positions fostering a sense of ‘compatibility’ 
between the two logics (Spooner et al, 2001; Dent, 2003).  For example, the senior 
professionals who led the CAG all held managerial responsibilities at their respective units as 
clinical leads. Also the ‘non-professionals’ who attended the meetings –one a Network 
Director and the other a Clinical Services Manager – and  offered the two ostensible 
‘management’ voices at the Clinical Advisory Group meetings had both previously worked as 
AHPs and  now managed full-time. As Doctor 1 noted (reference 144) it did not matter where 
stakeholders came from – the manager/professional distinctions were subordinate to the 
shared goals of improving stroke care.  
 
This is significant because it highlights the positive nature of the relationships between 
managers and professionals in this instance and the shared sense of purpose and trust between 
the two communities. Whilst traditionally, epidemiological knowledge and EBHC has been 
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seen to play two oppositional roles in professional-managerial relations – on the one hand, it 
has been characterised as strengthening professional values by having a positive effect on 
clinical knowledge; whilst on the other, it has been seen as a harbinger of increased 
surveillance and augmented management control and thereby antithetical to professional 
values (Mykhalovskiy and Weir, 2004; Weisz et al, 2007; Numerato et al, 2011); these data 
suggest that the relationship does not need to be oppositional – rather, it is possible to reduce 
aspects of clinical autonomy whilst furthering professionals’ abilities to realise their ‘ethical 
desires’ and professional goals (Herk et al, 2001; Flynn, 2002; Armstrong, 2002; 
Timmermans and Berg, 2003). 
 
The regimes of government developed as part of the London reforms of stroke care 
established new, increasingly authoritative professional hierarchies both at the pan-London 
and hospital unit level (Newman, 2001). The espoused ethos of ‘improvement through 
standardisation’ – of bringing performance up to a shared level of competence, through the 
development of a specialist stroke professional cadre focused exclusively on treating stroke 
patients required hierarchical relations and central oversight (Timmermans and Angell, 2001; 
Broom et al, 2009). New forms of professional and managerial supervision were introduced. 
New formal supervisory roles were developed which previously did not exist – for example, 
the position of regional clinical director for stroke and clinical network lead roles and 
increased unit level management as represented by the Clinical Services Manager at 
Kenworthy.  
 
Alongside newly developed locally agreed protocols for controlling systems of care 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003) and strict reporting mechanisms controlled by the medical 
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profession (Broom et al, 2000; Herk et al, 2001; Waring, 2007) the regimes of government 
developed here stressed the need for increased accountability of professional behaviours, 
increased control and central oversight which bolsters the jurisdictional power of clinicians 
committed to  delivering stroke as a specialist discipline (Abbott, 1988) and the academic 
managerial elite within that group (Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Freidson, 2001; Armstrong, 
2002;). 
 
Formal authority was extended beyond senior professionally dominant clinicians however. 
The regimes of government developed as part of the stroke reconfiguration programme also 
depended upon the extension of ‘top down’ SHA executive power (Newman, 2001; Pollitt, 
2013) distanced from the Department of Health (Moon and Brown, 2000). The SHA 
executive, significantly, was able to shape the priorities for senior PCT commissioners and 
(non-FT) hospital leaders and thus emphasise the strategic importance of stroke care 
developments by building this in to their annual Key Performance Indicators (see reference 
141). This demonstrated strong hierarchical management power contra Dent’s (2005) claims 
for a post-NPM model based on freedom of NHS providers and organisations because even 
FTs had to accede to the demands of the SHA if they wished to gain accreditation to deliver 
the London stroke model. The actions of the SHA here were closer to Dunleavy et al’s (2006) 
concept of ‘reintegration’. This increased formal authority based on hierarchical control thus 
demonstrated elements of both professional and managerial dominance; greater managerial 
power and increased ‘hands on management’ (Hood, 1995), alongside a trend towards 
‘informal’ aspects of authority as highlighted in relation to networks’ ‘soft power’ (see 




Returning to the concept of the power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie et al, 2011) it was possible to 
identify an integration of mutually compatible professional and managerial goals (Numerato 
et al, 2011). There was neither a homogenous ‘management’ position, nor a homogenous 
‘professional’ position. Instead, there were different coalitions of managers, policy makers, 
clinicians and ‘hybrids’ who strategically drew on and shaped different aspects of clinical 
evidence and techniques of management at different points to influence the emergent regimes 
of government – within a framework which was accepting of rather than hostile to the values 
and potentialities of the managerialisation of professional practice (Joyce, 2001; Waring, 
2007; Pickard, 2009). The reformed regimes of government (Dean, 2010) instigated NPM 
type (Ferlie et al, 1996) incentives focused at the hospital trust board level mandated through 
financial instruments (promises of greater funding and threats of lesser funding) 
demonstrating compatibility between professional and managerial goals through intertwined 
economic techniques and biopolitical (Foucault, 2007) goals which had strong professional 
support (Darr et al, 2003).  
 
The regional stroke clinical networks acted as conduits of managerial and clinical imperatives 
– both formally and informally (Sheaff et al, 2004) and worked on the development and 
implementation of organisationally focused change and measured this on behalf of the SHA 
and commissioners. The networks started from a point of trust that clinicians desired to 
achieve improved outcomes for their patients (Sheaff et al, 2004; Numerato et al, 2011). The 
ethos behind the networks’ surveillance was that Trusts were to be performance managed – 
not professionals (see reference 147). The SHA emphasis was on changing the organisational 
context in which stroke care was provided as a joint initiative between managers and 
professionals on the understanding that the professional stroke leading elite would ensure that 
the performance of stroke clinicians at the hospital unit level would consistently meet agreed 
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standards. This was highlighted by the role of the CAG and the content of the meetings 
observed. 
 
Therefore clinical and managerial goals were highly compatible – taking us beyond the 
resistance/control dynamic highlighted in other studies of health care governance change 
(Numerato et al, 2011). The picture painted by these data is much more nuanced then, and 
less conflictual – and crucially is not characterised by managerial change being imposed on 
reluctant professionals – but collectively and collaboratively led by managers and 
professionals together; thus making negotiation between stakeholders highly consensual in 
nature. The priorities of managers and professionals were not in opposition – they were 
negotiated through dynamic and evolving relationships that cemented the effective 
functioning of the power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie et al, 2011) and thereby the new episteme 
of stroke in London. The central, and perpetual nature of data collection ensured that new 
evidence of performance was constantly being generated and evaluated, discussed and 
compared, maintaining the importance of the central overseeing role of the networks and then 
the RCP.  This may be seen to have represented professional self-monitoring and 
managerialised control ‘at a distance’ (Light, 2001; Sheaff et al, 2003; Foucault, 2007). 
 
8.4 Section 3: Controlling the delivery: Specialising stroke care through the 
new episteme 
 
These data suggest that the ‘ethos’ of the London reconfiguration of stroke services, building 
on the multiple reform programmes instigated at a national level to improve stroke care since 
the mid-1990s displayed what Dean (2010) terms a ‘non-subjective intentionality’ to increase 
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management control through a reified episteme which influenced how all stakeholders 
conceptualised stroke (both diagnostically and therapeutically) and sought to encourage them 
to use their situated agency (Bevir, 2010) accordingly by adhering to a more coherent regime 
of practice (Dean, 2010) in which evidence based ‘thinking’ and responses became 
‘instinctual’ (Dopson and Ferlie, 2005). These regimes of government functioned as a 
‘restrictive,’ disciplining power by inscribing explicitly how stroke patients are to be treated 
and measuring performance against these criteria closely. This was welcomed by stroke 
professionals however because they utilised this disciplinary power productively to enhance 
their jurisdictional position and achieve their ethical desires as stroke specialist professionals.  
 
This is where the critical purchase of performing an analytics of government is established. 
No such ‘ethos’ is openly expressed in the Darzi review, nor the NHS London papers aimed 
at the public through consultation or the organisations as part of the site selection process. 
This ethos, or logic, emerges through analysis of observational and interview data which 
uncover how the protocols and audit regimes actively functioned. This new, heavily 
controlled regime of practice for treating stroke in London reified stroke ‘caring’ as an 
emergency concern, through which professional judgement was to a degree subordinated to 
protocols which were closely monitored and linked to financial incentives for Trusts. There is 
no evidence that such a policy was inevitable, rather government (as manifested through the 
reconfiguration process) appears to be a ‘constantly problematising activity’ (Dean, 2010) in 
Foucauldian terms, and it appears to be a dual (highly compatible) managerial and 
professional concern (Numerato et al, 2011). The new regimes of government which emerged 
from these processes emphasised increased monitoring, more management (and managers 
focused on stroke care) more measurement, more comparisons of performance, elements of 
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competition and collaboration at different times and within different contexts and a 
transformed type of clinical agency and professional identity (Newman, 2001). 
 
The specialist nature of stroke care and a new type of stroke specific professionalism was 
emphasised which impacted upon the subjectivities and ‘identity work’ of staff working in 
the new services. This new specialist tenet simultaneously emphasised both the 
‘standardisation’ at the heart of evidence based modes of delivery (Timmermans and Berg, 
2003) which promoted a reproduction of strictly protocolised actions whilst encouraging staff 
to feel they had the space to ‘enact’ (Dopson and Ferlie, 2005) and elaborate upon the same 
guidelines. These complex phenomena are explored in turn in this section. 
 
Specialisation and standardisation 
 
By the time the reconfigured service went live across the HASU and SU sites from 2009 
there was a well-established, episteme of stroke care based on the principles of specialisation 
(Pickard, 2010) and standardisation (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Historic weaknesses, 
such as care of the elderly nursing standards at Kenworthy, were identified and innovative 
mechanisms aimed at transforming such practice were being developed and were sufficiently 
funded. A rapid uptake of stroke staff across multiple professional groups was incorporated 
into new specialist teams (see chapter VII sections 1 and 2). Non-stroke specialists (LAS, A 
and E and Radiology staff) were trained to prioritise and treat stroke patients in new ways 
which aided the rapid functioning of the new stroke care pathway. At the heart of these new 
regimes of government was a professional and managerial push to reduce the historical 
ambiguity and subsequent variability that care at the micro-level had faced in stroke. Senior 
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professionals and managers wanted through specialisation to create a ‘production line’ (see 
reference 78) generating standardised care for all London stroke patients during their time in 
hospital. 
 
At an organisational level, the autonomy for staff ‘to [possibly] do things badly’ was 
removed – so that ‘you are not allowed to give suboptimal treatment’ (both reference 134). 
The LMDS and subsequent SINAP audit and data returns ensured that each HASU 
reproduced the agreed standards or risked losing accreditation and funding. The link between 
performance and funding was crucial in establishing and maintaining the new importance of 
stroke for the respective organisations (reference 87) and was compatible with both 
professional and managerial logics (Darr et al, 2003). This control was enhanced through the 
clinical supervisory work of the Pan-London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group and the 
regional networks and close links with commissioners. This built on personal relationships 
(Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005) fostered through peer review visits and the electronic 
panopticon of the SINAP data. The networks functioned as ‘learning systems’ (Davies and 
Nutley, 2000) through peer to peer comparison and pressure to demonstrate professional and 
organisational competence.  
 
The clinical autonomy of professionals to treat stroke patients (relatively unsupervised) based 
on traditional, or tacit knowledge was subordinated to new regimes of government 
increasingly based on ‘encoded knowledge’ (Flynn, 2002). This process was led by senior 
stroke care professionals and presented by them as central to delivering the standardised care 
which was best for the patients across the whole city – ‘people should follow guidelines and 
be measured against it and get good at that’ (reference 78). In this way, variation became less 
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acceptable and more easily identifiable and open to challenge as a part of the new regime of 
government. Therefore the re-stratified (Freidson, 2001) control over professional decision 
making and actions was significantly increased. This highlighted the disciplinary elements 
(Foucault, 1977) of EBHC. The regimes of audit and guidelines were constructed by and 
closely identified with professional leaders who appeared to have internalised the discourse 
of managerialism (Joyce, 2001; Doolin, 2002; Ferlie et al, 2011). These new regimes of 
increased audit and guideline influenced care and subsequently were based on relevant 
evidence, and therefore, on the whole, clinically legitimate in the eyes of the staff tasked to 
implement them (Herk et al, 2001; Weisz et al, 2007) – in contrast to political targets, such as 
the four hour A and E waits (reference 146).  
 
The requirement to continuously record evidence that care complied with the tariff mandated 
standards locked Trusts in to a disciplinary cycle of audit that reproduced the key goals and 
facets of the new episteme. In this way evidence of practice became a sophisticated 
management tool to increase control over professional behaviour, and where weaknesses 
were identified, it could then become evidence for practice (improvements). Informants at 
Kenworthy expressed how the disciplinary pressure of the new regimes of government and 
practice impacted upon on the subjectivities of staff (reference 133), and professional leaders 
emphasised their desire to reduce clinical autonomy and impose restrictions on clinical staff 
to deviate from the evidence based model they have designed (reference 134). In this way, 
the new regimes of government may be seen to function through powers of subjection 




Such an approach emphasised increased hierarchical professional relations, further 
surveillance of professionals and augmented regimes of calculability and accountability 
(Timmons, 2003; Waring, 2007) suggesting that EBHC may be interpreted as a form of 
disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) which imposes systems of measurement on individuals 
(Brown and Lewis, 2011). It is clear that this disciplinary power exerted increased pressure 
on stroke specialist staff at Kenworthy as they faced greater scrutiny of their actions from 
both peers and senior (clinical and managerial) staff both within the hospital and across the 
relevant network (reference 118, 122). Protocolisation of specialist stroke practices 
potentially pressurised staff to reform their behaviour and modify their actions and improve 
performance as they became vastly more accountable for this through the strictures of the 
SINAP audit.  
 
However, the ways in which such pressure was felt was variable. At Kenworthy, the nursing 
staff were put under increased pressure and greater scrutiny to perform by senior medical and 
nursing managers (e.g. the matron and stroke consultants) as highlighted by references 117 
and 118. This was pressure from fellow professionals rather than non-clinical general 
management and therefore counter to the findings of Timmons (2003) better aligned with the 
nurses’ professional identities and ethical desires. A discourse of self-improvement was 
internalised by senior nurses such as the ward manager and the HASU coordinator 
(references 126, 129 and 131) who emphasised a commitment to using this disciplinary 
power productively (Foucault, 1991; Brown and Lewis, 2011) – to drive up standards. The 
position of nursing at Kenworthy must be understood within the historical context of ‘failure’ 
expressed by informants at the site. These data are consistent with the concept of managerial 





Likewise, the disciplinary power of the new episteme and restrictive targets impacted heavily 
upon the Clinical Services Manager who claimed she would ‘die of shame if we failed an 
assessment’ (reference 123).However she was in favour of such pressure being used as a 
productive force (notwithstanding the tears of her therapists!) because she saw such 
surveillant power as ultimately positive to ensure that standards were met (reference 124). 
Junior doctors also faced increased pressure from seniors as the stakes behind rapidity of 
treatment delivery were substantially raised (Timmermans and Angell, 2001; Broom et al, 
2009). This accent on the disciplinary aspects of EBHC emphasised standardisation 
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003) and compulsion over enactment (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 
2005) and local innovation. Conversely, the disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) of EBHC in 
the London stroke case fostered an interpretive space (Iedema and Rhodes, 2010) in which 
leaders and fellow team members were able to realise their desires (Foucault, 1986; 
McKinlay and Starkey, 1998) as stroke specialist professionals and enact evidence based 
stroke care (Davies and Nutley, 2000; Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005). 
 
Therefore some informants emphasised the ability which providers had to elaborate and 
innovate within the broad rules set down by the new episteme: ‘how we did it, how we 
organised it, what it looked like, was entirely something we could create’ (reference 148) to 
effectively ‘enact’ the guidelines and shape them to their local contexts (Dopson and 
Fitzgerald, 2005). These stroke specialists’ revelled in the new episteme which despite its 
disciplinary tenets was a ‘productive’ force (Brown and Lewis, 2011) for them. These stroke 
specialist staff at Kenworthy internalised and utilised the positive potential of the disciplinary 
elements of the new episteme of stroke care in the London model in order to achieve their 
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professional desires (Foucault, 1986; McKinlay and Starkey, 1998). This view emphasises 
subjectification over subjection (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998) for these staff. 
 
Paradoxically, the reduction of space for action which the new regimes of practice foster in 
the HASU when viewed from the perspective of an ever restrictive, controlling episteme was 
actually welcomed by staff and interpreted as an opening up of space because for the first 
time, there was a coherent, shared conception of stroke which legitimated increased 
jurisdictional space for stroke care specialists within the institution, and the city more broadly 
(Flynn, 2002; Doolin, 2002). This seemingly ‘restricted’ or ‘controlled’ space was desirable 
for stroke specialists because it was a space which enabled them to exert their situated agency 
(Bevir, 2010) both individually and collectively more effectively and challenge the 
previously dominant Discourse which saw stroke as subordinate to multiple other clinical 
specialities. In this way professionals can be seen to ‘problematise’ themselves in relation to 
dominant and countervailing forms of power (Foucault, 1986: Haugaard, 2002, p186). 
 
So, through subjectification to new regimes of discipline, realisation of desire was possible 
(Foucault, 1986; McKinlay and Starkey, 1998) for these staff. By actively acquiescing to the 
data return requirements of LMDS and SINAP which opened the unit up to a performative 
external gaze of networks, commissioners and the RCP, stroke specialist clinicians and 
managers were able to harness this disciplinary power productively. In this sense, 
surveillance was crucial – it was the ‘central ring holding it all together, that enables people 
to become powerful in their own fiefdom. Whereas, if they can’t report back… who’s going to 
take any notice of them?’ (reference 82) The stroke service management at Kenworthy were 
able to turn the disciplinary power back on to non-stroke specialist management within her 
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Trust. This stroke service manager could ‘use the networks as a bogey man’ (reference 140) 
to protect her nursing establishment.  
 
By colonising (Power, 1999) the performance metrics of stroke care in the city, stroke 
consultants were able to reconfigure the managerial markers by which non-clinical managers 
were to be judged (references 77 and 79). In these ways, disciplinary power furthered the 
jurisdictional cause of this group and demarcated stroke specialist care. This demonstrated a 
shared stroke specialist professional and managerial instance of ‘reverse managerialisation’ 
(Waring and Currie, 2009) built around the particular jurisdictional interests of stroke care. 
The new distinctions in identity terms delivered by the new regime of practice (Dean, 2010) 
here were between stroke specialists and non-stroke specialists (both professionals and 
managers), rather than between professionals and managers – which once more illustrates the 
unifying potential of the new stroke specialist episteme. The following section explores how 
this may have been achieved; through an exploration of the ways in which these 
developments impacted upon individual and collective identities. 
 
 ‘Subjectifying logics’ 
 
The previous section highlighted that central tenets and techniques of EBHC – regimes of 
measurement, standardisation and protocolisation of professional practice for example can be 
seen as manifestations of disciplinary power – and that this power may represent a productive 
force. Discipline acts upon identity formation (Burchell, 1991; p146; Rose, 1999; p244) and 
is linked to what Foucault terms ‘techniques of the self’ defined as ‘those intentional and 
voluntary actions by which men [sic] not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek 
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to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being and to make an oeuvre 
that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria’ (Foucault, 1986 p10). 
This section explores the idea that key figures involved at the pan-London level as well as at 
Kenworthy – cultivated and were encouraged to cultivate stroke specialist identities. 
Furthermore, these identities were symbolically imbued with ‘evidence based’ principles – to 
guide them to practice health care in ‘instinctively’ evidence based ways (Dopson and 
Fitzgerald, 2005). It was this that enabled them to draw upon the disciplinary regimes of 
government (Dean, 2010) which sought to control clinical responses and decision making 
prioritised by the reconfiguration to mandate a socially mediated ‘subjectifying logic’ (Martin 
et al, 2013) to legitimate the disciplinary nature of the new episteme at the local level.  
 
EBHC manifests a dual clinical and managerial rationality which emphasises the ethical 
imperative to provide ‘best’ care (in the interests of both individual patients and 
epidemiologically defined groups) whilst also furthering the functional management goals of 
productivity and efficiency (Southon, 1994; Ten Have, 2000; Flynn, 2002). Thus, the 
‘enrolment’ of professionals into a management discourse may be interpreted as an effect of 
neoliberal ideology permeating the medical profession - aligning clinical and administrative 
decisions (Osborne, 1993; p353).  
 
However, the professionals studied in this thesis were not passive, docile recipients of 
management agendas, but active, ambitious agents reflexively aware of the utility of the 
employment of managerialism in the furtherance of their professional jurisdiction (Abbott, 
1988; Armstrong, 2002; Doolin, 2002; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Ferlie et al, 2011). 
Theories of hybridisation have indeed ‘blurred the boundaries’ between managerial and 
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professional identities (Dent, 2003; Numerato et al, 2011). There were two principal types of 
hybrid managers identified in these data. Firstly; medical-manager hybrids and secondly; 
nurse/AHP-manager hybrids. The ‘hybrid’ medical-managers were not reluctant or hostile to 
the force of managerialism – they did not see it as a force encroaching on their terrain – rather 
they welcomed and internalised (Waring and Currie, 2009) it as a power resource to further 
their jurisdictional goals. These senior ‘clinical leads’ (stroke specialist consultants) for 
HASUs and SUs in the capital maintained their clinical credibility by continuing to practice 
as doctors, whilst maintaining an academic profile through research collaborations and 
political influence via affiliation with the RCP and other professional bodies. In this sense, 
these doctors represented ‘strategic’ clinical managerial hybrids (McGivern et al, 2006). They 
displayed both managerial authority and  clinical credibility, the latter of which was heavily 
underscored by an ethically motivated logic of EBHC focused on the pursuance of a quality 
health care system as a collective good (Numerato et al, 2011). 
 
The second group of hybrid managers were employed principally by the networks and within 
the management structure at Kenworthy and included Network Directors, Clinical Service 
Managers, Ward Managers, and the Care of the Elderly and Stroke Director at Kenworthy. 
These individuals all had either nursing or AHP backgrounds and some had subsequently 
ceased to practice or had reduced their clinical commitments as respective professionals in 
order to perform full-time management roles. They also drew on the ethical dimension to the 
discourse of EBHC in accounting for their motivation for increasing control over stroke 
professionals, though were less likely to emphasise their mastery of the latest research than 




Alongside the ‘hybrids’ were non-clinical general managers – particularly those in senior 
positions within the SHA and PCTs. Whilst by definition not clinically trained, or credible in 
the interpretation of clinical data (and generalists rather than specialists), these managers 
were comfortable drawing on the discourse of EBHC and recognised its utility in 
depoliticising contentious decisions – and even presenting non-evidence based decisions as 
such – much to the ire of certain professionals as demonstrated in relation to the site selection 
controversy covered in chapter VI. 
 
The significance of this is that at both the pan-London level and also at Kenworthy, the 
discourse of EBHC was powerful for senior professionals (medical hybrids, and nursing/AHP 
hybrids) and (general) managers because it enabled them to simultaneously speak both the 
language of management and of professionalism highlighting the mutually compatible goals 
of both communities (Numerato et al, 2011). EBHC as a Discourse for professionals and 
managers was strongly aligned with the values of patient care, safety and professional pride 
(reference 129 and 132). These concerns justified the regular instigation of MDT meetings at 
Kenworthy (for example, a monthly meeting reviewed all thrombolysis cases) which 
reviewed performance and reflected on professional abilities to deliver effective care at the 
micro-level. Whilst at the meso-level for example, the observational data from the Pan-
London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group emphasised the subjectifying logic (Martin et al, 
2013) of professional leadership and discursive practice based on regular reviews of shared 
narratives around the efficacy of patient journeys through the system and potential problems 




In this way the data suggested that those in leadership posts were particularly important 
because they were uniquely positioned to influence the construction of local contexts (Grint, 
2005; Fairhurst, 2009) to be receptive to evidence based stroke care – thereby minimising 
dissent and professional opposition to the new (increasingly managerial) episteme. Local 
leaders interpreted broader Discourses by emphasising the utility of specific forms of practice 
over others thereby legitimating the disciplinary elements of the new episteme for junior staff 
(Timmermans and Angell, 2001; Broom et al, 2009) (see references 129 and 132).  Self-
discipline then became central to the new stroke specialist identities fostered by the reforms 
for staff (Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2005) on the new HASU and SU at Kenworthy (see 
references 126 and 132). 
 
This self-disciplined cultivation of a specialist identity, as stroke specialist doctors, nurses, 
and AHPs working within the new regime of practice was significant in accounting for why 
these professionals welcomed the disciplinary regimes of the reformed London stroke care 
model and submitted themselves so willingly to techniques of management which may 
appear to have been rather restrictive. Evidence based health care has an ethical – or 
‘inspirational’ (Ferlie et al, 2011) imperative. The HASU and SU staff at Kenworthy were 
able to draw on this imperative to demonstrate a collective transformation of themselves as 
high-functioning, responsible, caring and effective stroke specialist professionals. As 
demonstrated by Martin et al (2013), this was manifested communally drawing upon 
discursive reflective practice, led by credible clinical leaders, and justified by highlighting the 
patient benefits of transformed care. This validated submission to increased disciplinary 
regimes as an ethical realisation of desire (Foucault; 1986; McKinlay and Starkey, 1998) 
through the internalisation of managerialist logic (Osborne, 1993; Doolin, 2001; Pickard, 
2009; Waring and Currie, 2009) for some staff whilst for others, the disciplinary power of the 
365 
 
new episteme functioned by minimising the potentialities and coherence of resistance 




This chapter offered a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis. 
It presented these in three stages – firstly; the problematisation of stroke services in the 
capital which it was suggested led to a refashioning of the episteme of stroke care in London. 
Secondly, the development of the new episteme amongst professional, managerial and other 
stakeholders was explored. Finally, the techniques developed for the implementation of the 
new episteme were discussed in theoretical terms with reference to the empirical data 
collected at both the micro- and macro-levels. The important distinctions between evidence of 
and for practice were described. Following Dean’s analytics of government approach, a non-
subjective intentionality (Dean, 2010) of the London stroke reconfiguration was offered 
which emphasised an increased factor of management control through a reified episteme of 
evidence based stroke care. Rather than being imposed upon professionals by managers, this 
was developed collaboratively between the two communities emphasising the compatibility 
of their goals. 
 
A specifically ‘biopolitical’ approach to interpreting service reconfigurations was developed, 
with close links to the analysis of EBHC functioning as a ‘power/knowledge nexus’. The 
paradox of increased managerial control being experienced as professionally liberating for 
stroke specialist staff was explored which led to a further discussion around key Foucauldian 
concerns related to discipline, and disciplinary power alongside desire and governmentality 
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as an organising concept.  The following chapter offers concluding thoughts on the empirical 
and theoretical significance of the thesis and also reflects upon its limitations and the 









This final chapter reflects back on the thesis as a whole and addresses four distinct areas. 
Firstly, the wider theoretical implications beyond the case are discussed. Secondly, the 
practical implications that these findings have for health policy more broadly are developed. 
Following this, some reflections on the research journey and limitations of the study are 
commented upon before the final section presents future avenues for potential research. 
 
9.2 The theoretical implications of this research 
 
 
An important theoretical contribution which this thesis makes to the health care management 
literature is to demonstrate the utility of interpreting service reconfiguration as a biopolitical 
intervention (Foucault, 2007). This is significant in two respects; firstly in relation to 
specifically Foucauldian influenced studies in health care – which do not fully exploit this 
potentially significant aspect of Foucault’s work; and secondly in relation to health service 
research studies of reconfigurations – studies which are frequently underdeveloped in 
theoretical terms (Fulop et al, 2012). 
 
It was noted that Foucauldian theory was under-utilised in the exploration of strategic level 
change and service reconfiguration. This thesis has attempted to address this gap in the 
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literature by demonstrating the theoretical utility of presenting specific service 
reconfiguration across a defined geographic area as a biopolitical (Foucault, 2007) 
intervention. Foucault’s notions of ‘case, risk, danger, crisis’ (Foucault, 2007) identifying and 
legitimating direct and indirect governmental action are potentially theoretically useful 
beyond this specific case. This is because such an approach encourages analysis of how 
problems are identified at certain times in certain locations which is very much in line with 
Dean’s analytics of government approach (2010) and stems from Foucault’s method of 
‘problematisation.’ What is additive however, is that a biopolitical framing sensitises the 
analyst to a critical handling of the role of epidemiological knowledge (of specific 
populations) and how evidence is discursively used to promote or inhibit change as used  by 
stakeholders involved in the political framing of health care redesign. This is often lacking in 
other reconfiguration studies. 
 
Biopolitics encourages the development of, and is subsequently sustained by a 
power/knowledge nexus (Ferlie et al, 2011) consisting of individuals and institutions that 
derive their legitimacy from the creation and interpretation of detailed data about specific 
populations and phenomena, so an exploration of service redesign as a biopolitical 
intervention is theoretically useful in encouraging analysis of how specific power/knowledge 
nexuses develop and function. This enables the study of particular specific historical 
phenomena consistent with a commitment to the ‘singularity of ways of governing and 
conducting ourselves’ (Dean, 2010; p30) at the heart of the analytics of government 
approach. However, this does not mean that theoretical generalisation is impossible, and a 
therefore a number of theoretical implications for the study of health service reconfiguration 




A biopolitical theory of reconfiguration is concerned with a critical questioning of the 
legitimacy of not only the evidence behind the service redesign itself – but just as 
importantly, how discourse is developed around this evidence and how this then impacts 
upon ethical and economic perceptions of the key reforms through the long process of 
reconfiguration. Therefore it is important to make the distinction between evidence for 
practice, and evidence of practice. These two forms of knowledge are closely related but 
perform separate functions. Evidence for practice is used to reify a specific problem – 
rendering it ‘knowable’ in a new way and in so doing legitimate a new episteme. The 
increasing influence of evidence based health care on policy making in London since the 
1990s discerned be traced through analysis of  policy documents (as in chapter V section 1) 
demonstrating how the new discourse comes to de-politicise contentious decisions by 
showing how change may positively impact upon defined populations.  
 
A biopolitical theory of reconfiguration is also concerned with the population(s) affected by 
the reconfiguration – this refers to the public of a specific locale, a sub-group who as patients 
will be affected more heavily than others; also the professionals whose work is altered; and 
finally, those tasked with managing the governance of the new arrangements. Evidence of 
practice functions by assuring the delivery of the proposed benefits through increased 
targeted surveillance with impacts for governance arrangements and staff subjectivities. The 
London stroke reforms drew upon a discourse which emphasised clinical leadership and 
strategic management collaboration – this was an important factor in de-politicising elements 
of service redesign. Despite this de-politicising potential, EBHC is nevertheless a 
phenomenon with political implications – and this is clear to professional, managerial and 
other stakeholders. Indeed, a further contribution this thesis makes is to explore managers’ 
roles and their reflexivity in interpreting and using the politically powerful Discourse of 
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EBHC and professionals’ understanding of this – both when the goals are and are not 
compatible between the two groups. It is suggested that evidence is negotiated and mediated 
amongst elite groups to further specific ends at specific times and that this is well understood 
by the respective parties. 
 
Building on these ideas, the thesis also makes a number of further contributions to theoretical 
debates related to the Foucauldian literature on governmentality in health care. An important 
one is the development of a specific London stroke ‘power/knowledge nexus’ (Ceci, 2004; 
Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008; Ferlie et al, 2011; Ferlie and McGivern, 2013) as part of the 
reconfiguration and how this impacts upon the creation, interpretation and validation of 
numerous ‘evidence based’ strategies to reform and improve the regimes of practice for 
stroke patients. The power/knowledge nexus concept is explored empirically demonstrating 
the importance of management consultancy and public relations skills alongside the 
legitimising acquiescence of professional patient/carer groups and the marginalised nature of 
the public consultation in shaping change. It is shown how professional jurisdictions may be 
extended (academic clinical elites) or curtailed (AHPs) through the functioning of a 
power/knowledge nexus in a specific disease type in a specific location.  
 
A further important theoretical contribution this thesis makes to the Foucauldian literature on 
governmentality in health care relates to an interpretation of the ‘non-subjective 
intentionality’ (Dean, 2010) of the London stroke reconfiguration programme. It is suggested 
that increasing management control over professional processes focused on caring for stroke 
patients was central to this ‘non-subjective intentionality.’ The reforms heralded increased 
surveillance over the regimes of practice relating to the care of stroke patients. This 
surveillance functioned not merely as a disciplinary force, but was utilised productively by 
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both management and professional communities; in theoretical terms, the thesis demonstrated 
how EBHC may be seen to function as a disciplinary force with productive power (Foucault, 
1977; Brown and Lewis, 2009; Iedema and Rhodes, 2010) aligning the somewhat 
contradictory calls for ‘standardisation’ of care (Timmermans and Berg, 2003) and local 
‘enactment’ (Ferlie and Dopson, 2005) of evidence based care. This highlights the 
complexity of the new regimes of government and practice (Dean, 2010) fostered by EBHC.  
 
These new regimes of government (Dean, 2010) appeal to both ‘economic’ and ‘ethical’ 
logics and may be experienced by staff as both forms of subjection and as forms of 
subjectification (Dean, 2010). In this way, the thesis contributes to the theoretical debate 
around the interplay between discipline and governmentality (Martin et al, 2013) and how 
multiple and conflicting tactics of governance (Newman, 2001) may be drawn upon 
simultaneously highlighting the complexity of health care management. These two competing 
conceptualisations of Foucauldian power are rarely both accounted for together in health care 
studies (Martin et al, 2013) – this thesis adds to the previous work which explores how they 
may be seen to coexist.  
 
Rather than leading to professional resistance as might have been expected, the increased 
management control identified as part of the London stroke reforms was welcomed and 
indeed pursued by both senior and junior professionals  – highlighting that professionals and 
managers share more complex relationships than is often highlighted in the literature 
(Numerato et al, 2011).  An important contribution this thesis makes is to demonstrate how 
this alignment of management and professional goals was achieved. Central to this was that 
firstly, the new regimes of audit and measurement overall were based on relevant clinical 
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evidence and therefore seen as legitimate by most professionals. Secondly, the expressed 
ethos behind the new regimes of government was to ‘performance manage Trusts’ rather than 
individual clinicians – this functioned in the mutual interest of both SHA and PCT managers 
and stroke specialist service managers and professionals at the hospital level and was 
overseen by a trusted, respected intermediary body in the shape of the networks. This 
crucially important alignment of (professional and management) goals legitimated a 
reduction of clinical autonomy for front line stroke specialist staff whilst simultaneously 
furthering the same professionals’ desires to realise their own ethical needs and clinical goals 
(McKinlay and Starkey, 1998).Thus a reduction in clinical autonomy through increased 
discipline is experienced in productive terms for professionals. 
 
9.3 The practical implications of this research for health policy 
 
There are a number of important practical implications raised by this thesis. The first of these 
relates to the need for, or desirability of, regional level strategic health focused organisations. 
One of Andrew Lansley’s key acts as Health Secretary was to abolish SHAs along with PCTs 
as I was half way through writing this thesis. Nigel Edwards famously joked that the only 
things guaranteed to survive nuclear war would be ‘cockroaches and regional health 
authorities’ (Timmins, 2012) and therefore following this argument, it is likely that some kind 
of strategic/regional health authorities will remain – whether under the rubric of the National 
Commissioning Board or elsewhere. Likewise Lansley’s ‘creative destruction’ of NHS 
institutional arrangements also led to a downscaling of regional clinical networks. In practical 
terms, the data collected for this thesis suggest that both the SHA and the networks 





Strong central strategic level leadership shared between managers and professionals appears 
to have been important to challenging the vested interests of institutionally powerful hospitals 
and may be effective in delivering coherent integrated acute and emergency level care 
(Morris et al, 2014). However, whilst reflecting on the achievements of NHS London with 
respect to emergency care reforms, it must not be overlooked that other elements of care 
which Darzi and NHS London attempted to reform were apparently less successfully tackled 
– in stroke, prevention and rehabilitation appear to have been marginalised to the needs of the 
acute care reforms, and another example away from stroke might be the failure of polyclinics 
to be rolled out as extensively as Darzi’s vision called for (Appleby et al, 2011). 
 
Focusing on (disease specific) services to be reconfigured (such as stroke and trauma in 
London); as opposed to individual hospital up/down-grading may be a practical way to 
defuse the inevitable fear that the public has when service redesigns are discussed. Clearly 
linked to this is the use of a Discourse emphasising the  evidence behind specific clinical 
service reconfigurations and the ‘biopolitical’ aspect through which change can deliver 
improved rather than diminished services for patients and the public more widely. In public 
relations terms, service redesign is more likely to be palatable if the benefits for service users 
are well defined and publicised. Clearly, the fact that the stroke service reconfiguration in 
London was additive in financial terms was important, and ring-fencing funds for specific 
services may be an important way assuage public fears around service delivery change. 
 
The compatibility of managerial and professional goals in the London stroke reforms is 
highlighted in the thesis. Where goals are shared and relationships are positive and 




Whilst this thesis has explicitly focused on the discursive role of evidence in influencing the 
London stroke reforms  it has also identified a number of ‘non-Foucauldian’ themes that 
might explain certain elements of the reconfiguration process such as political bargaining and 
structural conflict between different communities (Alford, 1975); interprofessional 
jurisdictional conflict or profession building (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2001; Pickard, 2010). 
In this way, evidence is one of many factors which influence strategic health care change. 
Nevertheless, the thesis has endeavoured to highlight the discursive role played by evidence 
in structural conflict and the reification of stroke as a specialist discipline - drawing 
specifically upon the legitimating power of new evidence based advances in stroke care 
(Langhorne and Dennis, 1998). It might be speculated that less well established disciplines 
(such as stroke) might be more willing to submit to increased regimes of audit and 
managerial control than more established, historically well established and structurally 
dominant disciplines (for example, surgery – as highlighted by Waring (2007) in his patient 
safety study). A practical implication of this research might be that large scale service 
redesign which requires increased managerial input and oversight may be less contentious if 
focused on emergent specialities with new evidence bases.  
 
This thesis offers some thoughts on the effectiveness of late New Labour health policy 
making. Increased audit and targeted tariff arrangements did incentivise both professional and 
managerial stakeholders to alter their practice. Clinical leadership was more than a mere 
rhetorical construct in these particular reforms, and commissioners were closely involved in 
ensuring that historic underperformance in stroke care was challenged aided by responsive 
networks. The data from the micro-level study suggests that at the same time, this did 
increase pressure on staff and the disciplinary power of increased regimes of surveillance led 
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to some disaffection – particularly for lower status staff. Thus increased regimes of audit 
must take into account the potentially negative effects they may have on staff – it was not 
always clear that this was factored into these reforms, and whilst MDT working was 
encouraged and became an important aspect of the new stroke regimes of practice, there also 
are some senses in which divisions between professional groups were exacerbated by the 
increased pressure of the new regimes of government. 
 
These findings demonstrate that various programmes of reform may take a long time to 
influence regimes of government and ultimately practice – they build incrementally and show 
how government is a ‘constantly problematising activity’ (Dean, 2010). The change 
described here is contextually specific and dependent upon local and historical trends. The 
London reforms were informed by evidence and influenced by intuition – indeed, those who 
designed the London model highlight in interviews for this thesis, the lack of evidence for 
many aspects of it. Reforms – particularly high profile (and ‘successful’) ones like this may 
develop a perceived sense of ‘naturalness’ or ‘inevitability’ – it is important to challenge the 
‘taken-for-granted’ nature (Dean, 2010) of such reforms – for two reasons: first – this type of 
reform constructs its own ‘scientific’ legitimacy and definitive episteme – but things could 
have been done differently and this should be highlighted; second - the London model has 
come to be cited so frequently in contemporary politics and referred to as a model of 
reference for further reforms across the country. As public opinion continues to regard the 
London stroke reforms in positive terms (Boseley, 2014), it is important that the London 
model is not seen as the only way to modernise the delivery of stroke care (or indeed other 
diseases). What is important is that the best aspects are consolidated in new services 
elsewhere, whilst the weaker aspects are recognised and improved as stroke care is reformed 





9.4 Reflections and limitations 
 
This thesis generated many thousands of words from multiple sources for analysis. Given the 
volume of data, sometimes difficult decisions need to be made around the best ways to focus 
the study in both theoretical and empirical terms. A potential limitation of the present study 
may be that it focuses too heavily on the acute care aspects of the reconfiguration – to the 
detriment of the preventative and rehabilitation aspects of stroke care. Another criticism 
might be that an interest in the role played by clinical evidence was prioritised over other 
forms of evidence – commissioning, or finance evidence for instance. Both criticisms would 
be valid but may also be mitigated. Firstly, the data generated and analysed as part of the 
thesis is much richer with respect to acute care elements of the reconfiguration – it therefore 
made sense to explore this data as deeply as possible whilst drawing attention to how 
prevention and rehabilitation aspects were marginalised in both the design and 
implementation of the London model. Secondly, in justification of the clinical evidence 
prioritisation over other forms; again, there is more data on clinical evidence (in both volume 
and detail) than managerial, organisational, economic or financial evidence in the data 
collected by interview, documents and observations. Furthermore, my analysis of this data 
highlights that clinical evidence was more significant than other forms of evidence.  
 
A further limitation is the lack of patient and public involvement (PPI) in this research. In 
some ways, this may reflect changing social science practice between the commencement of 
this PhD research in 2009 and its completion in 2014. Were it that I was starting this research 
now, I would approach a stroke survivor group at the outset to canvass opinion on potential 
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PPI factors to consider as part of the research – however this was less of a concern in 2009 
than it may be seen to be now. The research is limited by the lack of PPI involvement and this 
was compounded by the difficulties faced in recruiting members of the patient representative 
panel to consent to be interviewed. Nevertheless, as important as the PPI angle is, the focus 
of this thesis and the research questions driving it is very much around professional-
managerial relations and the ways in which these central stakeholder groups interpret, utilise 
and implement evidence in stroke care.  
 
Another possible limitation was that the retrospective nature of the research hindered ‘real 
time’ observations of the work of the various panels involved in the early work of the 
reconfiguration.  Likewise the time in the field at Kenworthy was restricted which also 
hindered attempts to generate micro-level observational data which might have strengthened 
the overall dataset. Taken together, this inability to apply a longitudinal timeframe to certain 
(but not all) aspects of the research made data collection focused on the identity strand of the 
analytics of government difficult. A limitation of the embedded case study design at 
Kenworthy was that the thesis only studied one hospital site – and it was one which benefitted 
from the reconfiguration by virtue of the increased funding, staff and overall profile that 
came with HASU, SU and TIA service investment. Given greater resources, it might have 
been useful to have also researched staff perceptions at the micro-level at a unit that did not 
benefit in the same way from the site selection – staff perceptions at sites which ‘lost out’ 
may well be very different from those that might be termed ‘HASU winners’. However, 
whilst recognising this limitation, firstly, given the inevitable limits of PhD research there is 
justification that if only one site may be explored in detail, that it is one which was upgraded 
by the reconfiguration because it is here that the new model and its effects on staff can be 
best discerned. Secondly, the case study I interview data covered a number of staff who saw 
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their services downgraded and thus covers many of the issues felt and emotions generated for 
those working at ‘HASU loser’ sites. Thirdly, I was conscious that another research team 
with greater resources was conducting research comparing the experiences of HASU 
‘winners and losers’ in London (and other cities) – so my findings will sit alongside this other 
research when published. 
 
A final reflection focuses on the processes of anonymisation and pseudonymisation. Whilst 
the high profile nature of the London reforms is a positive factor which adds to the interest 
and wider relevance of this work, it also has to be noted that the London stroke ‘world’ is 
relatively small and many of the individuals are well known to the London NHS community 
– likewise there were relatively few senior SHA managers involved in the reconfiguration 
and the names of both clinical and managerial stakeholders are published and available via 
NHS London documents and webpages. Likewise, with reference to the site selection issue, 
there is plenty of data in the public domain relating to how different hospitals were affected – 
limiting the strength of my use of pseudonyms. Added to this are my personal and 
professional relationships with some of the key informants that have developed over the years 
through both the PhD and the EIS project, complicating my ethical commitments to 
stakeholders and perhaps leading to (self) censorship of certain aspects of the interview data – 
as I feared that some comments – even anonymised – might be (rightly or wrongly) attributed 
to certain figures and that this might be problematic. Some data has therefore not been used 






9.5 Future research agenda 
 
This research has suggested that Foucault’s concept of ‘biopolitics’ (2007) is potentially 
useful to frame studies of health care reconfigurations. It would be interesting to develop this 
theory by applying it to other health care reconfigurations to test it further – what for instance 
could such a concept teach us about other attempts at reconfiguration? As an example, why 
have efforts to reconfigure paediatric cardiology services proven so difficult? In biopolitical 
terms, it might be interesting to consider the type of population for who services are being 
reconfigured; it might also be fruitful to consider the impacts that the  geographical areas 
covered by reconfiguration has on efforts at reform. 
 
Another potentially fruitful avenue would be to consider further research into manager-
professional relationships in reconfigurations. This thesis has found a high degree of 
compatibility between the two traditionally dominant powers – is this related to the 
jurisdictional  work around ‘professionalising’ stroke as a distinct subspecialty – might 
change focused on established specialisms be more fraught in relational terms? Likewise, 
would change in more financially restricted times be more difficult than that of the stroke 
reconfiguration in London? 
 
It might be interesting to focus research into the identities of senior professional leaders as 
they take on more managerial responsibilities as part of drives for clinical leadership led by 
service reconfigurations. Also work may be needed on the furtherance of prevention, 
rehabilitation and community developments in stroke – for example around ESD services. 
Likewise, further work is required to explore how the roles previously overseen by SHAs and 
PCTs are performed in the ‘new’ NHS (if at all). Finally, more work on the power/knowledge 
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nexus concept and how it creates, implements and assures compliance to evidence based 
guidelines and practices, and the impact this has on both professional and managerial 
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Appendix A: Timeline of London Health Care Reform and stroke developments 
 
 
London Health Service reform 
 
(taken from Appleby et al, 2011 p2) 
 
Year Developments in stroke care 
 
(taken from unpublished EIS working 
paper [Rudd] and Langhorne and 
Dennis, 2008) 
Select Committee of the House of 
Lords’ report on metropolitan hospitals 
1890  
Report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Medical Schools 
(Goodenough) 
1944  
Hospital Survey of Greater London 
(Clark et al) 
1956 Early experimentation with ‘proto-SUs’ 
(e.g. Northern Ireland) 
Towards a Balance (London Health 
Planning Consortium (LHPC)) 
1979 Norwegian and Swedish SUs established 
Primary Healthcare for inner London 
(LHPC) 
1981  
 1983 Nottingham Hospital SU established 
Planed Health Services for Inner 
London: Back to Back Planning (The 
King’s Fund) 
1987  
London Healthcare 2010 (The King’s 
Fund) 
 
Tomlinson Report: Inquiry into 
London’s Health Service, Medical 
Education and Research 
1992  
Making London Better. Government 
Response to Tomlinson  
1993  
 1995 Research - NINDS trial (thrombolysis 
trial up to 3 hours 
London Commission: Transforming 
health in London (The King’s Fund) 
 
Turnberg Report: Health Services in 
London: a Strategic Review 
(Department of Health) 




 1998  
Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 1999 Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 
Changes to training/status of stroke 
professionals - British Association of 
Stroke Physicians established (the first 
stroke medical organisation in the UK) 
417 
 
 2000 Guidelines - RCP National Clinical 
Guidelines 1st edition  
 
Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 2001 National Policy Documents - National 
Service Framework for Older People  set 
‘milestone’ that every hospital in 
England should have a stroke unit by 
April 2004 and also some other 
milestones on TIA management 
 
 
 2002 Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 2004 Guidelines - RCP National Clinical 
Guidelines 2nd edition  
 
Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 
Targets and funding – QOF targets for 
stroke 
 
 2005 Audit – National Audit Office – 
Reducing Brain Damage: Faster access 
to better stroke care 
 2006 Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 
Development of networks of 
professionals -UK Stroke Forum 
established. Largest multidisciplinary 
stroke meeting in the world with >1500 
attendees at the annual meetings 
 
Darzi Review: Healthcare for London – 
A Framework for Action (Healthcare 
for London) 
2007 Research - EXPRESS study (Rothwell 
et al) showing that rapid intervention 
after TIA highly effective at preventing 
stroke 
 
Guidelines - NICE Technology 
Appraisal on tPA – should be provided 
to all appropriate 
 
National Policy Documents – National 
Stroke Strategy (DoH) 
 
Changes to training/status of stroke 





medical specialty in UK. Steady increase 
in training posts since then and a big 
expansion in the number of stroke 
consultant posts in the UK. 
 2008 Guidelines - RCP National Clinical 
Guidelines 3rd edition 
 
Guidelines - NICE Guidelines on Acute 
Stroke and TIA 
 
Audit - National Sentinel Audit 
 
Targets and funding – Vital Signs – 
90% stay on stroke unit and proportion 
patients with high risk TIA seen and 
treated within 24 hours 
 
 2010 Research - CLOTS trials showing that 
stockings ineffective preventing DVT 
after stroke 
 
Guidelines - NICE TA on anti-platelet 
agents recommending the combined use 
of aspirin and dipyridamole for 
secondary prevention updated to 
recommend clopidogrel 
 







































































Appendix D: List of documents reviewed 
Via NHS London website 
No Date Title  Description 
1 2008 Overview of contents Information for hospitals bidding for new stroke 
services 
2 2008 Bid checklist Aid to bidders to co-ordinate their bid submission. 
3 2008 Background 
information 
This paper provides background information 
relevant to the designation of acute stroke services 
across 
London 
4 2008 Overview of 
designation process 
This paper provides an overview of the different 
stages of the designation process, which will 
determine 
the configuration of providers that will deliver 
London’s acute stroke services 
5 2008 Guidance on the 
designation process 
This paper provides guidance to potential 
providers of acute stroke services on the 
designation process 
6 2008 Evaluation process Description of factors to be used to assess bids 
7 2008 Overview of 
commissioning and 
finance arrangements 
This paper sets out what the commissioning and 
finance arrangements will be for implementing 
acute 
stroke services within London. 
8 2008 Designation criteria for 
provision of a HASU 
service 
This designation criteria document outlines the 
service specification required to be met by 
providers intending to bid for the future provision 
of a hyper acute stroke unit (HASU) service 
9 2008 Designation criteria for 
provision of an SU 
service 
This designation criteria document outlines the 
service specification required to be met by 
providers intending to bid for the future provision 
of a stroke unit (SU) service 
10 2008 Designation criteria for 
provision of a TIA 
service 
This designation criteria document outlines the 
service specification required to be met by 
providers intending to bid for the future provision 
of a transient ischaemic attack (TIA) service. 
11 2008 Preliminary acute 
stroke strategy for 
London 
This document sets out the preliminary acute 
stroke strategy for London. Its purpose is for wider 
engagement and discussion with commissioners, 
service providers and other key stakeholders, 
before a stroke strategy incorporating prevention, 
acute and community rehabilitation is published in 
autumn 2008.  
12 2008 Preliminary acute 
stroke strategy for 
London: cover note 
Sets out the rationale behind the strategy 
13 2009 Pan-London high level 
guidance for stroke 
protocols 
High level guidance on stroke protocols, based on 
the best available evidence, with particular 
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emphasis placed on issues that may be difficult to 
resolve on a network level.  
 
14 2008 Patient flows for each 
London PCT 
This analysis provides a breakdown of predicted 
stroke 
patient flows for 2008. It details stroke events, 
mimics, 
hospitalisations, SU and HASU death, survivors 
and bed days that could be expected for London 
PCTs and the main non-London PCTs. 
15 2008 Summary of the 
London consultation 
feedback 
This document contains extracts taken from the 
Report on the Consulting the Capital and sections 
that cover the proposals to create a number of 
specialist stroke services in London 





This paper analyses the incidence of stroke among 
different equality groups, detailing the main 
findings relating to acute stroke services and 
making recommendations relating to stroke 
pathways. 
17 2008 Summary of sentinel 
audit, National Stroke 
Strategy 
and draft NICE 
guidelines 
This paper briefly highlights the key documents on 
which the Stroke Strategy draws (the Sentinel 
Audit, National Stroke Strategy and draft NICE 
guidelines). 
18 2008 Scale of the problem This paper gives an overview of the incidence, 
implications and costs of stroke in the UK. 
19 2008 Panel membership This paper details the membership of the following 
groups; Stroke Project Board, Clinical Expert 
Panel, Commissioning and Finance Panel, Patient 
and Carer Panel. 
20 2008 Key deliverables Information now included in the main document 
21 2008 Summary of the as-is 
assessment 
This paper summarises the key themes that were 
drawn from an assessment of the current acute 
stroke care system in London. 
22 2008 Summary of the three 
main stroke patient 
pathways 
This set of diagrams describes the current stroke 
patient 
pathways for Thombolysis, non-Thrombolysis and 
TIA care 
23 2008 Costs of acute stroke 
services broken down 
by PCT 
Detailed figures of costs based on available HRG 
information for London PCTs. 
24 2008 Summary of approach 
to modelling 
This paper explains in detail the derivation of the 
model used by the stroke team to generate the 
detailed analysis around stroke incidents. 
25 2008 Scope of financial 
assessment of stroke 
services 
This paper outlines the various approaches and 
assumptions used in identifying the costs of acute 
stroke care in London currently and what further 
work is required. 
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26 2008 Breakdown of the 2006 
Sentinel Audit for 
London hospitals 
This table contains key summary data by NHS 
Trust from the2006 Sentinel Audit for London 
Hospitals.  
27 2008 Analysis of current 
state of stroke services 
This paper documents the analysis of current 
stroke service provision, identifying specific 
challenges, tracking problems and examples of 
good practice. 






Ontario model of hyper 
acute stroke care 
Healthcare Quarterly (2006) academic paper 
29 2008 High-level stroke 
pathway 
This diagram is drawn from the National Stroke 
Strategy and highlights the Quality Markers across 
the acute pathway relating to the awareness, 
diagnosis and treatment phases of the pathway. 
30 2008 Performance standards This paper focuses on the performance standards 
for the Acute part of the pathway for patients 
undergoing 
thrombolysis; patients not undergoing 
thrombolysis; and, TIA patients. 
31 2008 Service specifications This paper outlines detailed service specifications 
for each stage in the acute stroke patients pathway. 
The new model of care for stroke will require 
providers to meet these service specifications 
32 2008 Challenges mapped by 
the new model 
This paper highlights the key challenges identified 
for the implementation of the new model. 
33 2008 Range of configuration 
options 
 
Details of the three proposed models for the 
configuration of acute stroke services in London 
 
 
34 2008 Evaluation criteria 
process 
Process for developing a set of criteria to evaluate 
the various potential models for stroke services as 
well as evaluate the locations for the new services. 
Includes the list of criteria. 
35 2008 Commissioning 
responsibilities 
Outlines the expected commissioning 
responsibility for the various levels in the system 
for Pan London, Sector and PCT. 
36 2008 Proposed role of the 
London stroke networks 
Outlines the role of the London stroke networks 
in: 
clinical leadership, quality, innovation, education 
and training and audit going forwards 
37 2008 Patient and carer 
involvement 
This paper details the proposed mechanisms for 
securing robust engagement with patients and 
carers both during the consultation phase for this 
strategy, and for future service delivery. 
38 2008 Challenges gap 
assessment 
This paper maps the gap between the current 
services and the new model of care identified. A 
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list of actions is outlined to ensure effective 
implementation. 
39 2008 Service specification 
and benefits realisation 
Outlines how the benefits realisation framework 
matches the Service Specification to the 
Evaluation Criteria. It describes a clear schedule of 
metrics to be generated to ensure the full benefits 




analysis of the London 
Stroke Service 
Report by Prof Stephen Morris et al (UCL) to 
evaluate cost-effectiveness of new model 
41  Commissioning and 
finance framework 
presentation 
Presentation explaining how new London uplift 
tariff will function and potential pitfalls alongside 
measures built into counter these – i.e. HASU 
payments cease after 5 days on HASU to 
incentivise Trusts not to game the system 
42 2012 Healthcare for London: 
reflections on 
leadership, lessons and 
legacy 
NHS London publication explaining and reflecting 







to commission quality 
services in 2010/11 
Sets out recognition that acute care has dominated 
and sets out key performance markers for in-
patient, and post in-patient care 
44 Nov 
2008 
London stroke strategy 
web version 
Includes in appendix 2 performance standards for 
prevention, HASU, SU, TIA, IP rehab, community 
rehab, GP care, voluntary sector 
45 2010 NAO report for DH – 
progress in improving 
stroke care 
Details update in practice since the 2005 report 
46 2008 Stroke designation 
round clarification of 
questions 













This document provides guidance on the 
commissioning and tariff arrangements 
associated with the new acute stroke system in 
London. 
It summarises the case for change, model of care 
and the process undertaken to designate units. 
t then outlines the framework developed to 
encourage the correct system behaviours in order 
to achieve the intended benefits. 
48 2008 Quantum for stroke by 
provider and PCT 
Cost of stroke by provider by PCT - NHS and 











Non-medical staff training requirements review 








TOR Stroke Clinical 
Reference Group 
Sets out terms of reference and governance for 






major trauma and stroke 
services in London 
 
Consultation document draft for public 
52 2009 NCAT stroke report Review of the external clinical panel by NCAT 
prior to recommendations going out for public 
consultation – based on interviews with key 
stakeholders, judging strength of the clinical case, 
sustainability of plans, support of clinicians, what 
more could be done to improve the processes – 
major recommendation is increased clinical 
support in the roll out of the new configuration. 
53 2009 
(2006) 
Provincial Status Report: 
Ontario Stroke System 
May 2006 report reviewing the successes and 
challenges of the Ontario Stroke System with 
learning points for the London team 
54 2008 Stroke Project 
Governance 
Document setting out key roles needed for the 
various reconfiguration panels 
55 2009 Stroke Implementation 
Options PPT 
Presentation listing options available for 
supporting implementation programme in the light 
of the low quality of bids received from many 
providers – recommends interventional 
commissioning approach and close clinical 
monitoring   
56 ?2008 Stroke Incidence PPT Presentation by M Wilson documenting how the 
HCfL stroke model is composed of a composite 
of; population predictions, stroke incidence data, 
stroke type data, re-occurence rates – led to two 
models – one based on population model (LSE), 
the other based on activity/finance data (HES) – 
these were merged to provide the number of stroke 
beds recommended by the model. 
57 2008 
(2006) 
Time is Brain; Saver, J. Academic article from Stroke – classic paper 
arguing for stroke to be treated as an emergency 
condition 
58 2009 Appendix 1: Decision 
making processes and 
criteria to be used by the 
JCPCT to agree future 
service provision 
arrangements 
Document which sets out the criteria by which 
  
the decision making processes it will adopt to 
agree future service provision arrangement.  
 
the specific criteria it will utilise to determine the 




59 2009 Briefing paper for PCT 
boards 
This report and its appendices detail the key processes 
adopted in relation to The shape of things to come – a 
consultation on improving stroke and major trauma 
care in London. It also provides information regarding 
the responses received from the public, NHS 
organisations and key stakeholders. 
 Focus on workforce, implementation, IT, finance 
and commissioning, whole pathway change, 
evaluation 
 
Of note – negative impacts of stroke reforms are 
discussed – point viii p23 – suggests that focus on 
stroke prioritisation may impact negatively on 
other (non-stroke) patients 
60 2009 Board cover sheet for 
PCTs 
Advice for board on ‘The shape of things to come’ 
61 2009 The shape of things to 
come 
Public consultation document which sets out the 
main arguments for and against the plans for 
trauma and stroke reconfiguration (including 
preferred plans etc) and invites consultation from 
the public 
62 2009 Top-line consultation 
responses 
Basic breakdown of consultation results 
63 2009 London councils, 
councillors and overview 
& scrutiny committees 
consultation responses 
Council by council response to the trauma and 
stroke proposals – uncontroversially, where 
services are upgraded they are supported, where 
downgraded they are not. Most councils agree 
with the general thrust of specialisation however 
64 2009 London Commercial 
Organisations 
Consultation 
2 responses – from a Somali health promotion 
community organisation in W London, and from 
‘perfect chicken’ 
65 2009 LAS response Well written document putting the position of the 
LAS in context – generally supportive of both 
trauma & stroke plans 
66 2009 London faith 
organisations responses 
Various faith groups responses 
67 2009 PCTs consultation 
responses 
Responses broken down by PCT 
68 2009 Health providers and 
commissioners responses 
to consultation 
Responses broken down by providers and 
commissioners (including non-London sites) – 
again, the sense is that where options suit local 
providers/commissioners they are supported – 
where not they are not. Some responses are more 
detailed than others – for instance the response 
from King’s Health Partners is particularly 
impressive – citing the Heuschmann et al paper on 
SU size and questioning the logic of co-location. 
69 2009 Local medical 
committees consultation 
responses 
GP responses – short and positive 
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70 2009 MPs, Mayors & London 
Assembly responses 
Overall generally supportive of the thrust to 
centralise – but with questions over locations – 
particularly where their own (constituents’) 
interests are impaired by loss of service. A 
Lansley’s response is of note as parliamentary 
stroke group chair, and soon to be Health 
Secretary – a real dislike of the plan to focus on 8 
HASUs (questions the evidence based behind 
this), and desire for any provider willing to meet 
criteria to be included – and also backs RFH & St 
T. Seems apparent that under him, coordinated 
planned rationalisation would not be in vogue. 
71 2009 Patient, public & 
voluntary representative 
organisations 
Interesting local and elderly focus – for example, 
Age Concern Haringey response talks about 
transport links for elderly residents – cut off from 
hi-tech EBM discourse 
72 2009 Professional & trade 
bodies consultation 
responses 
Again generally supportive – states case for rehab 
to be more prominent, alongside specific issues to 
do with recruitment, staffing/banding, and 
evidence behind certain interventions. Articulates 
need for more thought around community care 
73 2009 Responses received 
outside the consultation 
period 
A number of late responses are presented here 
74 2009 Beyond the bath board: 
vocational rehabilitation 
PPT 
75 2009 Community care event 
presentation 
PPT 
76 2009 Community Rehab best 
practice 
PPT 
77 2009 Conceptualising stroke 
rehab 
PPT 
78 2009 CPD event Andrew 
Jackson 
PPT 
79 2009 CPD event Health 
Professions Council 
PPT 
80 2009 CPD event Kingston 
University 
PPT 
81 2009 CPD event Stroke 
Association 
PPT 
82 2009 CPD event Tony Rudd PPT – interesting slide around 
‘transforming/specialising stroke services’ 
83 2009 Defined review best 
practice 
PPT – pilot studies of different community rehab 
regimes 
84 2009 ESD best practice PPT 
85 2009 Financing stroke 
community rehab  
PPT 
86 2009 Integrating health social 








88 2009 National Stroke Strategy 
direction of travel 
PPT – R Boyle presentation – useful – especially 
‘direction of travel slide’ 




90 2009 Structuring quality rehab 
services 
PPT 





92 2010 LMDS Description of London Minimum Data Set criteria 
93 2010 SINAP criteria Description of SINAP criteria 
94 2010 SINAP web-tool Web tool for collation of SINAP data 
 





Pan London Acute 
Stroke 
Services 
Appendix A: Integrated Impact Assessment 
Matrix  
Appendix B: Details on the Stakeholder 
Workshop Event  
Appendix C: Qualitative Access Review  
Appendix D: Carbon Assessment 
Assumptions and Emission Factors  
Appendix E: Stroke Access Assessment 
Maps  
Appendix F: Carbon Assessment Detailed 
Results and Context Data  
Appendix G: Further Analysis on Hyper-
Acute Stroke Unit Pairings 
96 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 10- 
Consultation on stroke 
& trauma service 
development 
Committee asked to approve the consultation 
document  
97 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 11- 
Consultation strategy 
on stroke & trauma 
service development 
Committee asked to approve the consultation 
strategy 
98 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 2- 
remit of JCPCT 
This paper explains the basis on which the 
JCPCT has been established, the terms of 
reference of the JCPCT, the arrangements for 
chairing the JCPCT and the standing orders 
to be followed by the JCPCT. 
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99 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 4- 
purpose of meeting 
This paper provides an overview of: 
· the purpose of the meeting; 
· the development of the options presented; 
· the content of the pre-consultation business 
case; 
· the options proposed for consultation; 
· the consultation process, 
· and details the key decisions which need to 
be 
made. 
100 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 4- 




The JCPCT has received a range of 
supporting information and papers at its 
informal meetings leading up to its formal 
meeting on 27th January 2009. These papers 
include travel time methodology, designation 
process overview, incidence of stroke in 
London, principles and good practice in 
developing options for consultation, and an 
implementation framework. 
101 27/01/09 JCPCT – power point 
by SRO – 
Implementation options 
for stroke 
Highlights findings from bid evaluation and 
plans for implementation – interesting point 
re poor bids and lack of management support 
– need for external support 
102 27/01/09 JCPCT agenda item 6 – 
criteria to be used by 
JCPCT to agree options 
for public consultation 
Outlines proposed criteria 
103 27/01/09 JCPCT Jan 2009 
meeting notes 
The above documents are ratified 
104 27/01/09 JCPCT meeting Jan 
2009 – pre-consultation 
business case 
The Pre-Consultation Business Case details 
the 
case for change, the process to determine the 
options, the financial issues and the benefits 
expected 
105 Jan 2009 Stroke Services 
presentation 
Short presentation by SRO – interesting as 
makes arguments around co-location with 
Trauma 
106 20/07/09 Report of the outcomes 
of consultation and 
recommended decisions 
for the Joint Committee 
of PCTs 
Description of the work of the project team 
in designing and conducting the consultation 
for both stroke and trauma 
107 July 
2009 
JCPCT July 2009 
meeting notes 
This is the important meeting where the 
HASU, SU & TIA service site selection is 





Short presentation re stroke incidence in 
London 
109  Communications 
activity report 




110 22/01/09 Healthcare for London  
Consultation strategy 
for stroke and major 
trauma services in 
London 
This strategy is a ‘blueprint’ for the 
Healthcare for London consultation with 
stakeholders on acute stroke and major 
trauma services in London. The strategy 
follows good communications practice and 
focuses on what will be meaningful to our 
stakeholders, as opposed to the production 
and promotion of project outputs. 
111  Evaluation assurance 
plan Major trauma and 
stroke 
This paper outlines proposals to take forward 
an evaluation planning framework for the 
new trauma and stroke systems with primary 
care trusts (PCTs), the London trauma 
director and the London stroke medical 
director. As such, it forms part of the 
assurance process to support the decision-
making of the Joint Committee of Primary 
Care Trusts (JCPCT) following consultation 
on the options for major trauma and acute 
stroke services across London. 
112 20/07/09 Developing new, high-
quality major trauma 
and stroke services for 
London 
The material contained in these documents 
provides an opportunity for the JCPCT to 
make recommendations to commissioners to 
ensure we pursue all opportunities to 
enhance quality and address the risks to 
successful implementation. The 
recommendations in this report are primarily 
based on an assessment of the above reports, 
by the stroke and trauma project boards and 
the Clinical Advisory Group. 
113 09/06/09 Consultation with 
traditionally under-
represented groups on 
the ‘shape of things to 
come’ 
Report done by ‘Health Link’ to canvass 
opinions of those often missed by 
consultations 
114  Implementation and 
transition assurance  
Stroke 
This paper sets out the Healthcare for 
London stroke project board’s assurance that 
the implementation of the preferred 
configuration (eight hyper-acute stroke units 
and 21 stroke units and transient ischaemic 
attack (TIA) services, together with three 
stroke units with TIA services in north east 
London), as set out in the consultation The 
shape of things to come is deliverable. This 
paper also outlines arrangements which have 
been agreed to enable smooth transition. 
115 16/07/09 Ipsos Mori consultation 
analysis Over 70% of individuals responding were in 
agreement with the proposal as to how stroke 
care would be provided in the future and 
agreed that eight hyper-acute stroke units 
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would provide the best urgent care for stroke 
patients in London. The major concerns with 
the proposed idea of eight hyper-acute stroke 
units surrounded the issue of location, 
ensuring patients get urgent medical attention.  
Whilst there was general support for the focus 
on specialist stroke care from key stakeholder 
organisations, some expressed concerns that 
the evidence base for the stroke care proposals 
was not as compelling as that for specialist 
major trauma centres.  
 
There was concern from some organisations 
with regards to the proposed location of 
hyper-acute stroke units (HASUs), 
particularly in terms of provision in outer 
London boroughs. The need for greater outer 
London coverage was mentioned by those 
organisations representing residents in Barnet 
and Enfield. However, there was agreement 
from transport organisations that blue light 
ambulance travel times could be met.  
Three in five (61%) respondents were in 
favour of the proposed configuration of 
hyper-acute stroke units and three-quarters 
(75%) were in agreement with the proposed 
configuration of stroke units and TIA 
services. Alternative locations for the units 
were the most frequently mentioned reason 




Joint Health Overview 
& Scrutiny Committee 
(JHOSC) to review 
Consultation proposals 
from 'Healthcare for 
London': "The Shape of 
Things to Come - 
Developing New, High-
quality Major Trauma 
and Stroke Services for 
London" 
This report presents the formal response of 
the Joint Health Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee (JHOSC) established to consider 
“The shape of things to come”, the 
consultation on developing high-quality 
major trauma and stroke services in London, 
undertaken by the Joint Committee of 
Primary Care Trusts (JCPCT) between 
January and May 2009. 
 
That the immediate eight HASUs should be 
seen as the minimum number, and the JCPT 
should be prepared regularly to review this 
number and to increase the number if 
demand justifies it; 
 





Joint Overview and 
Scrutiny Committee 
terms of reference 
 
118 2009 Strategic coherence  
Stroke and major 
trauma 
The JCPCT utilised 3 criteria when 
formulating options for inclusion in the public 
consultation which took place between 
January and May 2009. One of the criteria was 
strategic coherence. In applying this criterion 
the JCPCT developed options which enable 
co-location of major trauma and hyper acute 
stroke services and were aligned with the 
development of Major Acute Hospitals.  
The committee has indicated that it would 
wish to utilise strategic coherence as a 
criterion when formally taking decisions 
regarding the future configuration of acute 
stroke and major trauma service provision on 
July 20
th
. This paper seeks to clarify the 
rationale for utilising the strategic coherence 
criterion and explains how it could be 
applied in the JCPCT decision making 
processes. 
119 30/06/09 Clinical Advisory 
Group report  
Stroke 
This report identifies the issues raised during 
the consultation which, by virtue of their 
nature and significance, merited 
consideration by the Clinical Advisory 
Group (CAG) at its meeting of 26 June 2009. 
The CAG considered information and 
assessments made by the Healthcare for 
London stroke team in respect of these 
issues.  
The purpose of this paper is to present to the 
JCPCT the CAG’s views on these issues and 
the corresponding assessments.  
This report does not include the challenges 
made to the preferred location of hyper-acute 
and stroke unit services proposed in the 
consultation document; these were not 
discussed at the CAG following legal advice. 
120  Commentary on the 
consultation  
Stroke 
The purpose of this paper is to present the 
main issues raised during the public 
consultation on stroke to the JCPCT and the 
Healthcare for London stroke project’s 
commentary on these issues. 
121  Deliverability assurance  
Stroke 
This paper forms part of the assurance 
process to support the decision making of the 
Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts 
(JCPCT) following a period of public 
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consultation about the proposed 
configuration of providers of hyper-acute 
stroke units (HASUs), stroke units (SUs) and 
transient ischaemic attack (TIA) services. It 
describes the planning that has taken place 
which will enable the JCPCT to be confident 
in designating the new acute stroke service. 
122  Finance and 
commissioning 
assurance plan  
Stroke 
This paper aims to provide assurance to the 
Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts 
(JCPCT) that the proposals for the stroke 
system are affordable and that plans exist to 
commission the new stroke services and 
ensure that the benefits are delivered. 
123  Information and 
technology assurance  
Stroke 
The London Programme for Information 
Technology (LPfIT) and the Healthcare for 
London stroke project have been working 
together to examine areas of IT support and 
infrastructure that could be developed and 
implemented to underpin and improve the 
delivery of stroke services in London. These 
developments are not essential to the 
functioning of future stroke services but 
provide an opportunity to develop efficient, 
high-quality integrated systems. 
124  Whole pathway 
assurance paper  
Stroke 
The plans in place to continue work on the 
non-acute aspects of the stroke pathway 
allow assurance to be offered that a decision 
on the future of acute stroke services can be 
taken. 
125  Workforce assurance  
Stroke 
This paper gives assurance that there are 
plans in place to ensure that there will be 
sufficient workforce in place to enable the 








PhD work Year EIS work 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
Informal discussions with contacts 
about the stroke reconfiguration 
Sept 
2009 
Systematic reviews of medical and social 
science implementation literatures 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
Ethical clearance 
Observations began September 
(analysis concurrent) 
2010 Systematic reviews of medical and social 
science implementation literatures 
Began international case studies 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
PhD upgrade July 
Case study 1 pilot interviews then 
formal interviews began in August 
Case study 2 interviews September-
December 
Interview data analysis concurrent 
2011 Ongoing international case studies and 
data analysis 
Started to write Leadership paper – 
drawing on Dean framework in early 
stages 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
Observations ended September  
Ongoing case study 1 interviews – these 
were completed in 2012 
Interview data analysis concurrent 
2012 Ongoing data analysis, project 
commitments and paper writing 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
Interview data analysis concurrent 
Writing up status from September 
2013 Ongoing data analysis, and project 
commitments and paper writing 
Teaching role 
Documentary analysis, literature review 
Writing up to September 
Sept 
2014 





















1. Please tell me a little about your background; i.e. your job title, your role in the organisation, 
how long you have worked here? 
2. Please tell me about how you were involved in the reconfiguration of stroke services in 
London? 
3. In your opinion, what have been the effects of the reconfiguration? 
 
Visibility 
4. Why were stroke services identified for reconfiguration? 
5. Are all areas of stroke care being reconfigured (i.e. primary care, secondary prevention, 
community rehab, acute and hyper acute)?  





7. What is the evidence behind the reconfiguration? 
8. Where does this evidence come from? 
9. Is any of the evidence disputed, and if so, how are disputes resolved? 
 
Techniques 
10. What techniques are used to change practice in line with the goals of the reconfiguration? 
11. Is there resistance to this, and if so, how is this managed? 
12. How do you know these techniques are effective? 
 
Identity 
13. How have these changes affected staff? 
14. Has clinical autonomy been affected? 
15. Is there resistance to this, and if so, how is this managed? 
 
Conclusions/reflections 






Appendix G: EIS project Interview schedule 8 24/11/10 
 
Development of a European Implementation Score for measuring 





1. Please tell me about your professional position and your current role – how long have 
you been at this institution and working in your chosen specialty? 
 
 
2. Do you use evidence based research in your work, and if so, how? 
 
3. Could you provide me with an example of this? 
 
4. Could you provide me with an example of when an evidence based change has failed 





5. What is the motivation for changing practice to make it more evidence based at a 
personal level? 
 




7. What are the enabling factors which over time help the implementation of evidence based 
research knowledge? 
 
8. What are the restraining factors which over time hinder the implementation of evidence based 
research knowledge? 
 




For example what implementation strategies/interventions are used at your institution and how 










11. Are there any challenges which you find are specific to stroke care in terms of increasing 
research uptake and transferring this into practice? (Team work – what does this mean in 
practice?) Secondary prevention? 
 
12. As a nurse/manager/therapist/doctor etc, do you feel you face any particular challenges in 
increasing research uptake and transferring this into practice? 
 
Questions 7 & 8 
 
 
 Clear strategic vision 
 Good managerial relations 
 Visionary staff in key positions (opinion leaders) 
 Climate conducive to experimentation and risk-taking (learning organisation) 
 Effective monitoring and feedback decisions 
 Strength of the evidence 
 Resource allocation 
 Strong leadership (transformational) 







 Strategic/organisational approach to implementation (policies/procedures/standards) 
 Audit and feedback 
 Computerised decision support 
 Educational strategies 
 Multi-faceted interventions 
 Opinion leadership 
 User involvement/patient association liaison 





Appendix H: London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group minutes 
 
Tuesday, 3rd April 2012 
1. Clinical Advisory Group: 
In attendance: 








2. Minutes and Matters arising not covered elsewhere in the agenda 
2.1. Action for TR to write to SU leads re: repatriation of stroke mimics carried forward. 
2.2. SSNAP organisational audit update; each service was encouraged to pilot the 
organisational audit on the paper form published on the RCP website and feedback to the 
SSNAP development team. 
Delays confirming a contract with HQIP continue. 
2.3. Minutes of the previous meeting were agreed. 
3. Feedback from the HASU leads meeting  
It was reported as having been a positive meeting.  Main discussion focused on the escalation protocol 
for HASU capacity due to feedback from HASUs and LAS data.  As a consequence the protocol 
would be revised by HW/NT and TR.  
It was recognised that there was limited ability to intervene once an ambulance crew had arrive at the 
scene but that they would try to encourage a shift of journeys for patients from the Chase 
Farm/Edmonton area to NPH instead of UCH, using the same approach as when crews were 
encouraged to travel to STH to support capacity at Kings. 
This process would be reviewed over the following few months.  
Action: TR to feedback as appropriate 
4. St. Mary’s repatriation audit 
Guest attendee, Faye Wilson, presented the results of an audit on the information and details sent by 
HASUs with patients when they have been repatriated to St. Mary’s stroke unit.  They based the 
criteria for the audit of the London transfer protocol document. See presentation, attached with these 
minutes for details. 
Key findings were that only a small proportion of patients were being repatriated with; imaging, a 
discharge summary and a medical handover.  There had also been a significant proportion of patients 
that were transferred out of hours. 
Additionally, the creation of the audit highlighted that the transfer protocol included requirements that 
were out of date, and revision of the protocol to reflect changes in practice was suggested. 
Action: Person to lead on this revision within this group to be identified 
5. LAS role in TIA pathways 
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NT requested that the group consider what the appropriate action for an ambulance crew to take when 
they suspect a patient has had a TIA. 
This group agreed that if the patient has Atrial Fibrillation, reports as having had more than one 
‘event’ in the past week or still has symptoms these patients should be taken to a HASU. 
Any patients not taken to a HASU should be provided with (no more than) 2 day’s worth of aspirin 
and informed that they should visit their GP.  
6. Review of the standards of performance for acute services 
Carried forward to the next meeting 
7. Data (RAG) reporting to Board 
Stroke services providers had requested that they are able to review these reports prior to their 
submission to the pan-London cardiac and stroke network board and this proposal was supported by 
this group. 
Action: HW to feed this back to the other Network Directors and to confirm that the schedules 
for reporting enable sufficient time for these reports to be reviewed. 
8. Any other business 
8.1. Endovascular approach to acute stroke 
The so called consensus document from the Stroke Improvement Programme was noted. 
Some HASUs are looking to provide endovascular treatments for patients either routinely or 
as part of a trial.  Robust debate was had around whether these services should now be made 
available to all patients that might benefit or whether there should be an obligation to put 
patients into RCT’s e.g. the PEACE trial. Consensus was not achieved and it was agreed that 
there should be a separate meeting convened to discuss a London policy. This will be 
organised for early summer. 
Action: TR to coordinate a meeting between the HASU leads and the interventional services 
8.2. SSNAP 
TR confirmed that the acute data would be locked when a patient record is transferred 
between services and that the collection of the information at 6 months post stroke was 
conducted could be locally defined, it was not anticipated that the acute units would be 
responsible for this part of the record. 
8.3. Intensity of therapy 
Positive feedback for the RCP’s consensus event on the intensity of therapy post stroke.   
Future meetings; 
Tuesday 12th June 2012 Room LM2 4th Floor, Stephenson House 
Tuesday 3rd July meeting Cancelled 





Appendix I: example CAG meeting agenda document 
 
London Stroke Clinical Advisory Group  
 
Tuesday 1st May 15:00 – 17:00 
Room LM1 6th Floor, Stephenson House, 75 Hampstead Road  
 
1.  Welcome and apologies  Redacted 
2.  
Minutes and matters arising 
London HASU capacity escalation protocol 
Endovascular meeting 
 
3.  Successful patient experience model   
4.  Review of the standards of performance for acute services  
5.  Rehabilitation update  
6.  Standards of performance for rehabilitation services  
7.  Atrial Fibrillation and TIA services  
8.  Any other business ALL 
 
Dates of future meetings; 
Tuesday 12th June 2012 Room LM2 4th Floor, Stephenson House 
Tuesday 3rd July meeting Cancelled 




















Department of Management, 




REP(EM)/10/11-24 – ‘An enquiry in to the role of evidence in influencing the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in London.’  
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above application has been reviewed by the E&M Research 
Ethics Panel that FULL APPROVAL is now granted. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King’s College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/attachments/good_practice_May_08_FINAL.pdf).   
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 14th February 2012. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to this 
explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will not be 
necessary unless the protocol has changed).  You should also note that if your approval is for one 
year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics 
Office.  Should you need to modify the project or request an extension to approval you will need 
approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/applicants/modifications.html  
 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to the 
approving committee/panel.  In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full report 
must be made to the Chairman of the approving committee/review panel within one week of the 
incident. 
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to 




If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
















I am emailing to inform you that your modification extension request for research ethical approval 
REP(EM)/10/11-24 has now been approved by the Chair of the E&M REP. Your approval has now 
been extended by two years until 08/12/2013 and I have updated the King’s Research Ethics 
Database with this information. 
 
Best Wishes,  
 
Daniel Butcher 
Research Ethics Officer 
Arts & Sciences 
King’s College London 
Room K0.58, Strand, London WC2R 2LS 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7848 1440 
daniel.butcher@kcl.ac.uk 
 
From: Fraser, Alec  
Sent: 19 January 2012 17:35 
To: Butcher, Daniel 
Subject: RE: Extension request - REP(EM)/10/11-24  
 
Please see attached Daniel: 
 
Thanks as ever for your help. 
 





Research Associate in Social Science 
Department of Management 
King's College London 
Franklin Wilkins Building 




Tel 0207 848 4519 
 
From: Butcher, Daniel  
Sent: 19 January 2012 16:37 
To: Fraser, Alec 











Research Ethics Officer 
Arts & Sciences 
King’s College London 
Room K0.58, Strand, London WC2R 2LS 
460 
 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7848 1440 
daniel.butcher@kcl.ac.uk 
 
From: Fraser, Alec  
Sent: 19 January 2012 14:40 
To: Butcher, Daniel 




I hope you’re well. 
 
I wonder if it would be possible to have an extension for another 12 months to the college ethics 
clearance for this project please? 
 
I have so far performed a number of interviews, but I need to do more over the next few months. 
 
Many thanks, Alec 
 
Alec Fraser 
Research Associate in Social Science 
Department of Management 
King's College London 
Franklin Wilkins Building 








Appendix L: Consent form (interviews) 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES (interview) 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: ‘An enquiry in to the role of evidence in influencing the 
reconfiguration of stroke services in London’ 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:  REP(EM)/10/11-24 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide 




 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to the point of publication  
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
 The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be sent a copy. 
Please note that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify you from any publications. 










agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 





Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 





Appendix M Consent form (observations) 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES (observation) 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: ‘An enquiry in to the role of evidence in influencing the 
reconfiguration of stroke services in London’ 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:  REP(EM)/10/11-24 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide 




 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to the point of publication  
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
 The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be sent a copy. 
Please note that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify you from any publications. 










agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 





Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 






Appendix N Information sheets (interviews) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS (interview) 
 
REC Reference Number:  REP(EM)/10/11-24 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
‘An enquiry in to the role of evidence in influencing the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in London’ 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this original research project.  You should only participate if you want 
to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there 
is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
 This PhD project is an attempt to understand more about the role of evidence in the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in London in 2009, how the process as a whole was managed and how this fits in with 
Health Service Research Theory. 
 
 We are recruiting health service employees (clinical and managerial) working in primary, secondary and 
specialist care. 
 
 If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
 
 If you agree to take part, you will undergo a 30-60 minute semi-structured interview. Interviews will 
be recorded, subject to your permission. Recordings of interviews will be deleted upon transcription. 
 
 The recording will be given a code number (identifiable only to the interviewer) and later externally 
transcribed. 
 
 There is no risk involved in this study except your valuable time. There is no direct benefit to you 




 The information provided by you will remain confidential. Nobody except principal investigator will have 
an access to it. Your name and identity will also not be disclosed at any time. However the data may be 
published as part of a journal article and elsewhere without giving your name or disclosing your identity. 
 
 Name and contact details of the researcher:  Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s College 
London on 0207 848 4519. Email: alec.1.fraser@kcl.ac.uk 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason before 31/12/12. 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the details below 
for further advice and information: Dr Juan Baeza, Department of Management King’s College London 
on 0207 848 4634. Email: juan.baeza@kcl.ac.uk, or Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s 





Appendix O: information sheets (observations) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS (observation) 
 
KCL ethics Reference Number:  REP(EM)/10/11-24 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
‘An enquiry in to the role of evidence in influencing the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in London’  
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this original research project.  You should only participate if you want 
to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there 
is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
 This PhD project is an attempt to understand more about the role of evidence in the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in London, how the process as a whole was managed and how this fits in with Health 
Service Research and Organisational Theory. 
 
 We are recruiting health service employees (clinical and managerial) working in primary, secondary and 
specialist care and non-health service employees who sit on health service committees. 
 
 If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
 
 If you agree to take part, your participation at this meeting will be observed by a researcher who will 
take notes describing the events of the meeting. 
 
 There is no risk involved in this study except your valuable time. There is no direct benefit to you 
also. However, you will be offered a final copy of the report. 
 
 The information provided by you will remain confidential. Nobody except principal investigator will have 
an access to it. Your name and identity will also not be disclosed at any time. However the data may be 




 Name and contact details of the researcher:  Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s College 
London on 0207 848 4519. Email: alec.1.fraser@kcl.ac.uk 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason before 31/12/12. 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the details below 
for further advice and information: Dr Juan Baeza, Department of Management King’s College London 
on 0207 848 4634. Email: juan.baeza@kcl.ac.uk, or Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s 




























Appendix R: EIS project information sheet 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS (interview) 
 
REC Reference Number:  REP(EM)/10/11-8 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Development of a European Implementation Score (EIS) for measuring 
implementation of research into healthcare practice using vascular disease as 
an example 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this original research project.  You should only participate if you want 
to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there 
is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
 This collaborative project will develop a European methodology to assess the implementation of 
research evidence into practice (the European Implementation Score (EIS)) in primary, secondary and 
specialist care from the perspectives of different target groups (users and carers, voluntary 
organisations, range of health and social care professionals and health policy makers) using stroke as 
the main example. The transferability of the developed methodologies to coronary heart disease will be 
assessed. This work is split in to various Work Packages with specific goals in order to achieve this 
collaborative aim. The goal of our Work Package is to develop the European Implementation Score 
(EIS) to estimate the degree of implementation of research evidence into practice. 
 
 We are recruiting health service employees (clinical and managerial) working in primary, secondary and 
specialist care. 
 
 If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
 
 If you agree to take part, you will undergo a 30 minute semi-structured interview. Interviews will be 
recorded, subject to your permission. Recordings of interviews will be deleted upon transcription. 
 





 There is no risk involved in this study except your valuable time. There is no direct benefit to you 
also. However, the results of the study may help us to formulate the EIS to measure research 
implementation in healthcare, and you will be offered a final copy of the report. 
 
 The information provided by you will remain confidential. Nobody except principal investigator will have 
an access to it. Your name and identity will also not be disclosed at any time. However the data may be 
seen by EIS team members and may be published as part of a journal article and elsewhere without 
giving your name or disclosing your identity. 
 
 Name and contact details of the researcher:  Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s College 
London on 0207 848 4519. Email: alec.1.fraser@kcl.ac.uk 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason before 31/12/11. 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the details below 
for further advice and information: Dr Juan Baeza, Department of Management King’s College London 
on 0207 848 4634. Email: juan.baeza@kcl.ac.uk, or Alec Fraser, Department of Management King’s 







Appendix S: EIS project consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES (interview) 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: Development of a European Implementation Score (EIS) for 
measuring implementation of research into healthcare practice using vascular 
disease as an example 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:  REP (EM)/10/11-8  
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide 




 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to the point of publication  
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
 The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be sent a copy. 
Please note that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify you from any publications. 










agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 





Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 
Signed                                             Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
